Campaigning, coercion, and clientelism: ZANUPF’s

strategies in Zimbabwe’s presidential elections,

2008-13 by Lewanika, McDonald
1 
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Campaigning, Coercion, and Clientelism: ZANU-
PF’s strategies in Zimbabwe’s presidential elections, 
2008-13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McDonald Lewanika 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of 
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, December 2019 
2 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree 
of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work 
other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which 
case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is 
clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent. 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the 
rights of any third party. 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 101,684 words 
. 
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis engages the puzzle of why competitive authoritarian regimes 
campaign when they could achieve their desired ends through violence, electoral 
manipulation and other illicit strategies to retain power. It uses Zimbabwe’s 
ruling party - the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front’s (ZANU-
PF) election in the run-up to the 2008 and 2013 presidential campaigns. The thesis 
bases its analysis on the classification of constituencies into three main types: 
ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies (ZACs), opposition-aligned constituencies 
(OACs), and battleground constituencies (BCs). It identifies an overarching 
strategic logic behind ZANU-PF’s campaigning in 2008 and 2013 as a risk 
mitigation strategy against its loss of power and legitimacy. ZANU-PF pursued 
this broad strategy through attempting to maximise votes and voter turnout for 
itself while achieving the inverse for the opposition, i.e. minimizing its vote and 
turnout. I argue that ZANU-PF achieved its strategic logics through the 
deployment of combinations of seemingly competing strategies that included 
persuasion, intimidation, and clientelist inducements, deployed differently across 
space, depending on constituency type. I also argue that ZANU-PF implemented 
a spatially variegated strategy of mobilising its core-constituents (especially in 
2008) and chasing more independent voters (especially in 2013). The differences 
in strategic thrust between 2008 and 2013 suggest that contrary to popular 
analysis, ZANU-PF was a learning organisation, adept at adapting its strategies 
over time and space to preserve power as well as enhance its legitimacy. The 
thesis employs a nested subnational comparative analysis research design, which  
combines nested analysis (Lieberman, 2005) and the subnational comparative 
method (Snyder, 2001). It combines descriptive statistics with detailed qualitative 
description in analysis of presidential election campaigns at the national and 
subnational level. 
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1 CAMPAIGNING, COERCION, AND CLIENTELISM: 
ZANU-PF’S STRATEGIES IN ZIMBABWE’S 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 2008 – 2013 
 
Why do competitive authoritarian regimes campaign? Do they even bother? If 
they do, why do they campaign when they can achieve their desired ends through 
violence, electoral manipulation, and other illicit strategies to retain power? This 
thesis engages with the puzzle that is generated by these questions. It addresses 
these questions using Zimbabwe's ruling party - the Zimbabwe African National 
Union-Patriotic Front's (ZANU-PF) election campaign in the run-up to the 2008 
and 2013 presidential elections. The thesis bases its analysis on the classification 
of constituencies into three main types: ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies 
(ZACs), opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs), and battleground 
constituencies (BCs). It identifies an overarching strategic logic behind ZANU-
PF's campaigning in 2008 and 2013 as a risk mitigation strategy against its loss 
of power and legitimacy. ZANU-PF pursued this broad strategy through 
attempting to maximise votes and voter turnout for itself with the inverse holding 
for the opposition, i.e. vote and turnout minimisation.  
 
I argue that ZANU-PF achieved its strategic logics through the deployment of 
combinations of seemingly competing strategies that included persuasion, 
intimidation, and clientelist inducements. It deployed these strategies differently 
incumbent on constituency type. I also argue that ZANU-PF implemented a 
spatially variegated strategy of predominantly mobilising its core-constituents 
(especially in 2008) and chasing more independent voters (especially in 2013). 
In this thesis, I use “campaigning”, “coercion” and “clientelism” mainly as 
descriptive and partially analytical categories. In a departure from popular 
analysis, I also posit that the differences in strategic thrust between 2008 and 2013 
suggest that ZANU-PF learnt from experience and adapted its strategies over time 
and space to preserve power and enhance its legitimacy. The primary academic 
task of this thesis is to evidence this case using descriptive inference on whether 
and how, in its efforts, ZANU-PF campaigned to win hearts and minds of more 
independent voters to enhance its legitimacy. 
 
The thesis utilised a nested subnational comparative analysis research design. 
This design combined Nested Analysis (Lieberman, 2005) and the Subnational 
Comparative Method (Snyder, 2001), yielding a consolidated framework which 
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systematically mixed methods. It combined national descriptive statistics with 
detailed qualitative description and analysis of presidential election campaigns at 
the national and subnational level. The descriptive statistics were drawn from an 
original dataset on Zimbabwe's elections from 2002 to 2018 which I assembled 
for this study. I augment these descriptive statistics with subnational analysis of 
ZANU-PF campaigns across space and time based on a year of fieldwork in nine 
electoral constituencies in Zimbabwe. These are Mount Darwin North, Mount 
Darwin East, Mount Darwin South (in Mashonaland Central province), 
Goromonzi North (Mashonaland East province), Pumula, Makokoba (Bulawayo 
province), Lupane East, Tsholotsho North and Tsholotsho South (Matebeleland 
North). 
 
The findings in this thesis challenge explanations of ZANU-PF's longevity that 
overemphasise the party's authoritarian character and its reliance on force and 
fraud. The thesis contributes to several conversations in the African and 
comparative politics literature, including conversations about elections, 
clientelism, political parties and the emergent literature on electoral campaigns 
and rallies. I designate competitive authoritarianism as the ZANU-PF regime 
type. This marks the conceptual starting point of my analysis, but I try to avoid 
conflating the party, state and regime, and  attempt to analyse ZANU-PF's efforts 
as a ruling political party.  
 
In this introductory chapter, I briefly present the study’s puzzle in section 1.1. 
followed by the study's operational research questions in section 1.2. Section 1.3 
outlines the three main components of my argument -- the temporal, spatial, and 
genetic (or historical) components. Section 1.4 provides a conceptual overview 
of the analytic descriptor that I apply to Zimbabwe in this thesis -- "the 
competitive authoritarian regime." I review three strands of regime 
characterisation for the case of Zimbabwe, and show how I build on as well as 
depart from these characterisations. Section 1.5 briefly reviews the African 
political parties literature and outlines ZANU-PF’s emergence as a dominant 
authoritarian and electoral party between 1980 and 2008. The section also 
describes Zimbabwe’s party system, and identifies ZANU-PF as a dominant 
authoritarian party. Section 1.6. concludes this chapter and summarises its 
contents before moving to section 1.7, which outlines and provides brief vignettes 
of the chapters that make up the rest of this thesis. 
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1.1 The Puzzle 
Competitive authoritarian regime as an analytical descriptor for the ZANU-PF 
led Zimbabwe regime offers a useful lens to explore the inherent paradox in 
which illicit and licit means of acquiring and retaining power stand side by side. 
Howard & Roessler (2006: 369) characterise this paradox as an inherent 
contradiction. On one hand, these regimes are unrepentant authoritarian machines 
ruling with clear evidence of might, resorting to dirty political tactics to win 
elections. On the other hand, they allow the opposition to exist and also compete 
in elections whose outcomes, while tilted in the incumbent's favour, are often not 
as foregone a conclusion as popular commentary often suggests.  
 
Like most African regimes, the ZANU-PF governed Zimbabwean state is a 
hybrid regime, which operated in Carothers's (2002) grey-zone between 
democracy and authoritarianism. The ZANU-PF government allowed some 
essential elements of democracy -like regular multiparty elections - to exist, but 
with the state exhibiting some fairly severe democratic deficits. It also mixed 
legitimate modes of political activity and organisation with coercive means of 
compelling support. The latter, coercion, is usually stressed in the literature 
explaining ZANU-PF's stranglehold on power, while the former, legitimate 
modes of political activity and organisation, are relatively downplayed. This 
thesis attempts to explain the paradox presented by the unusual alchemy of 
competitive authoritarian regimes by acknowledging both their authoritarian 
character and their competitive political demeanour.  
 
This is the inherent contradiction that this thesis describes and undertakes to 
explain.  My goal is to elucidate why ZANU-PF still campaigned rather than just 
resort to political bully tactics and taking voters for granted, given their control 
of electoral processes and the coercive apparatus of the state. The thesis examines 
ZANU-PF's campaigns in order to determine the extent to which the party 
campaigned to win the hearts and minds of more independent voters.  
 
In examining ZANU-PF campaigns, the study also covered how opposition 
political parties and interested international audiences impacted and responded to 
ZANU-PF's electoral campaign efforts and political manoeuvres. In its efforts to 
win elections, ZANU-PF was not operating in a political vacuum. It faced and 
responded to local opposition, most prominently from the Movement for 
Democratic Change after 2000, and was constrained by geopolitical scrutiny and 
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interest in how it conducted itself politically. Nonetheless, this thesis is about 
ZANU-PF. While acknowledging local partisan competition and international 
dynamics, the study focuses mainly on comparing ZANU-PF's campaigns against 
one another over time and space.  
1.2 Research Questions 
I sought to answer the question: why do competitive authoritarian regimes 
campaign? I pursue an answer to this question through a series of questions about 
ZANU-PF as follows: 
1. How and where did ZANU-PF campaign using its bigwigs (praesidium) 
during the 2008 and 2013 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe?  
2. What campaign strategies did ZANU-PF employ at national and sub 
regional level in 2008 and 2013? 
3. What are the politically relevant variations of the constituency types in 
which ZANU-PF campaigned? 
4. What accounts for ZANU-PF’s dramatic shift in electoral fortunes 
between 2008 and 2013?  
5. Why does ZANU-PF campaign, given its easy access to tools of 
manipulation, and the means to coerce?  
Answering questions about what, where, how, and with whom ZANU-PF 
campaigned produced descriptive material (Shapiro, Smith, & Masoud, 2004) 
that serves as the basis for drawing descriptive inferences about whom, where 
and what kind of legitimacy ZANU-PF seeks, and thus, about why ZANU-PF 
campaigns.  
1.3 Thesis Argument 
I present an argument with three nodal elements or components: a genetic element 
(or historical analysis, having to do with the genesis of the phenomenon at hand), 
a spatial element, a temporal element. Broadly, I argue that there was a spatial 
and temporal logic to ZANU-PF's campaign strategy. This logic revolved around 
a risk mitigation strategy to prevent loss of power and legitimacy. I accept that 
violence and intimidation (coercion), as well as electoral manipulation and vote-
rigging, were realities in Zimbabwe's post-2000 elections. However, the 
explanation of ZANU-PF's continued hold on power is incomplete when 
restricted to these illicit methods of power retention alone. I suggest that ZANU-
PF's attempts to win hearts and minds of voters, although neglected in the 
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literature and popular opinion on Zimbabwe's elections, also constituted an 
essential element of ZANU-PF's success.  No narratives and analyses of the 
elections studied here are complete without attention to these aspects of ZANU-
PF's campaigns. ZANU-PF's persuasive election campaign efforts matter, and are 
an integral part of the story of both ZANU-PF's uninterrupted hold on power in 
Zimbabwe, as well as the opposition's failure to wrestle the state from ZANU-
PF. Although must not be taken to mean that ZANU-PF's election campaigns 
were "the" sole element that explains ZANU-PF's electoral success, ZANU-PF's 
election campaigns were indeed crucial to the party's overall strategy for holding 
onto power. I provide evidence for this through analysis of ZANU-PF strategies, 
their changes and continuities over time and space, as well as of the relationship 
between changes in strategy and electoral outcomes. 
 
My argumentation builds Skinner, De Mesquita, Kudelia, & Rice (2010) as well 
as Boone & Wahman's (2015) arguments around the contingent nature of political 
contests and resulting strategies, which are conditioned by temporal and spatial 
contexts. I also leverage de Mesquita et al.'s (2002) thinking on the logic of 
political survival. The resulting descriptions, explanations, and hypotheses are 
grounded in empirical findings based on a nested subnational comparative 
analysis of the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections. Following Skinner, de 
Mesquita, Kudelia, & Rice (2010:7) who argue that every political contest occurs 
within a unique context defined by its time and place, I base my analysis and 
arguments on an explicit time context (2008 and 2013 elections). I highlight some 
historical antecedents to this period and foreground a genetic explanation of 
ZANU-PF's inherent political contradiction as a competitive  authoritarian regime 
and its “split personality.”1  
 
My spatial arguments show that, despite the presence of general campaign 
strategies and tactics, the particulars of specific campaign efforts in 
constituencies were dependent on factors unique to the institutional, social and 
political contexts of the constituencies. The subnational campaign strategies and 
tactics were often combinations of seemingly competing logics. Nonetheless, 
they fed into ZANU-PF's overarching objective of risk minimisation to protect 
its power and legitimacy. I develop this argument by demonstrating how the 
strategy played out spatially and temporally, as revealed by a genetic analysis of 
 
1 I use the concept of split personality as a figure of speech. In persons this relates to a dissociative identity disorder (DID) 
where at least two distinct and relatively enduring personality states exist. I see this as similar to ZANU-PF’s enduring 
authoritarian and persuasive traits.  
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the party's character and strategy. Below I expand on the three elements of my 
argument in turn. 
 
1.3.1 The temporal argument 
The temporal element of the argument is that ZANU-PF's engagement in political 
contests in 2008 and 2013 was contingent on particular a time context and 
informed by background conditions shaped by their local opponents and other 
actors. In addition, a particular geopolitical context also informed ZANU-PF's 
campaign strategy. These include the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) mediation process from 2007 to 2009, and its curatorship of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) from 2009 to 2013. The curatorship 
arrangement required that Zimbabwe's 2013 elections abide by some SADC 
accepted standards, norms and values around democratic elections. It was 
apparent in this election that the ruling party's legitimacy would be a function of 
both the peoples' will and consent, as well as international recognition.  
 
ZANU-PF's campaign strategy evolved over time. Part of the reason for the 
change in ZANU-PF's political fortunes in 2013 was its ability to learn from the 
2008 electoral process, and to change its campaign strategy. Whereas in March 
2008 ZANU-PF targeted ZACs with most bigwig campaign visits, in 2013 it 
targeted OACs and consolidating ZACs with the most bigwig visits. I argue that 
this represented an important change in ZANU-PF's campaign strategy. 
Rohrschneider's (2002) conceptualization of campaign strategies distinguishes 
between mobilising and chasing strategies. According to Rohrschneider (2002), 
a mobilising campaign strategy  (1) is motivated primarily by policies, (2) focuses 
on reaching core voters, (3) primarily relies on the party’s ideological heritage, 
(4) predominantly emphasizes a party’s core constituencies, and (5) mainly views 
the organization as an instrument to contact voters, not to attract new voters on 
the basis of attractive participatory opportunities within parties (2002:376). A 
chasing strategy, by contrast, is one in which a party aims at maximising its vote 
share through attracting new, previously unaligned and/or opposition voters. It 
limits its recourse to ideological persuasion, and emphasises the qualities of its 
leaders while using the party organisation to increase its electoral attractiveness. 
The chasing strategy assumes that these elements are in addition to mobilising to 
turn out core-constituents, which continues (Rohrschneider, 2002:376-377). 
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I use findings from ZANU-PF bigwig rallies to modify and contextualise  
Rohrschneider’s (2002) concepts. I argue that ZANU-PF generally moved from 
a predominantly persuasive "mobilising" strategy in March 2008, to a coercive 
strategy (violence and intimidation) in June 2008, to a predominantly persuasive 
"chasing" strategy in 2013. It switched from paying limited attention to OACs 
and preferring to mobilise mostly its members and structures in ZACs in 2008, to 
mainly mobilising and persuading non-core members and structures in 2013. The 
switch avoided overt physical violence and had three main components:  
  
1. Chasing opposition leaders' constituencies during the interregnum of the 
Government of National Unity. 
2. Pivoting from "star rallies" where Mugabe was the main speaker to the 
greater use of "bigwig rallies" at which other members of the ZANU-PF 
praesidium took the lead.  
3. Rebranding ZANU-PF to become fashionable and programmatic, to 
chase the urban and youth vote. 
 
Over time, ZANU-PF's also developed a kind of "permanent campaign mode."  
Following a disputed election outcome in 2008, ZANU-PF and the opposition 
had to share power in a Government of national Unity (GNU). During this shared, 
ZANU-PF blurred the lines between governing and campaigning. Its general 
strategic shift partly account for the spectacular 2013 election results where it was 
able to win the presidency outright without the need for a second round.2 
 
1.3.2 The spatial argument 
I make three main arguments about spatial variation the party's campaign strategy 
at the constituency level, depending on constituency type. ZANU-PF attempted 
to minimise the risk of losing power and legitimacy by deploying strategies that 
maximised voter turnout and ZANU-PF votes in ZANU-PF aligned 
constituencies (ZACs). At the same time, it geared its strategies in opposition-
aligned constituencies (OACs) towards minimising voter turnout and opposition 
votes. In battleground constituencies (BCs), ZANU-PF's campaign strategies 
depended on the geographic and perceived political location of the constituency 
with respect to the ZACs and OACs. This dyadic approach to constituencies - 
seeing them basically as either ZANU-PF or opposition - was both a function of, 
 
2 In the 2013 presidential election, ZANU-PF was reported as mastering a spectacular Butlers Swing from opposition to 
ZANU-PF of over 20% ( and from MDC-T to ZANU-PF of about 17%). 
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and underlined by, the polarised nature of Zimbabwe's politics. The dyadic 
approach also meant that ZANU-PF made little effort to send its "bigwigs" to 
campaign in battleground constituencies (BCs) because these were not part of its 
strategic calculus. Even so, ZANU-PF's presidential election campaigns in 
battleground constituencies were often quite vigorous. In some instances, they 
were also creative and spawned the creation of extra-constitutional ZANU-PF 
organisational structures at the local level. 
 
Second, I underscore that the African voter is not homogenous. Voter 
heterogeneity includes class, socio-demographic diversity, and partisanship, 
apart from ethic differences. I argue that during the 2008 and 2013 elections, the 
geographic, political, institutional, social and political characteristics of various 
subnational electorates informed ZANU-PF's campaign strategy. The foci of 
ZANU-PF's bigwig visits, and the variation of its campaign messages and 
campaign tactics at subnational level, suggest that ZANU-PF understood the 
politically relevant heterogeneity of its electorate. Consequently, ZANU-PF's 
election campaign messages and strategies across space were not a one size fit all 
effort. The campaign messages that party bigwigs issued during campaign visits, 
and the strategies that ZANU-PF employed at the subnational level, varied 
depending on the type of voters that ZANU-PF targeted.  Not only did it matter 
for campaign strategy and messaging whether the voter was considered a ZANU-
PF or an opposition supporter, but it also mattered where the voter was located, 
i.e. whether they were resident in rural or urban Zimbabwe, and whether they 
stayed in a ZANU-PF-aligned, opposition-aligned, or battleground constituency. 
 
Third, ZANU-PF campaigns were marked by the differential use of persuasion, 
coercion and clientelist distribution across constituency types. In ZANU-PF-
aligned constituencies (ZACs), legitimacy-seeking bigwig and persuasive 
appeals at the sub-national level sat side-by-side and, in uncomfortable ways, 
with electoral manipulation, violence, and intimidation. ZANU-PF generally 
instituted a three-tier political game where it first attempted to persuade voters 
through bigwig rallies, as well as local meetings and canvassing. It also attempted 
to solidify and attract support through inducements and partisan distribution of 
electoral goodies, land, jobs as well as food and agricultural implements in a 
clientelist exchange for support. Nevertheless, ZANU-PF’s strategy in ZACs was 
in the main, coercive clientelist mobilisation. This was buttressed by ZANU-PF 
attempts to turn its core-constituencies into what it termed "one-party state 
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constituencies." To achieve this, ZANU-PF blocked, disrupted, and limited 
opposition campaigns, and it also coerced suspected opposition members into  
fleeing, reforming, voting for ZANU-PF at the polls, or joining the party. In 
ZACs, ZANU-PF generally could police, monitor and enforce voter compliance 
through a wide range of local patrons and facilitators drawn from party 
organisational structures, traditional leaders, war veterans and party youths. 
 
Initially (2008) ZANU-PF paid limited attention to opposition-aligned 
constituencies (OACs), and focused its campaign efforts on getting its members 
to the polls. This changed in 2013 when ZANU-PF's pursuit of opposition 
constituencies became more spirited. I argue that the strategy in OACs in 2013 
was a dynamic mix of clientelist mobilisation and persuasive chasing, as opposed 
to the coercive clientelist mobilisation observed in the ZACs. On clientelist-
mobilisation, ZANU-PF adopted what its members referred to as a “hands-on 
approach” which centred on building ZANU-PF structures through expanding its 
patronage network. I argue that this hands-on approach represented an embedded 
mobilisation on ZANU-PF’s part, which it hoped would later translate to electoral 
dividends. The underlying logic was that service provision could win votes, 
although this was not a purely material exchange. ZANU-PF’s also asked for a 
quid pro quo.  It offered solutions (jobs, housing stands, food and other material 
rewards) in exchange for support. It also pursued the youth vote and made use of 
its party structures to offer a multiplicity of clientelist bargains, enticements, 
tailored messaging and creative campaigning. ZANU-PF used persuasive appeals 
through bigwig rallies and clientelist enticements to retain, as well as attract 
support in the OACs with far less violence and intimidation than it deployed in 
ZACs. In OACs, the party could not police, monitor, and ensure voter 
compliance. Its party structures were generally weaker, and its ability to coerce 
limited. This was partly because it was not in control of the local state in the way 
that it was in ZACs , especially when it came to its relations with traditional 
leaders. ZANU-PF's campaigning in OACs was, surprisingly, based on more 
legitimacy-seeking methods than on coercion, despite the patent hostility of the 
territory within which its campaigns were staged.   
 
Although ZANU-PF deprived battleground constituencies of bigwig attention, 
subnational politics in BCs was extremely competitive. There was hybridity in 
strategy deployment across this constituency type. I refer to much of this 
hybridity as "persuasive-clientelist mobilisation" as opposed to the coercive 
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clientelist mobilisation of the ZACs, and as opposed to the persuasive clientelist 
chasing strategy the party employed in OACs. Across the BCs, patronage-based 
distribution of resources and campaign "gifts" was present. Constituents also 
generally accepted patronage as a critical element of the electioneering process. 
This led to processes of clientelist outbidding between ZANU-PF and the 
opposition regarding who could buy more votes through the distribution of goods 
and amenities to targeted voters. 
 
The spatial logics, partisan identifications, temporal factors, and geopolitical 
dynamics all impacted how ZANU-PF strategised to ensure its political survival. 
They also impacted the kinds of political, institutional, and socio-economic tools 
that it leveraged to this end.  
 
In advancing a spatial analysis, the evidence presented in this thesis questions the 
utility of notions of the "rural and urban divide" in describing campaign 
characteristics and voters.  The rural-urban distinction follows age-old analytical 
traditions of the “traditional” and “modern” settings as tropes for analysis in 
African politics. Lermachand & Legg’s (1972) influential conceptualisation of 
political regimes focused on patrimonialism and what they termed the 
patrimonial-clientege system. They argued that the system took two forms: the 
traditionalistic, where the patron-client relationship permeated the entire political 
system, and the modernising patrimonial system, where the higher rate of social 
mobilisation led to discontinuities in patron-client relations (Lermachand & 
Legg’s (1972:166-167).  
 
The above logic generally saw ruling parties as patronage dispensing machines 
and often painted their rural targets as possessing limited agency, and 
participating in political activities to placate their patrons (Chabal and Daloz 1999 
also Koter 2013). Conversely, It also depicted the urban constituents as exercising 
agency. Urbanites are seen as unreceptive to clientelism due to their social 
structural situation, and higher levels of education and enlightenment. These 
caricatures of urban and rural areas mimic Elster’s (1986) contrast between the 
market and the forum in his conceptualization of varieties of democratic theory. 
The urban areas are the market, where the act of voting is private and is the 
product of an individual’s aggregate interest. In contrast, the rural areas are the 
forum, where the private is public, and politics is about collective solidarity, and 
it is divorced from decision-making and the exercise of influence on events 
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(Elster 1986). Under these caricatures, the city is considered as opposition 
territory. In contrast, the country is considered incumbent territory, and  the 
opposition and incumbents seldom make forays into each other’s territories.  
 
The evidence from ZANU-PF campaigning that is presented here does confirm 
some of these distinctions. Yet it also demonstrates that the rural-urban binary is 
limited as an organizing concept, and that the traditional-modern dichotomy, as 
well as the forum-market distinction, are relatively unhelpful. I rely, instead, on 
the demarcations of space based on variation in constituency type, and on 
characterisation of constituencies along politically relevant dimensions that go 
beyond urban and rural. The Zimbabwe elections reveal the perverse nature of 
clientelism, persuasion and coercion across both traditional and modern, rural and 
urban, and market and forum spaces. The distinctions are not first and foremost 
geographic.  I follow Erdmann & Engel, who argue the closely interwoven nature 
of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination in most African 
polities, transcending the spatial distinctions between a "traditional" periphery 
and "modern" centre (Erdmann & Engel, 2007:99).  
 
1.3.3 The genetic argument 
My premise for this argument is an acceptance that institutions, forms of 
behaviour, and character have a history, or genesis, that informs what we 
eventually see in the present. The historiography of political institutions allows 
us to understand the political actors and events we study. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, this requires a historical study and periodisation that is not 
reductionist, and is nuanced in its embrace of a full ZANU-PF history.  
 
I reject as inadequate explanations of ZANU-PF's electoral conduct that limit 
their historical dive to ZANU-PF's existence as a guerrilla movement during 
Zimbabwe's war for independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Tracing ZANU-PF's 
authoritarian tendencies to its existence as a guerrilla army is a selective rendering 
of history, and while perhaps compelling, it is also inadvertently dishonest. An 
honest tracing of ZANU-PF's origins, grounding in its founding, is necessary for 
an explanation for its electoral conduct after 2000. This entails analysing how 
ZANU's predecessor movements are part of the origin story of ZANU-PF.3 This 
background offers a possible explanation of the contradictions inherent in ZANU-
 
3 Like Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) from which ZANU split, the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress 
(SRANC) and City Youth League (CYL) and others that I cover in chapter 3. 
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PF and other parties like it. The origins of ZANU-PF as a party contained 
democratic and popular  elements, but they were infused with violent and 
coercive politics. This could have led to its intractable competitive authoritarian 
disposition.  
1.4 Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Locating the concept 
1.4.1 The Zimbabwean authoritarian state: some extant characterisations 
Although the characterisations vary, there is a fair amount of consensus that post-
independence Zimbabwe was an authoritarian state. Authoritarianism is a 
prominent regime type, and is often contrasted in the scholarship to 
totalitarianism and democracy (Gasiorowski, 1990:109; Alvarez, Cheubub, 
Limongi, & Prezeworski, 1996). Linz (1970:225) defines authoritarianism as a 
system of rule in which a leader or a small group of leaders control the state and 
affords very limited political pluralism. Schedler (1998:93) places 
authoritarianism at one end of a continuum with democratic sub-types (electoral, 
liberal and advanced democracy) anchoring the other end. Despite Schedler's 
(1998) emphasis on democratic sub-types, Geddes (2004:5) argues that 
authoritarianism also has many subtypes which differ from each other as much 
as they differ from democracy. Zimbabwe's multiple characterisations of a type 
of authoritarian state lend credence to Geddes' point. Three categories of 
authoritarian regime (or authoritarian variants) that have been used to describe 
the Zimbabwe government under ZANU-PF are summarized below as follows:  
1. Entrenched socio-economic authoritarianism, characterised by extractive, 
predatory accumulation as part of the power politics of the state. 
2.  Militarised electoral authoritarianism, informed by legacies of the colonial 
past, guerrilla struggle for liberation and an easy resort to violence.  
3. Authoritarian nationalism, undergirded by anti-imperialism, manipulation 
of history and binaries between contesting nationalisms along liberal and 
nationalist lines.  
 
The entrenched socio-economic authoritarianism scholarship is allied to the 
developmentalist school. It fashions its critiques around the state's attitude 
towards socio-economic development, with implications on the nature of politics 
and emergent regime. Bracking (2005), for example, characterised the 
Zimbabwean state as an "entrenched social authoritarianism," which in the 2000s, 
resulted in pre and post-election spoils politics. This stemmed from its turn to 
authoritarianism after its failed postcolonial social democratisation project of the 
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1980s, and the onset of structural adjustment in the 1990s. Bracking (2005: 343) 
saw this authoritarianism as the default mode of a state that was anti-
development, and built on a spoils-based political economy. She argues that in 
the 2000s, international isolation and illiquidity forced ZANU-PF to pursue a 
zero-sum extractive form of accumulation at the expense of its citizens.  
 
The power politics that Bracking outlines, and her characterization of the state as 
vehicle for extractive, predatory and primitive accumulation, are recurring 
themes in many characterisations of the Zimbabwean state (Bond, 2002; Bratton, 
2014; Mawowa, 2013; Moore, 2001, Shumba, 2016). Bratton (2014:191) argues 
that ruling elites purposely blurred the boundaries between political, economic 
and military institutions for purposes of power capture and retention. Meanwhile, 
the military increasingly gained institutional vetoes in politics, which effectively 
blocked Zimbabwe's transition to democracy (Mangongera, 2014:68). Also, the 
elites were exploitative and deployed repressive state machinery to serve the class 
interests of a few well-connected bureaucrats, military, and paramilitary leaders. 
This elite predatory accumulation went on without the strictures of transparent 
regulation and was devoid of the systematic 'empowerment' and redistributive 
concerns that ZANU-PF often preached in public (Bond, 2002; Saunders, 
2008:129). The existence of such a predatory elite allowed party credentials and 
personal relations to trump professional competencies. As a result, the predatory 
state placed ruling party business and interests above the rest of the polity and the 
state -as distinct from the party (Shumba, 2016).  
 
The literature characterizing the Zimbabwe state as "entrenched social 
authoritarian" outlines long continuities and legacies that stretch back to "an 
uninterrupted progression of various shades of authoritarianism" from 1890 to 
1979 (Masunungure, 2011:49). This includes the colonial regime's militarisation 
of politics and primitive accumulation, including land grabs at the start of the 
colonial era in the 1890s (Bratton,2014; Moore, 2003:34). Post-independence, 
Shumba (2016:188) argues that the further from independence the country 
moved, the less developmental the state became. Predation, according to Shumba 
(2016:188), stood opposed to the developmental state, spawning a rentier state 
wherein the party and military were dominant. State domination and capture 
shaped state-business relations while violence and patronage shaped state-society 
relations (Shumba, 2016:192).  
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This literature shows the extent to which predatory elites had penetrated the state 
and private-sector space. This thesis further exposes the complex web that 
translated into ZANU-PF's incumbency advantages at elections. These 
endowments were sophisticated. While described in the above literature, these 
authors offer few indications as to how they morphed into financial support and 
deployable muscle for ZANU-PF at election time. This literature also pays 
limited attention to the changing face of Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism, as well as 
its contesting transitions as Mkandawire (2020) argues. I argue that while the 
legacies are real and inform the character of the "ZANU-PF regime", and while 
there are continuities, ZANU-PF changed over time. Seeing this, requires 
disaggregating the party-state conflation to analyse actions between state, party, 
and the party-state. I see the failure to draw these distinctions limits analysis of 
how the state and the party manoeuvred to deal with domestic, regional, 
international, and donor pressure during elections. It also limits our understanding 
of how the predatory authoritarian elites circumvented and or co-opted local 
networks, and deployed patronage along selective lines.  
 
The post-cold war rise of "hybrid regimes" informs the second characterisation 
of Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism. In electoral authoritarian regimes, rulers permit 
constrained pluralistic competition but prevent the regular rotation of elites. The 
Zimbabwe literature that employs this concept is heavily informed by Schedler's 
(2002; 2006) definition. These are authoritarian regimes that hold elections, but 
that systematically violate liberal democratic principles in ways that render 
multiparty elections instruments of authoritarianism rather than democracy 
(Schedler, 2006:3). Bratton & Masunungure (2008:42), as well as Masunungure 
(2011) and Bratton (2014), described the Zimbabwean regime as a "militarised 
form of electoral authoritarianism." They argue that this regime is supported by 
a destructive mix of violence, ideology and patronage. The military element 
stems from the military's overt intrusion into the political arena and elections. The 
post-2008 first-round elections are a prime example of this military execution of 
ZANU-PF's Machiavellian vision of hanging on to power (Bratton and 
Masunungure, 2008; Masunungure, 2011; Alexander & Tendi, 2008). The 
electoral element of the regime emanates from Zimbabwe's ability to conduct of 
elections consistently since independence in 1980. Yet allegations of severe 
manipulation abound (Masunungure, 2009; 2011; 2014), producing what 
Schedler (2006) lamented as the spread of multiparty elections without 
democracy.  
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The scholarship traces military intrusion into civilian politics to the liberation 
movement's modus operandi during the struggle for independence (Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2008; Dorman, 2006; Kriger, 2005; Levitsky & Way, 2012; 
Masunungure, 2011). This line of argument enjoys a rich intellectual tradition in 
African politics. Hyden's (2006) "movement legacy" theory summarises this 
tradition, as do Leys & Saul (1994:146) who argued that liberation struggle 
processes tended to generate undemocratic post-independence political practices. 
Similarly, Levitsky & Way (2012) argue that authoritarian durability and popular 
support during times of crisis can stem from identities, norms and organisational 
structures forged during times of sustained violent and ideologically driven 
conflict. They argue that this shared history of violent conflict not only lends 
regimes like Zimbabwe's their military element, but also forms the glue in 
authoritarian regimes born of conflict. LeBas (2011) extends this line of thinking 
by arguing that this regime durability is also due to the strengthening of polarised 
identities and within-group ties. These identities and ties link party members' 
fates within the party, and make supporting it a moral obligation. The obligatory 
and moralistic nature of this support traps potential defectors within the ruling 
party in ways that go beyond the role of material benefits in tying them to the 
regime (LeBas, 2011). This literature thus characterised the Zimbabwe regime as 
a cohesive militarised authoritarian regime on account of stable identities, post-
material solidarity ties, ideology, shared 'war ethos', discipline, and violent 
origins. 
 
The characterisation of the state as nationalist is central to the third broad way of 
characterising Zimbabwe's authoritarian state. Scholars stressing this angle see 
the ideological element as ZANU-PF's nationalism covering for authoritarianism 
(Cameron and Dorman, 2009, Sithole, 2001; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009 and Tendi, 
2010). Influenced by Gramscian analytics, Raftopoulos (2003; 2006) 
characterises Zimbabwe's authoritarian nature as a decentralised, authoritarian, 
nationalist regime. The Gramscian analytics produce a focus on the regime's turn 
to populism, its hijacking of popular discontents, neutralising of the opposition, 
incorporation of popular opinion, as well as leveraging of national identity and 
patriotism as part of hegemonic and power retention designs and also regime 
characteristics (Gramsci 1971; Hall, 1988; Mouffe, 2014;). Raftopoulos (2003: 
17) outlines how the Zimbabwean state historicised and racialised land restitution 
and justice, while introducing new forms of indigenous nationalism based on 
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claims of loyalty and national sovereignty. He shows how the state leveraged 
anti-colonial critiques of the West, and claimed to hold a political monopoly on 
the commitment to radical land and economic redistribution (Raftopoulos, 2003). 
This line of analysis of authoritarianism is also influenced by postcolonial and 
decolonial thinking about culture and ideology. Mamdani (1996), Ake (2000) and 
Mbembe (2001), among others, have argued that the colonial state informed the 
general practice of power in postcolonial African states, and postcolonial political 
culture. The interpellation of African nationalism with colonialism contributes to 
the reproduction of colonial violence and authoritarianism as traits of postcolonial 
regime governance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).  
 
These different characterisations of the Zimbabwean post-independence regime 
are useful, and proffer a convincing characterisation of the regime. Yet this 
literature has two important limitations, which I address in this thesis. 
 
 First, the electoral authoritarian regime literature focuses rather one-sidedly on 
the illicit dimension of the longevity of authoritarianism in Zimbabwe. It covers 
violence, coercion, patronage, theft, and chicanery, which are all elements of 
what Masungure (2014) following Schedler (2002; 2006; 2013) defined as "the 
menu of manipulation" and the dynamics of unfree competition in Zimbabwe. 
This strand of literature concerns itself with the characterisation of regimes as 
authoritarian, and analyzes the regime's practices as instances of undemocratic 
conduct, despite electoral procedures. The guiding concept, electoral 
authoritarianism, is itself a diminished subtype of authoritarianism. It thus covers 
one side of the continuum instead of possibly adopting "a double root strategy 
that maps contemporary regimes from both sides of the spectrum," that is,  both 
the authoritarian and democratic sides (Boggards,2009:400). 
 
Second, the "electoral authoritarianism"-inspired literature is steeped in liberal 
conceptions of democracy. In this liberal frame, ideology is also often viewed 
from the negative rather than the positive side. This buttresses the (un)witting 
location of authoritarian electoral regimes within the framework of liberal, 
democratic norms. In the process, the focus on the illicit makes the literature fail 
to capture how autocrats also solicit the cooperation of those they govern, as 
shown elsewhere (eg. Gandhi & Prezeworski, 2007). As Sim (2006:145-6) 
argued, the liberal frame's ability to see ideology as a part of everyday governance 
is limited.  Literature in this vein therefore fails to capture, let alone accept, that 
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ideologically-strong authoritarian governments can secure as much legitimacy as 
democratic ones. Such legitimacy can be due to a variety of factors, including 
economic or policy-based authoritarian bargains, or the regime pandering to the 
electorate to win elections and/or legitimacy (Mesquita, Smith, Morrow, & 
Siverson, 2005; Desai et al. 2009).  
 
1.4.2 A note on Clientelist appeals, distributive and patronage politics 
Knowledge gaps thus exist around how ZANU-PF and the state deploy ideology, 
where, and how diffusion occurs from the authoritarian leadership to the 
variegated masses in different constituencies. When we add the concept of 
authoritarian nationalism to assist in answering the questions around the place of 
ideology, further questions arise about how these shared historical solidarities and 
ideologies are brought to bear on the electorate in both urban and rural settings 
during elections. How ZANU-PF separates ideology and populism on the ground, 
and how this plays out across highly differentiated geographic, demographic, and 
political terrains, remains unclear. How ZANU-PF mastered its clientelist politics 
and selected targets for patronage distribution also enjoys little space in the 
literature, beyond acknowledging their prevalence. However, the literature does 
establish that patronage politics, while not the be-all and end-all of ZANU-PF’s 
tactics, occupies a key component of their election campaign strategy.  
 
Clientelism and patronage constitute a large part of the explanation of the political 
phenomenon in Africa in general. They, together with reservations around the 
presence of programmatic politics, also feature prominently in this thesis. At a 
basic level, clientelism revolves around the disbursement of particular benefits 
by a patron/agent in exchange for votes from clients/principals (Resnick, 2012; 
Robinson and Verdier, 2013: 62; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, Gans-Morse et 
al. 2014). Stokes (2007:649) defines it as a method of electoral mobilisation 
where politicians give material goods in return for electoral support from voters 
both retrospectively and prospectively. According to Gans-Morse et al. (2014), 
the exchange is informed by the role of the individual, context, and purpose of 
clientelism (whether the agent is negotiating for the principal’s vote [vote buying] 
or participation/abstention on the voting day [turn out buying]). Clientelist 
patronage can be (1.) direct, or (2.) involve intermediaries/brokers to enforce and 
monitor the transfer (Resnick, 2012), often through the use of chiefs as a 
technology to deliver resources to communities (Baldwin, 2013:796). According 
to Van de Walle, (2007: 3), there are varieties of political clientelism that include 
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tributary, elitist, and mass clientelism. Randal & Svasand (2002) and Van De 
Walle (2003) believe that clientelism in African politics exists in the elitist and 
tributary form. This, they argue, is due to the weakness of African political 
parties, which they argue, impedes their ability to master the kind of organisation 
required for mass clientelism. 
 
The generalisation that African parties were too week to have the organisational 
strength required for mass clientelism is one of the things that this thesis claws 
back on. It is simply untrue for ZANU-PF. Because it could conduct mass 
clientelism, it also blurred the lines between this and programmatic politics, given 
that both material appeals based on material exchanges (Wyatt, 2013). The 
distinction, which this thesis tries to make, relates to partisan selectivity in 
clientelism’s beneficiaries, whereas in programmatic appeals, citizens benefit 
regardless of political affiliation.  
 
There also is a tendency in the literature to use clientelism and patronage 
interchangeably. This thesis continues this practice but is cogniscent of the 
distinctions that Stoke (2007) and Stokes et al. (2013) make. That is between 
patronage, where politicians (office holders) use of public resources in return for 
retrospective or prospective electoral support from individuals, and clientelism, 
which is the broader use of material inducements to seek electoral support 
(Stokes, 2007). Pork barrel politics, i.e. the channelling of benefits to particular 
geographic areas for political reasons, is another element of clientelism (Stokes 
et al., 2013:12). Pork barrel politics will be at play later in this thesis, but is not 
emphasised and is, instead, blanketed under clientelism and the thesis’ use of 
patronage politics. 
 
While the definitional issues are of importance, they often defy consensus and 
take up acreage in the literature. However, more empirically and theoretically 
relevant discussions that this thesis engages are two-fold. The first relates to 
issues that Gans-Morse et al. (2014) raise around what informs the clientelist 
exchange and its use purposes, with debate suggesting that it is either for vote-
buying or turn out buying as informed by the role of the individual, and context. 
The second relates to the targets of clientelist appeals, i.e. is it convinced (loyal) 
or unconvinced (swing) or opposed voters. An extension to the second issue 
which directly relates to the thesis is whether these targeted are targeted as 
individual voters or as constituencies of voters, i.e. is clientelism targeted at loyal 
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constituencies rather than loyal voters or swing constituencies rather than swing 
voters. 
 
The literature varies greatly regarding targeting of clientelism. Cox & McCubbins 
(1986) argued that parties would target core supporters while  Dixit & Londregan 
(1996) as well as Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) hypothesised that opposing 
parties tended to strategically target undecided voters with limited partisan 
inclination who could be swayed. Their modelling suggested that parties would 
neither spend clientelist effort on their secured supporters because the votes were 
secured nor on dyed-in-the-wool opposition adherents, whose support they were 
unlikely to get regardless of the efforts they made. Stokes (2005:323) produced a 
similar theoretical model for Argentina which predicted that party machines 
would target “…people in the middle of the distribution of partisan 
predisposition..”, i.e. swing voters who are indifferent about their preferences. 
The assumption in both models was not just that swing voters allegiance was 
cheapest to buy through targeting the poorest of these because of their weak 
attachment. It was also that these were probably the only votes available to buy 
given that the other supporters and opponents were dug in. However, there has 
been limited empirical evidence to support the above hypothesis, and what 
evidence has been available has been at aggregate constituency, municipal or 
district levels. Nonetheless, given the scarcity of individual-level data, Golden & 
Min (2013:79) correctly argue that the evidence shows that political parties may 
be targeting swing constituencies rather than swing voters. 
 
When tested empirically, Stokes’ (2005) produced results that went against the 
swing voter predictions. It showed that at least in Argentina the dominant party 
targeted its supporters rather than swing voters with clientelist emoluments. 
Stokes et al. (2013) labelled this the loyal-voter anomaly. The so-called anomaly 
thus clawed back on Stokes (2005), Cox & McCubbins (1986), Dixit & 
Londregan (1996) as well as Golden & Min (2013) ’s assertions on targeting of 
swing voters and voters. This thesis encounters and tries to explain the loyal voter 
anomaly when it looks at ZANU-PF’s campaigns in ZACs in chapter 6. The 
findings in this chapter closely align with the thinking forwarded by Stokes et al. 
(2013), who posit the broker mediated distribution theory. They argue that while 
national politicians might want to target swing voters, their brokers at the local 
level instead target loyal voters because their votes are cheaper to purchase, 
creating room for local brokers to convert the excess to personal use. This 
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phenomenon is true in Zimbabwe, but in this thesis, I also mediate it with findings 
from Zambia by Kate Baldwin (2013) which show that rural voters do not just 
voter with their chiefs, the putative brokers in rural Zimbabwe, simply because 
their chiefs say so. She highlights how rural voters also make sophisticated 
calculations centred on the performance of elected officials; status of their 
relations with local patrons; and how this impacts their ability to deliver on 
promises and programs that affect the self-interests of rural citizens (Baldwin 
2013; 2015). This finding suggests that the rural populations are not as beholden 
to patronage and clientelist politics as uniformly or as generally thought. Bratton, 
Bhavnani & Chen (2012) also echo these findings from a 23 country study which 
suggests that contrary to conventional thought, voters in Africa value economic 
voting more than ethnic and other considerations. 
 
Nevertheless, the loyal voter anomaly holds at a general national-level analysis 
but gets complicated at the subnational level. The data presented in this thesis 
shows that ZANU-PF did not totally neglect swing constituencies and even 
opposition areas with clientelist politics. Of interest from the battleground 
constituencies (Goromonzi and Tsholotsho) covered in this study’s chapter 8, is 
also that when it does target swing constituencies, ZANU-PF does not target 
swing voters. Instead, the findings suggest that it sticks to loyal supporters and 
party structures, thus replicating the loyal voter anomaly despite the change in 
constituency type. To address the loyal voter anomaly, Nichter (2008) using the 
same data as Stokes (2005), argued that because parties cannot monitor and 
ensure the vote, clientelist appeals were made to secure or buy turnout of already 
loyal but unmobilised supporters, rather than vote-buying. Nichter (2008) defines 
turnout buying as a strategy by which parties reward supporters for showing up 
at the polls rather than for changing their vote. However, Like the submissions 
from Stokes (2005) and others, Nichter’s (2008) thesis only partially holds when 
applied to the Zimbabwean elections and subnational analysis in this thesis. The 
assumption of an inability to monitor the vote doesn’t hold for ZANU-PF in 
ZACs although it does in OACs. As such, in ZACs, ZANU-PF deployed 
clientelist emoluments to secure both the vote and turnout in what Nichter (2008) 
and in his later work with Gans-Morse et al (2014) correctly labelled double 
persuasion. ZANU-PF demonstrated in the 2008 elections that there were violent 
consequences to not following through on the vote. In 2013 it demonstrated 
capacity to monitor the vote. The thesis highlights both these elements at length 
in Chapter 6. In chapter 7 and 8, which focus on OACs and BCs, ZANU-PF had 
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limited capacity to monitor and ensure the vote, and in these spaces, turnout 
buying makes sense. Following Gans-Morse et al. (2014), this thesis will show 
that the emerging picture across space is that there is variation to the purposes of 
clientelist and patronage politics, and the combination of strategies deployed 
across space dependent on constituency type and voter targeted. 
 
1.4.3 Competitive authoritarianism as analytical descriptor 
This study builds on the above understandings of the Zimbabwean state and 
governing arrangements. It aligns closely with the literature on electoral 
authoritarianism and hybrid regimes. There is sufficient consensus that a 
significant number of African countries that pass the procedural minimums test 
are neither democratic nor outright authoritarian, but exist in a 'grey-zone' 
(Carothers 2002) or 'halfway house' between democracy and authoritarianism ( 
Huntington, 1991). This zone, according to Schedler (2002:47), constitutes the 
modal form of regime in Sub-Saharan Africa and around the world. Opalo 
(2012:83) hazards that 43% of African state regimes were autocratic, 25% 
consolidating democracies in some way, while 32% were of ambiguous regime 
orientation at the time of his writing. These trends show the uneven advance of 
democracy (Lynch & Crawford, 2012:276) and provide context for Cheeseman's 
(2015:4) findings that democratic breakdowns amongst the grey-zone countries 
continue to be a prominent feature of multiparty politics in Africa. Democratic 
breakdowns led to the development of concepts of subtypes of authoritarianism 
and democracy  to describe the grey-zone regimes. These include electoral 
authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism (Levistky and Way, 2002), and 
disguised dictatorship (Brooker, 2000:228). 
 
This study adopts competitive authoritarianism as its analytical descriptor for 
Zimbabwe, rather than the other regime characterisations mentioned above, for 
several reasons. In Zimbabwe's case, I contend that competitive authoritarianism 
offers some explanatory and analytical power. It renders an accurate description 
of the Zimbabwean state. Its nodal analytical probes (link and leverage and 
strength of the political party and state organs) provide guidance for structured 
analysis. This is critical, as it allows the study to separate the party from the state, 
thus allowing for a closer study of ZANU-PF as a political party during election 
campaigns. Second, competitive authoritarianism does not focus on the mere 
presence of elections as the defining regime characteristic. Instead, it defines  the 
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compete and believe it stands a chance to win elections. This competitiveness is 
what distinguishes these types of regimes from full-blown autocracies. At the 
same time, I deliberately move away from characterising the Zimbabwean regime 
as a diminished type of democracy. It is clear from the literature and empirics that 
the Zimbabwean state was some kind of an authoritarian rather than some kind 
of democratic regime. The term competitive authoritarianism does not meet 
Bogaards (2009) "double root" exhortation. However, it acknowledges the 
authoritarian roots and character of the regime and opens the door for analysis of 
contestation in situations where the opposition participates and can win elections. 
 
Levitsky & Way (2010:3) define competitive authoritarian regimes as civilian 
regimes in which incumbents combine electoral competition with varying 
degrees of authoritarianism. They categorise Zimbabwe as a stable competitive 
authoritarian regime where formal democratic institutions, like elections, are 
considered the primary means of gaining power. The formal democratic 
institutions are not entirely insulated from the incumbent's abuse of the state to 
gain a significant advantage over their opponents (Levitsky & Way, 2010:4; 
Morse, 2012). As such, while competition between incumbents and opposition is 
"real," it is also "unfair," with incumbents typically resorting to coercion, 
intimidation, and fraud to ensure electoral victory and transgress voter choices 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Collier & Vicente, 2012).  
 
The reality that the opposition uses democratic institutions to vigorously and 
sometimes successfully compete for power is the distinguishing marker for 
competitiveness (Levitsky & Way, 2002:59; 2010:4; Howard & Roessler, 
2006:368). Elections in these regimes are competitive because of the strength of 
democratic procedures in which the opposition can win, and elections are arenas 
through which opposition parties can contest for power (Gandhi & Przeworski, 
2009:3). Levitsky & Way (2010:6) outline how competitive authoritarian regimes 
differ from out-and-out authoritarianism as follows: In competitive authoritarian 
regimes 
1. legal channels exist through which opposition parties compete seriously 
for power, 
2. elections are held regularly, and opposition parties are not legally barred 
from contesting them, 
3. opposition activity takes place above ground,  
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4. civil liberties are sufficiently respected for opposition parties to open 
offices, recruit candidates, and organise campaigns, and  
5. leading opposition figures are generally not exiled or imprisoned. 
 
Competitive authoritarianism, like its related concepts, is steeped in the 
Schumpeterian procedural minimums of democratic philosophy. Part of the 
foundations of Levitsky & Way's analytics are four key attributes that Dahl 
(1971) outlines for democracy. These are regular, competitive, free and fair 
elections; universal suffrage; protection of civil liberties; and non-tutelary 
limitations to the winners' effective power to govern. Levitsky & Way (2010) add 
a fifth proviso, the existence of a reasonably level playing field between 
incumbents and opposition, despite some incumbency advantage. This advantage 
may include patronage, pork-barrel spending, clientelist social policies, and 
privileged access to media and finance but in ways that are not systematic enough 
to seriously undermine the opposition's capacity to compete (Levitsky & Way, 
2010:5). An uneven playfield exists when there is rampant abuse of state 
institutions, systematic favouritism of the ruling party at the expense of the 
opposition. There will also be severe handicaps to opposition abilities to 
campaign, including through skewed access to resources, media and the law -
including through partial electoral institutions and courts (Levitsky & Way, 
2010:9).  
 
While all this precludes competitive authoritarian regimes from being viewed as 
democratic (Levitsky & Way, 2010:1), elections still provide regime opponents 
with focused organising opportunities to defeat dictators (Geddes, 2004), as 
happened during Zimbabwe's 2008 March election. Competitive authoritarian 
regimes fail to meet the procedural minimums criteria for democracy outlined 
above because they fall short on one or more of these key attributes of democracy: 
(1) free elections; (2) broad protection of civil liberties; and (3) a reasonably even 
playing field (Levitsky & Way, 2010:6). The critical difference between 
competitive authoritarianism and outright authoritarianism is levels of regime 
effort at elections. Under authoritarianism, incumbents can rest easy ahead of 
elections, if they conduct them, knowing there can be no other result except a 
win. Under competitive authoritarianism, incumbents sweat to thwart opposition 
efforts through fair means and foul.  
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Competitive authoritarianism is also an analytical concept that is invoked explain 
the democratisation, or lack thereof of, of such regimes. A stable competitive 
authoritarian regime is conceptualized as one that survives for 15 years or more. 
Scholars identify two factors as key in explaining stability or lack thereof : the 
regime's link with and leverage from the West, and ruling party and state 
organisational strength. Levitsky & Way hypothesise that if a regime's linkage to 
the West is extensive, it democratises, and where linkage was low, regime 
outcomes hinge on incumbents' organisational and coercive capacity. They also 
argue that in situations where incumbent capacity is high, regimes remain stable 
and authoritarian. In contrast, where incumbent capacity is low, regimes tended 
to be unstable and authoritarian (Levitsky & Way, 2010:2).  
 
This thesis does not dwell on Zimbabwe's relations with the West. It takes as 
given that relations were tenuous, and the West had little leverage on the Harare 
regime. It does, however, explore an adapted version of the linkage and leverage 
theory by looking at Zimbabwe's relations with South Africa, and the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC). These are important because of the 
governing arrangements that Zimbabwe adopted after the disputed elections in 
2008. The other key element, the strength of the ruling party and state 
organisations, is more pertinent for this thesis, given my focus on ZANU-PF as a 
political party and its election campaigns in the run-up to the 2008 and 2013 
elections.  
1.5 ZANU-PF’s Emergence As The Dominant Authoritarian 
Support Party of Zimbabwe’s Competitive Authoritarian 
system 
ZANU-PF was formed in 1963 but participated in its first elections in February 
1980, when it won and began its journey as the predominant political force in 
Zimbabwe. It’s 1980 victory came as a surprise to the colonial regime;  some 
pundits and scholars who thought the electorate would reject ZANU-PF because 
it was too radical, and was based in exile. This was in contrast to some pundits' 
favourite, Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC), 
which had been active inside Rhodesia and organising since 1970 (Gregory,1981; 
Cliffe, Mpofu & Munslow, 1980). The UNAC had also won a landslide in the 
delegitimised Zimbabwe-Rhodesia elections of 1979, and was well resourced.  Its 
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moderate stance made it a more acceptable compromise for white Rhodesians 
(Cliffe, Mpofu & Munslow,1980). 4  
 
The independence elections took place under the administration of an appointed 
British Governor, Lord Soames. The Soames administration maintained a 
standing state of emergency and martial law, together with various repressive 
pieces of legislation that the colonial regime had used to quash dissent and 
criminalise political and guerrilla activity (Kriger, 2005:3). Zimbabwe held its 
founding elections under a system that sought to control every facet of political 
activity (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1980:16). Under this system, the 
transitional state was defined by restricted freedom of expression, licensed and 
controlled freedom of assembly, while restraining freedom of movement through 
curfews and summary detentions (Commonwealth Observer Group, 1980:16). 
These restrictions, implemented by a biased civil service which also ran the 
elections, affected ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU more than other parties that 
contested the 1980 elections (Commonwealth Observer Group, 1980:20-22). 
However, ZANU-PF was not just a victim of the system. It was also a perpetrator 
of some less-than-democratic tactics. As Kriger (2005:6) noted, many election 
observer groups and scholars deliberately ignored, peppered over, or justified 
ZANU-PF’s electoral infractions, especially when it came to the party's violence 
and intimidation. Observers and even electoral authorities often excused ZANU-
PF's ills to avoid antagonising it, and forcing a return to war and collapse of the 
transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. Many observers suspected that ZANU 
had stopped about 4,000 of its guerrillas from reporting to demobilisation camps. 
Instead, it deployed these guerrillas to various rural locations as part of its election 
machinery. This posed a real threat to the transition process. The prevalence of 
nationalist historiographers sympathetic to ZANU-PF in the post-1980 years also 
helps explain why much of the scholarship turned a blind eye to these aspects of 
ZANU-PF's electioneering (Kriger, 2005; Gregory, 1981).  
 
 
4 The 1979 elections were an outcome of the 1978 internal settlement and saw black Zimbabweans being able to vote on a 
common roll separate from the white roll, for the first time. The UANC, a moderate nationalist party, had agreed to an internal 
settlement with the Rhodesian government leading to the March 1979 election where its President, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, 
was formerly elected the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was condemned as illegal by the United 
Nations Security Council, (resolution 423 of 14 March 1978). However, it existed until the end of 1979 when the country 
returned to British dominion pending formal independence in April 1980 and first elections in February 1980. Other internal 
settlement parties were ZANU (later known as ZANU-Ndonga) led by Ndanbaningi Sithole, United National Federal Party 
(UNFP) led by Chief Kayisa Ndiweni, and the Rhodesian Front led by Ian Smith. The internal settlement was deemed a "sell-
out" act by the main nationalist movements, ZANU and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) which boycotted the 1979 
election (Sithole, 1985). 
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It was in this challenging political environment, in which ZANU-PF was both 
victim and perpetrator, that multi-party politics in Zimbabwe were born. ZANU-
PF won these founding elections with 63% of the vote share, claiming 57 of the 
80 available seats on the common roll. PF-ZAPU (running as Patriotic Front 
Party-PFP) got 20 seats, and the UANC won the remaining three seats. As shown 
in Figure 1-1, ZANU-PF would go on to dominate Zimbabwean politics and 
establish electoral hegemony with only weak opposition challenges for the next 
20 years (Sithole and Makumbe, 1997:122). In the 1985 election, ZANU-PF 
increased its seat tally from 57 to 64 seats, and popular vote share to 77%, while 
ZAPU suffered a decline from 20 seats to 15 seats in the House of Assembly, 
with the remaining seat going to ZANU-Ndonga (Kriger, 2005; Sithole, 1986; 
Sachikonye, 1989).5  
 
At independence, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe attempted to settle the nerves 
of former opponents and the international community by adopting a policy of 
national reconciliation (Mandaza, 1986; Raftopoulos, 2004; Eppel, 2004). 
Despite this policy, ZANU-PF’s authoritarian underbelly, initially hidden behind 
goodwill and broader transitional interests, as well as its pretensions towards 
political hegemony, were soon in evidence. It was soon clear that ZANU's 
reconciliation policy placated the whites and international community while 
subordinating other political parties and civil society (Raftopoulos, 2004: ix). 
This especially applied to ZAPU and its armed wing, the Zimbabwe People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which ZANU continued to mistrust. The divisions 
had their roots in ZANU's split from ZAPU in 1963, persisting throughout the 
liberation struggle and often manifesting in fierce fighting between ZANU and 
ZAPU activists as well as ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants (Eppel, 2004; 
Karekwaivenani, 2017; Doran, 2017; Scarnechia, 2008). At independence, this 
mistrust was manifest in the caching of arms by both ZANU and ZAPU during 
the demobilisation and military integration processes of 1979 and the early 1980s. 
Mistrust was also evident in clashes, like the ones in Bulawayo between former 
combatants of the two liberation armies in late 1980 and early 1981, and the 
emergence of about 300 ZIPRA dissidents who seemed intent on disrupting 
ZANU’s rule post-independence (CCJP & LRF, 1997; Eppel, 2004). Continued 
mistrust, and ZAPU’s good performance in the 1980 elections and sweep of all 
 
5 ZANU-Ndonga was a small political party which retained the support of Sithole's co-ethnics in Chipinge, in eastern 
Zimbabwe. Sithole was able to hold on to this seat as Chipinge's Member of Parliament From 1985 until his death in December 
2000 
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the parliamentary seats in Matebeleland in 1985, showed ZANU-PF that ZAPU 
constituted a potent political threat.  
 
In addition to local skirmishes between ZANU and ZAPU adherents, apartheid 
South Africa's deliberate destabilisation of Zimbabwe through various acts of 
sabotage using dissidents known as super ZAPU also complicated Zimbabwe’s 
internal dynamics and divisive politics. Despite knowledge of South Africa’s 
involvement, ZANU-PF blamed ZAPU for the sabotage acts. It used this as a 
premise to unleash the North Korean trained Fifth or Gukurahundi brigade to deal 
with the dissidents in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces6. Once deployed, the 
brigade tortured and killed thousands of civilians on the premise that they were 
Ndebele and supported ZAPU. The Fifth brigade’s atrocities were estimated to 
have reached 20,000 deaths and included depriving the bulk of the Matebeleland 
South population of food aid during the drought years of 1984 and 85 (CCJP & 
LRF, 1997; Eppel, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). In the run-up to the 1985 
election, ZANU’s youth brigade joined the Fifth Brigade’s terror campaign. The 
violence moved to urban areas and included torture, beatings, abductions and the 
burning of homes of suspected ZAPU members (Eppel, 2004: CCJP &LRF, 
1997).  
 
Further ZANU-PF efforts at political hegemony during the first ten years of 
independence included its concerted drive towards turning Zimbabwe into a one-
party state. De jure one-party state-ism was ZANU-PF’s main campaign issue in 
the 1990 election where it faced opposition from the Zimbabwe Unity Movement 
(ZUM) led by former ZANU-PF Secretary General Edgar Tekere. The agenda 
failed because of the contest and protest locally, and international pressure against 
one-party states (Hatchard, 199; Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991; Moyo, 1992). 
Nonetheless, with the abolition of the white roll in 1987 and increase in the 
number of constituencies from 100 to 120, ZANU PF won 117 seats out of 120 
in both the 1990 and 1995 general elections, with ZUM only getting two seats in 
1990 (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Moyo, 1992; Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000). 
The 1995 general elections saw a large number of other former ZANU-PF 
members leaving the party to contest as independents. The result was 
 
6 Former ZANLA combatants made up the bulk of the Fifth Brigade. Gukurahundi meant the " storm of the summer that 
sweeps away the chaff." ZANU-PF adapted it from the liberation war where it used it to refer to dealing with ZANU-PF 
opponents considered to be wavering from the liberation struggle (Sithole & Makumbe,1997:133). The strategy became 
especially prominent in 1979, a year that ZANU-PF declared "Gore reGukurahundi [the year of the storm]” to deal with the 
white settler colonial regime as well as the “internal settlement puppets” (Sithole & Makumbe,1997; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). 
41 
 
unprecedented numbers of independent candidates (Sithole &Makumbe, 1997; 
Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000; Dorman, 2000, Kriger 2005). Zimbabwe’s first 
Presidential election, held in 1990, saw Robert Mugabe winning with 83% of the 
vote increasing to 93% of the vote in 1996 (Sithole and Makumbe 1997: 131-
132). While the numbers in figure 4-1 suggest increased ZANU-PF dominance, 
the victories in the 1990s were made hollow by increasing apathy and declining 
turnout.  
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Figure 1-1: ZANU-PF vs Opposition Vote Shares & Voter Turnout (Parliamentary and Presidential Elections)1980-
2005 
 
Source: Author’s Data multi-sourced All election years affixed “p” were parliamentary elections, while those affixed “PresE” 
were presidential elections. The figures have been rounded off to the nearest percentage and are based on vote share, i.e. 
popular vote rather than seats. 
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1.5.1 The Party System and the Party 
Zimbabwe’s party system has been described in several different ways. Kuenzi 
& Lambright (2001:459) classified it as hegemonic in transition to denote the 
high levels of party institutionalisation but weak party competition that 
characterized  ZANU-PF’s electoral dominance. Kuenzi & Lambright (2001:461-
2) argued that ZANU-PF's long history, and its control of the state, allowed it to 
emerge as a strong party and to elicit long term loyalty.  
 
While the extent of party institutionalisation is not a significant source of 
divergent scholarly opinion in the case of ZANU-PF, the source of this 
institutionalisation may be. While the Kuenzi & Lambright (2001) argument is 
plausible, Riedl (2014), writing on Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin, raises 
another plausible explanation of ZANU-PF's high degree of institutionalization.  
She offers a path dependent explanation which suggests that party 
institutionalisation is also a function of new authoritarian regimes' ability to 
conscript, and incorporate local notables into the party and state. Much of the 
Zimbabwe scholarship shows how ZANU-PF at different times conscripted and 
incorporated key actors and institutions to strengthen its ranks, and to 
institutionalise. This includes labour and civil society at independence, war 
veterans circa 2000 (Moyo and Yeros, 2007), and economically powerful whites, 
and traditional leaders and various points in time (Alexander, 1994; Kriger, 1992; 
Raftopoulos, 2001; Sithole, 2000; Yeros, 2013; Moyo, 1992, and LeBas 2011; 
Zamchiya, 2011). As Reidl (2014) argues, the strategy to engage and integrate 
local notables often strengthened ruling parties, which took advantage of local 
notables capacity to mobilize voters and to assist rulers in managing populations 
at the local level.  This is another avenue through which unfair rules of the game 
were institutionalized in future civilian political processes. 
 
However, outside ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe has enjoyed a long history of parties that 
have proved reasonably sustainable and rooted in various segments of society: 
the UANC existed from the 1970s to 1985, ZAPU 1961 to 1987, when it merged 
with ZANU-PF, ZANU (Ndonga) from about 1973 to the 2000s. After 
independence, ZUM lasted through the 1990s and MDC has been in existence 
since 1999. These parties met Mainwaring’s (1999: 26) definition of 
institutionalized parties. They were relatively stable and rooted in society through 
fairly strong organisations, with status and value to society. Reasonable party 
(and in some cases, party system) institutionalisation in sub-Saharan Africa’s 
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party systems is not unique to Zimbabwe. Tanzania’s party system is reasonably 
institutionalised, as are party systems in South Africa, Mozambique, and 
Botswana. ZANU-PF’s dominance is also not unique.  It mirrors that of other 
political parties in sub-Saharan Africa which started as liberation or nationalist 
movements in countries like Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Ethiopia and Mozambique. However, some aspects of ZANU-PF's stability and 
institutionalisation as a party contrast with those of other parties. This is 
especially so when it comes to the "musical chairs" characteristic of parties in 
Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi, amongst others, where parties are weak coalitions 
of elites which often change both composition and party names from election to 
election (LeBas, 2019:18).  
 
In some ways, ZANU-PF’s story and that of Zimbabwe’s party-system is a 
departure from received wisdom around party institutionalisation and the fragility 
and weakness of African political parties and systems. Mainwaring (1999) 
associates party institutionalisation with low electoral volatility, and limited 
personalistic and neo-populist leadership. It is also associated with policy 
stability and better representation of popular sectoral interests. The case of 
ZANU-PF departs from Mainwaring's (1999) conceptualization along all these 
dimensions. As Figure 1-1 shows, in ZANU-PF's case, institutionalisation did not 
reduce electoral volatility, understood as the entry and extinction of ephemeral 
parties in between election cycles (Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014:1708). Healthy 
political competition increased with the formation of the MDC. And while the 
MDC and ZANU-PF were the significant electoral parties post-2000, new parties 
continued to emerge to contest elections, including splinters of the MDC, and 
defectors from ZANU-PF. Mugabe's dominance in the party, state, and nation 
means that a personalistic neo-populist leader existed alongside a well 
institutionalized party. Finally, a ZANU-PF's post 2000 governance was replete 
with policy inconsistency, and suffered severe legitimacy deficits. Concepts 
developed for the study of political parties elsewhere, such as Mainwaring's, do 
not always fit perfectly when imported to Africa.   
 
Yet there has been a significant effort to tailor typologies that are suitable for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The consensus is that African party systems are, in the main, 
dominant (one) party systems (Bogaards, 2004; Bratton, 1998; Doorenspleet & 
Nijzink, 2013; Erdmann, 1999; LeBas, 2019; Reynolds, 1999; Sartori, 1976), 
with a few exceptions. These exceptions include systems that are fragmented 
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(Van De Walle & Buttler, 1999), unstructured, pulverised (Satori, 1976), 
inchoate, or unstructured (Lindberg, 2007). There is also increasing recognition 
in the literature that not all dominant parties and party systems are the same.  This 
leads to a further distinction between dominant and dominant authoritarian party 
systems, following Sartori (1976).  Dominant parties are defined in different 
ways. For LeBas (2019). these are parties that have enjoyed 20 consecutive years 
in power. Bogaards (2004) and Doorenspleet & Nijzink (2013) define "dominant" 
as crossing Satori’s threshold of winning over 50% of the electorate in at 
parliamentary and presidential elections in three consecutive multi-party 
elections.  Van De Walle & Buttler (1999) defined dominant parties as parties 
which enjoyed more than 60% of legislative seats. Table 1-1 highlights the 
differences between some of the existing definitions of dominant parties. 
 
Table 1-1: Dominant Party Definitions 
  
Source: Bogaards (2004: 176). 
 
Broad generalisations of parties in ‘neo democracies,’ including those in Africa, 
exist.  The European experience of party formation and institutionalisation has 
heavily influenced many of these (Erdmann, 2004:63). According to Carothers 
(2006:4), parties in emerging democracies are almost invariably corrupt, only 
active around elections, do not stand for anything, and are directed by party 
leaders who are selfish and preoccupied with squabbling instead of governing the 
country (Carothers, 2006: 4). Schmitter (2001:67-89), writing on parties in neo 
democracies in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe, echoes Carothers. He 
argues that common features can be discerned amongst these parties. These 
include fewer members, weaker organisations, less distinct programmes, weaker 
linkages with (civil) society, weaker party identification, and thus higher 
volatility. Van de Walle and Butler's (1999:15) early work argued that African 
political parties were plagued by "weak organisations, low levels of 
institutionalisation, and weak links to the societies they are supposed to 
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represent." This analysis portrayed incumbent regimes in Africa as, mainly, 
patronage and clientelist electoral machines that are almost without agency 
outside the state, and that had little regard for distinguishable policy platforms. 
The perception is that ruling parties are distributors of ethnicised patronage (van 
de Walle & Butler, 1999; van de Walle, 2003). When they do have some 
semblance of policy platforms, these are judged to have little relevance to what 
politicians did once they were in office (Randall and Svasand, 2002: 10; Van de 
Walle and Butler 1999).  
 
Most accounts of African political parties consider them as ideologically vacuous 
and intent on collecting support, mostly through the manipulation of ethnic 
cleavages but thereafter, on any grounds (as catch-all parties). This thesis shows 
that the ZANU-PF experience calls for a rethink of this stereotype of African 
parties as ethnic parties. ZANU-PF is not the only party to break this mould. 
Exciting literature on politics in Ghana, Senegal, Namibia and other places is 
beginning to dispel the exaggerated view of ethnicity as the sole organising 
principle for most parties on the continent (Brierley & Kramon, 2018; Elischer, 
2013; Koter, 2013a; 2013b). Even so, ethnicity remains a geographically 
circumscribed yet salient feature of politics in some parts of East Africa (e.g. 
Kenya and Ethiopia), and other places (e.g. Zambia).  
 
In this thesis, I take dominant authoritarian parties as the foundation stones that 
support competitive authoritarian regimes. Parties are often the vehicles through 
which some of the characteristics of competitive authoritarian regimes manifest. 
For instance, dominant authoritarian parties are often responsible for creating the 
uneven playing field in which opposition parties compete. Uneven electoral 
playing fields are usually the function of unjust laws as well as unfair coverage 
enforced by police as an arm of the state, and partisan or state controlled media. 
However, this thesis also demonstrates how dominant authoritarian parties like 
ZANU-PF also tilt the playing field at local level and take over, complement and 
enforce the institutional arrangements that impede equal and fair competition at 
the national level. It is dominant authoritarian parties that often act in ways that 
make power alternation possible in theory, but very difficult in practice as I will 
show through the analysis of ZACs and BC, where political opposition was often 
rendered virtually non-existent or merely tokenistic (Bogaards, 2004:176; 
Joseph, 1998:6). The African politics literature widely accepts that many or 
perhaps most of the parties that rule in Africa fit the this mould, benefiting from  
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the advantages of unlevel electoral playing fields and often using repression, 
manipulation, patronage, and control and the incumbency to win elections 
(Arriola, 2013; Blaydes, 2009; Cheeseman, 2010; Lebas, 2019; Van De Walle, 
2003). 
 
Although its search for complete hegemony was elusive and often viciously 
contested (Moore, 2008: 25; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Raftopoulos, 2002), 
“dominant authoritarian party” seems a fitting epithet for ZANU-PF. In 
explaining this, the literature on ZANU-PF has closely mirrored the arguments 
advanced in the comparative and African politics literatures. This includes a focus 
on a sufficient measure of elite cohesion and organisational strength (Sithole & 
Makumbe, 1997; LeBas,2019); violence, intimidation, demonisation of the 
opposition in every election since 1980 (Kriger, 2005); effective use of 
propaganda and instrumentalisation of laws on the free press, expression and 
assembly (Bratton, Chikwanha & Sithole, 2005); and post material solidarity ties 
from the shared suffering of the liberation struggle (Levitsky & Way, 2012). After 
the 2002 Presidential elections, the literature also emphasises ZANU-PF’s 
electoral manipulation, including vote rigging, skewed registration, and 
gerrymandered constituency delimitation (Bratton, 2014, Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2008; Bratton, Dulani & Masunungure, 2016; Dorman, 2005; 
Makumbe, 2002; 2006; 2009; Masunungure, 2008; 2009; 2011; 2014; 
Raftopoulos, 2002; Zamchiya, 2013).  
 
This thesis attempts to show how the above factors variously contributed to 
Zimbabwe’s party system, and the kind of party that ZANU-PF became. It uses 
ZANU-PF’s 2008 and 2013 electoral campaigns as the lens through which to 
observe the party in action. Some of the literature cited above fails to dis-
aggregate the various components of the regime’s make up, to disentangle the 
regime’s supporting political party from other elements of the regime. This thesis 
aims to do this.  Although the party-state conflation does present challenges when 
it comes to attributing specific actions to specific components of a conflated state, 
the party remains significant in itself.  It can be defined as distinct from the state, 
following Erdmann (2004: 66), as an association of like-minded people who 
pursue common political goals and for which they, usually, try to get into 
government, is the instrument through which they attain power and exercise 
political dominance within a state.  For some, the separation of party and state in 
Zimbabwe is rendered difficult because “ZANU-PF never fully transformed itself 
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from an armed liberation movement into a democratic political party, and it has 
revealed its true temperament during times of political crisis” (Bratton et al., 
2008). For Bratton & Masunungure, (2008) and Bratton (2014), as well as others, 
ZANU-PF, the party, is just one of several other factors that that sustained the 
regime.7 While this argument can be accepted, that the party is "just one factor" 
does not negate the need to expose its workings and explain its efforts. Doing so 
tells us something about how the party sought to generate legitimacy, expand its 
appeal, and remain in power when it came under real challenge from a credible 
opposition party.  
 
The multi-level study of ZANU-PF and its campaigns at national, provincial and 
local levels that is presented in this thesis bears witness to both the imbrication 
of the party with the national and local state, but also its separateness as an 
organisation with its own modus operandi. This includes its own line of command 
and structures, different processes and procedures, as well as activities distinct 
from those of the state. As the empirical chapters will show, the party runs its 
own intelligence and surveillance, public as well as private and or secret activities 
that are rarely exposed to the public glare, and are largely invisible in analysis 
that centres on the national party, and conflates this with the state. I demonstrate 
that during the 2008 and 2013 elections, ZANU-PF was a strong political party. 
It organised outside of and along with the state, and demonstrated as a political 
party per se. I seek to get into the "black box" of ZANU-PF as a party. The goal 
is to understand its organisation, formal and informal structures, and how ZANU-
PF used these in service of its interests in retaining power and enhancing its 
legitimacy through the vote and turnout maximisation. 
 
There is consensus in the competitive authoritarian and hybrid regimes literature 
that illicit methods of power retention are not enough to stabilize regimes, and 
that a significant number of authoritarian regimes invest heavily in their "support 
party," and spend "heavily on pre-election political campaigns" (Geddes, 2006:1). 
The support party is an organised movement that performs the orthodox roles of 
a political party, but in service to the incumbent regime and presiding autocrat. 
As Geddes (2006:3) argues, support parties, whether created to support a new 
 
7 Bratton & Masunungure (2008) list these other factors as: ZANU-PF's ideological belief in its right to rule in perpetuity; A 
corrupted economy vested in the hands of party loyalists. An institutionalised role in policymaking for military commanders; 
Heavy reliance on violence, increasingly outsourced to auxiliary forces. It is this "heritage" that forces Mandaza and others to 
conclude that ZANU-PF as a party only exists in respect to its conflation with the militarised state.  
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regime or inherited by autocrats through other mechanisms, can play a potent role 
in prolonging the life of the regime. It is often through them that regimes, both, 
sponsor and quell protests, reorganise, purge, and engage their supporters, 
frustrate and hound the opposition, and persuade general public.  
 
Precisely because opponents cannot always be bribed or beaten into submission, 
huge investments into party building and operation become requisite.  Such huge 
investments point to the party as a critical institutional trench used to mobilise 
widespread support for incumbents, creating the possibility for authoritarian 
regimes to win elections on the strength of “popularity” (Gandhi & Przeworski, 
2007:1293). There are clear political dividends from investment in the support 
party and attendant electoral campaigns. The creation and support of a standing 
organised cadreship, provides the infrastructure for incumbent parties and 
regimes mobilise on short notice, campaign and triumphing at elections, and 
prolonging the life of the regime (Geddes, 2006: 12). As Brownlee (2005:1) notes 
in his study of 135 competitive authoritarian regimes between 1975 and 2000, 
authoritarian regimes with ruling parties tend to be more robust than other 
nondemocratic systems.  
 
Competitive authoritarian regimes also invest in parties to appease opponents and 
entrench incumbents (Markoff 1996:1010). This is because illicit methods of 
power retention like fraud and violence, while increasing incumbents’ chances of 
electoral victory, do not always guarantee victory (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & 
Jablonski’s, 2014). While violence is often a result of incumbent insecurity, 
incumbent regimes are also wary of the effects of excessive interference in 
election procedures, and of how excessive vote inflation can discredit the 
legitimacy of their rule in the post-election period (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; 
Bratton et al., 2016: 17). In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF learnt this lesson in 2008, and 
endured the costs of its excessive violence and electoral manipulation in that 
election. I argue that the need to minimise the use of illicit methods to mitigate 
the post-election impact and fall-out forced ZANU-PF's resort to strategies that 
did not over-rely on illicit methods.  This lead to their sparse use in 2013.  
 
This thesis attempts to demonstrate that this pressure to economize in the use of 
illicit methods is what leads competitive authoritarian regimes to rely on licit 
means of power retention, like campaigning. Campaigning can fill the gap that 
exists between the levels to which regimes can realistically manipulate elections, 
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and their extant level of popular support. The gap between what such effort can 
achieve, and a regime's willingness to resort to illicit techniques, is what makes 
such regimes susceptible to defeat and the changeover of leadership (Schedler 
2002:38; Levitsky and Way 2002: 54:55). 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the study. It explored the concept of competitive 
authoritarianism and presented the thesis’ puzzle, which revolves around the 
contradiction inherent in this type of regime. I presented the study’s main lines 
of enquiry regarding ZANU-PF election campaigns in 2008 and 2013 and 
outlined my main argument. It highlighted the temporal, spatial and historical 
aspects of these arguments . The chapter also located the study conceptually with 
respect to political science literatures on authoritarianism and political parties in 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian political systems.  
 
The next part outlines the chapter structure for the rest of the thesis. The next 
chapter engages some of the key concepts that are the center of this thesis, 
including election campaigns, types of campaigns, rallies, and legitimacy as a 
normative and empirical proposition.  
 
1.7 Chapter Outline 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 presents a conceptual overview of the comparative politics, African 
politics, political communications, and political sociology literature on election 
campaigns, political parties, rallies and legitimacy. It clarifies the use and 
definitions of these key concepts that will recur throughout the thesis, and on 
which it builds its theoretical and analytical framework. In the process, it delimits 
how, and in which forms the thesis applied these concepts. It drills explicitly 
down on the rally-intensive ground campaign (Paget, 2019) as the most apt 
description for campaign types in new democracies and most applicable to 
Zimbabwe. It showcases types of rallies, i.e. the national or “star” rally and the 
“ordinary” or “local rally, and introduces a third type of rally, the “bigwig” rally 
as distinct from the other two. The chapter sketches out this concept of bigwig 
rallies and how the thesis uses it as a critical indicator of campaign intensity and 
campaign strategy. It also engages the literature on legitimacy to outline the 
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study’s understanding of legitimacy, legitimation, and claims to legitimacy. It 
presents the scheme of claims to legitimacy that the thesis uses to engage its 
empirical findings. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the study's "Nested Subnational Comparative  Analysis" 
research design.  It justifies the design choice and also presents the case selection 
criteria and justification for studying ZANU-PF campaigns as cases, and the in-
depth study sites the research selected. The chapter also outlines the study's scope 
conditions and briefs the reader on the step by step implementation process that 
occurred for the study, as well as processes implications on analysis. It presents 
the thesis' broad theoretical propositions and the hypotheses that support them 
before transitioning to data collection methods, and the sampling strategies for 
document analysis, archival research and interviews. It ends with a 
methodological note on the thesis' use and citation of newspapers. 
 
Chapter 4 is one of five chapters that engage directly with the thesis’ questions 
and presents answers and results. This chapter explores pivotal moments in the 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) ’s history to 
provide a deep historical context for this study and presents a new genetic 
explanation for its competitive authoritarian character. It presents a more 
complex picture of ZANU-PF through a review of the historical record, and 
analysis of its primary data from interviews carried out with a wide variety of 
political stakeholders, some of whom were nationalists and combatants during 
Zimbabwe’s liberation war.  The chapter rejects as inadequate some of the extant 
historically grounded political explanations for ZANU-PF’s current form. This is 
because some of the accounts are limited to ZANU-PF’s existence in the late 
1960s and 1970s guerrilla war, and often emphasise only ZANU-PF’s coercive 
methods of operation before and after Independence in 1980. The chapter 
advocates for a more in-depth historical dive. It succeeds in being a historical 
context-mapping of pre-independence ZANU-PF politics and the changes and 
continuities these histories flag regarding ZANU-PF’s modus operandi during 
elections post-2000. The chapter neither seeks to re-write history, nor accomplish 
the impossible task of a ‘complete’ or ‘correct’ history of ZANU-PF. Instead, it 
builds on the vast amount of historical work done on ZANU-PF, Zimbabwean 
liberation and nationalist politics through different varieties of its political 
history. 
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Chapter 5 is a bridge from pre-independence to post independence Zimbabwe; 
from ZANU-PF as a nationalist movement committed to liberation through the 
barrel of a gun to ZANU-PF as a political party in government, contesting in 
elections for the right to govern. It presents an overview of Zimbabwe’s electoral 
terrain, and outlines Zimbabwe’s electoral system, framework, and allied 
management bodies. It picks up from where Chapter 4 left off and cuts a path to 
the two elections of interest in this thesis, i.e. the 2008 and 2013 presidential 
elections. On the way, the chapter details the constitutional amendments that had 
an import on elections, flags the problematic role of the Registrar General in 
elections, engages the state-of-the-art in Zimbabwe focused literature on 
elections, and especially engages the issue of systematic manipulation and 
electoral fraud around the 2008 and 2013 elections. The chapter ends its bridging 
functions by presenting the results from the study’s large-N statistical analysis, 
especially vital descriptive statistics that emerged at the first moment of analysis 
which informed targeting and selection of sites for further in-depth qualitative 
research. It presents an overview of the data on bigwig rallies in 2008 and 2013 
across several variables including, constituency types, rural-urban divide, land 
reform, and electoral outcomes. Following chapter 4’s historically grounded 
proposition on why ZANU-PF campaigns, chapter 5 offers the global picture 
regarding bigwig visits as material for inference and dispensing with the question 
of whether ZANU_PF campaigns or not, and where it campaigned using bigwigs 
in 2008 and 2013.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on ZANU-PF’s presidential election campaigns in ZANU-PF-
aligned constituencies (ZACs), constituencies that typically incline towards 
ZANU-PF. The presidential election results from 2008 and 2013 show that a total 
of 113 of the 210 House of Assembly constituencies were ZACs at some point 
during these elections. The chapter looks at how ZANU-PF campaigned in ZACs 
and how these campaigns connected national and local-level politics and 
campaigns. It uses three constituencies in Mount Darwin District to describe and 
explain the subnational politics of the 2008 and 2013 presidential races in 
Zimbabwe. The chapter tests the study’s primary hypothesis that ‘ZANU-PF 
campaigns to win the hearts and minds of voters to enhance its legitimacy’ 
through analysing bigwig appeals during rallies in ZACs and the subnational 
politics of the Mount Darwin constituencies (East, South, West) and surrounding 
areas. These Mount Darwin constituencies, located in Mashonaland Central 
province, fit the designation of ZACs in both the 2008 and 2013 presidential 
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elections. The electoral politics and campaign activity that occurred in these 
constituencies is representative of the ZANU-PF presidential election campaign 
modus operandi in ZACs in general. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses ZANU-PF’s campaigning in the 2008 and 2013 presidential 
elections in opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs). The OACs category 
includes opposition strongholds (where the opposition’s winning margins against 
ZANU-PF were over 52.75%), consolidating-opposition constituencies (where 
the winning margins for the opposition against ZANU-PF were between 31.3% 
and 52.75%), and constituencies where the opposition scored narrow victories 
(between 15.1% and 31.3%). While the primary presidential competition in 2008 
and 2013 was between Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai of 
the MDC, the opposition’s winning margins, which inform the OAC category in 
this chapter, are calculated based on combined opposition votes (MDC-T and 
other parties) against the incumbent, ZANU-PF. The calculation follows a simple 
formula of subtracting the second placed candidate’s votes from the winning 
candidate’s votes and dividing this by the total number of votes cast. The chapter 
analyses the presidential election campaigns in OACs at the national and sub-
national levels in 2008 and 2013, when ZANU-PF appeared resurgent. 
 
Chapter 8 covers ZANU-PF campaigns in battleground constituencies (BCs). It 
will overview of battleground constituencies from 2002 to 2018, i.e. one election 
before and after this study’s elections of interest, 2008 and 2013. The chapter will 
outline and analyse ZANU-PF bigwig visits to battleground constituencies in 
2008 and 2013 as well as the kinds of appeals that Mugabe and other members of 
the ZANU-PF praesidium made during these visits. In contrast to the preceding 
chapters, chapter 8 will also describe ZANU-PF’s efforts to engage with the 
economic and social crisis that was part of the 2008 election context and explain 
why there was this difference in approach. It also covers developments and extant 
analysis on the 2008 run-off election and will describe and analyse ZANU-PF’s 
ground game in battleground constituencies. It will argue that despite the general 
approach of analysing ZANU-PF as a monolith, some of the ways in which it 
conducted its presidential election campaigns in the battlegrounds show an 
interesting amount of variation in strategies and tactics, not just across 
constituency types and time, but also within constituency types as shown in 
battleground constituencies. The chapter will attempt to bring out these different 
strategies and tactics within battleground constituencies in four respects: party 
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organizational structures and the game of numbers; patronage politics; traditional 
leaders and their mediating role; and lastly coercion (physical violence and 
intimidation).  
 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. It restates the study’s main findings, main 
arguments and main theoretical and empirical contributions. It reflects on the 
latter contributions with a special focus on campaigns, rallies and political parties.   
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2  CAMPAIGNS, RALLIES & LEGITIMACY:  A 
CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW. 
 
This chapter presents a conceptual overview of the comparative politics, African 
politics, political communications, and political sociology literature on election 
campaigns, rallies and legitimacy. It clarifies the use and definitions of these key 
concepts  which recur throughout the thesis, and on which it builds its theoretical 
and analytical framework. The chapter defines and discusses types of election 
campaigns, rallies, and legitimacy. In the process it delimits how, and in which 
forms the thesis applied these concepts. It drills explicitly down on the rally-
intensive ground campaign (Paget, 2019) as the most apt description for 
campaign types in new democracies and most applicable to Zimbabwe. It 
showcases types of rallies, i.e. the national or “star” rally and the “ordinary” or 
“local rally, and introduces a third type of rally, the “bigwig” rally as distinct 
from the other two. The chapter sketches out this concept of bigwig rallies and 
how the thesis uses it as a critical indicator of campaign intensity and campaign 
strategy. It also engages the literature on legitimacy to outline the study’s 
understanding of legitimacy, legitimation, and claims to legitimacy. It presents 
the scheme of claims to legitimacy that the thesis uses to engage its empirical 
findings. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 introduces election 
campaigns and defines, debates, and delimits the concept. In section 2.2, it drills 
down on types of campaigns, focusing on the rally-intensive ground campaign 
which it accepts as the underlining assumed type of campaign in the terrain that 
the thesis investigates. Section 2.3 performs a similar task regarding rallies. It 
highlights the national and local rallies as defined in the literature as well as the 
two primary forms that these take in Zimbabwe, i.e. the “star” rally and 
“ordinary” or “local rally. It introduces “bigwig” rallies as distinct from the 
others. This section sketches out what a bigwig rally is in this thesis and attempts 
a mapping that can apply beyond the thesis and beyond characterising ZANU-PF 
rallies. It also explains why the study adopts bigwig rallies as a critical indicator 
of campaign intensity and strategy. Section 2.4 presents a conceptual definition 
of and discussion on legitimacy. It engages the comparative politics and political 
sociology literature on legitimacy from Weber to contemporary understandings 
of claims to legitimacy and types of legitimacy. It presents the study’s 
understanding of legitimacy and outlines the scheme of claims to legitimacy that 
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it uses to engage with this thesis’ empirical findings. It ends by briefly laying out 
the theoretical expectations of the types of claims to legitimacy expected of 
competitive authoritarian regimes. 
2.1 Election Campaigns: Towards A Contextual 
Understanding 
The increased imprint of marketing techniques, the social media revolution, rise 
of satire as an information source, and the advent of big data as critical resources 
to election campaigns have all had an impact on perceptions and definitions of 
what campaigning is. This is especially so in the West, where these developments 
have been rapid. The variety of interests, competencies, targets and perspectives 
on election campaigns have spawned a wide variety of definitions and thoughts 
around what they are within and beyond the field of political science.  
 
Most of the existing campaign literature focuses on electoral campaigns in the 
West, and as such, speaks with a distinct Western accent, evident from definitions 
to theory to empirical applications and manifestations. I reflect this in the brief 
review that I undertake below. In it, I try to move the conversation along, from 
the political communications and comparative politics stylised understandings of 
campaigns to how the scholarship has treated these understandings in the African 
context. In these days, where decolonising the academy is on trend, I am fully 
aware of the legitimate objections to the explanation of African political 
phenomenon by reference to western cannons and archives, which more often 
than not condescendingly treat African political phenomenon as aberrations and 
pathologies of Western  sponsored theories and frames. Nothing would have 
pleased me more in this section, than to review and build on a solid African 
archive and Zimbabwean theories, but the reality, as I qualify in chapter 4, is that 
this archive is either absent or inadequate, forcing us to review and build on 
Western cannons. On account of this, one of the tasks of this thesis is to perform 
a “keep, drop and create” task regarding extant explanations, and in a small way, 
take the opportunity to refine the vocabulary and concepts wherever I can through 
contextualisation. In this chapter, I make a first attempt at this through presenting 
some contextualised understandings of election campaigning in Zimbabwe as 
well as sketching out bigwig rallies. However, it is on comparative politics, 
political sociology and political parties literature on which I build the foundations 
of my theoretic, and then later I use the Zimbabwe focused and African politics 
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literature as the mortar for the analytical façade, that I build in the rest of the 
thesis.  
 
Bates (2005) described election campaigns as moments in an electoral cycle in 
which candidates mobilise large portions of the population for political action. 
This temporary specified understanding is not far from Nimmo’s (1970:9) 
perspective of political campaigns as a form of persuasive communication 
designed to influence the actions of people. The general thrust of these two 
definitions are not in dispute, but beyond them,  Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 
(2003:3) specify political campaigns based on (1.) their intents - to influence the 
process and outcomes of governance, and (2.) the actors who sought to influence 
the outcome of processes of political decision making by shaping public opinion 
and action. This precision advanced the conversation to agendas and actors, and 
closer to an understanding of electoral campaigns as different from broad political 
campaigns, although they are part of this group (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck 2003:5). 
According to Farrell & Schmitt-Beck (2003), in electoral campaigns, competing 
actors (parties or candidates) campaign on a range of issues with electoral success 
as the chief imperative. From this perspective, election campaigns are the 
conduits through which different candidates compete to win votes through 
asserting their capacity and testifying to their competence to lead, serve, decide, 
and command political affairs.  
 
Rose (1967) departs from the above rational vote-maximising campaign 
definitions and suggests that irrational campaign behaviour is just as 
commonplace as the rational variant. His import is that not all parties campaign 
to win elections, thus going against the conceptions of election campaigning 
mentioned above. But why should a party or candidate campaign if not to win? 
In this thesis, I adopt and forward the understanding that it is not always the case 
that political parties campaign to maximise votes, although invariably there is a 
maximisation of campaign efforts at stake. This may mean that while a party is 
not maximising votes to win elections in a particular area, their efforts may still 
contribute to maximising electoral outcomes when aggregated with efforts 
elsewhere. Parties may well campaign as some of the hypotheses in the literature 
suggests, to suppress votes, pilot a run, raise morale, spread patronage, identify 
and strengthen networks, among other things. In this respect, while electoral 
candidates are not maximising votes, their efforts are still tailored towards 
maximising the party's chosen electoral outcome. 
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From a market rationale and exchange theory perspective, Kotler (1999) saw 
election campaigns as political marketing. From this perspective, candidates and 
parties staged election campaigns in a political market, where sellers (the 
politicians) have something of value to trade (representation) to customers (the 
electorate) in return for support (votes). In a similar mould, Downs (1957:137) 
hypothesised that political parties in a democracy formulated policy strictly as a 
means of gaining votes to get into office. To achieve this, they served particular 
interests to get into office, rather than, the generally accepted notion of gaining 
office to serve particular interests. Downs (1957) argues that governments and 
parties act to maximise votes and are akin to entrepreneurs selling policies for 
votes, competing with other parties in the political market, with their final product 
dependent on the nature, type and intensity of the competition for power.   
 
Marketing's contributions to the study of campaigns, especially regarding 
terminology and types of actions is well acknowledged. However, as a discipline, 
it was often chastised for lacking theoretical tools beyond rationalising success 
and or failure in hindsight (Bowler & Farrell, 1992:6). The exchange and or 
consumer model was also adjudged to be a poor fit in politics (Baer, 2018). 
Nonetheless, to adequately cover Rose’s “rational” and “irrational” campaign 
behaviour, I adopt Bowler and Farrell's (1992: 11) definition of campaigns as: 
The process by which a party or candidate seeks to maximize electoral 
gains, consisting of all the efforts (promotional, financial, organisational) 
made by the party or candidate to meet the goal. (Bowler and Farrell, 1992: 
11) 
 
The above definition facilitates the introduction of context into the 
understandings of electoral campaigns. For instance, when Harowitz’ (1985:332) 
conceptualisation of campaigns as exercises in the mobilization of pre-existing 
(often ethnic) cleavages, Lindberg’s (2003) description of electoral campaigns as 
a time for voters to extract resources from politicians, and Makumbe & 
Compagnon’s (2000) dismissal of election campaigns as a smokescreen for illicit 
power retention, are all instances of understandings of election campaigns that 
are moderated by context. They may apply to Kenya, Ghana and Zimbabwe 
respectively, but may not characterise election campaigns in Mozambique, 
Namibia, or Senegal. I raise this, not to suggest that all election campaigns in all 
contexts are idiosyncratic, but to acknowledge that while we can generalise, 
campaigns are also products of context. Campaigns serve multiple purposes and 
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can be rational and irrational, to attain maximisation of electoral gains. For 
instance, I learnt the value of contextual appreciations of campaigning early 
during my fieldwork when I interviewed political party leaders and presidential 
aspirants as well as leading civil society campaigners. MO0410, an Executive 
Director of one of Zimbabwe’s leading advocacy and human rights organisations, 
described electoral campaigns as: 
[A] programme to achieve massive support from citizens regarding its 
objectives, aims and impact. It is defined by how it is rolled out to the 
communities in an effort for a candidate or party to be liked, and or 
supported (MO0410-Interview, 2017).  
 
MO0410’s conception of electoral campaigns raised two exciting points which 
brought out different shades of campaigning. He explicitly mentioned campaigns 
as a programme (deliberate, planned effort) where candidates seek to “be liked” 
which connotes persuasion, but also “to be supported” as a different element 
suggesting that citizens could support candidates without liking them. 
 
Nelson Chamisa, the leading presidential election challenger in Zimbabwe's 2018 
election, and former opposition MDC-T Organising Secretary offered an 
elaborate understanding of campaigns during an interview for this study.  He 
outlined what he called the political frame within which ZANU-PF forced 
political competitors to fit and campaign hinged on four elements. Chamisa 
termed the first element the material dimensions, expressed in Lindberg like 
terms as a period when the campaigner is giving something to the electorate. He 
opined that "even giving a cup of rice or a small tin of beans or a cup of maize 
seed from a 25kg bag, solar-powered torches, will make a difference and 
meaning" (Chamisa1010-Interview, 2017). The second element he expressed was 
the temporality of campaigning, expressed as the seasonal and non- continuous 
nature of the campaign period in an election year. He shared that: 
Campaigning is always around elections. The visibility and presence of the 
campaigner or politician is around them trying to come and solicit favour, 
assistance or votes from the electorate. For ZANU-PF, this is a bribe in 
some cases, and other cases, it’s an open carrot system (Chamisa1010-
Interview, 2017).  
 
The third element that Chamisa mentioned was persuasion. He, however, noted 
that for ZANU-PF, campaigning appeared to be a moral obligation, “to be seen 
to be there not necessarily to get a vote, but just to fulfil the rituals” 
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(Chamisa1010-Interview, 2017). The last element he mentioned was coercion, 
which he credited to “Zimbabwe's authoritarian nature”. 
 
The above conceptions constitute part of the concrete reality regarding 
campaigning in Zimbabwe. While both civil society and opposition party 
interlocutors claimed to have an alternative conception, it was never fully 
enunciated. Both the cited conversations placed on the table, the concrete realities 
of both the persuasive (liked) and coercive elements of electoral campaigns in 
Zimbabwe, a contention that most conceptions of election campaigns in the West 
would not consider as part of campaigning.  
 
With this understanding, I explore as much as possible “all the efforts made by 
the party or candidate to maximise electoral gains” at different levels (national 
and subnational). In doing this, I produce a portfolio of legitimacy-seeking and 
non-legitimacy seeking campaign strategies and tactics. The intention is to 
present a "holistic portfolio" of campaign strategies that include illicit and licit 
campaign strategies and tactics. Like Brierley & Kramon (2018:1), I appreciate 
that these strategies are not mutually exclusive of each other and explore how 
ZANU-PF deployed them across different local political contexts and times. 
2.2 Election Campaign Types & The Rally-Intensive Ground 
Campaign 
Most of the literature on campaign taxonomies deal with categorisation from an 
evolution or modernisation perspective (Norris, 2004; Gibson & Römmele, 2001; 
Gibson, Römmele, & Ward, 2004). Others refer to this as stages of campaign 
professionalisation (Farrell & Webb, 2000), ages of political communication 
(Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999) or orders of political communication 
(Epstein’2018). Resultantly, what emerges are types of campaigns associated 
with the state of modernisation, especially of communication and channelling 
technologies. Theorists of modernisation, understood as both the literal 
adaptation to modern needs and the Weberian and Parsonian model of 
progressive societal transition from pre-modern traditional society to a modern 
one, see structural changes at the macro level as causing adaptive change at the 
micro-level. Transnational diffusion theorists argue a uni-directional 
convergence process where American practices (and practitioners) and axioms 
influence electoral campaign management and execution abroad (Schafferer, 
2006; Plasser, 2000). Plasser & Plasser (2002:17) saw these changes in media, 
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political and social structures as impacting parties, candidates and journalists, 
resulting in gradual modifications of traditional styles of campaigning and 
strategies of political communication.  
 
Norris (2004) argued that these changes were not an " Americanisation" per se 
but could be understood as part of the modernization process rooted in 
technological and political developments common to many post-industrial 
societies. She added that the changes were also highly contingent on context, i.e. 
electoral system, campaign regulation, and organisational resources (Norris, 
2004:3). Norris (2000; 2004) advanced a theoretical typological framework that 
showed the evolution of campaigns from the pre-modern (often called traditional) 
to the modern and post-modern. According to Norris (2004:3), pre-modern 
campaigns display three main characteristics, i.e. interpersonal communications 
between candidates and citizens at a local level, extensive use of the partisan press 
as the intermediary between parties and the public, and strong party loyalties. As 
Scammell (1999) put it, these kinds of campaigns were by armies of volunteers, 
canvassing, leafleting, organizing meetings, and mobilising supporters to turnout 
on election day. They were low technology affairs, and the local party managed 
the campaign and decisions thereof, in a local-active campaign (Norris, 2004). 
More central coordination, the entry of professional consultants, with the news 
media, especially television, becoming the principal locus of campaign events 
characterised modern campaigns (Norris, 2004). These modern campaigns are 
capital intensive, rely on a much smaller base of volunteers and more central 
direction of campaign operations. They rely more on non-party experts (pollsters, 
media and image consultants, and marketers), involve far less face-to-face 
communication with voters, and increasingly target floating voters (Scammell, 
1999).  
 
Despite the salience of the modernisation thesis and its attendant categorisation 
of campaign types, Nickerson & Rogers (2014) argue that modern innovations 
have not radically transformed campaigning in quiet the same radical fashion that 
television did in the 1960s in developed economies. This is true in advanced 
democracies and also in emerging or new democracies and competitive 
authoritarian settings. Norris accepted this. She argued that the features of her 
model varied from place to place and that rather than replacements, each 
evolution stage supplements rather than replaces direct forms of campaigning in 
the pre-modern category (Norris, 2004:4). 
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Given the above, rather than pure types, campaigns embody hybridity dependent 
on context. This is a function of not just electoral systems, organisation capacity, 
and campaign regulations as Norris posited, but also media environments (plural 
or closed media space), and technological advancements (Epstein, 2018; 
Chadwick, 2013). Whether, and how, these technological developments impact 
campaigning, and campaign type also goes beyond these technological and media 
innovations. It includes other modernisation related variables like spatial and 
economic inequalities, urbanisation, education and development amongst other 
things, as factors that affect whether and how constituents adopt technology as 
part of their access to political and campaign information. For instance, although 
television may have revolutionised campaigning in the West in the 1950s and 
1960s, in Africa today, it plays second fiddle to the radio which remains the 
medium of the people. This is true of countries with different democratic and 
authoritarian credentials. For instance, Ghana, which is Africa's poster child for 
democracy and enjoys a free media environment, 56% of Ghanaians, across all 
levels of education listen to the radio daily and see it as their primary source of 
news and politics. Social media lags at 15% in terms of everyday use,  although 
TV is not far behind the radio at 42% (Isbell & Appiah-Nyamekye, 2018). Across 
Africa, Conroy-Krutz & Appiah-Nyaekye Sanny (2019) report that the highest 
proportion, 42%, access information through daily radio consumption, 34% 
through TV, while new technologies, the internet and social media though rising 
(from 13% and 14% respectively in 2015), are at 18% and 19% daily 
consumption rates respectively. 
 
These realities impact the extent to which campaigning in Africa has 
"modernised" and renders the typologies posited by most of the literature on 
political communication, marketing and campaigns, ill-fitting to the African 
context. Developing a taxonomy of campaign types and attendant strategies was 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I agree with Paget (2019:446) that the 
rally is still the predominant form of campaign communication in Africa, 
dwarfing other forms of campaign engagement. Further, I endorse his 
modification of Norris' campaign types through the development of an alternative 
schema, but one that is devoid of the modernist and patronising nomenclature that 
Norris and others adopted. Paget (2019:454) outlines these as; the ground-
intensive campaign, the mass-media intensive campaign, and the hybrid 
campaign ecology. He further distinguishes these ecologies on the rally-
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intensiveness of the ground campaign as a something present in all other 
campaign types, creating a dimension on which all these other types could place, 
as well as a fourth ideal type, the rally-intensive campaign. Rally-intensive 
campaigns " are those in which the ground campaign is rally-intensive, and the 
campaign as a whole is ground campaign-intensive" (Paget, 2019: 454). He distils 
four features of the rally-intensive campaign as follows: national and local 
leadership efforts into convening rallies, aggregate rally attendance, mass 
meetings versus canvassing as campaign contact, and rally production (Paget, 
2019:446). 
 
Paget (2019) is joined by some relatively recent literature that also acknowledges 
that traditional rally-intensive campaigns are still the order of the day in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This literature focuses on diverse elements like campaign 
resource targeting across different types of electoral constituencies (Brierley & 
Kramon, 2018) ethnic mobilisation and campaign targeting (Cheeseman & 
Lamar, 2015; Harowitz, 2016), messaging, rally performance, appeals and 
contesting populisms (Tendi, 2013; Cheeseman & Lamar, 2015; Lamar & Fraser, 
2007; Southall, 2013; Moore, 2014). While some of it does not focus enough on 
the campaigns themselves, the majority of this literature uses election campaigns 
as part of the explanations for election outcomes, which is part of what I argue in 
this thesis. This expands the African politics conversation beyond received 
wisdom around incumbency advantages, violence and fraud (Cheeseman & 
Klass, 2018; Collier & Vicente, 2012; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008). It paves 
the way for much-needed analyses of elections that includes results and campaign 
strategies that account for those results, bearing in mind that legitimacy-seeking 
and non-legitimacy seeking tactics are not mutually exclusive in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 
This above shift in conversation is also important when allied with other literature 
that has begun to dispel the notions of "issuelessness" of African electoral 
contests and clawing back on the neo-patrimonial African story. For instance, 
Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis (2017) showed that government performance was 
integral to Ghanaian voters during the 2016 polls and perceptions of failure to 
deliver on crucial economic and programmatic issues contributed to the 
incumbent losing the presidency. Brierley & Kramon (2018) argued that ground 
campaigning, beyond just canvassing or organising rallies also offered candidates 
and activists opportunities to discuss national and local policies. While in 
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Zambia, Baldwin (2013) showed that contrary to perceptions of Africa's rural 
voters as following their putative local patrons when voting due to vote-buying 
and deference, they made considered inferential decisions around the 
development and provision of local public goods to inform their decisions. In 
Zimbabwe, both Tendi (2013) and Zamchiya (2013) focusing on ZANU-PF and 
opposition MDC-T campaigns respectively, also showed how issues, ideas and 
programs appeared to be the centrepieces of each parties’ campaigns. As Tendi 
(2013:967) and Zamchiya (2013:956-7) show, Land, indigenisation, sanctions, 
and the liberation war (for ZANU-PF), and social and economic values, 
education, jobs, rural and urban housing, foreign direct investment (for the MDC) 
were clear campaign issues supported by facades of ideas on tackling them. This 
understanding, as I will show in later chapters, was shared by a significant number 
of other scholars (like Moore, 2014; Southall, 2013 and others). 
 
The above literature motivates for a closer look at electoral campaigns in Africa, 
with an eye for testing the extent of a shift from violence and fraud narratives to 
a more substantive politics around issues, and the extent to which these disjointed 
logics exist side by side. They call for a closer look at whether there is a more 
deliberate logic to campaign strategies of political parties in new democracies and 
competitive authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis attempts to 
do the above using ZANU-PF's electoral campaigns in 2008 and 2013. The 
centrepiece of this analysis is the study of bigwig rally distribution across 
constituency types, and the kind of appeals made thereof. I tie this to local politics 
to present a mid-level and national analysis of ZANU-PF's 2008 and 2013 
presidential election campaigns. However, as a precursor to this analysis and for 
purposes of properly grounding this thesis, the next section briefly engages the 
concept of and literature on political parties before getting into rallies and fleshing 
out the thesis' conceptualisation of bigwig rallies and why I give them pride of 
place in this study. 
2.3 Rallies: “Star” “Ordinary” And “Bigwig” Rallies  
The impression of rallies as expensive, messy outdoor mixtures of entertainment 
and political discourse culminating in a speech by a presidential candidate is 
relatively widespread (Langstone & Rosas, 2018). Despite the archaic nature of 
the rally as a technology and their preponderance in Norris' pre-modern type of 
campaign, they are still the mainstay of campaigning in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
other parts of the world that are yet to reach the liberal democratic destination 
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(Paget, 2019; Szwarcberg, 2012; Langstone & Rosas, 2018). However, while the 
focus on presidential candidates speaks to the national nature of elections, in this 
thesis, I draw attention to the fact that rallies at which the presidential candidate 
addresses, referred to in the Zimbabwean context as "star rallies", is only one type 
of rally. Following, Holbrook (1999:156) I draw attention to the reality that 
presidential campaigns are conducted at many levels beyond the national and 
local levels and have scope for different types of interlocutors and main speakers, 
as I will expand on below. 
 
Paget (2019:451) defines a rally as a public event at which speakers address an 
audience face-to-face for the ostensible purpose of politically mobilizing it. 
Paget's definition, while clear on rally's setting (public), mode of engagement 
(face-to-face) and purpose (political mobilisation), leaves the issue of who is 
mobilising open (agency) and restricts the purpose of the rally (to mobilising). 
Gilman (2009:339) offers a purpose/intention driven definition with form, 
intention and meaning as other vital characteristics. She sees the rally as a set of 
elaborate performances (form) orchestrated to disseminate political messages and 
promote political parties and candidates (intention and purpose). Gilman speaks 
to the agency by arguing that rallies are controlled through the party higher-ups 
in charge of producing the rally and determining key aspects (timing, venue, 
content, sequence and physical placement of the rallies various components). The 
aspect of control is critical because outside achieving stated goals, the rally must 
also minimise the possibilities of dissent and achieving unintended consequences 
(Jourde, 2005). Gilman (2009), based on her study of rallies in Malawi paints a 
picture of the rally as also characterised by dynamic and multiple performances 
which include slogans, praise-singing, speeches, dances and visual symbols. The 
rally, outside its location, who controls it, and its purpose, is also a unique feature 
of ground campaigning. This stems from its designation as an event that is outside 
the day to day activities of constituents and party agents alike. It is a special 
occasion also delineated from other events by the types of participants and 
activities that it is associated with.  
 
Paget (2019) limits the purpose or intention of the rally to mobilising in his 
definition. I argue that, because of the primacy of the rally as a campaign tool in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and limited penetration of new communication technologies, 
the rally serves similar communication functions as the broader campaign. In this 
respect, rallies in most places outside major urban centres become the channel 
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through which constituents are informed, agendas set, issues framed, and 
positions primed (Sceufele & Tewksbury, 2006).  Although Gilman (2009) 
focuses on the performative role of the rally, rallies are more than political theatre, 
and as Jones (1998) argues, rallies inform, exhort, and influence their publics. 
Conroy-Krutz’s (2016) study in Uganda, where until recently elections and 
campaigns have been uncompetitive, showed that election campaigns had a 
tremendous contribution to voters’ political knowledge across class and societal 
cleavages. Also, because rallies are spectacles and not ordinary day to day events 
(Gilman, 2009), they attract the attention of voters and the media. They can be 
broadcast through various technologies from word of mouth to the press, beyond 
attendees of the rallies. This broadcast communicates important messages around 
electoral viability, access to social services. Also because of the station and 
stature of speakers, rallies can act as a call to action through encouraging people 
to participate in the electoral process (mobilisation) and directly persuading 
citizens to vote for the candidate (Jones, 1998).  
 
The above is the good side of rallies, but they can also be a tool for itinerant 
rulership in service of authoritarianism. In this mould, rallies become a 
manifestation of authority where the very presence of the incumbent, even as an 
election candidate, makes their "infallibility" and power tangible (Jourde, 2005; 
Wedeen, 1999). It is partly in this way that rallies also become a theatre and a 
performance conveying to attendees’ specific definitions and conceptions of 
reality (Goffman,1951 cited in Jourde, 2005:425). They broadcast power, and in 
addition to giving out information and framing certain conceptions of reality, 
rallies can also gather information about the organisational strength of the party 
organisation on the ground, and also act as an intimidating feet to opponents. 
  
Given the existence of the national campaign space, as well as the provincial, 
administrative district, constituency, ward, branch, and cell in Zimbabwe 
campaign space, rallies differ. Paget's (2019) rally intensive ground campaign 
ecology spells out national and local rallies. These rallies differ in size, scope, 
speakers and attendees. In the Zimbabwean context, the national rallies are star 
rallies. Star rallies usually occur at the provincial level, with every party 
organisational structure required to both mobilise for and attend the rally. At these 
rallies, the presidency addresses and attendees are bussed in from all corners of 
the host province and beyond (Makumbe, 1991:182). Very rarely is the 
president’s speaking role delegated. Usually, when this happens, the rally seizes 
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to be referred to as a star rally, but it is also not a local one. Local or ordinary 
rallies have the same pomp and fanfare as the star rally, with the same intents but 
are organised at the constituency level and below. Marongwe (2013) describes 
these rallies as carnivals where political education and articulation of party policy 
takes place, interposed with a wide variety of spoken and sung entertainment 
utilising a variety of instruments like drums (Ngoma), whistles (pito), and other 
percussion instruments (Marongwe, 2013: 258). This carnival nature of ordinary 
rallies is replicated at star rallies where famous music stars provide entertainment 
together with party musical groups. The entertainment is meant to act as a time 
management device in between speakers, and also as a morale-boosting exercise 
(morari).  
 
The literature on rallies in Zimbabwe is relatively limited despite the prevalence 
of rallies. The little that exists focuses on the two types of campaigns covering 
the national and local rally activity. I coined the concept of "the bigwig rally" to 
denote rallies that take place at the figurative mid-point between the local and the 
national configurations. Bigwig rallies are rallies presided over by senior 
members of the party at the highest level, the praesidium. They include star rallies 
because the party president, whose address defines the star rally, is also a member 
of the praesidium, joining a small circle which includes a president’s deputy, 
party chair and secretary general, where they exist. The bigwig rally is defined 
by the presence and honouring of these officials more than by location. As such, 
a bigwig rally can take place in a constituency to cover that constituency only, or 
the district within which the constituency is located. Because of the inclusion of 
the presidential candidate or party president as a bigwig, rallies can therefore also 
attract a province wide audience. What differentiates them from orthodox 
national rallies or star rallies in Zimbabwe’s case, is that the president doesn’t 
have to be the main attraction, any member of the praesidium can be the main 
attraction. What separates bigwig rallies from local rallies, is that no one else 
outside the praesidium is considered a bigwig for purposes of this study. I am 
aware that for a big party like ZANU-PF, all 49 members of the politburo are 
party bigwigs, but I limit that to the top 4 or 5 officials because these are the ones 
who operate nationally whereas everyone else, in the politburo and central 
committee are seconded from and to represent provinces. As such, central 
committee members, politburo members, members of parliament and provincial 
leaders are not included in this thesis’ definition of bigwigs and their rallies. 
Although, this thesis does not focus on them, for the opposition party bigwigs 
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would include the party president, his two deputies, party chairperson and the 
secretary-general (top 5).  
 
The choice to sketch out the bigwig rally was not arbitrary. I made it after 
reviewing the literature and newspapers where I realised that it was not just the 
party presidents who conducted national rallies across the provinces. As Tendi 
(2013) notes, ZANU-PF made use of its Vice President, Joyce Mujuru, during 
the 2013 election. I will show that this applied to party chairperson Simon Khaya 
Moyo, as well who campaigned extensively in particular locations in 2013. In 
short, the following characteristics differentiate bigwig rallies from their star and 
local counterparts: 
1. They are a public partisan mass meeting at which a member of a party’s 
praesidium or top five leadership is the main speaker and primary guest.  
2. They are organised by regional party leaders (i.e. inter-district or 
provincial leaderships not district, ward or cell members,) party in liaison 
with provincial and national party structures and organs. 
3. They are explicitly staged in the run-up to elections to drum up support 
for a national presidential candidate and local members of parliament in 
a region. 
4. The speeches, messages, and appeals made speak to both national and 
local issues and questions and are geared for a cross-sectional audience 
of locals and other national audiences.   
5. Despite their location ( in a constituency, at a business centre, or school) 
they have at least administrative district-wide reach increasing to 
province-wide and national reach, especially when the party president or 
presidential candidate is the main attraction.  
6. They are always mass gatherings to project strength and popularity of the 
party and are a measure of the mobilising capacities of local notables. 
7. Attendance is open to the public and local party members for whom 
attendance is treated locally as a measure of commitment and loyalty to 
the party 
 
In this thesis, I use the bigwig rally as a proxy for campaign intensity given the 
extra amount of effort in organising that goes into their production. This effort is 
usually in addition to local campaign activity that is expected of political 
operators on the ground on during on a regular basis. The bigwig rally comes in 
as an addition and not a replacement of regular local campaigning and indicates 
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a vital investment of additional capacity, resources ( human and material) and 
attention for ZANU-PF. These additional political investments set the 
constituency that is visited apart from those that are not. Because of this, bigwig 
rallies are an excellent indicator of the areas that ZANU-PF prioritised and were 
(possibly) integral to ZANU-PF's electoral fortunes and signalled which kinds of 
voters ZANU-PF targeted in its campaigns. 
 
To my knowledge, bigwig rallies as a critical variable have not been used in 
studies of Zimbabwean politics and sub-Saharan Africa. However, I see their 
categorisation, characterisation, and profiling as a proxy for campaign intensity 
as a critical academic end. This is because the amount of organisational and 
political legwork that members of the praesidium put in during elections and the 
heightened political and organisational activity in the locale visited suggest an 
increase in political activity, if not campaign intensity. The effort that goes into 
the making of such rallies is complex and demands extraordinary effort to ensure 
that bigwigs are not embarrassed, for instance by empty chairs at rallies or by a 
hostile audience. Bigwig rally production is both a test of the popularity of the 
party and of the ability of the local leadership to mobilise participants and create 
a good impression of themselves to national leaders. Besides the increased 
investment in organising on the ground, bigwig visits also signal an increased 
investment in clientelist handouts from both local notables and the visiting 
bigwigs. Bigwigs ordinarily do not travel empty-handed, and they are better 
placed to leverage the incumbency advantage to distribute campaign largesse. In 
the context of scarce material resources and limited time, bigwig visits are a good 
indicator of where the party places its priorities.  
 
Nevertheless, I use bigwig rallies to offer a layer of analysis that brings the 
national and local campaigns into fuller perspective. This analysis allows one to 
explore the middle layer, often missing, between the star and ordinary rallies, 
national and local campaigning, and the presidential candidate and the grassroots. 
This synthesising role of the bigwig visit also allows the study to escape the 
dangers of over-generalisation and the "mean spirited-ness" usually associated 
with national unit analyses. It also allows me to escape the parochialism of purely 
local (subnational) unit analysis. The local unit analysis is often disconnected and 
separated from broader developments at regional and national levels. 
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The analytical strategy adopted in this thesis also allows the thesis to escape the 
usual, (although at times warranted) conflations of party leader with party and 
party with the state. By going beyond 'the' party leader to the party leadership 
(bigwigs), the study treats ZANU-PF as an organisation. It avoids treating the 
party leader as the personification of, and a replacement for, the party. It this way, 
the thesis also then treats ZANU-PF as more than its occupation of and conflation 
with the state or a regime, and analyses it as a political party, without forgetting 
that it controlled the state and enjoyed attendant incumbency advantages. 
 
2.4 Legitimacy, Political Legitimacy, & Claims To Legitimacy 
I build part of my analytical framework for this thesis around authoritarian 
regimes' need to mobilise consent, secure compliance, and legitimacy. I draw on 
theories of legitimacy like Weber's (1978) theory of domination and typologies 
of legitimacy, as well as political legitimacy (Barker, 1990; Beetham, 1991) and 
claims to legitimacy (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017). I also draw on theoretical 
accounts of how authoritarian regimes seek consent, including but not limited to 
the theoretical work by De Mesquita et al. (2002). 
  
I attempt to bring Weber's theory of domination and legitimacy into congruence 
with Levitsky & Way's (2002; 2010) competitive authoritarianism - a regime type 
that was non-existent at the time of Weber's theorising. I proceed on the 
assumption that despite ageing, Weber's theory can still aid the explanation of 
characteristics, not just of democratic states, but also of authoritarian hybrids. I 
base this assumption on the premise that patterns of legitimation define regimes, 
and that it is from these patterns of legitimation that historically and theoretically 
sound answers can be found (Weber, 1978; Beetham, 1991, Baker, 1990). I 
approach my analysis in this thesis from a process and sequencing perspective. I 
attempt to find the roots of legitimation of the competitive authoritarian ZANU-
PF regime in the claims to legitimacy it makes as a political party on the campaign 
trail. I discern the claims to legitimacy from the appeals ZANU-PF makes and 
the modes of politics it employs at the national and subnational levels during its 
presidential election campaigns.   
 
While the particulars of this thesis and the case it makes are specific to the study 
of ZANU-PF's election campaigns in 2008 and 2013, the assumptions mentioned 
above follow a robust scholarly tradition. Rothchild (1979:44) argued that to 
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understand the criteria that are used to attribute legitimacy to a system or regime, 
the priority is to establish what the political elites offer as theories or claims to 
legitimacy. These are usually discernible at the point of interaction between the 
state and its agents with constituents or society (Crook, 1987:554) within the 
realm of legal institutions and "impersonal" due process (Poggi, 1978:102). In 
this regard, I consider the manifestations of Zimbabwe's party-state legitimacy as 
the effects of the ruling party's claims to and appeals for legitimacy at the point 
of its interface with society (the campaign) within an established legal framework 
(the election). It is this premise that I test on the 2008 and 2013 presidential 
elections in Zimbabwe. I do this through connecting the dots from campaign 
targeting choices through bigwig rallies, to appeals made, claims inferred, as well 
as subnational politics employed as indicative of the type of legitimacy sought 
and reasons for campaigning that this infers. More recently, the above approach 
has been recommended by von Soest & Grauvogel (2017) who analyse the 
different foundations upon which various regimes claim legitimacy, focusing on 
the 'supply-side' of legitimacy, i.e. claims to legitimacy and endorsement or 
rejection by citizens (von Haldenwang, 2016). von Soest & Grauvogel accept that 
legitimation strategies or claims to legitimacy can be both instrumental 
manipulations to safeguard political power or sincere beliefs of the political elite. 
When sincere, these appeals can be of strategic value and may also express 
political elites’  true convictions about their perceived entitlement to rule (von 
Soest & Grauvogel, 2017:288-289).	 
 
Although the distinctions are not always clear, this study approaches legitimacy 
as both a normative and an empirical concept. Normatively, legitimacy is 
concerned with standards that actors, institutions or political orders must conform 
to in order to be considered legitimate. Empirically, legitimacy is about whether, 
how, and why people accept (or reject) actors or institutions (Bellina, Darbon, 
Eriksen, & Sending, 2009:8). Weber, in his theory of domination (Herrschaft), 
ventures an empirical definition of legitimacy as the belief in the rightfulness of 
a given institutionalised authority, domination or rule (Weber: 1978: 53). Weber 
(1978: 213) bases his theory of legitimacy on three ideal types of authority based 
on kinds of claims to legitimacy. These include: (1.) Legal-Rational Authority, 
which is legitimacy based on the belief in the authority of rules established by 
formally correct procedures. Under this ideal type, citizens owe obedience to 
impersonal rules and to a Beamte/officer whose authority comes from the 
impersonal rules. (2.) Traditional authority, which is legitimacy based on a belief 
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in the sanctity of tradition where citizens owe obedience to the person of 
Herr/Lord. Personal discretion within the spirit of traditional norms and 
obligations determine the Herr's sphere of authority. (3.) Charismatic 
Authority/domination, which is legitimacy - based on the belief in the exceptional 
qualities of an outstanding individual, with citizens owing obedience to the 
person of the Fuehrer/leader, whose authority stands outside any rule or 
precedent, and depends on the continued demonstration of charismatic qualities. 
 
In the above sense, legitimacy is an abstract concept where political authority is 
both based on the authority's stated claim to legitimacy, as well as the moral basis 
and belief on which its subjects render compliance to that Authority (Crook, 
1987:553). Weber (1978) is clear that while legitimacy is usually a concomitant 
of authority, it is not a necessary condition of rule because rulers can also acquire 
subordination to authority through coercion. However, when we approach 
legitimacy empirically, greater use of coercion, rights violations and low 
indicators of popular support (for instance at elections) are indicative of and may 
lead to, low legitimacy (Easton, 1965:163). The import of Easton's intervention, 
shared by Dogan (2009:209),  is that the legitimacy of any regime is always based 
on the consent of only part of the population. This can be argued to rest on the 
consent of what De Mesquita et al. (2002) referred to as the winning coalition 
within the selectorate, through which the regime receives diffuse support (Easton 
1965). This understanding of legitimacy is key to this study. However, support, 
though closely related to legitimacy, and a critical node of it- express consent 
(Beetham, 1991), it is not the same as legitimacy. As noted earlier, in the 
discussion on campaigning, political parties can aim for political support 
knowing that this they can coerce this support. This coercion can be on account 
of rationalities of fear and asserted beliefs in the superior morality of a ruler. 
Support can also be attained based on persuasion founded on rationalities of 
gains, benefits, habit, and performance (Weber, 1978; Marquez, 2016; 
Haldenwang, 2016:6).  
 
As the conceptualisations of legitimacy above indicate, not all strategies that 
allow for power retention promote a bid for domination – conceptualised as 
power and legitimacy – equally, or even as the same type of legitimacy, or 
uniformly. Boone (2003) argued for a variegated understanding of the 
topographies of the African state, showing that different subnational territories 
can be imbued with different sets of institutions, which impact authority 
73 
 
differently. I will show in this thesis that the same institutional differences are 
understood by incumbents who then model their attempts at securing consent and 
legitimacy based on the requirements of different political and socio-economic 
topographies, based on a clear spatial logic. It is this that perhaps saves Weber’s 
(1978) theory from being as anachronistic, simplistic, and ill-suited to explain the 
political legitimacy of the modern state as, for instance, Dogan (2009); Beetham 
(1991) and Matheson (1987) allege. I categorically disagree with Dogan 
(2009:195), who argues that traditional and charismatic authority are no longer 
present in the current political conjuncture. I argue that Weber's theory still has 
some applicability and explanatory power. This is because of the varying political 
topographies of the African state, where regimes and parties may use different 
types of appeals and strategies across space to acquire consent and win the hearts 
and minds of voters. They also do this, often selectively but, within the confines 
of the constitution and notional acceptance of the supremacy of the will of the 
people (Friedrich, 1974:37). 
 
Matheson (1987:199) concedes that, while Weber's classification is triadic, it 
comprises five separate principles of legitimation: convention, sacredness, 
personal ties, personal qualities and rationality, which retain complexity.  
Beetham (1991:42-43) however, argues for greater precision and argues that that 
political power is legitimate to the extent that (1.) It is acquired and exercised 
following the rules or laws (Legality). (2.) The rules or laws embody an 
acknowledged principle of political authority, regarding which they can be 
justified (Normative Justifiability). (3.) There is evidence of express consent to 
authority on the part of those qualified to give it (Express Consent). By Beetham's 
concession, all his elements are hidden in and can be pulled out of Weber's 
typology (1991: 42). Weber (1978) has consent as the cornerstone of his theory 
by definition and typology.  
 
However, while both Weber (1978) and Beetham (1991)’s types of legitimacy 
and political legitimacy are useful heuristics, for my empirical analysis I adopt 
von Soest & Grauvogel’s (2017:288) approach of analysing legitimacy through 
the analysis of legitimation as a strategy used to seek legitimacy, rather than 
legitimacy itself. I also adopt their six authoritarian regimes legitimacy claims 
and use them as the benchmark for observation in the empirical chapters of this 
thesis. von Soest & Grauvogel (2017:290-291) describe the six claims are as 
follows: 
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8. Foundational myths: where ruling elites and parties refer to their role 
in the state-building process to legitimate their rule. This build from 
Beetham (1991:103) who argues that argues that historical accounts are 
significant precisely because of their relationship to the legitimacy of 
power in the present. It also borrows from Levitsky & Way (2012:5)  who 
argue, with Zimbabwe in mind, that strong solidarity ties established 
during periods of violent struggle such as war, revolutions, and liberation 
movements are often used as compelling legitimation narratives. 
9. Ideology: Following Easton (1975) and Linz (2000) this speaks to 
narratives regarding the righteousness of a given political order, and 
ideology as denotative of a belief system intended to create a collective 
identity and or a specific societal order.	 
10. Personalism: Pertains to a discourse focusing on the ruler to boost their 
appeal. It comprises two aspects: (1.) Following Weber (1978: 133–136) 
and Fagen (1965:275–277), it refers to charismatic authority as an 
important source of legitimacy stemming from the ‘extraordinary 
personality’ and leadership qualities of a leader who is portrayed as 
chosen ‘from above’ to fulfil a particular mission and as having 
traditional authority. (2.) Following Isaacs (2010) and Nelson (1984), it 
also refers to a discursive mechanism that emphasises the ruler’s 
centrality to specific achievements such as the nation’s unity, prosperity, 
and stability. 
11. Procedure: This includes attempts to create procedural legitimacy based 
on the carrying out of elections and other rule-based mechanisms for 
handing over power through ‘orderly’	process.  
12. Performance: Following Easton (1965) this is based on the notion of 
specific support, which refers to regime legitimacy that stems from 
success in satisfying citizens’	needs. It focuses on the extent to which 
there is deliberate citation of real or imagined achievements and fulfilling 
societal demands (material welfare and security).  
13. International Engagement: Not to be mistaken with external 
legitimacy; this speaks to how regimes use external engagements as 
legitimation narratives at home. 
 
The above claims to legitimacy constitute the categories that I use throughout the 
thesis’ empirical chapters to organise the appeals that ZANU-PF officials made 
during bigwig visits to various constituencies. In the process I also test  von Soest 
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& Grauvogel’s (2017) expectations around the kinds of appeals that rulers in 
competitive authoritarian regimes make to claim legitimacy.  They lay out several 
expectations, some of which this thesis serendipitously assesses. Following 
Schedler (2013:121), who assumes that the institution of elections fundamentally 
changes how rulers relate to society because of the institution of the principle of 
popular consent, even when this may be subverted in in practice, von Soest & 
Grauvogel (2017:292) expect that competitive authoritarian regimes will focus 
strongly on procedural claims to legitimacy-Expectation 1. In addition, they also 
assume that all types of regimes need output legitimacy and following Easton 
(1965) they expect competitive authoritarian regimes to strengthen beliefs in their 
economic, distributional and security performance. So, performance-based 
claims to legitimacy - Expectation 4 - should be central to competitive 
authoritarian regimes as well (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017:293). This study’s 
focus on bigwig rallies and the appeals that ZANU-PF made on the campaign 
trail in 2008 and 2013 present a ready-made testing field for the above stated 
assumptions and expectations, and I duly oblige. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented overviews of the comparative politics, African politics and 
political sociology literature on competitive authoritarianism, election 
campaigns, rallies, and legitimacy. It defined, debated and adopted, as 
appropriate, these key terms and concepts that will recur in the thesis and are the 
foundation of its analytical frameworks. It specifically focussed on the rally-
intensive ground campaign which it adopts as the most appropriate campaign type 
to characterise the campaigns that it studies. It did the same with rallies, where it 
first outlines popular and scholarly characterisations of the national also referred 
to as star rallies (in Zimbabwe)  and local also referred to as ordinary rallies (in 
Zimbabwe). It clarified the understanding of star rallies. It introduced a third 
form, the bigwig rally, as a distinct type of rally from the star and ordinary rallies 
or national and local rallies. It sketched out this concept and differentiated it from 
its appears, and also justified its adoption and use in this thesis as an indicator of 
campaign intensity. Last, the chapter highlighted the six claims to legitimacy and 
expectations on what kinds of claims to legitimacy competitive authoritarian 
regimes make. These claims and expectations inform the analyses of causal 
process observations in the rest of the thesis. I operationalise these claims to 
legitimacy by way of broad theoretical statements and hypotheses in the next 
chapter, chapter 3. In addition to the broad theoretical statements and hypotheses, 
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Chapter 3 will also present and justify this thesis’ research design, case and site 
selection. It also maps the thesis’ scope conditions, report on the implementation 
of the research design, and outlines the data collection methods that the study 
utilised.  
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3 THE NESTED SUBNATIONAL COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
COLLECTION METHODS  
 
The research for this study utilised a design that combined the Nested Analysis 
(Lieberman, 2005) and the Subnational Comparative Method (Snyder, 2001) 
research designs. The combination yielded a consolidated framework, the Nested 
Subnational Comparative Analysis, with the amalgamation benefiting 
tremendously from the strengths of each design. The nested analysis involves the 
systematic mixing of methods in a unified manner, combining the statistical 
analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more 
of the cases contained within the large sample/Large-N (Lieberman, 2005:435-
436). The subnational comparative method entails scaling down the sample of 
cases to conduct systematic comparison of two or more subnational cases in a 
controlled comparative fashion to discern subnational variation (Snyder, 
2001:95; Sinha, 2003).  
 
The study employed this amalgamation to conduct a nested subnational 
comparative analysis of ZANU-PF's presidential election campaigns in 2008 and 
2013. Through this, the study was able to examine its research questions and draw 
inferences on why ZANU-PF campaigned. 
 
This chapter outlines this research design.  It justifies the design choice ( Section 
3.1) and the case selection criteria and justification for studying ZANU-PF 
campaigns as cases (Section 3.2). In the same breath, it outlines the study's scope 
conditions. Section 3.3 briefs the reader on the step by step implementation 
process that occurred for the study. It shares the implications that the research 
process has for analysis. Section 3.4 outlines how the critical element of 
constituency type was developed and operationalised in this study while Section 
3.5 outlines the study's broad theoretical propositions and the hypothesis that 
support them. Section 3.6 covers how data was collected for the study to inform 
casual process observations. It ends the chapter by explaining the sampling 
strategies for document analysis, archival research and interviews, as well as a 
methodological note on the use and citation of newspapers in the study. 
 
 
78 
 
3.1 Research Design Justification 
 
Both the nested analysis and subnational comparative method are robust research 
designs for increasing the numbers of observations in Small-N (small sample or 
a small number of selected cases) research, as well as making controlled 
comparisons between cases. As is evident, any one of these research designs 
could have adequately supported the pursuit of both exploring general 
relationships and explanations as well as specific explanations of individual 
constituent cases (Lieberman, 2005:436). Beyond their face value propositions, 
the real value of this combination lies not in significant differences regarding the 
underlying assumptions that inform each of the designs, but in the strength 
generated from the whole, which is greater than the sum of the two parts. 
  
Nested analysis has a broader and more general application (comparisons 
between national cases, subnational cases, institutions etc.). It places primacy on 
the development or utilisation of a large quantitative dataset to denote patterns 
and trends that can inform further case selection choices for in-depth small-N 
research (Lieberman, 2005). The subnational comparative method is more 
specific in its focus to comparisons. It limits comparisons to subnational units and 
desists from assumptions of unit homogeneity simply because the units belong to 
the same country (Snyder, 2001:96). From the onset, it assumes cultural, social, 
economic and political heterogeneity amongst subnational spaces. It also avoids 
the challenges usually associated with the "whole nation bias"  where researchers 
unreflectively gravitate towards national-level data, which often has some 
contrived internal heterogeneity, or a false universalism (Snyder, 2001; Rokkan, 
1970; Tillin, 2013: 236).  
 
However, escaping the false universalism through the use of the subnational 
comparative method alone could have meant foregoing a national level analysis 
which nested analysis affords. As a result, the research design retains the national-
level analysis, while the cases selected for in-depth qualitative research assist in 
focusing the study and facilitates rich descriptive analysis. It also facilitates a 
closer examination of ZANU-PF’s electoral campaigns within context (as per 
Brady & Collier; 2010; Gerring, 2004:347 as well as Stake, 1995). The design 
also allowed for the utilisation of multiple quantitative and qualitative data 
sources to reveal and explain the various features of ZANU-PF’s campaigns.  
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George & Bennet (2005) advocate for a clear division of labour between 
quantitative and qualitative methods and suggest that rigorous analysis is a task 
best left to quantitative, while exploration is best left to qualitative technics. In 
respect of task allocation within the research design, I perform the inverse of that 
suggestion. For this thesis, nested analysis is the primary source for analysis at 
the national level and in respect of trends analysis for further exploration. It plays 
an exploratory rather than explanatory function, although I do maintain a high 
level of rigor in the descriptive statistics this produces. It assists to answer the 
first questions around whether ZANU-PF campaigned using bigwigs in 2008 and 
2013, as well as where these bigwig visits occurred. In this respect, it precedes 
the subnational analysis, and allowed for the quick evaluation of extant arguments 
and explanations. For instance, a juxtaposition of bigwig visits against land 
resettlement would quickly show whether ZANU-PF campaigned in places where 
land had been redistributed or not. Or to take on another received wisdom, 
juxtaposing bigwig rallies against rural/urban classifications would quickly 
review whether ZANU-PF campaigned in rural areas where its support is 
believed to be strong and neglected urban areas believed to be opposition 
bastions.  
 
Beyond the abovementioned tasks, I do not subject the dataset to more rigorous, 
extensive, and advanced quantitative analysis in this thesis. This approach is in 
line with Lieberman (2005:440) who argues that Large-N analysis provides 
trends and hypothesis which are then investigated through small-N in-depth 
study, while the Large-N analysis only comprises dataset observations. The latter 
then combines small number of dataset observations with a host of casual process 
observations (Brady, Collier & Seawright, 2004; Lieberman, 2005). Subnational 
comparison is the thesis’ primary analysis at the subnational level, facilitating the 
exposure of variation regarding national and local ZANU-PF elite’s decision 
making within and across constituency types. The analysis here is much more 
rigorous than the initial national level analysis. It involves within-case analysis 
of variation and leans heavily on the process of valuing temporal change and 
events across time. In this respect, process tracing and causal process 
observations are streamlined into the subnational comparisons that occur. It 
investigates specific processes and actions of groups (e.g. ZANU-PF, SADC, the 
opposition, traditional leaders, war veterans) individuals (presidential candidates, 
campaign managers, parliamentary candidates, other bigwigs, opposition leaders) 
to evidence patterns, trends and hypothesis from the large-N analysis and the 
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literature. The interest is not restricted to hypothesised relationships and 
outcomes but is also to inductively generate alternative explanations and 
hypothesis based on causal process observations at this level. This element 
strengthens the study’s descriptive inference and allows for extensive 
conversation between rival explanations (Lieberman, 2005). 
 
The nested subnational comparative analysis design allowed this research to 
circumvent the dangers of mean-spirited analysis and over-generalization. It did 
this through having the national-level analysis but testing its emergent results, 
patterns and trends against small-N analysis. This also allowed for better coding 
and classification of electoral constituencies along this thesis' variables to 
produce more accurate subnational narratives that may assist, as Snyder (2001: 
98-99) suggests, to inform future national coding. Figure 3-1 is a mock-up of the 
research design and its various components and analytical moment. 
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Figure 3-1: The Thesis' Nested Subnational Comparative Analysis Research Design 
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3.2 Case Selection Justification And Scope Conditions 
 
I purposively selected ZANU-PF's campaigns in 2008 and 2013 for analysis, 
because of its seeming success to retain power and its longevity, which are 
noteworthy and thus, as Arneson (1993: 164) argues, appropriate for in-depth 
study. ZANU-PF (formed in 1963) and its leader Robert Mugabe were in power 
in Zimbabwe from independence in 1980 and through to 2013 and beyond. This 
long life makes ZANU-PF a prime candidate to study both the durability and 
changing face of authoritarianism over time and to explore how it has used the 
electoral process to make claims and stake claims to legitimacy. Because it is a 
well institutionalised competitive authoritarian regime, ZANU-PF is an excellent 
case, not just of authoritarian longevity, but also authoritarian elections. Studying 
it allows us to understand how similar competitive authoritarian regimes balance 
the modern pre-requisites of democracy with standing beliefs around the 
sacrosanctity of their right to rule. Chapter 4 offers a more developed, fully-
fledged historical picture of ZANU-PF that assists with justification for its 
selection in a critical review of its history and historically grounded analysis of 
its electoral conduct. 
 
However, the above sits on the assumption that ZANU-PF, as a party, is not sui 
generis and that studying it will inform us of the modalities and dynamics of 
similar types of regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Gerring (2004: 341) argues, 
the in-depth study of single units, have the potential to allow the scholar to 
elucidate the features of a broader class of similar phenomenon. While making 
no claims to ZANU-PF's representativeness as African political party, studying it 
allowed for the generation of empirically grounded working hypotheses. These 
hypotheses can be tested further within Zimbabwe and, at the highest level of 
ambition, in other competitive authoritarian regimes.  In the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region, competitive authoritarian regimes are a dime to a dozen. As Cheeseman 
& Klass (2018), as well as others, have argued, autocrats learn from each other, 
and it may be interesting to subject these similar regimes to similar studies. 
 
Nonetheless, this study is generalisable to other constituencies in Zimbabwe and 
can be comparable to the election campaigns of other electoral authoritarian 
regimes that are competitive authoritarian, rather than hegemonic authoritarian, 
regimes, and have a liberation movement background. While these qualifiers 
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limit the number of cases to which study can be generalisable and or comparable, 
it also sharpens the scope conditions to several countries and regimes. For 
instance, in Southern Africa these would include ruling parties in Mozambique, 
the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO); Namibia, the South West Africa 
People’s Organisation (SWAPO); South Africa, the African National Congress 
(ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC); Angola, the Peoples Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); and in Tanzania, Chama Cha Mapinduza 
(CCM). These parties in Southern Africa share a similar history with ZANU-PF 
and are still in power. However, the study's outcomes can also be generalisable 
to similar regimes in other parts of Africa, as well as other regimes at particular 
points in time in the past. This could illuminate why other former liberation 
movements succumbed to defeat and failed to stay in power. ZANU-PF's politics 
and political approach can assist in showing where and how the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia, Malawi's Malawi Congress Party (MCP), 
or Kenya's and ZANU-PF's namesake, Kenya African National Union (KANU), 
faltered. Beyond these parties, understanding and explaining why ZANU-PF 
campaigns also has the possibility of illuminating characteristics of similar 
regimes, elsewhere in the world. 
3.3 Research Design Implementation And Analytical 
Approach 
The nested subnational comparative analysis research design that I employ in this 
thesis produces three analytical moments, as follows: (1.) National-level analysis 
based on descriptive statistics from the dataset created for this study. (2.) Mid-
level, possibly district and provincial level analysis based on a study of the bigwig 
visits that took place in 2008 and 2013. Outputs from the dataset as well as 
newspaper reports on campaign visits inform this analysis. (3.) Subnational 
analysis of electoral politics clustered into three categories: ZANU-PF-Aligned 
constituencies (ZACs), Opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs) and 
Battleground Constituencies (BCs) across the two election periods, as well as 
analysis of electoral activity in specially selected constituencies from the nine 
that I targeted for in-depth research. Overall, this approach allowed for the 
comparison of political activity at all levels across time (2008-2013), as well as 
across space (comparisons of campaign activity and appeals across the three 
broad constituency types). The adoption of the nested subnational comparative 
analysis research design entailed several steps that integrated the procedures from 
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the two founding designs. I proceeded with research for this thesis as shown 
below in section 3.31. 
 
3.3.1 Construction of Large-N dataset of Zimbabwe’s 210 House of Assembly 
Constituencies (2002-2018) 
 
The process started with the construction of a large-N dataset of Zimbabwe's 210 
House of Assembly constituencies. The dataset has most presidential election 
returns (results, eligible voters, voter turnout, vote shares, and winning margins) 
at constituency level from 2002 to 2018. The only exception is the 2008 
Presidential election run-off whose results were only made public in aggregate 
form at the provincial level. The dataset uses 2002 as its baseline year. However, 
this immediately created challenges on account of changing constituency 
boundaries. In 2002, Zimbabwe had 120 House of Assembly seats, but in 2008 
and 2013, it had increased these constituencies to 210. As Figure 3-2 below 
shows, there were a significant number of grey areas (the new constituencies) 
which I could not initially code as either ZANU-PF or opposition. Figure 3-2 also 
shows the baseline conditions regarding electoral competition ahead of this 
study's elections of interest in 2008 and 2013. 
 
However, I was able to identify and code the new constituencies based on the 
electoral districts from which they were hewn out. In all instances, new 
constituencies were cut-out from existing ones, and the 2008 delimitation report 
showed the wards that constituted each constituency. Also, the parliament of 
Zimbabwe, as well as the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), 
produced brief constituency profiles which indicated which of the old 
constituencies the new ones had been part. The constituency changes were 
characterised by the movement of wards from pre-existing constituencies to new 
constituencies. As such, while the constituencies changed and new ones were 
created, the ward boundaries remained the same. After dealing with this 
challenge, I created two new election-related variables. The first was constituency 
type, fashioned as a categorical variable with values from zero (0) to six (6) based 
on winning margins, which I explain below. The second, was campaign intensity 
using bigwig visits as a proxy. Campaign intensity features as a discrete variable 
and the number of bigwig rallies in the constituency establishes its range, from 
zero (0) to four (4). 
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Figure 3-2: 2002 Presidential Election Results Map on the 210 New Delimited Constituencies For the 2008 Elections 
 
Source: Author’s data gathered from official 2002 presidential election results; ZEC’s 2008 Constituency delimitation 
exercise report, and ZESN’s 2008 Parliamentary election constituency profiles. 
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3.4 Categorisation Of Constituency Types And Designation Of 
Bigwig Rallies 
The dataset categorised all 210 constituencies into seven sub-constituency types 
which constituted the three main types, i.e. ZANU-PF-Aligned Constituencies, 
Opposition-Aligned Constituencies, and Battleground constituencies. The sub-
constituency types were as follows: ZANU-PF-strongholds, Consolidating-
ZANU-PF Constituencies, Marginal-ZANU-PF constituencies; Opposition-
strongholds, Consolidating-opposition, Marginal-opposition constituencies, and 
Battleground Constituencies. This thesis’ use of “marginal” is different from 
conventional use. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK) and other places, 
marginal refers to a very close contest where the winner’s victory is almost 
negligible, minor, and perhaps even fairly inconsequential. In this thesis, 
marginal refers to a narrow victory, but one that is not sufficiently borderline to 
be described in the foregoing terms. So, it is not borderline or negligible – for this 
I use the term battleground instead. Marginal constituencies are then those whose 
vote tally is not sufficiently borderline to warrant battleground status, but also not 
sufficiently strong to warrant comfort for the winner or for the constituency to be 
seen as beyond the reach of competitors.  
 
While acknowledging the importance of the local political economy and social 
geography in determining the character of constituencies, and in shaping political 
outcomes (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Boone and Wahman, 2015), the above 
typology only accounted for measures of constituency type based on voting 
returns and winning margins. Socio-demographic data was, however, coded. This 
included population size and density, location and development morphology-
rural, peri-urban and urban characterisations-, ethnicity, land tenure regimes, and 
poverty prevalence. This data is not incorporated into constituency type 
characterisation as used in this thesis in the interest of keeping the constituency 
type variable basic and easily replicable in other settings for purposes of 
comparability. Nonetheless, the thesis utilises descriptive statistics relating to 
some of the socio-demographic variables to assess whether there were any 
theoretically relevant trends and characteristics relating to certain types of 
constituencies. It also utilised them to inform in-depth study site selection and 
provided general background data to inform some of the analysis in the thesis' 
empirical chapters.  
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Table 3-1 shows the categories and winning margins that qualify constituencies 
for particular categories. The range for each category was initially based on 
quartile analysis of the winning margins during the baseline election, and the 
2008 and 2013 elections. This was then moderated by theoretical hunches on the 
ranges and where to place them after accounting for the volatility of election 
outcomes that characterises post-2000 Zimbabwe elections, as shown in chapter 
4.  
Table 3-1: Constituency type framework and constituency type definitions 
based on margins of victory 
Category Description Valid Range code 
Constituency type Indicates the direction of the 
margin of victory, as 
explained in range. 
  
Opposition 
Stronghold 
Opposition vote lead between  52.75% to 83.05 0 
MDC -T Vote lead between  46.67% to 77.63% 
ZANU-PF Stronghold ZANU-PF vote lead over 
Opposition between  
52.75% to 83.05 1 
ZANU-PF vote lead over 
MDCT between  
46.67% to 77.63% 
Marginal-Opposition 
constituency 
Opposition vote lead over 
ZANU-PF between 
15.01% and 31.33% 2 
MDC-T vote lead over 
ZANU-PF between 
12.03% and 27.99% 
Marginal ZANU-PF 
constituency 
ZANU-PF vote lead over 
opposition between 
15.01% and 31.33% 3 
ZANU-PF vote lead over 
MDCT between 
12.03% and 27.99% 
Consolidating -
Opposition 
constituency 
Opposition vote lead over 
ZANU-PF between 
31.33% to 52.75 4 
MDC-T vote lead over 
ZANU-PF between 
27.99% to 46.66% 
Consolidating-
ZANU-PF 
constituency 
ZANU-PF vote lead over 
opposition between  
31.33% to 52.75 5 
ZANU-PF vote lead over 
MDC-T between 
27.99% to 46.66% 
Battleground 
Constituencies 
ZANU-PF/Opposition vote 
lead is less than 15.01% 
0-15.01% 6 
ZANU-PF/MDC-T vote lead 
is less than 12.03% 
0-12.03% 
New Constituency Initially designated as 7 before being allocated to 
other constituency types depending on the 
preponderance of the wards they were composed of 
and the political heritage of the original 
constituency. 
7 
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The opposition votes captured in table 3-1 and used throughout the essay refer to 
the collective opposition vote, not just Tsvangirai’s alone for both elections, 2008 
and 2013. In 2008, when a third candidate, Simba Makoni, got a significant 
proportion of the vote (about 8%), this is reflected in some of the analysis in 
empirical chapters, but it is not the primary focus. If the thesis’ analysis was 
focusing on parliamentary seats, it would have been prudent to separate the 
opposition vote, but it focuses on the presidential runs and campaigns. The impact 
of vote splitting is huge as 2008 showed and but is almost non-existent in 2013. 
Consolidating the opposition vote against the incumbent thus may provide some 
misconceptions around, not opposition strength generally, but the strength of the 
main competitor against ZANU-PF. As 2008 showed, this phenomenon led to the 
opposition failing to capture the presidency in the first round of elections in 
March, when its combined strength suggested that it could have. 
 
3.4.1 Bigwig rallies: identification and coding 
The study codes bigwig rallies as a continuous variable. As such, the number of 
times a constituency is visited is the code that applies. As mentioned above, this 
range does not go too far and is only from zero (0) to four (4). The study used 
newspaper archival research for 2008 and 2013 elections to generate and curate 
accurate data on bigwig rallies. The searches, were, however, restricted to bigwig 
rallies that took place within approximately two months of the elections 
(February and March for 2008 and June and July for 2013, as well as May and 
June for the June 2008 presidential election run-off).  
 
In the main, the study incorporates rallies that occurred after the sitting of the 
nomination court for presidential elections. This invariably gave the parties 
between six and eight weeks within which they could vigorously campaign after 
their candidates were certified as candidates in the presidential elections by the 
nomination court. In both the 2008 and 2013 elections, the ZANU-PF election 
manifesto and campaign launches happened after the stated nomination court 
seating. The nomination court date constitutes a key marker for the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria for rallies in this study.  
 
The selection criteria for the rallies that were included in the dataset for this study 
followed the criteria on what constitutes a bigwig rally captured in chapter 1, 
section 1.3, especially these elements: 
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1. They were public partisan mass meetings at which a member of a party’s 
praesidium or top five leadership is the main speaker and primary guest.  
2. They were explicitly staged in the run-up to elections to drum up support 
for the national presidential candidate and local members of parliament 
in a particular region. 
3. The speeches, messages, and appeals made speak to both national and 
local issues and questions and are geared for a cross-sectional audience 
of locals and other national audiences.   
4. Despite their location (in a constituency, at a business centre, or school) 
they had at least administrative district-wide reach. 
 
3.4.2 Initial Large-N Analysis 
Following the completion of the dataset, I sought to answer the question of 
whether and where ZANU-PF campaigned using bigwig rallies in 2008 and 2013.  
I conducted some basic statistical analysis for descriptive statistics on the key 
variables, bigwig visits, against other variables on the dataset. This produced 
descriptive statistics of the distribution of variables in the dataset and trends and 
patterns amongst the constituencies. These descriptive statistics partly informed 
further analysis and investigation in step 3. Of particular interest were trends and 
patterns that emerged regarding campaign intensity at constituency level as this 
produced the universe of cases that the study could invest more time in because 
they had hosted bigwig rallies.  
 
The trends that emerged from the analysis limited the number of possible 
destinations for in-depth qualitative research. The data showed that across the two 
elections, ZANU-PF had deployed bigwigs to 41 of the 210 constituencies in 
2008, and 34 of the 210 constituencies in 2013. It is from this universe of fewer 
than 75 constituencies (some were visited more than once across the two elections 
as detailed chapters 6, 7 and 8) that the nine constituencies selected for in-depth 
research were selected from. I added maps to the data presentation to clarify 
further and sharpen the analysis around this variable. The maps were generated 
using ArcGIS mapping and analytics software. They consist of maps that overlay 
bigwig rallies against the other variables and characteristics that spoke directly to 
the thesis' hypothesis.  
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3.4.3 Subnational Diverse Case Selection Justification: Purposive Sampling for In-
depth Qualitative Research 
Based on observation of the patterns around bigwig visits from the large-N 
analysis, nine constituencies were purposively selected for further in-depth study 
which took place from August 2017 to July 2018. In-depth qualitative research 
assisted in answering questions around ZANU-PF's political practice, strategy 
and organisation at a local level. Given this, the nine constituencies selected were 
diverse cases. As Gerring (2008:651) explained, the essence of selecting diverse 
cases is to ensure maximum variation across categorical variables and dimensions 
of interest. In the case of this study, this was constituency types and bigwig visits, 
regardless of outcomes (such as voter turnout, winners) and to ensure 
representativeness of the selected sites in respect of the three main constituency 
type categories. In this respect, the nine constituencies represented the three main 
constituency types, as well as their natural breakpoints, as follows: ZANU-PF-
aligned constituencies – Mount Darwin East, Mount Darwin South, and Mount 
Darwin North.; Opposition-aligned constituencies – Makokoba, Pumula, and 
Lupane West; and Battleground constituencies – Goromonzi North, Tsholotsho 
South and Tsholotsho North. The selected constituencies represented wide 
variation across sub-categories of constituency types. They were drawn from five 
provinces, i.e. Bulawayo, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, 
Matebeleland North, and Harare, where I conducted some historical and national 
level key informant interviews. The geographic clustering of these constituencies 
allowed for a fair measure of unit homogeneity through intentional selection 
(King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994:115-116), which expanded the spread of 
variation regionally as well as ethnically. All this enhanced the possibilities of 
the diverse cases illuminating different causal mechanisms and pathways across 
cases. 
 
I also selected these sites because at some point during the campaign periods of 
the two election years, they had entertained some bigwig visits. I also possessed 
a priori knowledge on some of the constituencies from previous involvement in 
all post-2000 Zimbabwe elections as an election observer, democracy and 
governance practitioner, and civil society leader. King, Keohane, & Verba (1994: 
140) state that intentional selection can be based on a priori knowledge of some 
of the explanatory variables. I, however, augmented this with information from 
document analysis during the construction of the dataset to strengthen the 
selection criteria for in-depth research sites. 
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I noted that Zimbabwe’s political parties and campaign dynamics are also 
influenced by long histories and forms. In this respect, despite the attempt to vary 
regions, it is possible that some of the variation that emerges is steeped in long 
historical explanations that date back to areas within which different liberation 
movements operated and set up bases in during the liberation war. As I 
acknowledge elsewhere in this thesis, it is received wisdom that ZANLA and 
ZIPRA’s military approaches, as well as ZANU and ZAPU’s political approaches 
differed. These differences have long lasting legacies which continue to inform 
local level politics in the different areas they operated and mobilised prior to 
independence. These legacies have implications for the conduct of politics, as 
well as the kinds of strategies that are tenable in particular constituencies 
depending on historical legacies of political organising.  
3.5 Broad Theoretical Statements and Hypotheses  
This thesis generally sought to inductively generate hypotheses on the research 
question at a subnational level. The intention was to explain what campaign 
strategy revealed about how (and with which voters) the competitive authoritarian 
regimes like ZANU-PF seeks legitimacy. Alternative hypotheses, in the spirit of 
low-level typological theory based on empirical findings of ZANU-PF's 
campaign methods in ZANU-PF-aligned, opposition-aligned, and battleground 
constituencies, was the task.  
 
At a national level, this study sought to explain overall ZANU-PF campaign 
strategy as informed by the unique conjunctures within which the different 
elections took place. In this respect, the study followed Skinner, Kudelia, de 
Mesquita, and Rice's (2007:7) wisdom that every political contest is informed by 
a time and place context and tried to describe and explain the temporal and spatial 
contexts of the 2008 and 2013 elections. However, while inductive, the 
theoretical and empirical literature had some hypotheses that sought to explain 
ZANU-PF’s electoral behaviour. This study took these explanations and 
hypotheses into consideration and developed some broad theoretical statements 
and allied hypotheses that structured and informed casual process observations 
during data gathering. 
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3.5.1 Broad theoretical statement 1 
ZANU-PF campaigned in 2008 and 2013 to win the hearts and minds of more 
independent voters to enhance its legitimacy.  
Allied hypothesis 1:  
If ZANU-PF campaigns to win the hearts and minds of more independent voters,  
we would expect it to campaign: 
1. In battleground and opposition constituencies in both rural and urban 
constituencies, through bigwig visits, using persuasive appeals, 
especially programmatic, performance, and procedural appeals. 
2. In ZANU-PF aligned constituencies in rural areas, especially in zones of 
neo-customary land tenure, not campaigns using bigwigs Campaigns will 
use local patrons, surrogates, brokers, and intermediaries at local levels 
using performance, ideological, historical and programmatic appeals.  
 
3.5.2 Broad Theoretical statement 2: 
ZANU-PF varied its election campaign strategies in 2008 and 2013 depending on 
the type of constituency it was competing based on election results from previous 
elections.   
Allied hypothesis 2:  
1. In ZANU-PF aligned constituencies ZANU-PF used clientelist patronage, 
and political persuasion strategies to appeal to voters 
2. In opposition-aligned constituencies, ZANU-PF employed coercion, 
violence and electoral manipulation. 
3. In battleground constituencies, ZANU-PF used clientelist patronage and 
persuasive appeals and strategies. 
 
Table 3-2 shows a hypothetical matrix of constituency-type and strategy 
application based on a simple ordinal ranking of intensity (H= High, M= 
Moderate and, L= Low).  The table hypothesises what strategies ZANU-PF 
would employ in what constituencies at Times, 1., 2., and 3. 
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Table 3-2: Hypothetical ZANU-PF subnational strategies across time and constituency types 
CONSTITUENCY TYPE APPEALS & STRATEGY  HYPOTHESES 
V
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TIME 1 (T.1) – MARCH 2008 GENERAL & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
ZANU-PF Aligned  L L H  H H L Clientelist patronage, ideological, historical & programmatic appeals.  
Battleground Constituencies L H H M H L Clientelist patronage, Manipulation and programmatic appeals. 
  Opposition-Aligned 
constituencies 
L L L M M L Low effort: moderate manipulation and programmatic appeals.  
TIME 2 (T.2) – JUNE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RUN-OFF 
Incumbent Stronghold H H M L L L ZANU-PF resorts to coercion, violence and fraud to retain power at all costs. 
Battleground H H L L L L 
Opposition Stronghold H H L L L L 
TIME 3 – 2013 JULY GENERAL & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
ZANU-PF-aligned 
constituencies 
L M H H H L ZANU-PF pursues the same working formula from T.1- 
Battleground constituencies M M H H H L ZANU-PF ratchets-up political appeals and clientelist patronage 
Opposition-aligned 
constituencies. 
M M M M H L ZANU-PF still exerts the least effort here but increases violence from low to 
moderate through threats and reminders around what happened at T.2. 
Battleground.   
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3.6 Data Collection Methods 
The thesis benefitted from a variety of primary data collection methods to acquire 
both quantitative and qualitative evidence. This variety in data collection methods 
as well as the mix in approaches espoused by the nested subnational comparative 
method offered me, as Dunning (2007) argues, the possibility of triangulating on 
a given research problem to leverage the distinctive but complementary strengths 
of different research methods, and to make progress on substantively important 
topics. It broadly allowed me to maneuverer between evidence on aggregate 
correlations (the data set observations) and evidence on mechanisms (the 
interview and document based observations), to combine broad general theory 
with fine-grained detail from case studies. I was thus able to combine “data set 
observations” to “causal process observations” (Dunning, 2007:22) allowing for 
triangulation at the level of broad methods.  
 
Beyond the dataset, my main methods of data collection included a variety of 
interviews (elite, in-depth and group interviews), document analysis, and 
newspaper archival research. While all of these methods are legitimate sources 
that allowed for sufficient variation and triangulation at the level of data 
collection methods, they also have inherent weaknesses. For instance the 
reliability of interview data when based on the reliability of respondents recall of 
incidents from over a decade ago is a legitimate cause for pause. There are also 
possible interviewer effects that could have stemmed from my positionality as a 
researcher. In a past life I had been a “prodemocracy” activist, led a  big non-
profit organisation, and had been labelled a “regime change agent” by ZANU-
PF. These past identities were known by some of my interviewees from across 
the political divide and could have influenced the types of responses they 
provided me. The heavy use of state-owned newspapers as sources also raises 
some questions around reliability. I attempted to mitigate the challenges of the 
former through triangulation of both perspectives and methods.  
 
Regarding perspectives and possible biases in interview data, I varied the types 
of respondents I engaged in the field without introducing too much variation of 
types of interlocutor from site to site to facilitate comparability of perspectives as 
well as the cases. This allowed me to have multiple takes on the same issues from 
different members of the community and political leadership class. I also 
managed my profile and made sure that my identity was clearly that of a 
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researcher. I was also circumspect about the narratives that political leaders, 
especially those who still held positions of authority in their parties, shared. 
Nonetheless, the narratives, even when suspected to be contrived were very 
useful and allowed me to peek into how ZANU-PF wanted to be portrayed to 
external audiences.  
 
Method triangulation, the mix of interviews and archival data as well as other 
sources strengthened the validity of the observations that the thesis presents. The 
evidence to support this thesis' arguments, claims and propositions, from the 
inputs that came from respondents, as well as data from documented data sources 
assisted with verification of certain assertions and the development of a reasoned 
take on what the correct positions were. I deal with issue of reliability of state 
owned newspapers separately below, but first I explain and detail the methods 
below. 
 
3.6.1 Document analysis 
Review and document analysis were the first data collection method for this 
research project. It assisted in building a foundation for the study that benefitted 
from a tremendous amount of extant qualitative and quantitative information and 
accounts on Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF and Zimbabwean elections. Document 
analysis enjoyed three primary forms (1.) Socio-demographic and elections-
related materials, (2.) Peer-reviewed and grey literature on Zimbabwe, ZANU-
PF and elections pre and post-independence, and (3.) Analysis and review of 
press reports from 2008 and 2013, which this section reflects on separately in the 
next sub-section. 
 
Initially, this document analysis involved gathering and reviewing official 
demographic data from the 2012 census, Demographic Health Surveys, Poverty 
Atlases, and Labour Market Surveys, all from the Zimbabwe Statistical Office 
(Zim Stats) and its partners in the international development organisation 
community. This data was mostly at the provincial level and administrative 
district level, and because electoral constituencies are not an administrative 
organising element, the data did not exist for them. I was, however, able to access 
the lists of wards which formed the administrative districts from Zim Stat, and 
the wards that formed constituencies from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission's 
2008 Constituency delimitation report. This allowed me to disaggregate census 
and other data to ward level and aggregated this up to the constancy level, which 
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is this study's level of analysis. It also involved official and civil society reports 
on elections and election returns at the constituency level for all presidential 
elections from 2002 to 2013, and later 2018, although none of the 2018 data is 
used in any substantial way for this thesis. This data was statistical and informed 
the quantitative dataset referred to above and referenced throughout this thesis. 
 
Document analysis also entailed visiting the extensive body of peer-reviewed 
literature on comparative politics and African politics regarding election 
campaigns, clientelism coercion, and political parties. It mainly involved 
literature on Zimbabwe, and ZANU-PF pre and post-Independence, and elections 
post-independence. The peer-reviewed literature on Zimbabwe informs a lot of 
the evidence and analysis in chapter 4 and 5, as well as the main empirical 
chapters 6, 7, and 8. I also engage this literature more in the chapters that follow 
as part of the evidentiary base, and explanations that the thesis engages as it 
develops its arguments, analysis, and alternative descriptive explanations. As 
such, document analysis of primary and secondary sources from the academy 
constituted a running analysis and review throughout the research process. 
 
Beyond the primary purpose of building the dataset, both the socio-demographic 
and electoral data as well as the peer-reviewed and grey literature on ZANU-PF, 
and Zimbabwean elections allowed the study to corroborate information, refute 
observational data and contest information received from other sources (Yanow 
2007). Nonetheless, document analysis was part of sourcing information on the 
studies variables of interest as outlined throughout this document. This is 
highlighted in table 3-4, which lists data sources and provides examples of the 
sources and shows which type of information was gathered. 
 
3.6.2 Newspaper archival research 
As part of building the study's dataset and also fieldwork, the researcher 
conducted archival research at the Zimbabwe Newspapers 1980 Limited (Zim 
Papers). Zim Papers, a publicly traded company in which the government has a 
controlling stake, publishes 13 newspaper titles. These include three daily 
newspapers, The Herald (Zimbabwe’s oldest and largest daily newspaper by print 
run. Established in 1891, it is published from Monday to Friday), The Chronicle, 
and the H-Metro, a tabloid. The Zim Papers catalogue also includes two Sunday 
papers, The Sunday Mail and Sunday News, as well as the Saturday Herald. Zim 
Papers reporters religiously followed and reported on ZANU-PF rallies in 2008 
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and 2013. The Chronicle and the Sunday News predominantly cover regional 
news from Matebeleland, but they also serialise major national stories from the 
Herald and the Sunday Mail. Zim Papers also runs a Broadcast division 
incorporating two radio stations and one television network. 
 
A significant amount of the material regarding bigwig rallies, i.e. their locations, 
attendees, and content of speeches, is drawn from this archive. Inevitably, as a 
state-controlled entity, the reporting in the Zim Papers newspapers was slanted 
towards ZANU-PF. This would ordinarily raise issues around objectivity and 
validity of information gathered from such a partisan source. However, for this 
study, this did not constitute a considerable disadvantage because the research 
was not geared towards gathering the stable's analysis of elections but specific 
factual information on dates, locations and messages. Zim Papers' unfair, but 
massive coverage of ZANU-PF during elections, instead, constituted a rich 
archive for the study to draw from. This included acres of space given to verbatim 
pronouncements by ZANU-PF bigwigs at rallies, as well as full coverage of the 
rallies as they occurred. In 2013, the Zim Papers archive went digital and began 
to include live updates from rallies as they occurred. This too became a useful 
source of information, and a refreshing departure from having to comb through 
and scan physical copies of newspapers, as was the case with the 2008 materials. 
 
The study also involved further archival research on newspapers at the Media 
Monitors Zimbabwe, formerly Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ) 
who kept a digital archive of newspapers and radio and television news stories 
from the 2008 and 2013. A large number of the private newspapers' stories used 
in this study were collected from this archive. The researcher also collected radio 
and television broadcasts which are not used in this study due to time constraints 
associated with sorting such huge audio and video files.  
 
3.6.3 Interviews 
Interviews constituted the primary data collection method for this thesis during 
the in-depth qualitative study phase and are easily the most significant source of 
primary data that the bulk of the analysis in this thesis relies upon. They allowed 
the researcher to engage with the actors that the literature theorises about and to 
test some of the study's hypotheses and broad theoretical propositions with a wide 
range of actors on the ground. Given their value to this study, the research project 
treated interviews as a distinct, stand-alone empirical tool to test and generate a 
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hypothesis (Mosley, 2013). The study accounts for no less 128 interviews with 
over 160 people across Zimbabwe. Table 3-3 breaks down the interviews 
conducted for this thesis by location.  
 
Table 3-3: Interview Matrix 
 
Type of Interview 
Elite Group In-depth 
Harare 4  3 
Bulawayo 3  6 
Makokoba 12   
Pumula 11   
Lupane East 14 3  
Tsholotsho North 16   
Tsholotsho South 3   
Goromonzi North 12 2  
Mount Darwin North 10   
Mount Darwin East 11 3  
Mount Darwin South 14 4  
 
The bulk of these interviews -110, were elite interviews. These are interviewing 
that targeted people directly involved in the particular political process, in this 
case, electoral campaigns, and with unique insights into causal processes of 
specific political processes (Dexter, 1970; Beamer, 2002; Marshal 1996).  Most 
of the interviews were with local elites who included ZANU-PF and opposition 
local officials, previous election observers, campaign managers, Members of 
Parliament, local chiefs and headman, war veterans, and local businesspeople. 
ZANU-PF officials were the priority, and all respondents except for a few of the 
national elites mentioned below, are anonymised. 
 
Seven of the 110 interviews, listed under Harare and Bulawayo, were with 
national level elites. These included national leaders of political parties (ZANU-
PF, the MDC) and civil society leaders with knowledge of the 2008 and 2013 
electoral processes. Three of these interviews’ respondents had run or were going 
to run as presidential election candidates, i.e. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZAPU 
Presidential candidate in 2013, Simba Makoni, Mavambo Presidential candidate 
in 2008, and Nelson Chamisa, MDC Alliance Presidential candidate in 2018. The 
remaining four were: former leader of the war veterans association, Jabulani 
Sibanda, former ZANU-PF Spokesperson in 2013, Bright Matonga, civic leader, 
Okay Machisa, and a member of the ZANU-PF Commissariat department who 
preferred anonymity despite his station. While amongst the 103 interviews, others 
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occupied national offices and responsibilities, this thesis treats them as local elites 
as this, in most instances was the politics in which the study was interested. These 
include former ministers and members of parliament as well as sitting members 
of parliament from across the political divide, and civic leaders who were 
interviewed in their different local settings or on specific local matters. 
 
As Table 3-3 shows, nine interviews were in-depth interviews because of the 
extensive amount of time that they took. These were interviews with high-level 
contacts from ZANU-PF, the opposition and ZAPU, all of whom were former 
liberation war veterans and were instrumental either in the popularisation of 
ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU or the formation of the opposition MDC. Five of these 
interviews had to be conducted over multiple sessions and proved invaluable to 
understanding origins and histories. However, this thesis does not use the bulk of 
data gathered from these interviews. Twelve group interviews were also part of 
this study. The group interviews were not part of the study's initial design, they 
occurred serendipitously. As table 3-3 shows, most of these were in the three 
Mount Darwin constituencies. This was because some respondents from both 
ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC-T preferred to talk in the company of at least 
one other person. On enquiring why, I learnt that this was for both safety and 
accountability reasons.  I adapted to these preferences, and the numbers did not 
impact the process negatively, in some instances, they allowed for dynamic 
exchanges amongst the research's respondents. In Lupane, the group interviews 
were based more on the convenience of respondents choosing to meet centrally 
than anything else. 
 
In all cases, the study adopted a non-random sampling strategy to identify 
respondents. This purposive sampling included a quota to ensure the variation of 
perspectives amongst interlocutors. Theoretically, the chosen respondents were 
the most likely to possess enough information at the right level to pass as causal 
process observations and to suggest well thought out answers to the study's 
questions. Some of the respondents had multiple identities, which allowed the 
study to benefit from, for instance, a war veteran's take who was also a ZANU-
PF district organisational structure member. As such, targeted respondents were 
considered to have the right knowledge, access, and influence. Local contact 
persons greatly assisted the research process by identifying and approaching 
respondents. In Mount Darwin and Goromonzi, the local contact persons were 
provincial chairpersons for the Zimbabwe Human Rights Organisation 
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(ZIMRIGHTs). In Bulawayo, it was the director and staff of the Bulawayo 
Progressive Residents Association (BPRA), while in Lupane and Tsholotsho it 
was a combination of BPRA, and ZANU-PF and MDC officials. While both 
ZimRights and BPRA are respected organisations, like most civil society 
organisations in Zimbabwe, they are perceived to be pro-opposition. However, 
this perception is at the national level, and the kind of access they were able to 
facilitate on the ground showed that in communities they operate, community 
members are aware of their nonpartisan stand. This reality allowed me to have 
access to respondents across the political divide. In addition, in some instances, 
the organisations only provided contacts as seeds, with the rest of other people 
engaged being identified by other members of communities that I engaged with. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the study’s research design and data collection methods. It 
outlined the nested subnational comparative analysis research design and justified 
this design choice on the strength of methods mix. It also justified the purposive 
selection of Zimbabwe’s ruling party, ZANU-PF and its election campaigns as a 
case of competitive authoritarian election campaigns. It presented the scope 
conditions where the study could be generalisable and also comparable. The 
chapter provided an outline of the data collection process sequence, as well as an 
outline of the data collection methods. It explained and justified the method 
choices and explained the utility of all three methods stressing the ability to 
triangulate methods and perspectives as well as to verify data. The chapter also 
outlined the study’s operating hypotheses and theoretic statements. The chapter 
ends with the presentation of table 3-4 below which illustrates the type of data 
and its sources that this thesis utilised. 
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Table 3-4: Illustrative Matrix of Data Sources 
SOURCE 
V
io
le
nc
e 
 m
an
ip
ul
at
io
n 
cl
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nt
el
ism
 
Po
lit
ic
al
 
so
ci
o -
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
 
et
hn
ic
ity
 
EXAMPLE OF SOURCE 
Human Rights 
Monitoring 
reports 
√ √ x x √ √ Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGOs Forum (NGO 
Forum), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human 
Rights (ZLHR 
Long-term 
election 
observation 
reports 
√ √ √ √ √ √ Zimbabwe election support network 
(ZESN), elections resource centre ( ERC), 
SEOM, 
Pre-Election 
reports 
√ √ √ √ √ √ International crisis group (ICG) human 
rights watch (HRW), crisis coalition. 
Election 
Observers  
reports 
√ √ √ x √ √ Local and International Observer Groups, 
e.g. SEOM, AUEOM 
Court 
cases/records 
√ √ √ x x x The ruling party and opposition contestants, 
ZLHR 
Candidates 
reports 
√ √ √ x x x The ruling party and opposition contestants 
Party manifestoes x x x √ x √ Incumbent 
campaign trail 
itineraries 
x √ √ x x √ Press, incumbent archives, Social Media 
Campaign 
advertisements 
x x x √ x √ Press & party archives, e.g., Media 
Monitoring Project Reports and archives. 
Humanitarian 
NGOs reports 
x x √ x √ √ Care International, Save the Children, 
World Vision, ZPP 
Press reports √ √ √ √ √ √ National Dailies, local Press, Online Press, 
e.g. The Herald, Sunday Mail, News Day, 
Bulawayo 24, News 24, 
Speech 
Transcripts 
x x √ √ x √ Press and Political party archives ( ruling 
and opposition) 
Elite/Key 
Informant 
Interviews 
√ √ √ √ √ √ Party officials at the national and local level, 
Local MPs, Civil society leaders and 
academics 
In-Depth 
Interviews 
√ √ √ √ √ √ Ordinary citizens in selected cases or 
research sites. 
National 
Statistics  
x x x x √ √ ZIMSTAT reports (Census, labour force 
Surveys, MSME Business reports) 
Local & central 
government  
√ √ √ √ √ √ Ministry and agency reports, e.g. Ministry 
of Lands ( land Audits or allocation stats) 
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4 ZANU-PF AND THE MAKING OF A COMPETITIVE 
AUTHORITARIAN PARTY: ORIGINS & HISTORY. 
 
This chapter explores pivotal moments in the Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) ’s history to provide a deep historical context for this 
study and presents a new genetic explanation for its competitive authoritarian 
character. It presents a complex picture of ZANU-PF through a review of the 
historical record, and analysis of its primary data from interviews carried out with 
a wide variety of political stakeholders, some of whom were nationalists and 
combatants during Zimbabwe’s liberation war.  The chapter rejects as inadequate 
some of the extant historically grounded political explanations for ZANU-PF’s 
current form. This is because some of the accounts are limited to ZANU-PF’s 
existence in the late 1960s and 1970s guerrilla war, and often emphasise only 
ZANU-PF’s coercive methods of operation before and after Independence in 
1980. The chapter advocates for a more in-depth historical dive. It succeeds in 
being a historical context-mapping of pre-independence ZANU-PF politics and 
the changes and continuities these histories flag regarding ZANU-PF’s modus 
operandi during elections post-2000. The chapter neither seeks to re-write history, 
nor accomplish the impossible task of a ‘complete’ or ‘correct’ history of ZANU-
PF. Instead, it builds on the vast amount of historical work done on ZANU-PF, 
Zimbabwean liberation and nationalist politics through different varieties of its 
political history.8 These varieties of Zimbabwe’s political history were products 
of their political moments and are used as the compass to map the historical 
antecedents to ZANU-PF campaigns in the 2008 and 2013 elections.  
 
The chapter explicitly makes two main arguments. First, it argues that tracing 
ZANU-PF's authoritarian tendencies to the guerrilla war is selective, and while 
compelling, is also inadvertently incomplete and dishonest. The chapter argues 
for and provides a deeper history that goes back to the genesis of the nationalist 
 
8 This refers to “Nationalist Historiography” - history in service of nationalism, as the first variety of Zimbabwe’s political 
history. The second is “The history of the nation and nationalism”: a post-independence variant of historical and political 
analysis that critiqued the first variety and presented a more balanced account of history through highlighting the darker aspects 
of ZANU-PF and its armed wings, missing voices beyond elites, and other organizations that were also part of the liberation 
struggle. This chapter focuses on these two varieties, but there is a third and possibly a fourth which the next chapter and the 
rest of the thesis touch on. The third variety is “Patriotic History”: a hagiographic and convoluted reconstruction of history as 
told by ZANU-PF for political experience and instrumental purposes. A fourth variety is a set of more recent histories that 
have sought to explain the rapid political developments of the late ‘90s and early 2000s. This can be divided into two parts. 
First, liberal internationalist critiques of the ZANU-PF state which focused on its excesses and authoritarianism. Second, 
nationalist intellectual averments which sought to rationalize the Zimbabwean crisis as the continuation of a radical national 
democratic revolution, thus justifying ZANU-PF’s authoritarian nationalism as the necessary pangs of this continuing 
revolution. 
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movement and ZANU’s predecessor organisations and parties, thus covering the 
extant politics, organisation, cultures, and personalities of key actors who would 
lead ZANU post 1963 and ZANU-PF post 1987. 9 Second, the chapter argues that 
the ZANU-PF origin story is a complex mix of a politics of democratic aspiration 
and mass-based politics mixed with nascent violence and a polarisation 
subculture. It argues that these founding ingredients, perhaps even more than the 
guerrilla war, account not just for ZANU-PF’s coercive politics, but also its 
competitive authoritarian nature.  
 
Allied to the above point and building on Cliffe (1980) and Moore (1991), the 
chapter argues that ZANU was a broad church of sometimes contradictory 
interests, which during the struggle for independence spawned several 
“generations” of leadership and supporters. It expands on Cliffe’s “generations” 
argument by extending its logic to ZANU-PF in its post-2000 form. Since 1987 
ZANU-PF not only carried these multiple generations which differed in age, 
ideology, military training, war experience and forms of politics, but also another 
set of “generations” from its liberation war counterpart-cum-foe, Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU), and its armed wing, ZIPRA. The complexity 
and diversity of ZANU-PF’s post-2000 political settlement, the chapter argues, 
have produced an authoritarian politics that neighbour’s democratic contestation.  
 
The chapter argues that the two points made above were manifest throughout 
ZANU’s pre-independence existence and render the debate on ZANU’s historical 
popular support inconclusive. The background provided in this chapter offers a 
possible explanation of the contradictions inherent in ZANU-PF’s broad church 
and other parties like it. It suggests that while the origins of ZANU-PF were 
democratic and popular, later events infused the party with a violent and coercive 
politics. This helps explain their intractable competitive authoritarian disposition 
that makes it a hybrid regime and illuminates our understanding of why it 
campaigns in the way it does.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 briefly explains why 
historically based political explanations are important in the Zimbabwean 
 
9 The party only became ZANU-PF in 1980 at election. PF, Patriotic Front had been the joint moniker under which ZANU 
and ZAPU had negotiated at the independence talks at Lancaster House in London (1979) and its adoption was also meant to 
differentiate it from ZANU (Ndonga) a splinter of the party which founding ZANU president Ndabaningi Sithole ran. At the 
1979 Internal Settlement elections and 1980 independence election, Sithole had registered his party as ZANU. The moniker 
stuck in 1987 when ZANU and ZAPU merged. 
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context. It locates this importance in contestations over this history, as well as 
ZANU-PF’s instrumentalization of it during electoral campaigns as an appeal and 
claim to legitimacy. Section 4.2 focuses on ZANU’s origins, tracing its formation 
as a breakaway party from ZAPU, the motivations for its formation, and its 
founding vison. It leverages what its leaders articulated, the reasons given for the 
split, and the intellectual positions of the leadership to argue that it was founded 
on a mass popular base on account of the popular nature of the grievances it 
sought to address. It also highlights ZANU’s early efforts at organisation 
building. In the same section, the chapter covers ZANU’s predecessor 
movements and organisations and argues that part of its founding character was 
borrowed from these movements and their struggles. Section 4.3. Traces ZANU-
PF’s roots to its precursor movements. It spotlights a few of the major predecessor 
movements and highlights that even in the early days of nationalism, a violent 
sub-culture was emerging. covers ZANU-PF during the guerrilla war and extends 
the conversation on its coercive politics and the debate on popular support. 
Section 4.4 focuses on ZANU’s pre-independence party structures which ZANU-
PF transitioned into post-Independence Zimbabwe with. Section 4.5 is the last 
substantive section. It looks at ZANU-PF’s electoral dominance after 
independence up to 2000 as part of the background to this study’s elections of 
interest.  
4.1 The Importance Of Political History To Understandings 
And Explanations Of ZANU-PF 
Terence Ranger, one of the most prominent historians on Zimbabwe, remarked 
in a 2004 article, that while history is often relegated as an area of study and 
circumstance in other places in Africa, in Zimbabwe, history, did not only seem 
to matter, but was enormously important (Ranger, 2004:217). Ranger rightfully 
located some of the post-2000 political dynamics in Zimbabwe as a struggle over 
the past because liberation war and contemporary history in Zimbabwe is a 
viciously contested terrain. Part of the importance of history in Zimbabwe stems 
from the fact that a significant amount of scholarship on Zimbabwe traces ZANU-
PF’s authoritarian tendencies to its past. This approach has a rich heritage in 
politics and follows the thinking of Hyden (2006) and his movement legacy 
thesis, and was earlier captured by Leys and Saul (1994) who, writing on 
Namibia, suggested that ‘the very process of struggling for liberation, especially 
by resort to force of arms, may generate political practices that prefigure 
undemocratic outcomes in the wake of revolutionary success” (Leys & Saul, 
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1994:146). Kriger (2005), Dorman (2006), Bratton & Masunungure (2008), and 
Levitsky & Way, (2010) are amongst many scholars who make a variation of this 
argument specifically for Zimbabwe. 	
 
Leys and Saul’s (1994) was a legitimate suggestion, and the points made by the 
Zimbabwe-specific scholarship are quite correct, with the cited studies 
representing some of the better articulations of this argument. However, as 
Radclifeffe-Brown (1935) suggested, “one ‘explanation’ of a social system will 
be its history, where we know the detailed account of how it came to be, what it 
is and where it is. Another ‘explanation’ of the same system is obtained by 
showing what it is and does” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1935: 401). Part of the broad 
argument this thesis makes is that popular scholarship on ZANU-PF’s strategies 
focuses inordinately on the first source of explanation, i.e. the history. In doing 
so, it misses some critical elements of the second form of explanation, i.e. what 
it is and what it does. So, while history is important, a significant amount of 
analysis is informed by ZANU-PF’s pre-independence existence as a guerrilla 
movement and argues that it hasn’t changed. This thesis finds this approach 
inadequate for two primary reasons.  
 
First, it selectively periodises ZANU-PF’s history to a late pre-independence 
period when the war period, which was sporadic until escalation in the mid-1970s 
(Alexander & MacGregor, 2004), rather than holistically looking back at where 
the party came from. Doran (2017:1) rightfully points out that many Zimbabwean 
observers wrongly see Zimbabwe’s modern history as defined by two defining 
periods, i.e. “ The civil war of the 1960s and 1970s” and “the decade and half 
since 2000 during which land has been expropriated.” Doran (2017) makes a case 
for the importance of the period 1980-87 as a defining period which the literature 
has neglected, yet it is during this period that ZANU sought to impose its vison 
on the new state through implementing its pre-independence aims. Doran (2017) 
is justified, and I follow suit in this thesis, by arguing that the initial period need 
not be about the “civil war of the 1960s and 70s” but should go to the period prior 
to the so-called civil war, at least to the mid-1950s where most scholar agree the 
nationalist movement began to find its feet.  
 
Second, while there is value in historically grounded explanations, the major 
focus on ZANU-PF’s often subsumes some changes that constitute and may 
explain better ZANU-PF’s contemporary conduct. In addition, some of this 
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history and associated arguments fall into the trap of considering ZANU-PF 
history to be the history of ZANU, yet ZANU-PF is an institution that post-1987 
could count amongst its number, not just members from ZANU’s political 
leadership, nationalist struggles and armed wing Zimbabwe African National 
Liberation Army ZANLA, but also the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union 
(ZAPU) and its ex-combatants from the Zimbabwe Peoples Liberation Army 
(ZIPRA). Both the parties and the armed wings diverged in political approach 
and military execution, and this diversity is often missed in analysis and historical 
recounting that stresses the ZANU elements in understanding ZANU-PF. 
 
History and historically informed political explanations of ZANU-PF are also 
important in Zimbabwe because of ZANU-PF’s use of (its) political history. The 
use and abuse of history, as well as its contestation in Zimbabwe is encapsulated 
in a variety of academic, journalistic, and political articulations spawning several 
varieties of pre- and post-independence nationalist struggle history which this 
chapter reviews in the next section. ZANU-PF has sophisticatedly used political 
history as a claim to legitimacy. As this thesis will show, it consistently made 
historical appeals as part of its persuasive arsenal to win the hearts and minds of 
voters. However, more than just being a claim to legitimacy, this thesis argues it 
was also an articulation of performance legitimacy as part of ZANU-PF’s efforts 
to gain consent to govern with(in) the legal-rational tradition and political 
legitimacy.  
4.2 The Origin & Formation Of ZANU 
The formation of ZANU was officially announced on 8 August 1963 as a 
breakaway party from ZAPU, in the founding presidents’ words, closing a 
chapter on “evasive, short sighted and elusive leadership” (Sithole, 1963 cited in 
Doran, 2017). Robert Mugabe, ZANU’s founding secretary general and former 
ZAPU secretary for information and publicity, in an interview with the Herald 
newspaper in 1983, reflected on ZANU’s formation and stated that the official 
reason for the breakaway was:  
Because of disagreements as to the direction the leadership was giving, 
some of us decided that a change of leadership was desirable … [but] 
Nkomo quickly suspended those of us who were thinking along those lines, 
and we had no alternative but to quit and form ZANU (Mugabe, cited 
Doran, 2017) 
 
107 
 
In addition to general leadership challenges as averred by Sithole and Mugabe, 
the break-away from ZAPU, which was then led by veteran nationalist Joshua 
Nkomo, also followed some concrete strategic and “tribal” disagreements 
amongst the leadership of ZAPU (Moore, 1991; Sithole, 1979). The biggest of 
these strategic challenges emanated from Nkomo’s thoughts on establishing a 
government in exile in response to the increasingly repressive white settler 
regime of the Rhodesian Front, while others on his national executive, like 
Mugabe and ZAPU’s external Affairs secretary, Leopold Takawira, felt that “ the 
credibility of the executive depended on a preparedness to remain in Southern 
Rhodesia, showing loyalty to the party’s followers.” (Doran, 2017). In addition, 
these other ZAPU leaders argued that Joshua Nkomo was spending too much 
time seeking foreign support instead of building a domestic revolutionary 
liberation movement with a mass popular base (Kriger, 1992; Riley, 1982). 
According to Riley (1982), ZANU’s founding fathers set up the party as an anti-
colonial, pan-African, and socialist movement intent on direct confrontation with 
the Rhodesian state. Despite Mugabe’s clarity in 1983 on why ZANU was 
formed, some accounts suggest Mugabe was ambivalent and stayed loyal to 
ZAPU longer than some of his other colleagues. According to Mazarire (2017) 
and Riley (1982) Mugabe was initially retained as ZAPU secretary for publicity 
and was elected as ZANU Secretary General in absentia, a bigger post that is 
argued to have finally convinced him to cast his lot with ZANU rather than with 
ZAPU. 
 
There is very little dispute regarding the above framing of ZANU’s origin story, 
1963 and its events, including Nkomo’s denouncing in May 1963 of 11 members 
of his national executive for “nicodemously” plotting to form a new party, and 
the suspension of Mugabe, Takawira and Sithole whom he fingered as ring 
leaders (Doran, 2017). However, as KTC2711, a 67-year-old former ZANLA 
combatant and ZANU-PF member who later became an opposition strategist, 
minded me, we need to: 
[g]o back to what exactly is ZANU PF? Where did it come from? How did 
it come to be? If we miss that, we miss a lot of things. That is why in Shona 
culture when we ask you for your name, and you say Lewanika, we ask 
you for your totem, and your original home, which is your rural home. We 
ask for your totem and rural home because that is your source, and from it, 
there are things intrinsic to you on account of your source that we will not 
understand without knowing this. So that is what you also need to do with 
ZANU-PF (KTC2711-Interview, 2017). 
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In respect of the advice from KTC2711, the preceding narrative on ZANU’s 
formation shows us the two primary terrains on which the nationalist movement 
was waging its struggle, i.e. the home front, through building mass support, and 
the international front, through a campaign of diplomacy. At this point, the war 
front (which would gradually become the main terrain of the struggle for 
liberation after 1972), had not yet emerged as a strategic terrain, although, as 
Doran (2017) shows, consideration on it in ZAPU had begun to be made in the 
early 1960s. It also gives us the immediate reason(s) for ZANU’s formation, 
summed up as: (1.) leadership division over the need to expand ZAPU’s popular 
base, entrenching its local presence through present leaders who led from the 
front, and engaged in more direct confrontation with the Rhodesian Front (RF) 
regime, as opposed to (2.) the diplomatic and symbolic actions meant to place 
reputational pressure on the Rhodesian state which ZAPU president Nkomo 
preferred. 
 
Hence, ZANU’s origins were in part based on mass politics and mobilisation 
before the more violent and coercive elements that could have been corollaries of 
waging a guerrilla war for independence against a settler state. KTC2711 
corroborated the above and shared that as far he could recall,  
ZANU was a national nationalist political party formed to fight for 
independence or against colonisation. It emerged with a national character 
from birth, due to the national nature of the grievance it sought to address. 
… It is a party that emerges from national grievance, a national outcry for 
independence from colonial rule. Both ZANU and ZAPU which are now 
one, came from the National Democratic Party, so the politics that informs 
the formations of ZANU and ZAPU were the politics of democratisation, 
liberation, and self-determination. No one is against self-determination. 
So, it enjoyed a mass base from the onset on account of the agenda that it 
sought to address.  (KTC2711-Interview, 2017) 
 
While its base could be grown, as Mugabe and others were intent on in the last 
days of a unified ZAPU and early days of ZANU formation, ZANU appears to 
have been formed with fairly high mass appeal as a party, or at least with 
expectations of mass appeal. This was despite the fact that at ZANU’s formation 
ZAPU still enjoyed the lion’s share of ‘popular support’, until ZANU established 
rear bases in Mozambique in the 1970s. Besides being bestowed this mass 
character by virtue of the grievances it sought to address, Doran (2017) also 
shows how, unlike other breakaway nationalist parties, which were crushed 
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through vilification and accusations of wanting to split the liberation movement, 
ZANU survived. That it did so was a testament not just to the leadership that 
founded it but also because it had genuine supporters on the ground who could 
withstand vilification and even physical attacks from ZAPU cadres. In addition, 
its founder’s preference for domestic organising, as well as a commitment to 
escalating the political struggle to armed struggle, were popular positions that 
were able to win people’s imaginations of which movement could take the people 
across the finishing line of decolonisation. In part this entailed building that 
popular base and winning the hearts and minds of people on the ground –  
something, that Doran (2017) notes, Nkomo was left with no choice but to do 
likewise. The result was the rapid development and cultivation of popular appeal 
especially in the urban areas and townships of Rhodesia of both political parties.  
 
The possibility of waging an armed struggle was also part of the calculus of both 
parties which constitute ZANU-PF today, and is part of what elevated Mugabe 
and led to the deposition of Ndabaningi Sithole whose commitment to the war, 
his national executive now doubted. It is clear that the aspiration to extend the 
battlefield from the political to include military action was achieved on account 
of the formation of ZANLA and ZIPRA, and the onset of guerrilla war in the late 
1960s which the next section covers. However, as argued above, ZANU, its 
founding leadership and the general nationalist leadership were initially more 
intent on less violent or radical means of attaining independence. It appears the 
escalation to the bush war was as a result of the failure of the politics of 
engagement, and limitations of the politics of mass mobilisation and civic 
disobedience, especially in light of the incessant proscription of African 
nationalist parties and detention and restriction of the leaders. These origins have 
important bearings on the institutional character of ZANU ever since.  
 
In 1960, a young Nathan Shamuyarira, who would go on to become a high 
ranking member and spokesperson of ZANU as well as Minister of Information 
and Foreign Affairs, viewed nationalism’s potential turn to violence and armed 
struggle as a failure of the British government to act decisively in regard to 
decolonization and its abandonment of moderate African leadership (the 
intellectuals) (cited in Moore, 1991). The loss of reformist African leaders, he 
argued in his article entitled “‘Revolt of the intellectuals: eggheads join NDP”, 
would inevitably see the rise of more radical men who had the possibilities of 
leaning “east” towards socialist states. Saul (1979) shared some of Shamuyarira’s 
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understanding of the calibre of the nationalist leaders who were emerging, which 
I critically expand on in the next section. Regarding ZANU’s formation via split 
from ZAPU, Saul argued that it was a “confrontation between a faction of 
educated middle class, rather elitist elements who joined the nationalist 
movement in the early sixties” versus “populists from the mid-1950s” whom he 
argued had “much firmer roots among migrant workers and the peasantry itself ” 
(Saul, 1979:112).  
 
I argue that understanding the founding of ZANU as a mass movement, albeit, 
led by a leadership that some admired for being educated and others condemned 
for being elitist, can assist us in understanding why ZANU-PF continues to 
placate, nourish, pander to, as well as manipulate this mass base. It can also aid 
our understanding of why it has been important for ZANU-PF to engage in 
polemics against the opposition and the West, and why ideology, its articulation 
and winning the political debate appears to matter to ZANU-PF today despite its 
other violent and coercive characteristics. The base referred to above was, in the 
main, rural  areas where nationalism’s roots lay in people’s violent opposition to 
the Land Husbandry Act & Land Apportionment Acts, which had robbed many 
people of their cattle and their land. This was central to the early days of 
nationalism in the 1950s. 
 
 In addition, rural areas as a base were central by virtue of demographics and 
Zimbabwean culture. For most people, cities and towns were places of work. 
“Everyone” came from a rural place, which is what most referred to as home. 
Rural Zimbabwe, in this sense, is ZANU-PF’s symbolic original home, and 
whether it goes to look for allies in the “East”, seek “rapprochement with the 
“West”, or pays lip service to urbanites, it still returns to its base, during elections, 
to fortify and retain its mandate from those who gave it in the first instance. As 
KTC2711 put it, for ZANU to remain relevant at whatever stage in its 
organisational life, it had to address its roots – the mass base. This, he suggested 
was part of why it campaigned – to nurture its political base and regain its own 
sense of identity. (KTC2711-Interview, 2017).  
 
KTC2711’s reference to a mass base and roots referred to rural Zimbabwe. In 
both pre- and post-Independent periods, Zimbabwe retained most of its 
population in rural areas. Returning to his roots analogy, KTC2711 equated the 
life of ZANU and its constant return to its base to the life of an ordinary 
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Zimbabwean who is a  resident in the city, but who religiously sends plough heads 
and seeds back to his parents in the rural areas. This child also builds a house at 
the rural homestead, in which he perhaps sleeps once in 5 years. All this, the son 
does to stay in touch with his base, to remain rooted and relevant, remain 
‘themselves,’ because if they neglected their roots, they would be no longer 
themselves but something else (KTC2711-Interview, 2017).  
 
The above analogy suggested that ZANU-PF just doesn’t campaign to win 
elections, but also to remain relevant to the key constituency, the rural mass, that 
brought its political agenda into being. Moyo (1992) argues a similar point to 
explain why despite considerable doubt on its ability to implement it, ZANU-PF 
removed the moratorium on land allocation and repossession in 1990 through a 
constitutional amendment that allowed it to acquire both utilised and unutilised 
land with “fair” compensation. This step was critical considering the struggles 
against the land apportionment and land husbandry acts referenced above. As 
Moyo reported: 
Some informed observers wonder to what extent, if at all, ZANU-PF 
intends to implement what is really a political statement designed to remind 
all concerned that the peasants form the social base of the ruling party, and 
that they need to see (or, at least, to hear) that something is being done 
about their demand for more land if the present national leaders are to 
maintain their legitimacy (Moyo, 1992: 321). 
 
Moyo noted that given the social origins of the ZANU-PF government and 
reservations on the initial moratorium on land acquisition from the 1979, 
Lancaster House agreement, “At long last, the peasants, who are pressing for 
more and better land, have the constitution supporting their political demands, at 
least symbolically” (Moyo, 1992:321).  However, despite attempts to placate and 
appease the social base, evidence, as will be shown later in this chapter and 
elsewhere in the thesis, suggests that ZANU-PF is unlike the child in KTC2711’s 
analogy. ZANU-PF has used coercion, manipulation, and intimidation as part of 
its political toolkit. This in part raises the contradiction that forms part of this 
thesis’ puzzle. For KTC2711, however, there is no contradiction because, for 
ZANU-PF 
campaigning is still important because today you rule at the will of the 
people. Whether that will be coerced or otherwise. The will has to be there, 
how it is secured is another question, if the people agree that we [ZANU-
PF] are the ones who are in power (KTC2711-Interview, 2017). 
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The preceding demonstrates the complexity of ZANU’s story and of ZANU-PF, 
the party. While I argue that its violent element is emphasised to the extent of 
blinding analysis to other elements, the reality is that violence and coercion are 
part of the ZANU-PF story. These were not just part of the ZANU-PF story from 
its days in the bush, but also part of its constitutive process at formation. This, as 
I expand on below, was due to the existence in the African nationalist movement, 
in the late 1950s and 1960s, of a violent subculture.  
 
KTC2711’s initial injunction cited at the top of this section advises a slightly 
deeper  revisiting of ZANU-PF’s history, to get and provide a sounder genetic 
explanation thereof of why ZANU-PF operates the way it does over 50 years after 
its formation. In doing this the study then presents a slightly more complex 
picture of ZANU-PF’s “totem” and “original home” as suggested by KTC2711, 
as these origins help provide a slightly better historically based political 
explanation of why  ZANU-PF competes (even in a pseudo-competitive ways) in 
elections by campaigning. The next section looks at ZANU’s predecessor 
organisations before moving onto the onset and analysis of historical accounts of 
the liberation struggle as waged through the guerrilla war. 
4.3 ZANU’s Precursor Movements & The Emergence Of A 
Violence Sub-Culture 
Rodwin (1979) rightfully suggests that it is difficult to place a date of birth on the 
nationalist movement in Zimbabwe, but one can trace the precursor or 
predecessor movements and parties to ZANU-PF to as far back as 1934 when the 
Rhodesia version of the African National Congress was initially founded. In this 
section, the chapter traces the origins of ZANU to at least the mid-1950s, which 
a significant amount of scholarship agrees is when Zimbabwe’s African 
nationalism came into its element (Mlambo, 2014; Moore, 1991; Sithole, 1979; 
Riley, 1982; Rodwin, 1979, amongst others).  
 
ZAPU, from which ZANU split, had been formed in 1961 as the successor party 
to various nationalist formations which the Rhodesian government had banned. 
With each ban, the African nationalists created a new party but retained, in the 
main, the same agenda and leadership. It is this consistency of agenda and 
leadership that makes ZANU’s predecessor movements and parties important to 
quickly review, as similar casts of actors recurred in the different party formation 
and dissolution episode prior to 1963. The predecessor parties included the 
113 
 
African National Congress (ANC) of 1948, the City Youth League (CYL) of 
1955, the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) of 1957, 
which Moore (1991) argues was the beginning of modern Zimbabwean 
nationalism through a merger of the moderate (ANC) and militants (CYL). 
ZAPU’s immediate predecessor was the National Democratic Party (NDP) of 
1960, which was founded after the SRANC was banned in 1958.   
 
Joshua Nkomo was the president of the SRANC and the successive NDP. 
Between these organisations, a significant number of Nkomo’s SRANC 
executive were retained in the leadership of the NDP. Robert Mugabe later joined 
the NDP in 1960 as its publicity secretary. When the NDP was banned in 
December 1961, ZAPU was formed to take its place later that same month. Joshua 
Nkomo again became its president, Ndabaningi Sithole became its national 
treasurer and chairman, Mugabe became its secretary for publicity, and a 
significant number of the NDP leadership were retained in the ZAPU executive. 
ZAPU was banned in 1962 and split in 1963, with ZANU becoming a separate 
entity under the leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole. Because the Rhodesian 
government had proscribed ZAPU, Nkomo and those who remained resolved not 
form a new party, but to stay independent as ZAPU. Instead they resolved to form 
an association, the People’s Caretaker Council (PCC), for above ground 
operations. The PCC became ZAPU’s effective operational counter to ZANU for 
some time.  
 
These predecessor formations to ZANU, like most nationalist movements in 
Africa at that time, embodied some form of black pride and sought the 
representation of the black majority by radically reforming the colonial political 
system. They protested, lobbied at home and abroad, and organised in urban and 
rural areas for the extension of the franchise to the black majority and its just 
weight in governance through the slogan of ‘One Man, One Vote’, but with 
limited serious militancy and ideological grounding. A renowned leader of 
Zimbabwe’s liberation war veterans and former ZIPRA combatant, SJ1212, 
characterised the foundation stones of the liberation and nationalist movement as 
follows: 
The politics in the 1960s, 50s, even 30s was simple. It was for 
independence of the black man from a foreign white rule. Because of that, 
there were no ideologies. People just wanted to be free. What to do with 
that freedom was something else (SJ1212-Interview, 2017). 
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Speaking on the character of the leadership that emerged to lead these 
movements, SJ1212 painted a picture that is similar to the leadership that emerged 
from almost everywhere else in Africa. The leading personnel came from colleges 
and religious mission schools, and “their leadership skills and approach were 
initially products of that socialisation in terms of how they looked at an African 
and how they wanted to develop that African” (SJ1212-Interview, 2017).   
 
A cursory look at the leading personnel in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle proved 
SJ1212’s point as many nationalists fit this description, in addition to having 
further education abroad in South Africa and the United States amongst other 
places. Doran (2017) remarked how, on returning to Rhodesia in 1948, Nkomo 
was elected to lead as president of the Railway Employees Association reflecting 
a “hunger amongst Africans for educated organisers” (Doran, 2017:306). 
Shamuyarira celebrated intellectuals joining the NDP.10 Shamuyarira, himself a 
Princeton educated journalist wrote: 
The voices of these men will be dominant in the organisation, curbing 
feelings of violence where they existed, and bringing home the realisation 
of that the struggle is a moral, not physical one. Such moderation should 
be tremendously reassuring to those Europeans and Indians who fear for 
their future and their property. Edgar Whitehead [Rhodesian prime 
minister] could not afford to ignore the opinion of the cream of African 
society. He could no longer say that the nationalists were non-working 
spies, who had made thuggery and intimidation the law in African 
townships…it will not be easy to accuse names well established in the 
professions of self-seeking thuggery” (Shamuyarira, 1960, cited in Moore 
1991: 487). 
 
Although the struggle for Zimbabwe’s independence became more radical and 
militant in the 1970s, SJ1212’s sentiments and Shamuyarira’s celebration suggest 
that the nationalist movement and ZANU’s foundation stones were fairly 
moderate and steeped in a basic democratic thesis centred around franchise and 
reasoned debate. Shamuyarira stresses this point in 1960 that the struggle is not 
amongst other things “physical”, and that the voices of educated elites would curb 
“feelings of violence where they existed” (Moore, 1991). This moderation, appeal 
to reason, and engagement are well captured in Joshua Nkomo’s sentiments, on 
 
10 These included Herbert Chitepo (later ZANU Founding Chairperson and definitive leader between 1964 and 1975), 
Ndabaningi Sithole (later ZANU founding President), Dr. Bernard Chidzero later Minister of Finance in Independent 
Zimbabwe, and Robert Mugabe (later ZANU First secretary, President and independent Zimbabwe’s first prime minister and 
head of state). 
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reflection, of the usefulness of the SRANC which the NDP succeeded. Nkomo 
remarked that it was “a ‘weak organisation’ that could do little more than listen 
to grievances and petition the authorities on them (cited in Doran, 2017:306). 
SRANC is not the only organisation that fit this bill. Charles Mzingeli’s 
Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICU) which was 
dominant in township politics in the 1950s pursued modest aims like black 
peoples’ access to the city centre, and advocated for blacks to attain more 
education. The latter was sponsored so that the black men could “obtain greater 
respect so that they could in turn make greater claims to an imperial working-
class citizenship” (Scarnecchia, 2008). The CYL, which was amongst the more 
radical of the 1950s movements, had emerged initially out of the frustration that 
young urban black men felt left out of opportunities availed to ‘educated’ 
Africans then under racial partnership in the 1950s (Karekwaivanane, 2017). 
 
In addition, Shamuyarira’s emphasis on the credibility of leaders and “names well 
established in the professions” spoke to the character of the nationalist movement 
at that time. A movement, which Karekwaivenane (2017) shows in the 1950s and 
1960s, was heavily reliant on the law, from which it borrowed “both language 
and locale for debates between Africans and the settler authorities over the 
political questions that were vexing the Rhodesian body politic” 
(Karekwaivanane, 2017:2). He shows how African Nationalists like Joshua 
Nkomo, Herbet Chitepo and others were able to utilise the courts to great political 
effect as stages upon which they could articulate their causes, and expose the 
ridiculousness of the efforts at repression of the Rhodesian establishment. He also 
shows how the CYL was able to oppose the Land Husbandry Act through 
supporting public interest cases by villagers to sue local authorities 
(Karekwaivanane, 2017:81-111).  
 
The above is not to suggest that this emphasis on reasoned discourse and the use 
of legal language was itself democratic or nonviolent. As already conceded, there 
was a violent subculture that was already existent in the nationalist movement, 
where organisations would at times confront each other violently to hold 
monopoly claims of representing the black Rhodesians. In addition, the law, for 
the long period during the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, was used by 
the state to quash nationalism. This is clear from the use of bans demonstrated 
above, and later in the 1960s, of detentions, clamp-down on protests, and 
eventually criminalisation of nationalist organisations, and parties.  
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Karekwaivenane (2017:6) argues that besides the symbolic and constitutive 
powers of the law, there also was an intimitate relationship between it and 
violence, which was simultaneously repressive and productive as well as coercive 
and constitutive. A review of the historical record shows a clear pattern of 
escalation regarding how the Rhodesian state instrumentalised the law, as did the 
nationalist movement too for its own political showmanship and purpose, until 
the state got fed up and upped the ante. The reasons for the state’s frustration 
included an embarrasment and irritation “at the fact that nationalists had become 
sufficiently knowledgeable of the legal system that they could use it to frustrate 
government designs” (Karekwaivanane, 2017). This was coupled with the rise of 
a rightwing ultra-racist regime in the form of Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front which 
came to power in 1963 promising a tougher hand on black dissent and 
championing the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 (Riley, 1982). 
As prominent ZANU-PF leader Edisson Zvobgo would admit later in post-
Independence Zimbabwe, “The Rhodesian Front of Ian Smith plunged us into 
war” (Zvobgo cited in Laakso, 1999). How the Rhodesia Front plunged ZANU-
PF into war was eloquntly summarised by Sachikonye (2004:141) as follows: 
A conventional nationalist movement, which arose in the 1950s, was 
confronted by an obdurate white minority regime that refused to concede 
independence but instead went on unilaterally to declare independence in 
1965. The regime used repressive means to try to contain African 
nationalism but was ultimately unsuccessful. The nationalist movement 
then mutated into a liberation movement that grew in strength and spread 
its tentacles in the 1970s and subsequently forced the minority regime to 
the negotiating table (Sachikonye, 2004:14).  
 
The above pages have shown, some of ZANU’s precursor movements were mass-
driven parties and organisations which were at times fairly moderate. Even the 
radical variants did not seriously set about organising an armed struggle until after 
1965. ZANU’s genesis starts with these movements and parties. Their politics 
was not always clean and they fought aginst each other, but these fights were 
often rooted in monopoly claims to  represent the people, and a tendency towards 
polarisation. As Mlambo (2014:148) argues the rivalries in the nationalist 
movements were intense and political intolerance and polarisation turned parties 
against each other and presaged a cycle of political violence between the two 
main movements during the liberation struggle and after independence.  
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The armed struggle literally meant that by the late 1970s there were two armies 
fighting for liberation, whose parties were rivals. Both the monopoly claims to 
representing the people and polarisation are characeristics of ZANU-PF and 
general politics of representation in Zimbabwe that persist to day. The former is 
an intergral part of the patriotic history discourse, whose segregation of citizens 
into “patriots” and “sell outs” is also part of a culture of the latter polarisation.  
 
As LeBas & Munemo (2019) show, polarisation has endured amongst parties and 
political elites in post-independence Zimbabwe, coming to a head first in the 
1980s between ZANU and ZAPU, and later post-2000 between ZANU-PF and 
the MDC. Nevertheless, Doran (2017) extensively covers the violent and coercive 
elements of early nationalism prior to the onset of the liberation war. He covers 
the PCC/ZAPU and ZANU polarisation and inter-party skirmishes in Highfields 
after the formation of ZANU in 1963. In addition, evidence abounds of how the 
City Youth League, saw it fit to intimidate RICU, including beating its leaders to 
monopolise the black people’s representational space in urban areas prior to the 
existence of ZAPU and ZANU (Doran, 2017; Raftopoulos, 1995; 
Karekwaivanane, 2017).  
 
The above supports my argument that when looking into ZANU-PF history as 
explanation for its modern day modus operandi, a deep dive is in order. As the 
above paragraph shows, doing so does not negate the analysis around the 
existence of violence as part of ZANU culture pre-independence. It shows that 
contrary to most analysis and narratives, this was not founded during the war 
years, but was part of the toxic culture even as the nationalist movement was 
coming into being. As Scarnecchia (2008) shows, the nationalist ‘sell-out’ 
discourse, which was used to justify violently targeting political opponents during 
the war of liberation and in post-independence Zimbabwe emerged in the late 
1950s. The violent roots of ZANU-PF can thus be established without resort to 
selective periodisation, because they were present, at founding, in the two parties 
that constitute ZANU-PF today, and in some of their predecessor organisations.  
 
Outside intra-party skirmishes, the violence that nationalists were accused of by 
the state was often civil disobedience which is not so different than what a lot of 
so-called pro-democracy movements engage in today, with ZANU-PF applying 
remarkably similar laws and policing instruments to the Rhodesian ones to deal 
with them too. I also argue that the closing of the limited space for democratic 
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contestation which Ian Smith’s government championed, strengthened the hand 
of a radical flank in the nationalist movement which had always thought that the 
Rhodesians needed to be fought through arms. This was exacerbated by the 
incarceration of almost the entirety of nationalist leaders across ZAPU, PCC and 
ZANU who were in Rhodesia in the mid-60s. This left leadership to their exiled 
and external colleagues. It also made the guerilla war inevitabile, perhaps in part, 
as Shamuyarira had thought, without the moderating influence of a lot of the 
learned men whose entry into politics, he had praised. The guerrilla war then 
started modestly in the mid-1960s as a sabotage campaign, involving a few cadres 
to convince the whites to grant majority-rule to the Zimbabwean people 
(Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2008; Mlambo, 2014; Seegers, 1983; Riley, 1982).  
 
This is the background to ZANU formation, and the background informing 
ZANU’s predecessor movements, in whose ranks its old guard and founders had 
plied their political trade as leaders. However, it is the onset of and experiences 
during the guerrilla war that most analyses base their historical explanations of 
contemporary ZANU-PF. The next section reviews part of this narrative and the 
challenges with this approach to understanding ZANU-PF.  
4.4 Violence and Popular Support Within the Limited Frame 
of the Guerrilla War 
Levitsky and Way (2012) argue that ZANU-PF endured in power because it 
possessed strong identities and post-material ideological solidarity ties generated 
during the collective colonial experience of violence (Levitsky & Way, 
2012:874-876). In arguing that ZANU-PF’s coercive politics, choice of methods, 
and claims to legitimacy lie in its history, Levitsky & Way (2012) are joined by 
a plethora of scholars (e.g. Sithole and Makumbe, 1997; Bratton and 
Masunungure, 2008; Kriger, 2005; Sachikonye, 2011). In the main, these scholars 
trace ZANU-PF’s coercive politics to its colonial existence and the legacy that 
this bestowed on the post liberation party and governments (see Leys & Saul, 
1994:146; Hyden ,2006). Hyden (2006) termed this the “movement legacy” of 
symbolic power of the collective experience of colonialism.  
 
However, Hyden (2006) notes the differentiated impact of the movement legacy 
depending whether the pre-independence movement was a wholly nationalist 
movement or a liberation war movement, which he argues qualify as even more 
representative of the movement legacy than the nationalist movements that were 
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rewarded with political victory without physical struggle. Given this 
differentiation, ZANU-PF would qualify as a Liberation movement given its turn 
to arms in the late 1960s and 1970s. It had to operate from exile, often in 
underground conditions without the same access to the majority of the population 
as the nationalist movements elsewhere had, or as it initially had to openly 
campaign for independence. This, Hyden (2006) argues, imbued liberation 
movements with a legacy of secrecy, relying on military means to achieve their 
objectives, coming to power by way of the barrel of a gun, with attendant post-
liberation complications on norm compliance, transparency and respect for 
human rights, and failing to transcend the military component of the movement 
legacy.  
 
Bhebhe & Ranger (2003) concur with this line of argument, and note that African 
nationalism in Zimbabwe was hegemonic, intolerant of diversity, criticism, and 
dissent, as well as sweeping in what it claimed and annihilatory in what it 
rejected. On this wisdom, the violent methods that ZANU-PF used to safeguard 
its power post-1980 have their roots in the pre-independence liberation war, and 
the violence ZIPRA and ZANLA forces were subjected to by the Rhodesian 
forces in combat and by the coercion they may have had to institute to galvanise 
support amongst the masses in rural areas.  As Kriger (1992) shows rural 
participation in the war of liberation was not always positively induced. Some 
peasants, for instance, did not readily support ZANU and ZANLA out of fear of 
reprisals from the Rhodesian forces, but had to support it paradoxically also out 
of fear of reprisals from guerrilla forces, who did not tolerate “sell outs” 
(Masunungure, 2009: 42; Sachikonye, 2011). As Kriger (1992: 27) notes, to 
mobilise a nationalist consciousness in the rural areas, the guerrillas often utilised 
coercion rather than persuasion. Firstly, due to the constraints on time for careful 
mobilisation, but also secondly, because the rural population had various 
generational, status and community cleavages. For instance, Kriger notes how the 
youth were generally supportive of the struggle, while some peasants were not 
because of the fear mentioned above, as well as the material deprivation that 
supporting the guerrillas led to (Kriger, 1992). The variation in reasons for 
guerrilla support show that the incentive structure was not made up of 
homogenous factors, and that both positive and negative sanctions resulted in 
“support”.  
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The above analysis is correct and not disputed by members of ZANU-PF and 
former liberation combatants today. They accept ZANU-PF’s characterisation as 
violent, but clawback on being called authoritarian because it is a “Western” 
interpretation. In the patriotic history formulation non-Westerners who use the 
characterisation and the labelling of ZANU-PF as authoritarian rather than 
revolutionary fall into the category of Western handmaidens and imperialist 
lapdogs. As MB0704, a former government minister and ZANU-PF 
spokesperson during the 2008 election, remarked at the beginning of an interview 
for this study,  
when I saw your topic [Why do competitive authoritarian regimes 
campaign?], I was not offended because I was in the West and I understand 
their thinking, so I quite understand where you are coming from (MB0704-
Interview, 2018).  
 
I was coming from London and was possibly lumped in MB0704’s head as a 
lapdog, coming with labels received from his imperialist masters. But secondly, 
MB0704 accepted the characterisation of ZANU-PF as violent with justifications, 
arguing that the brutality of the colonial regime could only be met with, and also 
ensured by the brutality of the liberation movement. According to MB0704, 
The background to ZANU-PF or ZANU is that it was a guerrilla movement 
fighting a system that was oppressive, and that was evil. That was the white 
settler regime that occupied Zimbabwe for a century. Blacks were never 
allowed to vote, so really it was the white man, the Indians, and dogs in 
that order. It was that bitterness from ZANU’s perspective that when 
dealing with the white man you have to be firm. Our grandfathers 
experienced the ruthlessness of the white minority. They used all 
derogatory terms on blacks, so this is where we were coming from resulting 
in the emergence of the 1st Chimurenga and the 2nd Chimurenga which 
some of us participated in. You have this evil white man presented. So, 
when you see evil, how else do you fight it except through ways it 
understands. Besides, we believed that the only good white man was a dead 
white man (MB0704-Interview, 2018). 
 
This narrative was supported by other respondents, like former soldier and 
ZIPRA combatant, MI1312, who agreed that the coercive elements of ZANU-PF 
were throwbacks from the liberation struggle, but also ‘normal’ and a function of 
necessity to safeguard the gains of liberation. MI1312 argued that,  
Because we attained our liberation through the barrel of the gun, it creates 
that coerciveness. The fact that you will have been forced to change your 
attitude, that you have to be a revolutionary, you have to fight, go through 
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tough terrains, and so on. Now when you are there, Independent, the 
economy is not doing well, people are becoming very lazy, you start 
thinking of forcing them….In democracy, there are many things that are to 
be considered and if you are revolutionary and you think that if you 
consider all of them, and lose elections, what will happen?(MI1312-
Interview, 2017). 
 
The above statements by MB0704 and MI1312, capture the characterization of 
ZANU-PF that is predominant in the post-2000 liberal scholarship and popular 
imaginary, both as critique and justification. However, as Dorman (2006) 
reminded us, despite incessant references to attaining freedoms through the barrel 
of a gun, Zimbabwe actually attained freedom through a negotiated settlement. 
And MI1312’s allusions to coercion being part of the everyday political culture 
of former liberation movements needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. It is again 
one of those things that are easier said, but Zimbabwe’s near neighbours like 
Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique are all presided over by former 
liberation movements without the loud outcries around coercion that Zimbabwe 
has often attracted.  
 
While the guerrilla struggle had indeed initially been a modest insurgent sabotage 
campaign, in which “guerrillas who infiltrated Rhodesia from 1966 to 1971 were 
annihilated by the Rhodesian army”, it still would have taken a toll on the 
liberation movement and would have been met by both a sense of profound loss, 
anger and a hunger for revenge (Mlambo, 2014:162). As Kriger (1992:153) 
points out, from the perspectives of the guerrillas, their coercion was best 
understood as arising from the extremely difficult environment that they had to 
mobilize support in, rather than as a function of their poor training (Kriger,1992: 
153). In addition, Alexander, McGregor & Ranger (2000) observed, intense 
colonial repression and war ruled out open, democratic practice and tolerance and 
of alternative views, fostering a ‘culture of authoritarianism’. They also argue 
that, violence in post-independence Zimbabwe, therefore, was the consequence 
of a strong state, itself in many ways a direct Rhodesian inheritance, and a 
particular interpretation of nationalism. It is undeniable that since ZANU-PF was 
not operating in a vacuum, their culture during and after the liberation war would 
have been impacted by the systems, actors and circumstances they were 
encountering.  
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African postcolonial theory lends a useful lens through which to understand the 
above. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ndlhovu (2013) argued, African Nationalism itself 
was deeply interpellated by colonialism, and reproduced colonial violence and 
authoritarianism, bequeathing it on postcolonial Africa as a mode of governance. 
In arguing this way, Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ndlhovu posit an explanation for both 
the behaviour of the guerrillas during the fight for independence, as well as the 
behaviour of the ruling party after attaining independence. This is in sync with 
the generality of the African postcolonial trope which generally argues that 
colonial legacies shaped post-colonial states into all powerful and arbitrary 
political formations, which continued the colonial legacy of turning against 
democracy (Mamdani, 1996; Ake, 2000; Mbembe’s 2001). Mbembe (2001) also 
argues that the general practice of power in postcolonial Africa, thereof, has 
followed directly from colonial political culture.    
 
The preceding portrayals of ZANU-PF’s are generally correct, but in some 
respects, the above are a fitting description for ZANLA and or ZIPRA rather than 
for ZANU-PF whose existence, as shown above predated the war, and whose 
foundations were not in the throes of war, in addition to counting amongst its 
number non-combatants. I argue that ZANU-PF was never one thing, even after 
the onset of the war which added to its cast of politicians and nationalists with 
their largely urban activist supporters, ideologically trained and battle-hardened 
guerrillas, together with the rural supporters they were politicising, educating and 
recruiting. I find Cliffe’s (1980 cited in Sithole, 1984:119 and also Moore, 2016) 
outline of key leadership generations in Zimbabwe’s nationalist politics 
persuasive. He outlined these generations as follows: 
1. The early nationalist leaders detained internally by Ian Smith (1964-1974); 
2. Early nationalists’ leaders leading exile politics after the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI); 
3. Nationalists who lived in more distant exile (academics);  
4. Guerrilla cadres (military-cum-political); 
5. Internal political leaders.  
 
Although labeled as key generations of leaders, all the five groups that Cliffe 
(1980) outlined existed at the same time, as part of one organisation during the 
struggle and also after independence, and almost all had some kind of ground 
organisation and grassroots support. Of course, as Sithole (1979) and others 
posed, this coexistence was not devoid of ractious factionalism among, within 
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and between the generations, some of which led to expulsions and purges by one 
group or another, or even within people who belonged to the same group. The 
ZANU-ZAPU split,  ZAPU and ZANU internal fights circa 1972 between Sithole 
and Mugabe, and between Jason Moyo and James Chikerema, show the latter.11 
Notheless, I agree with Moore (1991) that ZANU was an intricate ideological 
fusion where perverse antimonies, including between principles of liberalism and 
authoritarianism, populism and elitism, Marxism and capitalism, military action 
and popular mobilisation existed. For various reasons, including legitimation and 
the need to put out a united narrative, as well as enemy action, these intricate 
fusions are sometimes not on display in today’s accounts of ZANU-PF and seem 
to have been expunged from memory. Yet, as I highlight elsewhere, Chung 
(2006) highlights Mugabe’s ability to keep this complex group togther, pre- and 
post-independence as the ZANU-PF political settlement, as an astounding task 
that is seldom acknowledged. I argue that this mix-and-holding it together is also 
part of what makes ZANU-PF complex. At the same time the existence of a 
complex cast of characters provides the beginings of an explanation for ZANU-
PF’s inherent contradictions and evident political duality as a party. This dualistic 
character is apparent in both its make up and its operations. 
 
Kriger (1992) and  Raftopoulos (1999) among others, acknowledge that the 
ZANU and ZANLA’s strategy changed over time. They highlight that the last 
years of the war witnessed more general indiscipline among guerrillas who were 
sensing a political settlement, and who concentrated less on patient politicisation 
and more on increasing guerrilla numbers in a more strictly militarist strategy. 
These references to and a focus on the “later years of the war” often hide that 
prior to the reported period, presumably the guerrillas were more disciplined and 
concentrated on more patient perhaps even persuasive politicisation of the 
masses. It also subsumes the reality that the war effort was secondary to initial 
attempts at politically attaining independence without a resort to guns. In 
addition, it was initially a modest insurgent sabotage campaign, not a continuous 
campaign (Alexander & MacGregor, 2004). As attested by Flower (1987 cited in 
Mlambo 2014:163), the performance of the early guerrilla forces, including their 
annihilation, called for a new strategy, which ZANU Chairman Hebert Chitepo 
articulated  as “…politicising and mobilising the people before mounting attacks” 
(Mlambo, 2014:163).  
 
11 During the liberation struggle there were several internal fights within both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU and their respective 
military arms. Masiphula Sithole offers an interesting account of some of these in his 1979 book, “Zimbabwe: Struggles within 
the struggle”. Moore (1991) and others do a good job of flagging the fights in ZAPU.  
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The change in strategy described by Chitepo does not present a counter-narrative 
to the history of violence and coercion, but it shows that besides the military 
action, which most scholarship uses to characterise it, ZANU also politicised and 
mobilised people as part its 17-year existence prior to Independence. During and 
interview, SJ1212 grudgingly acknowledged ZANU’s engagement with the 
masses as part of core ZANLA approaches which they (as ZIPRA) did not adopt. 
He stated that  
ZAPU did not believe in beating people and forcing or coercing them. We 
did not have “pungwes”[overnight political meetings or vigils conducted 
for political education and sometimes intimidation purposes by ZANLA 
forces during the liberation struggle] because at pungwes people would 
come and sing in the evening, and then in the morning “Mabhunu” [the 
Whiteman] would come and shoot all those people. Here [referring to 
Matabeleland] we had no pungwes because we needed to protect the people 
we were fighting for. We did not want to expose them to unnecessary 
gunfire... No, we did not want to do that. We did not want to expose our 
people to our enemies. We wanted to expose ourselves (SJ1212-Interview, 
2017). 
The pungwes were ostensibly meant to politicise the rural masses and strengthen 
their spirt and resolve in fighting against the Rhodesian establishment. They are 
also often referred to as “moraris” because of their stated intentions of raising 
the morale not just of the suffering masses, but also the fighting guerrilla forces, 
who together with appointed civilian commissars would preside over the 
pungwes (Kriger, 1992).  
 
Two things emerge from SJ1212’s input. The first is the clear demonstration of 
ZANU’s attempts through political commissars, in its armed wing, to politicise 
the masses, i.e. to build some form of popular support alongside the fighting, and 
attendant coercion referred to above. The second is the fact that although ZANU 
and ZAPU as well as ZANLA and ZIPRA operated differently during the 
liberation struggle, post-1987, these different parties, forces, modes of operation 
and understandings of politics were brought together under one political roof, 
ZANU-PF in 1987. In this respect, I argue that the bringing together of these 
varied actors and experiences must be accounted for when one conducts a 
historical analysis of ZANU-PF, remembering that ZANU-PF is not ZANU, it is 
ZANU and ZAPU plus their armed wings.  
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While coercion is easy to prove by way of testimony because people are prone to 
believe these horror stories and be sympathetic to and empathetic with victims, 
the question of popular support, post-facto, is still difficult to prove and disprove. 
Even as this thesis moves to the elections of interest, the issue of the extent to 
which people are forced to, or voluntarily support ZANU-PF continued, to be a 
slippery slope. This is even made more difficult given the suspicions and often 
unreliability associated with election returns, which the thesis covers in the next 
chapter, a phenomenon which started with the very first post-independence 
elections. For purposes of this thesis, it is enough to note that, outside the violence 
and coercion as well as the danger and fear narratives around ZANU’s liberation 
war tactics, some elements of popular mobilisation existed and are often 
underplayed because of the limited dramatic and even emotional effect of fair 
play.   
 
While pungwes and moraris were indeed phenomena of the war given their 
nature, they were not the only mobilisation tool in ZANU-PF’s kit, and broader 
politicisation and mobilisation were not strategies introduced in the middle of 
ZANU’s struggle for independence. MB0704 cites politicisation and mobilisation 
as prior to military engagement. Explaining ZANU’s modus operandi, MB0704 
states that:  
ZANU was a guerrilla movement, so we would mobilise the mass first 
without using a gun, telling them how bad the Whiteman was, and these 
are things which they were seeing and experiencing, and we worked 
underground. So quietly ZANU managed to mobilise people using their 
political commissars, which made them to improve their strategies in 
damaging the white regime. (MB0704-Interview, 2018) 
 
The view that MB0704 expresses is the standard fare in the conduct of guerrilla 
warfare à la Mao Tse Tung, based on the dictum that the people are the sea and 
the guerrillas the fish. It echoes what ZANU Chairperson Chitepo meant when he 
stated a change in strategy above, and it speaks to process, rather than the origins, 
which the chapter has also covered above. A look at those origins show that 
ZANU’s founding strategy was mass mobilisation of the urbanites. The guerrilla 
war changed the locus of those efforts from being predominantly urban, where 
the township dweller and town worker were the targets, to the rural areas where 
the peasant was the target.  
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4.5 Pre-Independence Party Organisational Structures (Party 
Organs) 
The complexity of the ZANU-PF story, and its ability to attract support, popular 
or otherwise, in both pre and post-independent Zimbabwe is in some respects 
complicated as well as evidenced by its party organisation. In this section, I turn 
to the issue of ZANU’s party organisational structures just before independence 
to show the kind of organisation that they had built on the ground, a fact which 
most of the scholarship acknowledges, but with disputes on whether this was 
based on popular support.  
 
In the run up to independence, ZANU had built an organisation that included both 
formal and informal structures and apparatuses of power in rural areas in the 
eastern side of Zimbabwe. ZANU and ZANLA’s Political Commissars built and 
extended an informal infrastructure of male (Mujibha) and female (Chimbwido) 
aids who operated after the party was banned in in 1964.  Cliffe, Mpofu, and 
Munslow (1980:44-67) mapped the vast ZANU political organisation at 
independence. They argue that, while there were few ZANU cells in some parts 
of the country in the 1960s, on account of ZANU being banned a few months 
after its formation and its leaders detained, by 1972, ZANU had established itself 
as a party, organisationally (Cliffe et al., 1980: 49). By the 1980 election, ZANU 
had established peoples’ committees (at kraal and village level) and Mujibha and 
Chimbwido networks, in addition to some more orthodox election-oriented party 
organs like provincial and district committees. Kriger (1992) agreed that ZANU 
had a formidable organisation on the ground, but rather than being for political 
organising purposes, Kriger highlighted other utility functions of the structures 
like efficiency.  According to Kriger (1992) young boys and girls were drawn in 
to help transport and cook food, married adults formed village committees, and 
unmarried youths over the age of fifteen formed youth wings.  
 
Kriger (1992) also shows how, in 1977 and early 1978, ZANU introduced branch 
committees composed of a cluster of villages. These committees had a 
chairperson, secretary, treasurer, security officer, organizer, ‘logistics’ 
representative, and a political commissar. Each of these positions was filled, with 
an alternate on standby for when the incumbent was ill or absent. According to 
Kriger, the roles of the committee members were as follows: 
The chairman coordinated the various tasks and ensured that the guerrillas 
got the resources they asked for; the secretary kept records of who 
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contributed what. The security officer detected potential spies by tracking 
movements of strangers into the village and of village residents to Mutoko 
centre and other areas where security forces were based. The organizer 
went from house to house collecting rice, maize, vegetables, and other food 
supplies, and collected money to buy meat, cooking oil, salt, bread, sugar, 
and other cash items. The ‘logistics’ staff supervised cooking for the 
guerrillas and ensured that there was adequate food for them. The political 
commissar gave political instruction to the people and conveyed what 
happened at moraris (political education sessions conducted by the 
guerrillas) to those who did not attend. (Kriger, 1992:132) 
 
Cliffe et al (1980) and Kriger (1992) both agree that a formidable structure existed 
pre-1980 but disagree on the utility functions of the structures and on whether 
ZANU-PF victory and perceptions of popular support are attributable to these 
structures. However, Kriger’s outline of ZANU branch committee roles above 
shows clearly that there was a multiplicity of use functions to the structures based 
on the role a member was assigned, including surveillance (security officer), 
logistics (organiser and logistics committee) as well as popular education and 
mobilisation (political commissar). Kriger (1992:133) also adds that “Teachers, 
clergymen, nurses, and storekeepers who often lived among peasants in the Tribal 
Trust Land but who had more resources than them, preferred to organize as 
occupational collectives rather than become integrated in a system with the 
peasants” forming an additional layer of ZANU support structures. But, besides 
being an extra layer of support, these status hierarchies of the patrilineal system-
induced structures also laid the foundation for emergent class conflict between 
elites and peasants. Besides the struggles within the struggle of guerrilla 
movements and parties which Sithole (1979) and others outlined, the conflict 
between “elites” and “peasants” represented a second strain of struggles within 
the struggle amongst different supporters of the struggle for independence, 
something which several scholars acknowledge (Saul, 1979; Cliffe, 198;  Kriger, 
1992).  
 
Cliffe et al (1980:54) and Gregory (1981) saw a duality of functions for the 
ZANU/ZANLA structures which Kriger (1992) points out as functional. They 
argue that by 1980 ZANLA had achieved a system of ‘dual power’ in which the 
guerrillas  challenged and destroyed the colonial civilian administration and 
established a civilian network of councils and committees responsible for 
providing support for the insurgency campaign in catering to the local 
population’s needs. The above scholarship (Cliffe etal,1980 Kriger,1992 and 
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Gregory, 1981) agree on the existence and utility functions of these committees, 
while they disagree on the extent to which the structures were the product of or a 
manifestation of popular support. They also disagree on whether they serviced 
rural communities materially instead of just taking away materially.  
 
Gregory (1981) argues that it was “…this organisation of the peasantry in the 
rural areas during the war that provided the cornerstone for ZANU-PF’s triumph 
at the polls” in 1980 (Gregory, 1981:69). This view is supported by Cliffe et al 
(1980:54) who also argue that the victory was in addition to popular support, 
because of the rejection of the internal settlement parties (like UNAC), and 
citizens’ belief in ZANU’s ability to end the war. They further credit ZANU’s 
success in 1980 to a clear articulation of the grievances and aspirations of the 
workers, peasants and other classes, in addition to the formidable organisation on 
the ground built during the liberation struggle. These ZANU-PF structures 
seemed to have formed an intractable ground presence for ZANU’s opponents, 
which organised and campaigned in ways that made up for ZANU’s severe 
resource constraints. In the tradition of machine politics, the structures educated 
voters on the election process, and turned them out on election day (Gregory, 
1981).  
4.6 Conclusion 
In the preceding pages, the chapter presented a dynamic outline of ZANU-PF the 
organisation in historical perspective, and used the different varieties of history, 
as well as more recent accounts of this history to produce a fuller portrait of it as 
augmented by primary data from interviews conducted for this study. Critical to 
this re-composition is the founding of ZANU-PF as a mass-based persuasive 
organisation, which both the accounts that vilify it as violent as well as those that 
glorify the violence as revolutionary often underplay. While accepting genetic 
explanations of present-day ZANU-PF’s conduct, the chapter argued that this 
history shows multiple shades of ZANU-PF, and shows that ZANU-PF’s, is not 
a single story, and its part was not and continued not to be homogenous in various 
respects. These included ethnically, as well as in relation to “generations” of key 
leaders, the coming together of ZANU and ZAPU as ZANU-PF, and the extent 
of its formal and informal structures and support networks.  
 
The chapter argued that this diversity of actors in ZANU-PF as a political 
settlement, as well as its mixed heritage of being formed on the strength of 
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popular grievance and intent on building a mass party, alongside an emergent 
subculture of violence in the nationalist-cum-liberation movements, may assist to 
explain the often-contradictory modes of operation that ZANU-PF exhibits today. 
In addition, the chapter showed how in the late 1950s and early 1960s the 
nationalist movement emphasised both fighting through and fighting the law as 
part of nationalism. It also showed that use of demonising discourse like ‘sell-
out’ to legitimate violence against political opponents has an even longer history 
than PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF.  
 
As this thesis transitions to focusing on post-independence Zimbabwe, this 
chapter, in tracing and outlining ZANU-PF’s colonial existence, poses a 
cautionary note to students of ZANU-PF, and urges that analysis of ZANU-PF be 
attentive to the changes in its endowments as it transitioned from being a 
liberation movement to being a post-liberation party in power. The history of 
ZANU-PF pre-Independence is of a movement, party and guerrilla army, which 
as Kriger (1992:11) noted, had limitations on its control over territory and the 
extent to which it could offer positive utilitarian appeals (e.g. land redistribution 
and alternative marketing systems). Post-Independence, ZANU-PF, on the other 
hand, still had the endowments of the liberation movement, but now also had the 
effective power to govern, control over territory, and possessed the ability to offer 
and deliver on ‘positive utilitarian appeals’. The above are also in addition to 
other post-independence endowments like control over a supportive public press 
and other incumbency advantages.   
 
This transition, as the next chapter will show, altered ZANU-PF’s form, structure, 
and function. These alterations or changes in ZANU-PF alongside well-
articulated continuities, especially on violence and coercion, are a running 
argument in this thesis. It basically will continue arguing that ZANU-PF’s  long 
stay in power since independence in 1980, could not have been tenable had 
ZANU-PF atrophied. ZANU-PF’s long incumbency suggests that it may have 
been more dynamic than the literature acknowledges. This dynamism was enough 
to allow ZANU-PF to reproduce itself and maintain a strangle hold on power 
through different periods of political and socio-economic crisis during the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s. These various moments of crisis were also moments of 
deconstruction and reconstruction of the ZANU-PF body politic. During these 
political conjunctures, ZANU-PF sought refuge in history and historical methods 
that had served it well during the liberation struggle. It also reverted to coercion 
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and looking to the past to state its claims to legitimacy and reignite its founding 
anti-imperialist ‘revolutionary discourse’ around chimurenga.  
 
The import of the preceding pages is that analysis of ZANU-PF must retain 
vigilant watch on its origins beyond the short period of serious guerrilla war in 
the 1970s, its multiple identities or “generations”, methods and tactics, and its 
changes and continuities. The next chapter begins the process of outlining some 
of these changes and continuities in ZANU-PF after independence. It will outline 
the legislative and electoral regulatory framework that conditioned elections in 
Zimbabwe. It will also specifically begin to engage systematically with literature 
on Zimbabwe’s post-2000 election literature. The chapter acts as bridge between 
these three foundation chapters and the thesis’ three main empirical chapters. In 
this respect, outside painting the political and electoral context, the chapter will 
also present the findings from the study’s large-N analysis before moving the 
chapters that focus on subnational politics. 
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5 ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS, FRAMEWORKS AND 
POST-2000 CONTESTS AS ANTECEDENTS TO THE 
2008 ELECTIONS  
 
This chapter presents an overview of Zimbabwe’s electoral terrain. It briefly 
outlines Zimbabwe’s electoral system, framework and management bodies. It 
picks up from where sections of Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 left off. It acts a bridge 
from the historical context provided in chapter 4 to the study's two primary 
elections of interest, i.e. the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: In section 5.1, it presents Zimbabwe's 
electoral system and the legal and institutional frameworks that conditioned 
elections in the country from independence in 1980 to 2013. It details the 
constitutional amendments that had an import on elections and section 5.2 briefly 
outlines the election management bodies that presided over the 2008 and 2013 
elections. Section 5.3 closes the gap on electoral contests, picking up these 
contests from the year 2000 when ZANU-PF's dominance started to wane. 
Section 5.4 engages the comparative politics and Zimbabwean politics literature 
that sought to explain developments around elections post-2000 and organises it 
into patriotic history, liberal critiques of the state and nationalist averments of 
Zimbabwe as a radicalised state.  
 
Section 5.5 introduces the two electoral periods of interest to this thesis ( 2008 
and 2013). Section 5.6 engages in a robust conversation with systematic 
manipulation and electoral fraud literature on the two elections. Section 5.7 
continues this conversation by looking at presentations from practice (election 
watchdogs) and the academy on detecting fraud and manipulation. Section 5.8 
updates the conversation on ZANU-PF’s electoral politics through an 
engagement with two clusters of work, the ZANU-PF-Continuity group and the 
ZANU-PF changed group. This literature is integral to the thesis as it is what the 
study engages and compares its findings with the most in later chapters. Section 
5.9 is a brief on the results from the study's large-N statistical analysis based on 
vital descriptive statistics that emerged at the first moment of analysis which 
informed targeting and selection of sites for further in-depth qualitative research. 
It presents an overview of the data on bigwig rallies in 2008 and 2013 across 
several variables including, constituency types, rural-urban divide, land reform, 
and electoral outcomes. Following chapter 4’s historically grounded proposition 
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on why ZANU-PF campaigns, chapter 5 follows up by presenting the global 
picture regarding bigwig visits to dispense with the question of whether ZANU-
PF campaigns and the kinds of constituencies it targeted with bigwig rallies in 
2008 and 2013.  
5.1 Electoral System: Legal, Institutional, And Management 
Frameworks (1980 To 2013) 
Zimbabwe’s first post-liberation elections in 1980 were a product of the 1979 
Lancaster House talks which culminated in an agreement and constitution that 
facilitated a transition from colonialism to independence. The Patriotic Front, a 
combination of ZANU and ZAPU, attended the talks together with the internal 
settlement parties like the United African National Congress (UANC). The 
delegates to the talks agreed on a raft of constitutionally guaranteed transitional 
compromises which included reserving 20% of the 100 parliamentary seats for 
whites elected from a separate “white” voter roll for the first ten years after 
independence. It also maintained the economic power structures of colonialism, 
especially white-biased property relations, and placed a moratorium on 
compulsory land acquisition for 10 years with no amendments to the bill of rights 
for 10 years, and the preservation of the special white seats for seven years 
(Bratton, 2014; Caute, 1983; Davidow, 1984; Herbst, 1990; Mandaza, 1986). 
According to Hatchard (1991), this meant that for any amendments to the cited 
issues, it would take a unanimous vote of parliament. At the expiry of the periods, 
it would take a two-thirds majority of parliament voting in favour of changes. 
 
The Lancaster deal left some in the liberation movement uncomfortable as they 
viewed it as being too compromised, and a “sell-out” deal (Caute, 1983; Herbst, 
1990; Mandaza, 1986). Some of the commentaries in the aftermath of 
independence praising the new government's upholding of the criticised 
compromises heightened this discomfort (see Davidow,1982). Mugabe knew of 
this problem and, as prime minister, often expressed disdain on the provisions, 
calling them “pepper cones needed to attain independence” while continuing to 
hold the country hostage (Levy, 1987:142). The Lancaster House Constitution 
followed the Westminster model. This was meant to introduce liberal notions of 
limited government, separation of powers - an independent judiciary and 
legislature, and a justiciable bill of rights (Hatchard, 1991:79; Ncube, 1991: 171). 
In many respects, as Madhuku (1999:91) argues, the Lancaster House 
Constitution was a codification of the British constitutional system with a non-
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executive president taking the place of the British Queen. Under this 
constitutional framework, Zimbabwe held her first independent election based on 
a party-list proportional representation (PR) system (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). 
The Party-list PR system, which was adopted not because it was the fairest or 
most preferred, but because it was the most practical given the challenges of 
doing a constituency delimitation process in a country at war, required parties to 
breach a 5% threshold to get seats in parliament. The new government discarded 
it ahead of the 1985 elections in favour of the first past the post (FPTP) system 
based on 100 single-member districts for the house of assembly and 40 senate 
seats filled by the house of assembly sitting as an electoral college (Sithole & 
Makumbe, 1997; Madhuku 1999). The motivation for abandoning the PR system, 
which, then as now, most political scholars saw as a fairer and more 
representative political system for divided societies, was ZANU-PF’s suspicion 
that white politicians could use the system to prevent its clear victory, and/or band 
together with moderate parties to form a coalition government against ZANU-PF 
(Gregory, 1981) 
 
The year 1987 was a significant political year in Zimbabwe for three reasons. 
First, it saw the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU 
on 22 December 1987, which turned the two parties into a united party, ZANU-
PF in December 1989 (Hatchard, 1991; Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Moyo, 1992). 
The agreement brought to an end the civil strife and genocide that had been 
occurring in the southern part of the country where Mugabe’s government had 
deployed a paramilitary group, the 5th brigade, ostensibly to crush a rebellion, but 
actually to quell political opposition. This dark period in Zimbabwe’s past, would 
account for an estimated twenty thousand deaths and tens of thousands of 
displacements (Scarnecchia & Sisulu, 2008; CCJP & LRF, 1997) and was a 
calculated measure to ensure ZANU-PF's dominance in the political field and 
elections after 1980. Second, there were two significant amendments to the 
constitution, amendment numbers 6 and 7. Constitutional Amendment Number 6 
abolished the reserved white seats elected from the white roll, ending the era of 
racial segregation in Zimbabwe’s representative politics (Levy, 1987; Hatchard, 
1991). This amendment came soon after the expiration of the constitutionally 
inscribed seven-year period within which no one could make changes to the 
provision. The Mugabe government replaced the reserved seats with an equal 
number of seats filled by parliament seating as an electoral college (Madhuku, 
1999: 90; Hatchard, 1991).  
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Constitutional Amendment Number 7 of 1987 switched the Zimbabwe political 
system from a full parliamentary system and “…metamorphosed [it] into some 
obscure system, most of whose features exhibited a presidential character” 
(Madhuku, 1999:91). It abolished the ceremonial president and office of the 
prime minister and introduced an executive president directly elected by voters 
every six years. The new arrangements collapsed the powers of the prime minister 
and president under the Lancaster house constitution into the presidency in an 
arrangement that "…created an all-powerful president who enjoyed the "best" of 
both the parliamentary executive system and the American style executive 
presidency"(Madhuku, 1999: 92). With this amendment, the executive president 
now had the power to dissolve parliament, dismiss the cabinet, legislate through 
presidential emergency powers, as well as veto legislation from parliament. 
 
In 1989, constitutional amendment Number 9 abolished the bi-cameral 
parliament, leaving an expanded single-chamber parliament of 150 members. In 
the expanded parliament, voters would directly elect 120 members while 30 
members were appointed by the president as follows: 8 provincial governors, ten 
chiefs, and 12 others appointed by the president (Hatchard, 1991; Madhuku, 
1999). In 1990, constitutional amendment Number 10 was made, which added to 
the president’s powers the discretion to appoint no more than two vice presidents. 
The introduction of two vice presidents was a replication in the state structure of 
the Unity Accord arrangement where ZANU-PF was operating with two Vice-
Presidents, one each from ZANU and ZAPU (Madhuku, 1999). Constitutional 
amendment Number 11, was an omnibus amendment which represented the first 
attack on the bill of rights and amongst other things extended the voting franchise 
in Zimbabwe to permanent residents, followed in the same year (Madhuku, 
1999).  
 
The above amendments, some of which strengthened the powers of the executive, 
governed the electoral system of Zimbabwe almost unaltered until 2005 when a 
ZANU-PF dominated parliament reintroduced the 50 seat Senate soon after the 
2005 general election, in which ZANU-PF secured a two-thirds majority. 
However, the subsequent senate election saw one faction of the MDC which had 
split on the issue, not participating in the Senatorial elections, thus leaving 
ZANU-PF to snatch 43 of the 50 senatorial seats, with the remaining seven going 
to the MDC faction that had decided to participate.  
135 
 
 
In 2007, following a SADC facilitated mediation process, ZANU-PF and the 
MDC factions were able to agree on Constitutional Amendment Number 18, 
which harmonised elections leading to Presidential, Parliamentary and Local 
government elections taking place concurrently, and with the same term. This 
amendment also increased the number of seats in parliament, from 150 to 210 all 
contested seats. The 2008 elections were governed by the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe as amended by Amendment Number 18, the Electoral Act [Chapter 
2:11], the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act [Chapter 2:12] as amended by 
the Electoral Laws Amendment Act of 2008. These legal arrangements provided 
the parameters for the conduct of elections, the delimitation of constituency 
boundaries, the operation of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the 
enfranchisement of voters, the establishment of the Electoral Court, and the 
resolution of election disputes, results management and transmission, amongst 
other things (ZESN, 2008). 
 
The above represented the electoral system and the set of institutional 
arrangements that were at play in the 2008 election. However, at the turn of the 
21st century, ZANU-PF increased its instrumentalization of law and order to 
maintain its hold on power. It introduced a suite of repressive pieces of legislation 
that impacted freedoms of association, assembly and speech. These included:  
1. the Broadcasting Services Act of 2001 (BSA) which restricted the 
communicative rights of citizens, silencing rather than liberating 
previously unheard voices and made it difficult for new players to enter 
the broadcasting market. (Moyo D., 2005). It set up the Broadcasting 
Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), whose board was controlled by the 
national executive which appointed it. In 2011, BAZ licenced two new 
"private" radio stations to "expand" media space. These were AB 
Communications which was run by ZANU-PF MP and later Deputy 
Minister of information, Super Mandiwanzira, and Zim Papers Talk 
Radio, which was run by Zim Papers who ties to the state I highlighted 
in chapter 2 (Media Institute of Southern Africa, 2010; 2011).  
2. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002 
(AIPPA): ZANU-PF promulgated this but with reservations even within 
ZANU-PF. Then chairperson of the parliamentary legal committee, 
Edison Zvobgo, saw it as "the most calculated and determined assault 
on our liberties guaranteed by the constitution." He argued that it was 
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poorly drafted, "obscure, vague, overbroad in scope, ill-conceived and 
dangerous”(Zvobgo cited in Media Institute of Southern Africa, 
2010:2). 
3. The Public Order and Security Act of 2002 (POSA), which extended 
police power and surveillance of political groups and individuals, 
through requiring police clearance for meetings of more than seven 
people. Police application of POSA to stop the opposition and civil 
society from convening meetings and arresting offenders after 2002 was 
especially rampant. However, a study of 1981 such cases revealed on 
only four (4) convictions by 2005, indicating that the law was an 
intimidation and disruption tool more than anything else (Solidarity 
Peace Trust, 2006) 
 
The above were in addition to other laws like the Criminal Law Codification and 
Reform Act  (The Code) of 2005, and amendments to the electoral Act which 
restricted the rights of citizens in unwieldy ways. In March of 2013, four months 
ahead of the elections, Zimbabwe promulgated a new constitution and parliament 
made amendments to the electoral law. However, in the main, the 2013 Elections 
were conducted using the old constitution and its supporting legislation on 
elections. 
5.2 Election Management  
Popular and scholarly articulations of the post-2000 ZANU-PF regime paint it as 
a seasoned autocratic regime, which was militarised, conflated with the state, and 
which masterfully used its over-lordship of the state and electoral infrastructure 
to rig elections ( Masunungure, 2009; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Matysak, 
2017; Moore, 2014; Makumbe, 2009, Zamchiya, 2013). Given the above, ZANU-
PF created an uneven playing field for elections and held sway over election 
management bodies (EMB) from independence in 1980. As Collier & Vicente 
(2012:118) argue, this incumbency advantage provides fertile ground for 
electoral fraud because of the incumbent's control of electoral processes and 
institutions.  
 
Between 1980 and 2004, elections were supervised by the Electoral Supervisory 
Commission (ESC). Its task was to monitor and oversee the administration of 
elections. It also oversaw the work of the delimitations commission, the elections 
directorate, and the Registrar General of Elections. The Registrar, with the 
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assistance of the directorate, had the primary management role (Moyo, 1992: 53; 
Makumbe and Compagnon 2000). The ESC had five members, all appointed by 
the president of Zimbabwe and was by most accounts, an ineffective watchdog 
(Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000; Dorman, 2005). According to Moyo (1992) and 
Makumbe and Compagnon (2000), there were two main challenges associated 
with the ZANU-PF-EMB relationship. First, the EMBs were captured 
institutions, held hostage by and deferring to ZANU-PF and the executive. 
Second, the EMB leadership was accused of lacking the political courage to rise 
to the challenges of their public responsibilities (Moyo, 1992: 53). Raftopoulos 
(2002) and Dorman (2005) amongst others argue that these challenges found their 
way to all post-2000 elections.  
 
 In 2004, the ZANU-PF regime overhauled the management of elections and 
established a new, notionally Independent Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 
(ZEC) through a ZEC Bill and gave it constitutional grounding through 
Constitutional Amendment Number 17. In principle, the ZEC Bill made it clear 
that the body was supposed to function without being subject to the direction of 
any person or authority. However, civil society lamented that excessive 
ministerial intervention and executive as well as partisan appointments undercut 
the commissions' independence and impartiality. It also lamented that the new 
framework returned the Registrar General as Registrar of voters, very much in 
the mould of the old Electoral Supervisory Commission that ZEC sought to 
replace (ZESN, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2004; Linington, 2009). According 
to Linnington (2009:99) ZEC’s structure “ to put it mildly, was not designed to 
facilitate fairness”. 
 
Adding to reservations about ZEC’s independence, military men were brought in 
to preside over its essential functions, with Colonel Gula-Ndebele chairing the 
commission; Brigadier Nyikayaramba, being its Chief Elections Officer, and 
Brigadier General Chiweshe chairing the Delimitation Commission (Dorman, 
2005:162). Mugabe later appointed Brigadier General Chiweshe as Chairman of 
the new ZEC, with his tenure lasting until 2009 when an inclusive government 
emerged as a resolution to the disputed 2008 election. However, opposition 
parties, civil society, and scholars concur that the most significant challenges on 
elections relate to the role of the Registrar of Elections. They alleged that the 
Registrar manipulated the voters' roll, and registration to ensure ZANU-PF 
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victories (Southall, 2013: 137).12 Section 4-3. will explore these allegations and 
analysis from the literature and critical electoral stakeholders after introducing 
the two election years at the centre of this study. 
5.3 Electoral Contests 2000-2008 
While the ZANU-PF regime faced opposition at elections from 1980, it was with 
the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, that 
elections became very competitive in Zimbabwe. In February 2000 a 
constitutional referendum took place in which civil society and the newly formed 
MDC campaigned for the rejection of a government-sponsored draft constitution. 
The “NO” vote won the referendum with 53 % of the vote to the “Yes” vote’s 44 
%, marking the first time that ZANU-PF had politically hit the canvass. It was 
not a knockout, and what was supposed to be one by way of officially accepted 
electoral defeat would come eight years later. 
 
The referendum was followed up by a tightly contested Parliamentary election, 
where the opposition MDC took 57 of the 120 contested seats, with ZANU-PF 
getting 62 seats (Dorman, 2005; Hatchard, 2001; LeBas, 2006). In the 
Presidential elections of 2002, Mugabe’s vote share fell from the 93% of 1996 to 
56.2%, with MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai getting 42%, amidst allegations 
of violence and vote-rigging (Sachikonye, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2002; Dorman, 
2005; Kriger, 2005). The allegations were serious enough to warrant action by 
the international community. They led the European Union, United States of 
America, United Kingdom and Nordic countries to impose (smart) sanctions and 
targeted measures on Zimbabwe's ruling elites and state-owned companies 
(Chingono, 2010; Grebe, 2010).  
 
In the sections that follow, I review the literature that attempted to explain the 
above developments and Zimbabwean politics general state of play post-2000. I 
do this through organising the literature into three streams, i.e. patriotic history, 
liberal and nationalist critiques of the state. This literature constitutes the veritable 
scholarship that I engage, test, refute and build on, as appropriate, in the rest of 
the thesis. 
 
12. For more accounts of this from 1990 to 2013 see also Moyo (1992), Sithole & Makumbe (1997), Dorman, (2005), 
Masunungure (2008), and Moore (2014) among others. The voters' roll integrity was an issue in all elections amidst allegations 
that ‘errors’ were deliberate to inflate votes in favour of ZANU-PF 
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5.4 The Academic State-Of-The-Art And Cotemporally 
Analysis Of Zimbabwe's Post-2000 Elections 
Tremendous economic and political changes preceded the onset of the new 
Millennium in Zimbabwe. Economically, as Patrick Bond and his colleagues 
demonstrated, this period saw the onset of austerity and strife. This strife was the 
aftermath of the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program 
(ESAP), the rise of popular socio-economic discontent leading to crippling 
national strikes and bread riots, the increase in ZANU-PF war veterans discord, 
Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC war, the eventual pay-out of war veterans, 
and the fall of the Zimbabwe dollar (Bond, 1998; Bond & Manyanya, 2002; 
Mhone & Bond, 2001; Bond, 2005). Political events in Zimbabwe unfolded 
quickly, and scholars attempted to keep pace with developments. I classify their 
efforts as the fourth variant of varieties of Zimbabwean political history 
articulated alongside nationalist historiography, the history of nationalism, and 
patriotic history. 
 
For ease of review, I borrow from Tendi (2010) and divide this cotemporary 
political analysis stream into three tracks: patriotic history, liberal critiques of the 
state, and nationalist intellectual defences of the state, all of which I detail below 
after briefly introducing them. Through patriotic history, ZANU-PF sponsored a 
convoluted version of history that was hagiographic and meant to stake ZANU-
PF’s claim to leadership through an exaggerated image of its role during the 
liberation struggle. Patriotic history translated Liberation struggle history into an 
official discourse aimed at giving legitimacy to authoritarian nationalism and a 
selective image of citizenship reinforced by the instrumentalisation of the land 
question (Hammar et al., 2003).  
 
According to Tendi (2010), it was also a narrow and authoritarian repackaging of 
history which placed land at the center. It also espoused race-essentialism, which 
entailed that white people could not be Zimbabwean. The purveyors of this 
ideology were smart intellectuals and media sympathetic to ZANU-PF who 
deployed their talents and standing recklessly, to help legitimise violence, 
persecution and a calculated assault on human rights (Tendi, 2008). These 
intellectuals made sustained attempts to propagate the repackaged, authoritarian 
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version of Zimbabwe’s liberation history in the media, schools and universities.13 
Outside what Werbner (1998) characterised as the quasi-national character of the 
party-political nature of the liberation war discourse, scholars invested an 
immense amount of academic effort in understanding and explaining the ZANU-
PF regime through liberal critiques and nationalist averments of developments in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The liberal critique of ZANU-PF generally saw ZANU-PF as a norm violating 
authoritarian regime that used the coercive apparatus of the state to prolong its 
stay in power. Moyo and Yeros (2007), whom I associate with the nationalist 
intellectual stream, argued that the liberal critique was subject to Eurocentric and 
populist influences, and failed to recognise that what Zimbabwe was going 
through was the continuation of the national democratic revolution. However, the 
liberal critiques generally argue that the post-2000 Zimbabwean crisis was that 
of a liberal norm violating regime which used militarisation, violence, coercion, 
and limitations of democratic space as means of disciplining dissent and 
maintaining its dominance. While it had international interlocutors amongst the 
scholarship, locally, the proponents of the liberal critique were mostly 
intellectuals critical of ZANU-PF who often had leadership roles in civil society 
organisations (Tendi, 2010).14  
 
Zimbabwe’s nationalist intellectuals, on the other hand, were in the main pro-
ZANU-PF or at least not too critical of it regarding their own intellectual and 
ideological positioning. The nationalist intellectual accounts portrayed 
Zimbabwe as a radicalised state suffering the pangs of a nationalist redistributive 
project. To them, ZANU-PF was conducting the historical task of taking the 
independence struggle to a higher level of economic redress and of fighting neo-
colonialism, i.e. the second liberation, especially where the land question was 
concerned (Moyo, 2001, Moyo & Yeros, 2005; Osaghae, 2005; Tendi, 2010). At 
times it was difficult to separate these nationalist intellectuals engaged in 
 
13 Professors Tafataona Mahoso, Vimbai Chivaura, Claude Mararike, Godfrey Chikowore, Sheunesu Mpepereki and Ibbo 
Mandaza, are amongst some of the intellectuals who were purveyors of patriotic history identified by Tendi (2008). 
14 For instance Professor Brian Raftopoulos ( University of Zimbabwe’s (UZ) Institute for Development Studies and also 
Chairperson of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition), Professor Lovemore Madhuku ( UZ Law School and Chairperson of the 
National Constitutional Assembly) , John Makumbe (UZ Political Science department and Chairperson of Transparency 
international Zimbabwe), Masipula Sithole ( UZ Political Science Department and founder of the Mass Public Opinion 
Institute) and others. 
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legitimate intellectual discourse from a perspective different from their liberal 
colleagues and intellectuals sponsoring patriotic history.  
 
5.4.1 Patriotic History 
Patriotic history closely approximated what Henning Melber (2003:11), writing 
on Namibia, defined as the “situational application of militant rhetoric as a tool 
for inclusion or exclusion”. It constituted ZANU-PF's ideology and propaganda 
outlet. It consisted of historiography that, in addition to offering a highly selective 
and streamlined version of the anti-colonial struggle, promoted a doctrine of 
“permanent revolution” intolerant of questions or alternatives (Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2008; Ranger, 2004). Part of the instrumentalisation of patriotic 
history also included vilifying civil society and opposition political parties as 
“western puppets” and “sell-outs” engaged in a treasonous endeavour to restore 
the colonial status quo ante (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008). In sum, it was a 
doctrinal ensemble hinged on land, race, a dichotomy between “sell-outs” and 
“patriots”, and the rejection of Western interference based on “Western ideals” 
such as human rights (Tendi 2010).  
 
One of patriotic history's leading developers and interlocutors, Jonathan Moyo, 
termed it the Third Chimurenga: Hondo yeminda [Third War of liberation: The 
struggle for land]. The impetus for doing this stemmed from the formidable 
opposition challenge after 2000. Given these new circumstances, it was easy to 
think of patriotic history as new, but it had roots in the past (Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2008; Muzondidya, 2010; Waldahl, 2004; Ranger, 2004; Kriger, 
2004; Saunders, 2011). Patriotic history borrowed from the Marxist-
Leninist/nationalist ideology built around the concept of liberation war, 
Chimurenga that ZANU-PF had adopted during the liberation struggle.  
 
Parallels could be drawn between patriotic history and parliamentary debates in 
the 1990s between nationalists and combatants in ZANU-PF (Kriger,2004), 
between it and Rhodesian propaganda (Ranger, 2004), and as Scarnecchia (2012) 
showed between it and the discourses in the early nationalist movements of the 
late 1950s. Tendi (2010) argues that the Third Chimurenga promoted the political 
contest in Zimbabwe as a “war” between nationalism and sovereignty versus the 
imperial recapture of the Zimbabwean state by Britain and its allies aided by the 
opposition and civil society as proxies. This war had economic empowerment 
and Indigenisation as its rallying cry. This cry was allied to the centrality of land, 
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race, and polarisation of citizens into sell-outs and patriots (Tendi, 2010; Hammar 
et al., 2003:17). Viewed this way, it is clear that patriotic history was not just an 
attempt to re-write history during the post-2000 era. It was also a reinterpretation 
of the past, and an explanation of the present during the post-2000 political 
conjuncture. 
 
During successive elections, this historically tinged ideological narrative recurred 
and was central to ZANU-PF’s campaign messages in all elections between 2000 
and 2013. I argue that patriotic history, barring reservations one might have on 
its character and truthfulness, was deployed as part of ZANU-PF claims to 
legitimacy. It was an attempt to appeal to people’s affinities for patriotism, 
liberation and freedom and made opposing views and perspectives appear like 
self-harm. Tendi (2010) argues that liberal-leaning intellectuals opposed to the 
state lost the debate to their nationalist colleagues in the court of public opinion. 
He alleges that the liberal scholars failed to articulate, for the Zimbabwean public, 
an alternative to patriotic history and misjudged the extent to which the nationalist 
narrative swayed the public. 
 
However, Tendi’s (2010) judgements must be mitigated and qualified by the 
reality that was there around unequal platforms on which to spread messages. As 
Moyse (2009: 48) shows, during the 2008 elections, patriotic history was 
incessantly churned out through the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Commission (ZBC) 
which gave 80% of its television coverage to ZANU-PF and its interlocutors 
while opposition voices received 12% coverage. This was the same for radio, as 
the ZBC appeared privatised by ZANU PF (Moyse, 2009:49). This phenomenon 
had worked in the past to condition citizens' perceptions of ZANU-PF. In the run-
up to the 2005 general elections, ZBC behaved like a virtual organ of ZANU-PF 
(Bratton, Chikwanha, & Sithole, 2005). Waldahl (2004) found the same for the 
2000 elections and argued that the politics of persuasion, through the press, was 
a critical cog of ZANU-PF's electioneering.  
 
The skewed coverage enunciated above by Moyse (2009) worked in ZANU PF's 
favour. Bratton, Chikwanha, & Sithole (2005) found that public trust in Mugabe's 
leadership had risen from 20% in 1999 to 46% by 2004. Mugabe’s job approval 
ratings also increased from 21% to 58% over the same period, despite the onset 
of a debilitating economic crisis. While propaganda paid dividends, ZANU-PF 
augmented it with ruthless attacks on independent media, including banning, 
newspapers, 'pirate' radio stations, foreign journalists and international media 
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outlets, as well as constant arrests and harassment of journalists (Bratton et al., 
2005). With limited choice and information, Bratton et al. (2005) conclude that 
many Zimbabweans were persuaded by ZANU–PF’s view of a country beset by 
internal and external enemies.  
 
5.4.2 Liberal critiques: The violent underside of patriotic history and ZANU-PF’s 
militant politics  
While patriotic history constituted the ideological and propaganda arm of ZANU-
PF politics, its use of election-related violence is also well elaborated in 
contemporary Zimbabwean historical and political accounts. Bratton and 
Masunungure (2008) and Alexander (2011) explain how the militarisation of 
civilian political processes was on the increase during this period. Rupiya (2004) 
argued that the reciprocal phenomena of the politicisation of the military, and the 
militarisation of politics, characterised Zimbabwe's crisis. 
 
The literature suggests that violence was part of ZANU-PF's electoral campaigns 
for all post-2000 elections (Kriger, 2005; Raftopoulos, 2002; McGregor 2002; 
Alexander and Tendi, 2008; Masunungure, 2010; Sachikonye, 2011; Collier 
Vicente, 2012 and Alexander and Chitofiri, 2010). This also included ZANU-PF 
virtually locking out the opposition from campaigning in rural areas especially 
between 2000 and 2005. Here, ZANU-PF set up over 150 bases, ostensibly as 
campaign centres to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people, but as LeBas 
(2011:4) observes, they also served as staging centres for violent campaigns, and 
intimidation of opposition supporters and election agents. In rural Matabeleland 
and Midlands, the violence ahead of the 2002 presidential elections secured 
ZANU-PF's control of the local state where the opposition had begun to penetrate 
rural areas. Former liberation war veterans closed schools, rural district offices, 
and demanded the removal of officials they deemed sympathetic to the 
opposition. The war veterans complemented this with a ruthless campaign of 
abductions of MDC youths amid reports of increased political rape cases 
McGregor (2002: 10 & 24-25).  
 
The Human Rights Forum (2002) indicates that ahead of the Presidential election, 
political murders stood at 120 from March 2000 to February 2002, with 25 of 
these having taken place between the beginning of January and mid-February 
2002. The MDC reported that it could not adequately monitor just over 2250 of 
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the 4584 polling stations set up for the election due to abductions and threats to 
its polling agents (Raftopoulos 2002).  
 
The run-up to the 2008 presidential election run-off, constituted the worst post-
2000 political violence. Two hundred senior army officers were deployed to 
different areas to take charge of the ZANU-PF’s election campaign (Crisis 
Coalition, 2011; Masunungure, 2009). In the aftermath, ZESN reported that April 
alone witnessed 4359 incidents of violence indicating, up 470% from pre-election 
levels of 795. By May, election violence had shot up to 6288, but retreating in 
June and July to 3735 and 1123 respectively. By July, the Zimbabwe Peace 
Project had recorded 17 605 incidents since April. In July, ZESN could verify 
171 deaths, 9148 assaults and 16 rape cases (ZESN, 2008:48). The 2008 violence 
started in rural areas and ZANU-PF strongholds and spread to cities. 
Masunungure (2009), like Alexander and Tendi (2008), argues that the violence 
was meant to punish, terrorise and re-educate in fashions similar to guerrilla 
operations from the 1970s. They, however, do not explain why ZANU-PF would 
terrorise, punish and re-educate even in areas it had huge pluralities in the March 
2008 election. 
 
Collier & Vicente (2012) suggest that voter intimidation is not used to win 
support, but to dissuade soft-core supporters of opponents from participating in 
the political process (Collier and Vicente 2012). They support this thesis using 
Zimbabwe’s June 2008 Presidential election run-off. Given the widespread nature 
of the violence, Collier & Vicente’s explanation fails to explain why there would 
be violence and coercion in areas the incumbent was strong. Hafner-Burton et al. 
(2014) argue that the utility of election-related violence is both, to dissuade 
opposition voters, and encourage opposition boycotts, increasing, in both 
instances, chances of incumbent victories, albeit with amplified risks of post-
election costs to the incumbent regime regarding legitimacy. This explanation is 
also borne out by the 2008 Presidential elections, where after an initial first-round 
loss to the opposition, the incumbent instituted a violent campaign, achieving 
both opposition-voter apathy and an opposition boycott, but with consequences 
that eventually led to ZANU-PF sharing with the opposition (Alexander & Tendi, 
2008; Masunungure, 2009).  
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Figure 5-1: Zimbabwe’s Post-2000 Elections Dashboard ( ZANU-PF/MDC Vote Shares & Voter Turnout- 2000-2018 
Across All Elections 
Source: Author’s data from official election results as reported from the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and later 
the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. All figures have been rounded off to the nearest percentage for ease of presentation
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Figure 5-2: Presidential Elections Results Map March 2008 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Presidential Election Results Map 2013 
5.5  
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5.6 Harmonised Elections – 2008 & 2013 
In 2008 ZANU-PF, suffered its first official electoral defeat at the parliamentary 
and presidential levels since 1980. The results showed the opposition had won 
110 (100 MDC-T, 10 MDC-M) of the 210 available seats in parliament. As can 
be seen from Figure 5-1, a dashboard of all presidential elections since 1990, 
Robert Mugabe lost the first round of the Presidential election, gaining 43.2% 
and trailed opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC-T) who got 47.9% of the vote. The remaining 8% of 
the ballot accrued to another opposition candidate, Simba Makoni of 
Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn party. The post-March 2008 election map based on 
presidential results is shown in Figure 5-2.  
 
In instances where neither candidate running for president gets 50+1%, the law 
demanded a run-off election between the two top contenders. What followed was 
a violent campaign towards the run-off election. Tsvangirai withdrew from the 
run-off leaving the incumbent to stage a show election which, as Figure 5-1 
shows, he “won” by 93% up from 42 % just three months earlier (Alexander & 
Tendi, 2008; Masunungure, 2010). While securing Mugabe’s re-election, the 
violent campaign robbed him of legitimacy and forced ZANU-PF to share power 
with the MDCs in a SADC and South African President Thabo Mbeki facilitated 
deal.  
 
As Figures 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3 show, in 2013 there was a reversal of fortunes. 
Mugabe was able to win the presidential election without the need for a run-off, 
garnering 63,09% of the vote to Tsvangirai’s 33,94%. This was a huge swing, 
signalling a national Butler’s swing from opposition to ZANU-PF of over 20% 
(MDC-T to ZANU-PF swing is about 17%). Attempts at explaining the huge 
swing and dramatic change of fortunes for the respective political protagonists 
from 2008 to 2013, is an allied puzzle that this study also answers. In past 
elections, like the 2008 Presidential run-off election, the 2002 Presidential 
elections and 2000 general election, ZANU-PF’s electoral victories were 
attributed to a combination of the margin of terror, patronage, and the margin of 
error.  
 
The margin of terror was explained as the negative consequences on free choice 
of violence and intimidation, while the ‘margin of error’ was described as the 
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effects of vote-rigging, i.e. vote inflation (Masunungure, 2014; Zamchiya, 2013). 
As shown in the previous section, violence was a real concern, especially during 
the run-off election of 2008. Violence and the March 2008 election has been a 
largely ignored subject in the literature, either because it was not there or because 
it paled in comparison to what followed ahead of June 2008. Later chapters will 
try to resolve the empirical question as it relates to this March 2008 election. 
However, the next section engages the margin of error thesis, i.e. election fraud 
through vote inflation in the 2008 and 2013 elections below. 
5.7 Election Manipulation, Malpractice And Fraud  
While there have been many allegations of electoral fraud in Zimbabwe’s post-
2000 elections, evidence has been in short supply. This is normal. As Lehoucq 
puts it “no one who stuffs the ballot box wants to leave a trail of incriminating 
evidence”(Lehoucq, 2003:233). Lehoucq (2003:233) defines electoral fraud as 
clandestine efforts to shape election results, which explicitly break the law (235). 
Attempting to narrow and sharpen this definition, Vickery & Shane (2012) define 
electoral fraud as deliberate wrongdoing by election officials or other electoral 
stakeholders, which distorts the individual or collective will of the voters. They 
define systematic manipulation as the use of domestic legal provisions or 
electoral rules and procedures that run counter to widely accepted democratic 
principles and international standards that purposefully distort the will of the 
voter (Vickery & Shein, 2012:13). Below I engage these two elements as they 
relate to Zimbabwe, starting with election manipulation then fraud. I treat both as 
instances of vote-rigging but with qualified differences.  
 
5.7.1 Systematic Manipulation 
It is only amateurs who manipulate elections on election day because seasoned 
autocrats do this well in advance of elections; Cheeseman & Klaas (2018) argue. 
One of the main ways in which ZANU-PF has been accused of this long-range 
manipulation is through redistricting or constituency delimitation, and voter 
registration. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) completed a 
delimitation exercise in January 2008 that increased House of Assembly 
constituencies from 150 to 210. During this and previous delimitation exercises, 
speculation was rife that the Delimitation Commission gerrymandered 
constituencies to favour ZANU-PF through placing more constituencies in rural 
areas. That the 2008 delimitation exercise produced 143 rural, 50 urban, 17 peri-
urban constituencies is often used as evidence of this rural favouring. 
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However, at 68% of all constituencies, the proportion of rural constituencies is in 
line with world bank figures which suggest that Zimbabwe’s rural population 
stands at 67.79% (The World Bank, 2018). Boone & Wahman (2015:339) also 
found that rural-favouring malapportionment, while rampant in Africa, is 
generally low in Zimbabwe. They define malapportionment as the unequal 
assignment of legislative seats so that the votes of some citizens weigh more than 
others, running counter to the democratic principle of ‘one person one vote,’ thus 
creating strong biases in electoral systems (Boone & Wahman, 2015:337). Table 
5-1 shows that their general judgement on Zimbabwe is supported by the figures 
on average constituency sizes per province. The table outlines the changes in the 
number of Single Member Districts (SMBs) or House of Assembly constituencies 
after the 2008 constituency delimitation exercise. 
 
Table 5-1: Pre & Post Delimitation Number of Constituencies by Province 
& Party Alignment 
Province General 
Party 
Alignment 
in 2008 
Number Pre and post 2008 
Delimitation   
Average 
Constituency 
Size -
Registered 
Voters 
%age 
Increase in 
SMDs 
  N=120 N=210   
Bulawayo Opposition 8 12 26,122 33% 
Harare Opposition 19 29 26,430 34.4% 
Manicaland Toss-up 14 26 27,294 46% 
Mashonaland 
Central 
ZANU-PF 10 18 27,138 44.40% 
Mashonaland 
East 
ZANU-PF 12 23 27,158 47.80% 
Mashonaland 
West 
ZANU-PF 12 22 25,347 46% 
Masvingo Toss-up 14 26 26,892 46% 
Matabeleland 
North 
Opposition 7 13 26,558 45% 
Matabeleland 
South 
Opposition 8 13 26,329 38% 
Midlands ZANU-PF 16 28 26,411 42% 
 
Table 5-1 shows that the numbers of registered voters per constituency were 
within the acceptable range in 2008. However, the Research and Advocacy Unit 
in Zimbabwe argues that for 2013, at least 40 constituencies out of 210 deviated 
from the acceptable margin of 20% (RAU, 2013).  
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The bulk of the 90 new constituencies from the 2008 delimitation process were 
in areas where ZANU-PF enjoyed more support than the opposition. Electoral 
returns aggregated at provincial level show that four out of 10 Zimbabwean 
provinces were ZANU-PF aligned, four opposition-aligned, and two were toss-
ups. The four provinces where the opposition had more support than ZANU-PF 
received, on average, 37.5% increases in the number of constituencies, while the 
four considered ZANU-PF aligned had increases on average of 45% (ZEC, 2008: 
xi). This favouring of ZANU-PF aligned provinces appeared to follow a pattern 
from the previous delimitation process in 1995 and 2004 where Harare, Bulawayo 
and Matabeleland North lost constituencies while Mashonaland West, 
Mashonaland East, and Manicaland picked up new constituencies (Boysen & 
Toulou, 2009; EISA,2000).  
 
The data used to determine apportionment, that is, the number of registered 
voters, has often been argued to be a poisoned chalice. These allegations have 
been because of alleged ZANU-PF manipulation of voter registration processes 
through its control of state institutions and the EMB from the 1990s to 2013. The 
alleged manipulation favoured rural areas while instituting urban voter 
suppression during registration processes (Southall, 2013: 137, Moyo, 1992; 
Sithole and Makumbe, 1997; Dorman, 2005; Masunungure,2009; Moore, 2014). 
According to Dorman (2005:163-164), in 2002, voter registration was 
unofficially extended for three months in ZANU-PF's rural strongholds but not 
urban areas. In 2013, an urban voter registration exercise that was supposed to 
last for three weeks only lasted three days in urban but not rural areas. The result 
was that in 2013, voter registration in the countryside was 99%, but only 68% in 
urban areas (Southall, 2013:140). Because of this, the differences in voter 
registration numbers would inevitably produce a rural favouring delimitation 
process. This bias is not readily discernible when one looks at constituency sizes 
because the gerrymandering is hardwired into voter registration rather than in the 
delimitation processes. 
 
5.7.2 Vote Rigging And Electoral Fraud 
Analysis of Zimbabwe's elections post-2000 is replete with allegations of election 
fraud. When one considers these allegations within the framework of what 
Gandhi & Przeworski (2009) layout as facilitating the emergence of competitive 
elections, Zimbabwe comes across as ripe for both fraud and competitive 
elections, at least in 2013. Gandhi & Przeworski (2009:2) broadly argue that	
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sheer	 force,	 the	 manipulation	 of	 rules,	 and	 fraud	 could	 keep	 incumbent	rulers	 in	power	 independently	of	 the	voice	of	 the	people,	but	not	without	risk.	They	also	argued	that 
The conditions for the emergence of competitive elections are narrow 
because the prospect of losing coercive power as a consequence of an 
electoral defeat makes the incumbent rulers less inclined to hold elections, 
while the prospect of having to leave office induces them to engage in 
fraud. Elections are competitive when incumbents cannot remain in power 
by force alone and when they fear to be abandoned by their armed allies if 
elections were discovered to be fraudulent (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2009:1).  
 
Based on the above logic, and considering that ZANU-PF enjoyed a two-thirds 
majority in parliament towards the 2008 elections, the prospects of leaving office 
via electoral defeat were remote. Fraud would not have been expected at scale in 
the March 2008 election. This may also suggest why ZANU-PF lost that election, 
and why it resorted to violence in the run-off election. The 2013 elections, 
however, presented a different set of circumstances, and the prospects of leaving 
office, given what happened in the presidential election in 2008, would have been 
real, and the incentives to turn to fraud, high. ZANU-PF would have had to factor 
in that incumbency was shared and that the ZEC commission was a multiparty 
constellation based on secondments from all parties represented in parliament.  
 
The scrutiny on the election from the guarantors of the Government of National 
Unity (GNU), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the 
international community was high. In this situation, while the incentive to use 
fraud would have been high, the impetus towards competitive elections would 
have been high as well. This is because it was reasonably clear that, while it was 
unlikely that the army would desert ZANU-PF, it was also clear that brute 
violence would not secure their legitimacy at home and abroad. These 
circumstances are discussed further below, especially the fraud element, while in 
chapter 7, the thesis delves deeper into the competitiveness of the 2013 election, 
and chapter 8 on the other external and internal pressures around ZANU-PF in 
both 2008 and 2013. 
 
Zamchiya (2013:956) and Moore (2014:60), looking at the 2013 elections argued 
that the opposition failed to deal with ‘technical’ elements of the election, 
allowing ZANU-PF to manipulate the elections. Moore (2014:55) and 
Masunungure (2013:100) argue that the opposition’s failure to take advantage of 
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intelligence reports around possible rigging by an Israeli company, Nikuv, led to 
its defeat in 2013. Besides, the numbers of "assisted voters" in rural areas were, 
at every election, inordinately high (Lewanika & Ndou, 2014; Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2008; Linnington, 2009; Makumbe, 2008; Southall, 2013; 
Zamchiya, 2013; and Moore, 2014). Interestingly, after the March 2008 election, 
ZANU-PF also alleged rigging. Mugabe’s election agent, Emmerson 
Mnangagwa protested giving the following reasons:  
Given the many anomalies, malpractices, deflation of figures of 
ZANU(PF) candidates as information was transmitted upwards, inflation 
of figures relating to opposition candidates as information was transmitted 
to higher command levels, multiple voting and people who are not on the 
voters roll being allowed to vote, persons on the voters roll being turned 
away and not allowed to vote, and irregularities in the manner that 
handicapped persons were assisted to vote (Saturday Herald, 3 May, 2008)  
 
Mnangagwa alleged that there had been a pattern of anomalies that they identified 
during an official recount process in 21 constituencies which showed a systematic 
bias against ZANU-PF in the management of the electoral process. He added that 
ZANU-PF, "especially its presidential candidate fe[lt] aggrieved and were greatly 
prejudiced by attempts by the MDC and its sponsors to tamper with the electoral 
system" (Saturday Herald, 3 May, 2008).  
 
In later chapters, I argue that the above allegations articulated by Mnangagwa and 
ZANU-PF, were part of ZANU-PF’s political script in 2008. As part of this script, 
ZANU-PF incessantly blamed the poosition, "victims", for all the infractions that 
observers laid on ZANU-PF’s door. This included violence and electoral 
manipulation of the kind that Mnangagwa outlined above. Also of note is that the 
recounts that Mnangagwa referred to were unlawful having been conducted out 
outside the legally prescribed time. They served to delay the announcement of 
presidential election results, which were only officially released on the same day 
that Mnangagwa made the above remarks to the press. 
5.8 Detecting, Documenting  And Deterring Electoral 
Manipulation In 2008 And 2013 
The literature cited in sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 above provides a sense of the 
possibilities and range of ZANU-PF’s electoral manipulation. However, it is 
generally inconclusive on the specifics and extent of electoral manipulation and 
its direct bearing on electoral outcomes in various types of constituencies. In 
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attempting to add some clarity on the matter of ZANU-PF electoral manipulation, 
I briefly analyse poll projections based on the ZESN’s Parallel Vote Tabulation 
(PVT) exercises for 2008, a Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) voters roll audit 
and engage in a bit of detail Bratton, Dulani, & Masunungure’s 2016 paper on 
detecting electoral manipulation in Zimbabwe.  
 
5.8.1 The Zimbabwe Election Support Network’s (ZESN) Parallel Vote 
Tabulation (PVT) 2008 
In 2008, ZESN conducted a PVT or Sample Based Observation (SBO). 
PVT/SBOs entail the observation of polling day events and activities at polling 
stations that end with an estimation of final results based on the collection and 
aggregation of election results obtained from a representative sample of polling 
stations (EISA, 2011:2). PVT's are believed to generate an independent basis for 
evaluating the performance of authoritarian systems forced to hold elections 
(Lehoucq, 2003). Their strength and also part of their weakness is that PVTs are 
based on actual results as counted by polling-site officials and verified by partisan 
poll watchers and other eyewitnesses at the close of polls (Garber & Cowan, 
1993:97).  
 
Using data collected from 435 randomly selected polling stations, the ZESN PVT 
in 2008 gave Morgan Tsvangirai the lead with 49.40% of the vote, while Mugabe 
had 41.80% of the vote, and Simba Makoni, 8.2% of the vote, with projections at 
95% confidence levels. The margin of error ranged from +/-1.1 for Makoni to +/-
2.60% for Mugabe, with margins for Tsvangirai in between but closer to 
Mugabe’s (ZESN, 2008:39-40). When ZEC announced the official results, they 
had Tsvangirai in front but with 47.9% followed by Mugabe with 43.2%, and 
Makoni with 8.3%, with the remaining 0.60% going to other candidates (Saturday 
Herald, 3 May, 2008:1). The official results closely mirrored ZESN's projections 
and were within the margins of error. Ordinarily, when official results align with 
PVT projections, this signals that officials have not tampered with results (too 
much). However, in this case, several things were a cause for concern. 
 
First, when ZESN presented its projection, the MDC-T rejected it, saying that 
their (own) PVT had them winning the election without the need for a run-off. 
MDC-T Secretary-General, Tendai Biti, held a press conference and announced 
that their tabulation showed that Tsvangirai led with at least 50.30% of the vote, 
while Mugabe trailed with 43.8% of the vote and Makoni with 7% (The 
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Guardian, 2 April, 2008). Like ZEC’s, the MDC-T results were within the ZESN 
margins of error. Second, The ZESN announcement was on 31 March 2008, the 
MDC-T’s on 2 April 2008, but the ZEC announcement only came on 2 May 2008, 
five weeks after the poll. ZEC's late announcement was suspicious and increased 
speculation that it was trying to engineer a run-off. 
 
It is likely that the ZESN PVT deterred fraud at scale, and that if ZEC and ZANU-
PF manipulated the results, they were forced to do so within ZESN's announced 
margin of error. That no independent observers or opposition agents could verify 
the results announced by ZEC as the EMB had closed shop from the 6 April 2008 
to 1 May 2008, only fed the above speculation (ZESN, 2008:40). As a result, 
there were apparent issues around the credibility of the results, chain of custody 
of ballot materials, inordinate delays, and ZEC's impartiality. 
 
ZESN's projections were probably correct, but the PVT process is based on 
official results from polling stations, as I have argued above, some of the 
processes of manipulation raised in the literature are prior to election day. It is 
possible that just like the delimitation process, election day results could have 
already been a poisoned well. This limits the ability of the PVT to act as a 
deterrent of fraud and manipulation. It is a stable door that the stable boy possibly 
closes after the horse has already bolted. 
 
5.8.2 Research and Advocacy Unit’s (RAU) Voters Roll Audit 
In 2013 and 2014, RAU, a respected think-tank from Harare conducted audits of 
the voters roll used in the 2013 election to ascertain its state at the point of the 
election. For the 2013 report, RAU compared the roll against the national census 
and concluded that: 
1. Overall, the voters' roll had about 773,664 more registered voters than the 
census indicated the country had elligiable voters. 
2. 63 of the 210 constituencies had over registration, that is, more registered 
voters than the census indicated there were eligible voters, 
3. 23 constituencies of the 210 were above the maximum threshold of voters 
(33,566) while 17 were below the threshold allowed of a minimum of 
22,378.  
4. Nearly two million potential voters aged under 30 were unregistered and 
over one million people on the roll were either deceased or had relocated.  
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RAU concluded that the gap between the ideal voter figures as per registration 
and actual figures on the roll impinged on the integrity of the electoral process. 
In 2014, RAU continued the process. However, this time focusing on election 
results. RAU concluded that the additional 1.03 million votes gained by Mugabe 
could not have been a result of a significant increase in registered voters, although 
there were a reported close to 800,000 new voters with a significant swing in 
allegiance toward Mugabe and away from Morgan Tsvangirai (RAU, 2014). 
Also, RAU (2014) argued that ZEC had not been entirely in control of the 
electoral process and that this created possibilities for manipulation, especially 
on voter registration. RAU surmised that even if every one of the 792 279 newly 
registered voters were Mugabe supporters and voted for him in 2013, about 200 
000 votes (about 6% of the poll) remained unexplained.  
 
RAU's findings highlighted some of the severe challenges regarding the integrity 
of the voters’ roll, which eventually led to the ZEC adopting a Biometric Voter 
Registration process to avoid duplications and starting the registration process 
from scratch after the 2013 elections. Despite the seriousness of the challenges 
posed by the data they presented, fraud, as a consequence remained relatively 
speculative, and a number of the issues they raised could have been functions of 
ineptitude and malpractice, although manipulation cannot be dismissed. 
 
5.8.3 Bratton, Dulani & Masunungure’s (BDM) Survey versus Actual Results 
Comparison 
Bratton, Dulani & Masunungure (2016) -BDM, made the most authoritative and 
scholarly attempt at detecting manipulation for the 2013 elections. Their effort 
tried to show the extent of manipulation and fraud and where it could have taken 
place. They compared official 2013 election results against survey projections 
based on vote intentions from an Afrobarometer survey conducted in May and 
June 2013, at least a month ahead of the 2013 elections. They assumed that the 
survey was reliable based on an ample and randomly selected sample of N=2400, 
a small sampling error of plus or minus 2, where any excesses outside this margin 
became a suspect for manipulation. They also assumed that the timing of the 
survey was close enough to the election to avoid dramatic shifts in opinion 
(Bratton, Dulani, & Masunungure, 2016:15). The survey had predicted that: 
1. Among eligible voters, Mugabe would enjoy an 8-point advantage over 
Tsvangirai (42.7% versus 34.9%), with one in six respondents (16.5%) 
declining to answer, whom they labelled reticent. 
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2. Among registered voters, the ZANU-PF candidate's advantage would 
expand to 10 %age points (44.8% for Mugabe versus 35.1% for 
Tsvangirai). This statistic did not change dramatically for those who said 
they were going to vote ( 45.6% for Mugabe, 35.6% for Tsvangirai. 
3. Among those registered and likely to vote, Mugabe’s margin increased 
to 11% (46.30% for Mugabe, 35% for Tsvangirai). 
4. Amongst all ordinary Zimbabweans, the margin increased to 12% 
(45.1% for Mugabe, 33.2% for Tsvangirai). 
 
They compared the above results to ZEC’s official results shared as 60.60% for 
Mugabe, 33.70% for Tsvangirai, with the remaining 5.7% spread across smaller 
candidates. There was a discrepancy between the official results which gave 
Mugabe a 27 percentage-point lead, and the survey which predicted an 11%-point 
lead. While BDM expected Mugabe to win, they had not anticipated that the 
winning margin could be as large as ZEC proclaimed. On this reasoning, BDM 
concluded that about 16 percentage points possibly inflated the national vote. 
BDM posit that Masvingo province was a prime candidate for rigging, as was 
Manicaland, Mashonaland East, and Matebeleland South because of the huge 
variances. The assumption was that the swing vote was the stolen vote. BDM’s 
study is not exact and does not show precisely how ZANU-PF manipulated the 
election. If ZANU-PF manipulated it, why did it manipulate that excessively 
beyond what Mugabe required for a comfortable win? 
 
The argument that BDM made was easy to understand despite the complexities 
of their methods. The effort assisted readers to see areas where fraud could have 
been prevalent. However, the challenges of conducting surveys in undemocratic 
settings are known and do not bear repeating at length. Nevertheless, the study 
makes a problematic assumption that the timing of the survey was close enough 
to the election to avoid dramatic shifts in opinion because election campaigns had 
not started at the time the enumerators administered the Afrobarometer survey. 
Zimbabwean elections generally have a constrained campaign period, usually not 
more than two months, and they intensify towards the election date. For instance, 
in 2008, ZANU-PF launched its election campaign on 29 February, exactly a 
month ahead of elections (ZESN, 2008). In 2013, the Supreme Court ruled on 31 
May that the elections should be held by 31 July 2013 (BBC News, 31 May, 
2013). The parties in government and civil society organisation spent the better 
part of June fighting this decision at SADC summits and the courts, with the 
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courts deciding at the end of June that the poll would go ahead on 31 July. This 
June is the latest point at which the survey was conducted. The MDC-T launched 
its campaign on 7 July, and as I will show in Chapter 5, Mugabe only started his 
national campaign through a manifesto launch on 5 July 2013 (Mail and 
Guardian, 12 July, 2013), and only staged his first campaign rally on 11 July in 
Chiweshe, Mashonaland central. 
 
The above suggests there was ample time, opportunity, and effort invested during 
July, for Zimbabweans to "change their minds" after the survey had been 
administered. Ferree, Gibson & Long (2014) show, for Kenya's 2013 elections 
using exit polling data, that, issues, candidates claim, ownership of success, and 
allocation of blame in power-sharing arrangements matters. They also show that 
it mattered for voting intentions who acted or was treated as the incumbent in 
popular opinion also mattered for voting intentions.  
 
This thesis offers an ex-post analysis of the 2008 and 2013 elections, which shows 
that some of the things, inadvertently neglected by the survey mattered for the 
elections in question. It cannot be assumed lightly that the difference between the 
survey’s projected margins and announced margins, i.e. the swing, was down to 
manipulation. I argue that there is no narrative on the elections in Zimbabwe that 
can be reasonably complete without factoring in campaigns with the exception of 
“non-elections” like the run-off of June 2008. To do so is to assume that 
campaigns do not matter, and that electoral legwork around canvassing, 
pamphleteering, advertising, propaganda (including slander) and rallies do not 
move the needle in Zimbabwe politics. Yet they do.  
 
On account of the above, I argue that there can be added value to BDM's study if 
it is juxtaposed with legitimate campaign activities. I do just that below and 
demonstrate that through this, readers can see where campaigns may have been 
targeted and may have yielded results, and where campaigns were limited, yet the 
results are not commensurate with effort. The data for this study suggests that 
ZANU-PF did not target Masvingo, Manicaland, and Mashonaland East 
provinces (the top three highest targets for fraud, according to BDM) for intense 
campaigning through bigwig rallies. Figure 5-4 shows the places that ZANU-PF 
targeted in 2013 with bigwig rallies. As is evident from the map, Manicaland, 
Masvingo, and Mashonaland East hardly received any bigwig attention, while 
Matebeleland South did.  
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Figure 5-4: Bigwig Visits overlaid on BDM's Suspected Provincial Rigging 
 
Source: Author's data overlaid on a provincial map based on BDM's fraud 
likelihood projection 
 
If Bratton, Dulani, & Masunungure (2016) are correct, what are the implications 
for this study? A sceptic might argue that this study's concern with campaigning 
is misplaced because ZANU-PF may have campaigned through bigwig rallies in 
areas it intended to rig.  
 
Fortunately the sites for the thesis' in-depth study mostly fall outside the zones of 
possible high fraud that BDM highlight. This study's sites are in Bulawayo 
(Makokoba and Pumula), where the variation between survey and official 
election results is below zero (-2), Mashonaland Central (Mount Darwin 
constituencies), which is outside the top four for possible manipulation, as is 
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Matebeleland North (Tsholotsho North and Lupane East). Gormonzi South is the 
only one located in the possibly "high fraud province" of Mashonaland East. 
However, the above allows the thesis to continue with limited concern for high 
levels of electoral fraud but does flag these where they were encountered (chapter 
6 and 8).  
 
However, as is visibly apparent, from Figure 5-4, if ZANU-PF intended to rig in 
Masvingo, Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Matebeleland South Provinces, 
Figure 5-4 shows it did not attempt to cover up such electoral fraud through 
bigwig campaigns to these areas. The study's findings show that, on the contrary, 
the locus of ZANU-PF intense campaigning through bigwig visits in 2013 was 
away from the provinces identified as the top four zones of possible manipulation 
and fraud. Figure 5-4’s import is that not campaigning in the areas (Manicaland 
and Masvingo) heightens the possibility that ZANU-PF's gains in those areas 
could have been the products of fraud. Many possibilities can account for ZANU-
PF's victory in these areas. In chapter 7 and 8, this study will highlight the 
subnational politics away from bigwig visits in two constituencies in 
Matebeleland North, Lupane East and Tsholotsho North. This could help answer 
questions related to its neighbouring province, Matebeleland South, which as 
Figure 5-4 shows, received some bigwig attention in 2013. 
 
5.9 Continuity Or Change ? or Change in continuity: ZANU-
PF’s campaign strategies for the 2008 and 2013 
Presidential Elections  
 
Beyond the above-cited literature, some scholarship has attempted to explain the 
outcomes of the 2008 and 2013 elections. For 2008, however, most of this 
literature focuses, in the main, on the run-off election, with limited coverage on 
the March 2008 election. Below, I conduct a quick scan of this literature and then 
present this thesis' take on the two elections regarding broader strategy issues as 
part of building a foundation for the three chapters that follow. For ease of 
analysis, I divide this scholarship in two, the ZANU-PF continuity group, and the 
ZANU-PF change group. The continuity group suggests that there was minimal 
to no change in ZANU-PF strategy and is similar to the accounts reviewed above. 
It argues that ZANU-PF did not divert from its historical, illicit approaches to 
power retention, attributing much of ZANU-PF's victory to opposition weakness, 
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external connivance, and the incumbency advantage. Matyszak (2017) presents 
the extreme version of the continuity argument. He posits that: 
There has been no shift in Zimbabwean politics for the past two decades. 
ZANU-PF won the elections in July 2013 in exactly the same way (with a 
few variations on a theme) as they won those in 2000, 2002, 2005 and June 
2008 (Matyszak, 2017:9).  
 
Matyszak credits ZANU-PF’s electoral fortunes in 2013 to substantial 
malfeasance and its control of electoral institutions. He accuses any scholarship 
that attempts to explain ZANU-PF’s 2013 victory as the result of an enlarged 
support base as being without empirical backing and perpetuating ZANU-PF 
legitimating narratives. For him, 2008 and the attendant Tsvangirai and 
opposition victories were mere aberrations.  
 
Moore's less "radical" version of the continuity argument suggests that the 2013 
result was due to ZANU-PF’s adept incorporation of “coercion, cheating, and 
[SADC] regional connivance (with the opposition's hapless performance)" 
(Moore,2014:47). This, he argues, was augmented by meticulous preparation; 
populist strategies; and MDC-T's ill-preparedness (Moore,2014:47-60). Others 
argue that ZANU-PF ran a "careful scam” with no “single rig”(Chan, 2013) 
augmented by ZANU-PF’s control and conditioning of the elections and 
associated electoral machinery, ensuring its victory in advance (Southall, 
2013:137). In this genre, there is also an emphasis on ZANU-PF’s manipulation 
and MDC-T’s poor technical and political performance (Zamchiya, 2013; 
Masunungure, 2014).  
 
Except for Moore (2014) and Southall (2013) who grudgingly accept that ZANU-
PF may have outcampaigned the opposition, the bulk of the continuity literature 
gives little to no credit to ZANU-PF's political gamesmanship as a party. It falls 
into the all too familiar tragedy of analysing the party as what it is in the state. 
There was indeed party-state conflation in Zimbabwe. However, it is also true 
that analysis that limits its lens to that configuration often fails to see what 
ZANU-PF does as the party presiding over the state, and what it does as a political 
party. In sum, this brand of scholarship mainly concurs with Bracking’s (2013) 
verdict that in the 2013 election, ZANU-PF employed “a multi-pronged, multi-
dimensional, very traditional set of tactics from the best practise handbook of 
stealing elections”.  
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The change group generally starts from the premise that because ZANU-PF made 
the electoral gains it did in 2013 without recourse to violence or visible 
intimidation, repression and the manipulation of elections arguments are 
insufficient as explanations for the stunning electoral reversal. As such, 
something significant, must have changed. While I present it as one group, this 
literature varies on what it thought changed, or how ZANU-PF changed.  
 
Some argue that part of what changed was structural and institutional. The very 
nature of governing arrangements through the GNU, the institutions it spawned, 
and structures it erected had an impact on the kinds of politics at play in the lead 
up to the 2013 elections. In this realm, LeBas (2014) attributes part of what 
changed to the "perils of power-sharing" which she argues disadvantaged the 
opposition and created opportunities for ZANU-PF (LeBas 2014:53). 
Raftopoulos (2013:983) argues that ZANU-PF changed its electoral strategy in 
2013, from its dominant reliance on violence in the June 2008 run-off to a 
combination of coercion, consent and deliberately stalling on political reforms 
during the GNU and succeeded because of a reconstituted social base.  
 
Others argue changes in political demeanour and Mugabe’s personality. Chan & 
Gallagher (2017:15) argue that ZANU-PF reconnected with its base during the 
GNU and “unleashed a charm offensive”, where its leaders reconnected, 
apologized and promised reform while distributing largesse and preached policies 
that promised to enhance the people’s material well-being. Tendi (2013:965) puts 
the change down to ZANU-PF not employing overt violence, reducing Mugabe’s 
exposure through campaign appearances but making sure that when he did, he 
was much more personable than he was in 2008. Table 5-7 shows Mugabe’s 
official campaign itinerary for 2013. It evidences Tendi’s change and shows why 
looking at bigwig visits is important. As is evident, Mugabe had a lighter load to 
carry, but the reality that this thesis highlights is that he was not working alone.  
 
The change group treats ZANU-PF a bit more like a party. However, some of the 
analysis, for instance, impressions of Mugabe switching from being combative, 
to a charm offensive and becoming more personable, is not denotative of a 
change. Mugabe, even in 2008 was a "charmer" and charismatic and often elicited 
bouts of laughter from his audiences across the country. It is this charisma that 
endeared him to many of his admirers. Articulation of this kind of change is 
informed by what I call headline analysis, where scholars and the public engage 
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in the formation of opinions based on newspaper headlines or prevailing opinion. 
This is especially so for 2008, where I have already stated, the scholarship and 
analysis overly focus on the violent run-off election, when indeed Mugabe was 
more combative, less humorous and “charming”. Nevertheless, this was a 
president who after 30 years in power was on the verge of losing to political 
"novices" who had not let out blood, sweat and tears for the independence of the 
country. What could one expect of him? A study of the March 2008 election 
presents a different picture and pulls down the façade on some of the alleged 
changes.  
 
The analysis that in this thesis broadly supports the conclusions of the second 
group. I note the importance of an analysis of ZANU-PF that is steeped in the 
longue durée and speaks to ZANU-PF's traditional conduct and history. 
However, I argue that the focus on how ZANU-PF stuck to its old form boxes the 
scholarship into an expectations trap. The analysis is limited to expectations of 
ZANU-PF as a historically authoritarian party rather than a more empirical focus 
on what it did. I argue that ZANU-PF learnt from 2008 and adapted in 2013, while 
the opposition in 2013 was still caught up in its 2008 glory and overestimated its 
chances because of the “absence” of violence. I note three things that contributed 
and influenced changes to ZANU-PF’s 2013 election campaign strategy and 
eventual election outcomes. These three things enjoin my analysis to the change 
group, but as I will show in the coming chapters, it also separates it from some of 
the changes or types of changes that the change group forward. I introduce these 
three things that I argue forced ZANU-PF to change, here and flesh them out in 
later chapters.  
 
First, the costs of violence to ZANU-PF's legitimacy at home and abroad were a 
well-learnt lesson from 2008. In some respects, ZANU-PF's resort to brutal 
violence and increased patronage control and distribution of campaign largesse 
(after the March 2008 election and in the run-up to the presidential election run-
off in June 2008) was the first and noticeable change in its strategy (Alexander 
and Tendi, 2008; Alexander and Chitofiri, 2010). This election violence, in which 
the military was implicated, had, as Hoglund (2009:416) notes, the objective of 
influencing the election process in ways similar to earlier attempts in 2008 by 
Mugabe to intimidate and dissuade soft-core opposition supporters from voting 
as I elaborate in Chapter 7. This was not out of character for ZANU-PF (Kriger, 
2005; Sachikonye, 2011), as competitive authoritarian ruling parties are known 
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to use election violence and political repression to contain the democratic 
uncertainty at elections (Collier & Vicente 2012; Schedler 2002:104). It, 
however, came after an attempt at being elected within accepted Weberian legal-
rational premises, which spoke to the intention in March 2008 to claim some 
procedural legitimacy. 
 
The military and violent incursion into civilian electoral processes of June 2008 
came at a cost. As Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski (2018) note, the use of 
violence as a tactic of manipulation increases post-election challenges to the 
incumbent's rule, leading to high costs and concessions. In Zimbabwe, the 
African Union Election Observer Mission and SADC Election Observer Mission 
(SEOM) unequivocally stated that the June run-off elections did not represent the 
will of the people of Zimbabwe (SEOM, 2008:6). The African Union's Heads of 
State Summit issued a communique calling for dialogue, a Government of 
National Unity, and SADC mediation (AU, 2008:2). ZANU-PF had secured 
Mugabe's place as President in 2008. However, Tsvangirai had pulled out of the 
election because of violence, denying Mugabe legitimacy at home (Reuters, 9 
March, 2008) while the SADC and AU’s condemnation denied him legitimacy 
among his peers, forcing Mugabe into a Government of National Unity (GNU). 
These circumstances, I argue, were a catalyst for change and are part of the causal 
pathway to ZANU-PF's 2013 election campaign and victory as chapters 7 and 8 
will elaborate.  
 
Second, like LeBas (2014), I argue that some of the changes to ZANU-PF's 
campaign strategy and resultant electoral fortunes in 2013 were a product of the 
GNU as a political moment where ZANU-PF shared incumbency with the 
opposition MDC formations. The very existence and operation of the GNU 
affected the modus operandi of not just the opposition, but also ZANU-PF. The 
genesis of the GNU forced ZANU-PF to shift its campaign strategies and tactics. 
The 2008 electoral process showed that ZANU-PF was on the back foot, and the 
GNU was a constant reminder of its failure to govern alone and as it wanted. 
Linked to this, and third, the 2013 election presented Mugabe and ZANU-PF with 
a chance to take corrective measures to allow it to govern alone and how it liked. 
This message, as chapters 6,7 and 8 will show, was consistently bellowed out at 
bigwig rallies. As Hall (1988) notes, in situations where incumbent authoritarian 
parties are cornered, the old order cannot be preserved. It is left with the choice 
to reform or die. ZANU-PF chose to live, which entailed reform. Based on the 
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wisdom of hindsight it imperfectly adopted and adapted legitimacy-seeking 
methods to contest in the democratic field of elections in 2013. 
5.10 Overview Of ZANU-PF National Level Campaign 
Strategy For The 2008 And 2013 Presidential Elections  
ZANU-PF's change in strategy was evident at several levels. At the national level, 
this study's evidence suggests that ZANU-PF changed its primary campaign 
targets. Whereas in 2008 ZANU-PF targeted ZANU-PF aligned constituencies 
(ZAC) with the most bigwig visits, in 2013, it targeted opposition-aligned 
constituencies (OAC) and consolidating ZACs more. I argue that this is both 
indicative and a result of ZANU-PF's changes in its campaign strategy. Following 
Rohrschneider (2002), I characterise these strategies related to whom ZANU-PF 
targeted with enhanced campaign efforts as "mobilising" or "Chasing" strategies. 
In 2008 ZANU-PF's targets for the intensive campaign through mainly Mugabe's 
rallies suggest that the party at the national level was engaged in a mobilising 
strategy that targeted its core-constituencies.  
 
In 2013, the data suggests that at the national level, ZANU-PF had switched 
campaign targets from its core-supporters to unaligned and opposition voters, 
indicative of a predominantly chasing strategy at that level. However, as I will 
show in the chapters that follow, this "neat" national strategy was much murkier 
at the subnational level, where the demands of local contexts disciplined 
variations and adaptations of these broad national strategies. 
 
The results displayed in Table 5-2 support the above position. The study 
catalogued 81 bigwig visits within two months of each of the 2008 and 2013 
presidential elections. It mapped these bigwig visits across constituency types, as 
shown in Table 5-2. I mapped the bigwig visits onto constituency types that 
emerged from the results of the previous presidential elections. That is, 2008 
bigwig visits mapped onto 2002 presidential election results-based constituency 
types, and 2013 visits mapped onto March 2008 presidential election results 
constituency types.  
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Table 5-2: ZANU-PF Bigwig visits for 2008 and 2013 
Constituency Type 2008 
Bigwig 
Visits 
 
N = 42 
2008 Aggregate 
proportions per 
Major 
Constituency 
type 
2013 Bigwig 
Visits 
 
 
N = 39 
2013 
Aggregate 
Bigwig visit  
ZANU-PF Strongholds 7  
 
 
 
53% 
3  
 
 
 
26% 
17% 8% 
Consolidating ZANU-PF  3 3 
7% 8% 
Marginal ZANU-PF 12 5 
29% 12% 
Battleground 
Constituencies 
6 14% 3 8% 
14% 8%  
Opposition Strongholds 4  
 
 
34.% 
9  
 
64% 
10% 23% 
Consolidating Opposition 4 5 
10% 12% 
Marginal Opposition 6 11 
14% 28% 
Source: Author's Data based on cataloguing campaign stops of the ZANU-PF 
Praesidium during the2008 (March and June) and 20 13 elections.  
 
Table 5-2 shows that in 2008 ZANU-PF invested 53% of its bigwig visits in 
ZACs, and 34% of its effort in OACs, while BCs received only 14% of visits. It 
also shows that in 2013, ZANU-PF changed its locus of attention from ZACs, to 
which it invested 26% of its bigwig efforts, thereby almost reducing its attention 
there by half. It then paid closer attention to OACs, where it invested 64% of its 
bigwig visits. It barely visited BCs at 8% of all bigwig visits. 
 
Of the 41 nationwide bigwig visits mapped for 2008, 31 bigwig visits were staged 
ahead of the March Presidential election, while ten bigwig visits were after the 
March Presidential election but ahead of the ill-fated June Presidential Election 
Runoff. The constituency sub-type that ZANU-PF paid the most attention to was 
marginal-ZANU-PF constituencies which attracted 29% of all visits and about 
55% of visits to ZACs. Marginal ZANU-PF constituencies were constituencies 
where ZANU-PF had narrowly won. However, the margin of victory was not low 
enough for the constituency to slip into the BC category, and also not large 
enough to be in the safer consolidating category. ZANU-PF paid the least 
attention to opposition strongholds (10%) and consolidating ZANU-PF 
constituencies.  
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The above results are generally consistent with the mobilising strategy. They 
show that ZANU-PF focused on shoring-up support in "its" core-constituencies, 
but mainly in the ones which, in 2002 had shown signs of slipping through narrow 
margins of victory. It paid little attention to battleground and opposition 
constituencies. I argue that this was because the 2002 election results as well as 
the two-thirds majority in parliament that ZANU-PF enjoyed, provided it with a 
sense of confidence in 2008. All things being constant, shoring up its support in 
the marginal constituencies and maximising in its strongholds should have been 
able to keep its political dominance intact. Nevertheless, this strategy did not 
work with dire consequences for ZANU-PF's hold on power, and later, its 
legitimacy. Figure 5-5 shows ZANU-PF's 2008 bigwig visits mapped on 
constituency types. 
 
Figure 5-5: ZANU-PF Bigwig 2008 visits x Constituency Types 
 
In 2013, of the 39 catalogued visits, ZANU-PF deployed most of its bigwig visits 
to marginal-opposition constituencies (28% of all visits) and opposition 
strongholds (23% of all visits). These two constituency sub-types alone 
accounted for over half of ZANU-PF's bigwig rallies, indicating a concerted 
effort on ZANU-PF's part to campaign to non-core voters. Targeting of marginal-
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opposition constituencies made sense because of the narrowness of the margins, 
and ZANU-PF's need to recover from the 2008 defeat. On face value, the attempts 
on opposition strongholds made no strategic sense.  
 
However, beyond face value, I argue in chapter 7 that ZANU-PF saw an 
opportunity through the GNU and decided to take advantage of MDC leaders’ 
preoccupations with government business to attempt takeovers of the 
constituencies represented by MDC ministers. The fact that ZANU-PF targeted 
opposition constituencies goes against the thinking in the majority of the 
literature. For instance, Bratton et al. (2016) and ICG (2013) argued that ZANU-
PF appeared to be concentrating its efforts in its rural strongholds, something that 
the data for this study disputes.  
 
The results accord with the thesis' general positioning that ZANU-PF proved 
adept at learning and shifted to a chasing strategy. A reasonable basis on which 
one can question the assertion that ZANU-PF had switched strategies can be 
regarding why it then did not target battleground constituencies. In chapter 8, I 
argue that BCs were not part of the election campaign calculus of ZANU-PF and 
that in its eyes, there were opposition and ZANU-PF constituencies, although 
some of these were easier to win than others. Figure 5-6 shows ZANU-PF's 
bigwig visits for 2013 mapped on constituency types from the 2008 election 
results. 
 
168 
 
Figure 5-6: ZANU-PF Bigwig visits 2013 x Constituency Type 
 
Source: Author’s data 
 
The data displayed in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-5 and 5-6 clearly shows that ZANU-
PF paid the least attention to its core constituencies in 2013. ZANU-PF made 
bigwig visits to its strongholds and consolidating constituencies the least visited 
(8% of all visits each) in 2013. This is consistent with a chasing rather than 
mobilising strategy. On face value, the data also suggests a reduction in bigwig 
visits for 2013 from the 2008 level of 41 to 39, which is counter-intuitive to a 
hearts and minds and chasing campaign that would entail more campaigning not 
less. This observation is buttressed by ZANU-PF spokesperson, Rugare Gumbo, 
who in 2013 announced that Mugabe would make ten appearances at star rallies 
(Daily News, 2013, July 11). Tendi (2013) points out that opposition pundits 
ascribed this to ill-health and ZANU-PF's attempt to manage both the workload 
for the then 89-year-old Mugabe, as well as managing the optics around over-
exposing a visibly fragile and weak candidate. The official rally schedule for 
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Mugabe as announced by Gumbo after the politburo meeting is shown in table 5-
7 below 
Table 5-3: Mugabe's Official 2013 Campaign Itinerary 
Place Province Date  Provincial 
Capital (y/n)  
Nzvimbo Growth Point, 
Chiweshe 
Mashonaland Central Thursday 11 
July 2013 
No 
Marange, aerodrome Manicaland Saturday 13 
July 2013 
No 
Rudhaka Stadium,  
Marondera 
Mashonaland East Monday 15 
July 2013 
Yes 
Chibhuku Stadium, 
Chitungwiza 
Harare  Tuesday 16 
July 2013 
No 
Chinhoyi Stadium Mashonaland Central Thursday 18 
July 2018 
Yes 
Lupane Matabeleland North Friday, 19 July 
2018 
Yes 
Pelandaba Stadium 
Gwanda 
Matabeleland South Saturday, 20 
July 2018 
Yes 
Masvingo Masvingo Thursday 25 
July 2013 
Yes 
White City Stadium, 
Bulawayo 
Bulawayo Saturday 27 
July 2013 
Yes 
National Sports Stadium, 
Harare 
Harare Sunday 28 July 
2013 
Yes 
    
Source: Author’s Data based on ZANU-PF Politburo announcement on 10 July 
2013 
 
It is worth noting that the visits for 2008 included about ten which where after 
the March 2008 election and were staged as Mugabe's effort towards the election 
run-off. In real terms, on an election by election basis, the reduction in 2013 is an 
increase of bigwig campaign activity in the first round of the Presidential election. 
Also, as this thesis will show in chapters 6, 7 and 8, while Mugabe’s workload 
was reduced, that of other bigwigs, especially Vice President Joyce Mujuru, and 
Party Chairman, Simon Khaya Moyo, was increased. It is precisely because of 
this shift that this study focuses on bigwig rather than "star" rallies.  
 
Strategically, the deployment of bigwig visits during the two elections was a 
study in contrast. Beside the de-escalation of attention to ZACs from highest 
priority in 2008 to lowest priority in 2013, and the escalation of OACs from low 
(2008) to high priority (2013) the data showed other shifts. For instance, in 2008, 
68% of ZANU-PF’s 2008 bigwig visits (28 out of 41) were to rural 
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constituencies, with urban areas only accounting for 17% (7 visits) and peri-urban 
areas 14% (6 visits). The majority of these visits were to new constituencies 
(63.5% of total visits) which had emerged from the delimitation process, but 
which mostly carved off old ZANU-PF strongholds that were predominantly 
rural. In 2013, most of the constituencies that ZANU-PF targeted with bigwig 
visits were still rural. However, the proportion had gone down from 68% to about 
54%, while the proportion of urban bigwig visits more than doubled, increasing 
from 17% of all visits in 2008 to about 37% of all visits in 2013. 
 
The study’s data suggest that in the 2013 Presidential election, ZANU-PF 
changed tactics and went after opposition constituencies. It is also plausible that 
ZANU-PF was going after the “new” constituencies it had lost to the opposition 
in 2008. Chapter 6 and 7 will take a closer look at why and how ZANU-PF 
campaigned in opposition-aligned and battleground constituencies in both the 
2008 and 2013 elections in a bit more detail. As this section demonstrated, a large 
part of the national level analysis for this study hinges on bigwig rally allocation 
and deployment as a proxy for campaign intensity, and the basis on which the 
study infers which kinds of constituencies were important to ZANU-PF in the 
two elections.  
 
5.10.1 Some Notes On New Constituencies 
Chapter 4 outlined the delimitation exercise that the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission conducted in 2008. This delimitation exercise increased the number 
of single-member districts for House of Assembly elections from 120 to 210, 
creating 90 “new” constituencies. These new constituencies attracted a significant 
amount of ZANU-PF’s campaign attention through bigwig visits. Bigwig visits 
to new constituencies accounted for 17 of the 41 bigwig visits (about 42%) 
catalogued for 2008 in this study. Battleground constituencies received the 
second highest amount of attention, followed by ZACs, with OACs received the 
least attention.  
 
Table 5-3 shows the new constituencies that ZANU-PF bigwigs visited. As stated 
above, when new constituencies are factored in separately, it is clear that they 
were the most targeted with bigwig rallies. The make-up of the new 
constituencies that ZANU-PF targeted with bigwig rallies shows ZANU-PF 
targeted new constituencies drawn from consolidating ZANU-PF the most 
followed by battleground constituencies. The politics of this approach makes 
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sense and tallies with general thinking that ZANU-PF had increased the number 
of house of assembly constituencies to its benefit. Rallies in new, formerly 
ZANU-PF constituencies would ensure that the anticipated electoral dividends 
could come. However, the fact that ZANU-PF targeted new constituencies with 
traditional ZANU-PF DNA, i.e. the bigwig visits to the new constituencies did 
not constitute the bulk of non-ZAC visits in 2008. This data does not change the 
analysis when the new constituencies are coded along the seven categories 
without the new designation.  
 
Table 5-4: 2008 Bigwig Visits To New Constituencies 
New Constituency At 2008 Presidential 
Election 
Constituency Type  
Pre-Delimitation in 2008  
Based On 2002 Presidential 
Election Results 
Number Of  
ZANU-PF 
Bigwig 
Visits 
Mbire ZANU-PF stronghold 1 
Masvingo Urban Battleground 1 
Mount Darwin East ZANU-PF Stronghold 1 
Chiredzi West Consolidating-ZANU-PF 1 
Chirumanzu Zibagwe Consolidating-ZANU-PF 1 
Goromonzi West Consolidating-ZANU-PF 1 
Chegutu East Battleground 1 
Marondera Central Battleground 1 
Goromonzi North Consolidating-ZANU-PF 1 
Hwange Central Marginal-Opposition  1 
Zengeza East Opposition Stronghold 1 
Bikita South Consolidating-ZANU-PF  1 
Gokwe-Gumunyu Consolidating-ZANU-PF 1 
Magunje Marginal-ZANU-PF 1 
Lupane East Consolidating-Opposition 2 
Tsholotsho South Battleground 1 
Beitbridge West Consolidating-ZANU-PF 1 
 
 So while the picture presented in Table 5-3 above is accurate, this section 
proceeds from the premise that this picture treats these new constituencies 
erroneously as a tabula rasa. They were not tabula rasa and to treat them as such 
would distort the analysis of the kinds of constituencies that ZANU-PF targeted 
for the 2008 presidential election race. A review of the genetic codes of the new 
constituencies based on the electoral histories of the constituencies, from which 
they were cleaved, shows that 59% of the new constituencies, to which ZANU-
PF deployed bigwig rallies in 2008 (10 of the 17), were cleaved from ZANU-PF-
aligned constituencies. Only three of the 17 (about 17%) were drawn from 
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opposition-aligned constituencies. Four were cleaved from existing battleground 
constituencies.  
5.11 Conclusion  
This chapter provided an overview of the legislative and institutional framework 
under which elections were conducted in Zimbabwe. It provided a historical 
background of constitutional and legislative amendments that had an impact on 
elections from 1980 up to 2008. The chapter also reviewed the state of electoral 
contests in Zimbabwe after 2000, focusing specifically on presidential elections. 
This review included an analysis of extant literature on post-2000 elections, and 
the 2008 and 2013 elections. It highlighted the issue of violence and fraud and 
dealt explicitly with the later based on interventions to detect fraud from civil 
society organisations and the scholarship.  
 
The chapter argued that while violence and fraud were realities, the literature 
often overemphasises these elements because of their historical significance and 
recurrence. However, this leads the literature to review ZANU-PF as its past 
rather than its current form. In the process, it misses ZANU-PF's "current" actions 
and what they import as it looks to the familiar as informed by ZANU-PF's past 
form. It also misses changes that are often present even in continuity regarding 
ZANU-PF and its electoral strategy. The chapter dispensed of arguments that 
argue continuity rather than change in ZANU-PF and located itself with 
scholarship that discerned some change in ZANU-PF and or its campaign strategy 
in 2013.  
 
The chapter ended by presenting the study's findings around national-level 
campaigning based on an assessment of bigwig visits and how ZANU-PF 
deployed them to different constituency types. It showed that ZANU-PF 
concentrated its efforts in 2008 to ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies and argued 
that this was indicative of a generally mobilising campaign strategy at the national 
level. It also showed that in 2013 ZANU-PF shifted its focus through bigwig 
rallies to opposition-aligned constituencies and argued that this represented a 
strategic shift from mobilising to a generally chasing campaign strategy at the 
national level.  
 
The chapter cautioned that while the initial findings are almost clear cut, the 
picture was more diffuse and sophisticated at the subnational level. The next 
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chapter begins to look at ZANU-PF campaigns from both a national and local 
perspective. It starts the process of illuminating the complexity of ZANU-PF's 
campaigns at different levels and vantage points. Specifically, the next chapter 
studies ZANU-PF campaigns in ZANU-aligned constituencies, ZACs. It presents 
further dataset observations as they relate to bigwig rallies and ZACs and uses 
Mount Darwin constituencies to show how ZANU-PF campaigned at subnational 
level, the kinds of appeals it made during bigwig rallies to ZACs in general and 
Mount Darwin in particular. It uses its evidence to engage with specific 
explanations from the literature. It infers what the findings mean for ZANU-PF's 
attempts at gaining consent to govern from the people and the kinds of claims to 
legitimacy that it staked in ZACs 
 
 
 
 
. 
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6 PERSUADING BY DAY, COMPELLING BY NIGHT: 
ZANU-PF CAMPAIGNS IN ZANU-PF ALIGNED 
CONSTITUENCIES (ZACS). 
 
This chapter focuses on ZANU-PF's 2008 and 2013 presidential election 
campaigns in ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies (ZACs). ZACs are constituencies 
that typically incline towards ZANU-PF. They include ZANU-PF strongholds, 
consolidating and marginal constituencies, as defined in Chapter 2. The 
presidential election results from 2008 and 2013 show that a total of 113 of the 
210 House of Assembly constituencies were ZACs at some point during these 
elections. The chapter looks at how ZANU-PF campaigned in ZACs and how 
these campaigns connected between the national level presidential campaign and 
local-level politics in Mount Darwin District, whose constituencies this chapter 
focuses on, to describe and explain the subnational politics of the 2008 and 2013 
presidential races in Zimbabwe. The chapter tests the study's primary hypothesis 
that 'ZANU-PF campaigns to win the hearts and minds of voters to enhance its 
legitimacy' through analysing bigwig appeals during rallies in ZACs and the 
subnational politics of the Mount Darwin constituencies (East, South, West) and 
surrounding areas. These Mount Darwin constituencies, located in Mashonaland 
Central province, fit the designation of ZACs in the 2008 and 2013 presidential 
elections. The electoral politics and campaign activity that occurred in these 
constituencies is reasonably representative of the ZANU-PF presidential election 
campaign modus operandi in ZACs in general.   
 
The chapter concludes that ZANU-PF campaigned in legitimacy-seeking ways 
through bigwig visits to Mount Darwin and ZACs. However, at the local level, it 
engaged in a coercive mobilisation campaign and used clientelism as both a carrot 
and a stick through denial of access to clientelist benefits. ZANU-PF flattered to 
deceive as it publicly sought legitimacy, but privately compelled support in 
wicked ways that were inimical to legitimacy-seeking modes of electioneering.  I 
argue that in ZACs across both the 2008 and 2013 elections, ZANU-PF generally 
adopted a mobilising campaign strategy with coercive and clientelist features. 
Despite the continuity of the coercive mobilisation strategy in ZACs across time, 
there were significant variations to the implementation of the coercive-clientelist 
mobilising strategy. The chapter outlines how ZANU-PF generally instituted a 
three-tier political game of (i) persuasion at bigwig rallies and (ii) persuasion, as 
well as (iii) coercion at the local level. Party organisation, restricting opposition 
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campaigns, and instrumentalising traditional leaders, war veterans and party 
youths were central cogs of ZANU-PF's subnational politics. ZANU-PF expected 
to win in these constituencies as well as nationally through mobilising sufficient 
turnout of what it imagined was its huge popular base, especially in 2008. 
Whatever inducements ZANU-PF offered; were to "buy" ZANU-PF members' 
turnout. 
 
Meanwhile in 2013, while still mobilising constituents in these core-ZANU-PF 
areas, ZANU-PF campaigned to increase the turnout, not just of its members, but 
members of rural communities in general. Whatever inducements it offered were 
effectively monitored and played a dual role of "vote and turnout buying." The 
monitoring ensured that as many people as possible in ZACs, beyond formal 
ZANU-PF structures, voted for ZANU-PF. This led to ZANU-PF not only 
winning but doing so with telling winning margins.  
 
In light of the above, the chapter finds, against the study's hypothesis that ZANU-
PF campaigns to win the hearts and minds of more independent voters to enhance 
its legitimacy. At least not in ZACs.  ZANU-PF initially restricted its efforts to 
established support bases. However, even when it was generally chasing new 
support in 2013, the politics in ZACs remained toxic, with intimidation quite rife. 
The evidence suggests that in these types of constituencies, ZANU-PF campaigns 
to establish its credentials as the party of liberation and expects voters to support 
it on this account. This generally speaks to identity-based claims to legitimacy, 
and as expected, ZANU-PF centred these claims on foundational myths (history) 
and ideology. 
 
I organise the rest of the chapter using two main sections. Section 6.1 covers 
ZANU-PF's campaigns in ZACs in 2008 using bigwigs and provides an overview 
of ZANU-PF aligned constituencies across time (2002-2013). It then looks at the 
appeals that ZANU-PF made during rallies. It finds history and ideological 
appeals, opposition vilification and the instrumentalisation of chiefs as the most 
prominent. None of the appeals spoke to procedural or performance legitimacy. 
This was mainly the same for both the 2008 and 2013 election. The appeals made 
spoke to identity and foundational myths, as well as traditional legitimacy in the 
Weberian sense. Section 6.2 covers ZANU-PF's ground game in ZACs. It outlines 
the local appeal of history and ideology, the kinds of clientelist bargains the local 
organisers made with supporters and suspected opposition members and how 
176 
 
ZANU-PF treats its organisation as part of the campaign strategy. It studies 
ZANU-PF's voluntary and involuntary conscription of traditional leaders, and its 
more virulent politics. The section will describe and explain the return of the 
colonial type of exclusionary politics, as well as the use of violence and 
intimidation.   
6.1 Preaching To The Choir: ZANU-PF’s Mobilising 
Campaign Strategy In ZACS (2008 And 2013) 
In this section, I outline the prevalence of ZACs across time and the extent to 
which ZANU-PF campaigned in them during the 2008 and 2013 elections 
through bigwig visits. I argue that in 2008 ZANU-PF implemented a campaign 
strategy aimed at energising its base, which it targeted with the most bigwig visits. 
Within this base it targeted marginal constituencies the most to shore up its 
support based on the assumption that ZANU-PF strongholds and consolidating 
constituencies were fairly secure. After outlining the extent to which ZANU-PF 
campaigned using bigwig visits in ZACs in 2008, I describe the kind of appeals 
that ZANU-PF bigwigs made during campaign stops. I do the same for ZANU-
PF bigwig visits for 2013, where I argue that in ZACs, ZANU-PF maintained the 
mobilising strategy, but modified it to capture the opposition vote. Unlike in 
opposition strongholds and battleground constituencies in 2013, where ZANU-
PF adopted a persuasive chasing strategy to capture the votes of non-ZANU-PF 
members, in ZACs, especially Mount Darwin, ZANU-PF compelled this support. 
The section that follows this one will explore in greater detail this compulsion, 
and how ZANU-PF put in place measures that ensured that beneficiaries of its 
patronage voted as expected. 
 
As Zimbabwe went to the polls in March 2008, ZANU-PF was confident. It had 
a two-thirds majority in parliament from the 2005 parliamentary elections, and in 
the 2002 presidential poll, its presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe, had 
garnered 56.2% of the vote, against his rival Morgan Tsvangirai, who had 
obtained 42%. Based on the solid parliamentary showing from 2005, and the 
substantial lead from the 2002 presidential election, ZANU-PF had at least 106 
constituencies, out of 210, that were in the ZAC column and could be considered 
relatively "safe" prior to the 2008 Harmonised election. The 106 ZACs included 
39 strongholds, 34 consolidating constituencies, and 33 marginal constituencies. 
Table 6-1 shows the distribution of ZACs across all post-2000 presidential 
elections in percentages and absolute numbers. 
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Table 6-1: ZANU-PF Aligned Constituencies (2002-2018) 
ZANU-PF Aligned CONSTITUENCIES 
 
 
Election Year 
Number Of Constituencies  
Per ZAC sub-Constituency Type 
Strongholds Marginal Consolidating Total 
ZACs 
T1-2002 39 33 34 106 
Proportion of 210 districts 18.57% 15.71% 16.19% 50.47% 
T2-2008 9 20 19 48 
Proportion of 210 districts 4.28% 9.52% 9.04% 22.85% 
T3-2013 46 30 44 120 
Proportion of 210 districts 21.90% 14.28% 20.95% 57.14 
T4-2018 34 37 15 86 
Proportion of 210 districts 16.19% 17.61% 7.14% 40.95% 
Source: Author’s data computed from official presidential election results 
 
As Table 6-1 shows, the 2008 presidential election outcome left the number of 
constituencies in the ZANU-PF aligned category at 48, with the number of 
strongholds declining from 39 to 9, the number of marginal ZANU-PF 
constituencies falling from 33 to 20, and the number of consolidating ZANU-PF 
constituencies also declining from 34 to 19. The ZANU-PF base had weakened, 
with reductions across all ZAC constituency types, and some going into either 
the battleground or opposition aligned category.  
 
The 2013 presidential election outcomes show a dramatic recovery for the 
numbers of constituencies falling into the ZAC category. The total number of 
ZACs increased from 48 to 120, almost tripling the category’s tally. As illustrated 
in Figure 6-1, the number of ZANU-PF strongholds increased from 9 to 46, and 
the numbers of marginals and consolidating constituencies increased to 30 (up 
from 20) and 44 (up from 19) respectively. Of the 113 constituencies that 
remained in the ZAC category across time, 103 were rural constituencies, with 
the remainder being peri-urban constituencies. No urban constituency entered the 
ZAC categories. Of the 103 ZAC rural constituencies, 68 had benefitted from the 
post-2000 Fast Track Land Reform process, which was mostly ‘complete' by the 
time of the 2008 presidential election process.  
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Figure 6-1: ZANU-PF Aligned Constituencies Trends 2002-2018  
 
Source: Author’s data compiled from official presidential election results (2002, 
2008 (March), 2013, and 2018 elections) 
 
6.1.1 ZANU-PF’s Bigwig Visits In 2008  
During the 2008 March presidential elections, ZANU-PF concentrated most of 
its bigwig visits to ZACs as shown in Figure 6-2. It spared 53% of all bigwig 
visits for ZACs while battleground and opposition aligned constituencies (OACs) 
took up the remaining 47% of visits at 14% and 34% respectively. Table 6-2 
shows both the percentages (rounded off to the nearest whole number) and 
absolute number of bigwig visits per sub-constituency type for 2008. It shows 
that the majority of ZANU-PF’s bigwig visits to ZACs, about 55%, were to 
marginal ZANU-PF constituencies, while strongholds received 32% and 
consolidating ZANU-PF constituencies about 14% of all visits to ZACs.  
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Figure 6-2: ZANU-PF Bigwig Visits to ZACs in 2008 and 2013 as 
proportions of all Bigwig visits during the two elections. 
 
Source: Author’s data 
 
I argue that the fact that ZANU-PF's main focus in 2008 was on its regions of 
perceived strength, particularly marginal constituencies, indicates two things. 
First, the fact that ZANU-PF paid the most attention to its core-areas suggests 
that at the national level ZANU-PF was implementing a mobilising campaign 
strategy. A mobilising campaign strategy emphasizes policies, pre-dominantly 
appeals to core voters, primarily relies on ideology, emphasizes leaders, and 
mainly views the party organization as a means to reach voters (Rohrschneider, 
2002:368).  
 
In the sections that follow, I will show how ZANU-PF’s 2008 campaign placated 
its base, focusing on ZANU-PF friendly policies, its ideology and selling 
hagiographic accounts of its candidate while using its party organisation as a key 
vote mobilisation vehicle.  
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Table 6-2: ZANU-PF Bigwig Visits to ZACs in 2008 
Constituency Type 2008 Bigwig 
Visits 
N = 42 
2008 Aggregate proportion of 
ZANU-PF Bigwig visits to ZACs  
ZANU-PF Strongholds 7  
 
 
53% 
16.67% 
Consolidating ZANU-PF  3 
7.14% 
Marginal ZANU-PF 12 
28.% 
Source: Author’s data based on media bigwig rally coverage 
 
The data also indicates that ZANU-PF’s focus on marginal constituencies more 
than any other ZAC sub-type suggests that ZANU-PF strategically targeted its 
weaker areas of support and considered consolidating and stronghold 
constituencies fairly secure. This sense of security emanated from ZANU-PF’s 
past electoral form. In the 2005 general election, the ZANU-PF base had 
delivered a blistering victory against the opposition, attaining a two-thirds 
majority in the House of Assembly. The 2005 results appeared to consolidate 
ZANU-PF’s electoral gains following its win in the violent 2002 presidential 
election, where Mugabe had triumphed with a vote share of 56.2%. The scare 
from the close competition of the 2000 election where ZANU-PF had barely 
scrapped through with 62 of 120 seats but with only a vote share of 48% seemed 
to be comfortably behind them (LeBas, 2006; Hatchard, 2001) I contend that that 
this electoral history and the successful propaganda campaign, as well as the 
private and foreign media clampdown between 2002 and 2005 (Bratton, 
Chikwanha, & Sithole, 2005), led ZANU-PF to believe that it was in peak 
electoral form. With the electoral patterns reasonably stable, it is probable that 
ZANU-PF believed that to win the 2008 presidential election it could mobilise its 
core-voters, whose volumes, on past form, could deliver a victory for Mugabe, 
especially if it bettered its performance in marginal constituencies.  
 
6.1.2 ZANU-PF’s Appeals On The 2008 Campaign Trail 
Based on how it distributed its bigwig visits in 2008, ZANU-PF campaigned to 
energise its base and get it to turn out. This being the intent, ZANU-PF did not 
need to tone-down its “red meat” rhetoric. Mugabe and other bigwigs went all 
out with ideological, historical, and anti-imperialist rhetoric, as well as opposition 
demonisation and other polarising discourses. As LeBas (2006:435) notes, 
political parties are best able to accomplish the task of mobilising constituencies 
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and maintaining party cohesion when they use confrontational or polarising 
tactics to draw sharp boundaries between themselves and their opponents. The 
next section will explore how, and with what appeals, ZANU-PF went about 
mobilising its constituents. It will show how ZANU-PF deployed ideological and 
historical appeals that hagiographically elevated Mugabe’s role in the past and 
depicted him as the best candidate to lead the country.  
 
The section that follows will explore how ZANU-PF maintained its party 
cohesion using its organisational structures as well as other social capital 
institutions in Mount Darwin. It will catalogue the tactics that ZANU-PF 
employed at the subnational level in Mount Darwin during the 2008 election as 
part of the national mobilising campaign strategy for the 2008 presidential 
election. 
 
6.1.3 More than votes: fighting for sovereignty and defending independence. 
Where we are now going, to the 29th of March, we must go and vote. We 
must prepare for the vote that will come out then. A vote that shows that 
we are of Chimurenga, a vote that shows that we fought for this country, 
and that we did not fight for it so that it can go back into the hands of the 
British. Our fist is tightly gripping the country and we will not let go, we 
will not open it up to allow our country to be taken again (Mugabe quoted 
in Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). 
 
The 2008 ZANU-PF presidential candidate,  Robert Mugabe, who was also 
sitting state president made the above call to thousands of supporters at a rally in 
Mount Darwin, at the Kamutsvenzve Grain Marketing Board Silos on 14th March 
2008. Mugabe made the case that, despite there being opposition candidates in 
his former lieutenant Simba Makoni, who was running as an independent 
candidate having left ZANU-PF a few months earlier, in addition to his primary 
challenger Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC, the election was a fight against the 
British. The 2008 election fight, according to Mugabe, was a contest, not just 
between parties, but more importantly between preserving Zimbabwe’s 
independence in the hands of ZANU-PF or returning it to the British and the 
Rhodesians through the opposition (Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). By 
making this case, Mugabe was continuing a narrative from earlier post-2000 
election campaigns and dipping into a rich vein of emotive struggle and 
postcolonial state formation tensions that dated back to the struggle for liberation, 
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not only in Zimbabwe, but also across Africa and the colonised world (Phimister 
& Raftopoulos, 2004; Raftopoulos, 2002; 2006). 
 
Mugabe dedicated much time to the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, 
whom he called more stupid than his predecessor, Tony Blair. At the Mount 
Darwin rally, he revealed that this was because Gordon Brown had admitted in 
writing to the British Law Society that he had increased funding for the opposition 
in Zimbabwe from 2.5 million British Pounds to 3.3 million British Pounds 
(Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). In pursuing this line of attack, Mugabe was 
picking up from the 2005 general election, where ZANU-PF had devoted acres 
of space in its election manifesto and campaign to the so-called Bush and Blair 
factors in Zimbabwe’s politics (ZANU-PF, 2005:4-7). ZANU-PF accused the 
opposition of being a “political mongrel of Blair, Bush and the West” who were 
puppets in a war to push back the "clock" of the African revolution in Southern 
Africa, and to perpetuate western dominance with Zimbabwe as the chosen 
battlefield (ZANU-PF, 2005:7).  
 
This acerbic rhetoric was initially Mugabe’s way of placing the Zimbabwean 
problem at the centre of a more fundamental anti-imperialist and pan-African 
ideological battle. I was also a response to widespread local and international 
critiques around property and human rights violations in Zimbabwe and the 
absence of the rule of law post-2000 (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:385). As 
such, besides connecting to earlier election campaigns, Mugabe’s sentiments 
connected with longer running pan-African battles and were characteristic of 
post-colonial Africa’s challenges with its former colonisers. Post-colonial states 
are generally animated by a search for identity, being recognised as responsible 
agents whose opinions matter and who are self-determining, as well as the 
practical dynamic of building an efficient modern state characterised by the good 
life, political order, and playing a role in the international commonwealth of 
nations (Geertz,1973:258). Mugabe’s rhetoric during the 2008 election, 28 years 
after independence, still betrayed this dual challenge, and an attempt at resolving 
it through asserting and defending the country’s national sovereignty. The claims 
around the battle being between independence and subjugation by former 
colonisers tapped into “…the widespread concern in Africa that there is a process 
of 're-colonisation' going on under the ideological cloak of globalisation and 
structural reform”(Bush & Szeftel, 2002:5).  
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Phimister and Raftopoulos (2004) are right about the genesis of the anti-
imperialist discourse, but as I will show below, during the 2008 election 
campaign in places like Mount Darwin, ZANU-PF’s use of the sovereignty and 
anti-imperialist discourse did more than galvanise pan-African solidarity, it also 
acted as a potent local persuasive appeal. ZANU-PF’s National Party Commissar 
and Mashonaland Central provincial kingpin during the 2008 election, Eliot 
Manyika, was an eloquent purveyor and disciple of the anti-imperialist rhetoric. 
He helped to spread in the message in his province and argued that: 
Everyone should understand that if we lose this election, we would be 
going back to the period where we were under control of the Whiteman. 
The MDC agenda is foreign sponsored [and] the Western imperialists are 
not kind people, they do not do anything because of compassion but are 
just trying to run the country by remote control to loot our resources  
(Chronicle, 3 June, 2008). 
 
In Mount Darwin, Mugabe ensured that allusions to the liberation struggle were 
not just declarations and claims to legitimacy because Mugabe and ZANU-PF 
had led the liberation struggle. They were also a collective identity that included 
Mugabe and the people of Mount Darwin as one “we” who had fought for the 
liberation of the country and had a responsibility to protect it from falling back 
into British hands directly or by proxy. This is an approach that Mugabe used 
again to great effect in the 2013 election, as I will show in the sections that follow. 
Nonetheless, Vice President Mujuru, during her March 2 visit to Mount Darwin 
West, struck a similar chord, and expressed confidence that the people of Mount 
Darwin knew whom to vote for because they knew their history and had seen the 
ugly face of the liberation struggle (Chronicle, 3 March, 2008).  
 
While sometimes vile, hateful and maligning, the ideological and historical 
discourse was resonant in Mount Darwin, where some members of ZANU-PF 
embraced the argument, and indicated to me their belief that Zimbabwe was under 
siege from the West. This resonance in ZACs has to be understood in the context 
of ZANU-PF feeding its base “red meat rhetoric” and the ZANU-PF’s ideological 
appeals, in this case, being targeted at already believing core-constituents. As 
such, Mujuru’s sentiment above, and Mugabe and Manyika’s references to 
history have to be understood in the particular context of Mount Darwin and much 
of Mashonaland Central. Mount Darwin borders Mozambique, and houses 
Mukumbura Border post, which served as a useful channel for guerrilla crossings 
to and from Mozambique’s Tete Province during Zimbabwe's liberation struggle 
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in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, some parts of Mount Darwin were at the 
forefront of the war of liberation, and significant numbers of its sons and 
daughters participated in the war effort at home and across the border in 
Mozambique.  
 
The amount of guerrilla activity in Mount Darwin and the surrounding ‘tribal 
trust lands’ between Chiweshe (further inland in Mashonaland Central) and the 
border with Mozambique, led the Rhodesian settler regime to introduce Protected 
Villages in 1973 as part of an operation code-named Hurricane. This operation 
also included the establishment of a "cordon sanitaire" minefield along the border 
with Mozambique (Mazambani & Mashingaidze, 2014; Mills & Wilson, 2007: 
23). Rhodesian Lieutenant Colonel Bates, quoted in Cilliers (1985:15), 
summarised the strategy as:  
…large external operations to turn off the tap; a cordon sanitaire with 
warning devices, patrolled and backed by a 20 km wide no-go area; 
population control consisting of Protected Villages, food control, curfews 
and (eventually) martial law, and massive psychological action (Lt Colonel 
T Bates quoted in Cilliers, 1985:15). 
  
At the time of writing, R2M2 landmines left over from the liberation struggle still 
litter parts of Mount Darwin, leaving large sections of the district inhabitable, and 
the land unavailable for productive agricultural purposes (Munyukwi, 2017). 
While the landmines are a clear and present danger, they are not the only 
surviving legacy of the liberation struggle that is impacting daily life in Mount 
Darwin. As I will show later, when covering the local politics of presidential 
elections in Mount Darwin, the liberation war history and associated narratives 
have a ‘sweet and sour place’ for and in Mount Darwin, and continue to shape 
the conduct of politics, including electoral politics in the constituencies. 
 
6.1.4 Blurred Lines: Pragmatic, programmatic and clientelist appeals in 2008  
Despite the serious economic challenges that Zimbabwe was going through in 
2008, Mugabe, running in the election as an incumbent, neither apologised nor 
explained. Instead, he blamed the British for the imposition of sanctions and 
sabotaging the Zimbabwean economy, which he argued the British still controlled 
(Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). It was the western sabotage and sanctions 
that Mugabe presented responses to, announcing that his government had 
instituted a “Look East” policy focusing on trade and investments from China, 
and other Asian countries to deal with the sanctions. In regard to the British 
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economic control and sabotage, Mugabe presented the indigenisation and 
economic empowerment act, which he had signed into law a few days earlier on 
March 8. This law, promulgated three weeks before the presidential election, 
prevented foreigners from holding more than 49% equity in local companies and 
businesses (Reuters 9 March, 2008). While presented as part pragmatic and part 
programmatic, Mugabe located these solutions within a historical balance of 
forces and ZANU-PF’s liberation credentials trope, with the Chinese captured as 
the all-weather friends, and the British and their American “cousins” as the 
coloniser and traditional enemy.  
 
ZANU-PF touted the land reform process and its historical and practical 
implications for economic emancipation as its biggest achievement. It sought to 
build on this success with Mugabe pledging to set up a results-based government 
to continue empowering people through supporting “new farmers” with 
implements to increase productivity (Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). This 
promise of support was predicated on a government instituted US$ 180 million 
farm mechanisation programme, which together with grain and fertiliser 
distribution to new farmers, the government had instituted in June 2007 
(Financial Gazette, 13-19 March, 2008). Through this initiative the government 
had, between June 2007 and March 2008, given newly resettled farmers at least: 
2725 tractors, 746 boom sprayers, 608 fertiliser spreaders, 466 planters, 105 
combine harvesters, 210 hay bailers, 78,000 scotch carts (Ox drawn carts), 46,000 
cultivators, 2000 planters, 100,000 ploughs, 130,000 animal drawn harrows, 
92,000 knapsacks, 200,000 chains, and 3120 heifers and bulls.  
 
While new rural farmers were the beneficiaries of the farm mechanisation 
programme, most of the animal drawn implements (scotch carts, ploughs) and 
simple tools (Harrows, chains) were manufactured locally, creating employment 
and access to economic opportunities for urban locals (Financial Gazette, 13-19 
March, 2008). New farmers, given the politics of the country and the land reform, 
were mainly perceived to be ZANU-PF supporters, and their privileged access to 
the above stated programmes was adjudged to be a form of bribery for political 
ends (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Murisa, 2011; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006; 
Zamchiya, 2013b Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006). The timing and selective 
distribution of farming inputs had an impact on election campaigning and 
appeared calculated to (i) benefit perceived ZANU-PF supporters as rewards for 
loyalty, and (ii) demonstrate Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s ability to honour their 
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“programmatic” promises. The interventions were deliberate although public 
officials, like the Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, whose quasi-fiscal 
activities supported these initiatives, denied it.  
President Mugabe deserves to be rewarded by the voters if they, on their 
own, judge that the farm mechanisation programme is a good one and that 
it is succeeding because the President is behind it. That cannot be said to 
be a March 29, 2008 campaign strategy, but if it is, then surely there is 
nothing wrong with it because it is part and parcel of the democratic 
process (Sunday Mail, 23-29 March, 2008). 
 
Mugabe also made programmatic appeals specifically targeted at provinces. For 
instance, he pledged rural electrification in Mashonaland Central, and stated that 
his government would harness solar energy and increase the electricity generation 
capacities of thermal power stations to electrify schools and clinics (Saturday 
Herald, 15 March, 2008). In addition to the above, at every star rally, Mugabe 
officially handed over 23 buses from the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company 
(ZUPCO), a state enterprise, to support provincial transport needs. These buses 
were among the 300 bought through the Reserve Bank ahead of the 2008 
elections. While Mugabe’s programmatic appeals were grand, and some, national 
in scale, in Mount Darwin, Mujuru made locally focused programmatic appeals 
around irrigation schemes and poultry projects (Herald, 3 March, 2008). 
Mujuru’s campaign efforts, in their tone and focus, show the fluidity of the 
concept of bigwig, because despite being Vice President of ZANU-PF, she was 
also a local patron in her home area. Mujuru would switch between operating as 
a parliamentary candidate (local patron) and campaigning for Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF as a bigwig, as it suited her.   
 
The above attempts at programmatic appeals by Mugabe and ZANU-PF also 
illustrate the extent to which ZANU-PF blurred the lines between pragmatic 
interventions, programmatic delivery, and clientelist distributions. Nonetheless, 
the appeals mainly targeted perceived ZANU-PF supporters, solidifying our 
argument that ZANU-PF was not chasing new votes, but was mobilising its base 
as the 2008 strategy in ZACs. As part of this strategy  minimal effort was made 
at influencing vote choice because the targets were perceived as being ZANU-PF 
core-supporters already. Instead, the programmatic and policy appeals as well as 
the clientelist distribution of farming implements and other goods acted more as 
a reward for support and a demonstration of the benefits of loyalty to ZANU-PF 
rather that an attempt to “buy” votes. In this respect the encourage was for 
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constituents to go and vote more than it was to persuade them to vote ZANU-PF. 
This is normal, given the situation and akin to what Nichter (2008) terms turnout 
rather than vote buying in his model. Turnout buying targets supporters and the 
monitoring that takes place is not of the vote choice per se but whether the 
rewarded voter actually turned out to vote (Nichter, 2008:19). The way that 
ZANU-PF stated and operationalised programmatic appeals also shows the 
blurring of lines regarding the extent to which clientelist appeals and distribution 
were accepted as part of the political game. 
 
6.1.5 ZANU-PF’s Bigwig Visits To ZACs In 2013 
In 2013, ZANU-PF decreased its attention to ZACs, staging 11 bigwig visits out 
of the 39 in the period immediately preceding the election. As Table 6-3 shows, 
this constituted about 26% of all catalogued bigwig visits in 2013, down from 
53% in 2008. The biggest share of this attention still remained on marginal 
constituencies, with consolidating and stronghold constituencies accounting for 
8% each of the total visits. ZANU-PF’s strategy at the national level had clearly 
changed with this departure from a primary focus on ZACs to OACs, which this 
thesis describes and explains in Chapter 7. 
   
Table 6-3: ZANU-PF Aggregate Bigwig Visits to ZACs in 2013 
Constituency Types 2013 Bigwig Visits  
 
N = 39 
2013 Aggregate 
Bigwig visit  
ZANU-PF Strongholds 3  
 
26% 
8% 
Consolidating ZANU-PF  3 
8% 
Marginal ZANU-PF 5 
12% 
Source: Author’s data based on media bigwig rally coverage 
 
The data shows that 10 out of the 12 visits were to Mashonaland Central with 
Mount Darwin accounting for 33% of the bigwig visits to Mashonaland Central, 
and 25% of the total bigwig visits to ZACs. The increased attention that ZANU-
PF paid to Mount Darwin can be plausibly explained by the fact that one member 
of the ZANU-PF Praesidium in 2008 and 2013, Vice President Joyce Mujuru, 
who did most of the campaigning in Mount Darwin, hailed from Mashonaland 
Central and had been a Member of Parliament for Mount Darwin since 1980. 
This, however, does not negate the fact that ZANU-PF targeted the province for 
188 
 
intensive campaigning. The Vice President also campaigned in other provinces, 
registering at least 14 campaign stops out of a total of 39 bigwig visits catalogued 
for 2013, and staging 11 of the 12 bigwig visits to ZANU-PF aligned 
constituencies. At times she conducted several rallies in different places in one 
day. Some of these rallies are not catalogued because they were neither Star nor 
Bigwig rallies in the sense adopted in this thesis, but local rallies,  or they took 
place outside the window of visits catalogued for this study. The above suggests 
that other ZANU-PF bigwigs dealt with the base, while Mugabe, the principal, 
went elsewhere. As shown in Table 6-4, Mujuru’s 2013 campaign performance 
was a marked departure from her 2008 performance in both its scale and 
substance, and this was one of the changes to the broad campaign strategy that 
ZANU-PF implemented between the two elections. This increased campaign 
activity on the part of Mujuru in Mashonaland as well as ZANU-PF Chairperson 
Simon Khaya-Moyo's deployment to his native Matabeleland are elaborated in 
Chapter 7 and 8.  
 
Table 6-4: ZANU-PF Particular Bigwig Visits to ZACs in 2013 
Constituency Province Bigwig Date of Visit 
Zvimba North Mashonaland 
West 
Chairman S.K. 
Moyo 
21 April 2013 
Mount Darwin West – Mudzengere 
School, Dotito 
Mashonaland 
Central 
V.P Mujuru 7 July 2013 
Mount Darwin West – Chakoma 
Primary school 
Mashonaland 
Central 
V.P Mujuru 7 July 2013 
Mount Darwin West – Nembire 
Primary School 
Mashonaland 
Central 
V.P Mujuru 7 July 2013 
Muzarabani South – Nzvimbo 
Secondary School 
Mashonaland 
Central 
President 
Mugabe & V.P. 
Mujuru + 
11 July 
Mudzi West – Chitumba High School 
Suswe 
Mashonaland 
East 
V.P Mujuru 16 July 2013 
Muzarabani North – Muzarabani 
Business Centre 
Mashonaland 
Central 
V.P. Mujuru 18 July 2013 
Guruve North - (Gonono) Mashonaland 
Central 
V.P Mujuru July  22 2013 
Mbire - (Mushumbi) Mashonaland 
Central 
V.P Mujuru 22 July 2013 
Shamva South - Chakonda Mashonaland 
Central 
V.P Mujuru 24 July 2013 
Bindura North 
 
Mashonaland 
Central 
V.P Mujuru July 24 2013 
Rushinga – Chimhanda Primary 
School 
Mashonaland 
Central 
V.P Mujuru 26 July 2013 
Source: Author’s Data generated from media coverage of 2013 Elections 
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6.1.6 Ideological and historical appeals on the 2013 campaign rail in ZACs 
There were a number of changes to the tenor and content of the bigwig appeals 
on the 2013 campaign trail, but one of the things that remained constant was 
ZANU-PF’s resort to history and ideological appeals. References to ZANU-PF 
and Mugabe’s role in the liberation war and defeating western hegemony and its 
attempt at neo-colonialism in Zimbabwe were integrated into ZANU-PF’s 
campaign messages as in 2008. During her rallies, Mujuru consistently reminded 
her audiences of how ZANU-PF had fought for their freedom and given them 
land at the cost of sanctions by the west. For instance, speaking at Nembire on 6th 
July 2013, Mujuru located Mugabe as the people’s champion who deserved to be 
thanked in order to fully “…defeat the illegal sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe at 
the instigation of some western askaris pretending to be forces of democracy” 
(Mugabe, 2013). How this “thanks” would translate to the defeating of sanctions 
was something that was left to the voters imagination, but the form of the ‘thank 
you’ was “my vote and your vote” to Mugabe, whom she argued had, since the 
liberation struggle, fought for the empowerment of the people (Share, 2013). In 
Rushinga, Mujuru urged the 30 000 registered voters to turn out, and advised 
“…those who are illiterate to ask for help from polling officers so that the number 
of spoiled papers is reduced” (Ruwende, 2013). Mujuru’s professed task at these 
rallies was to make sure that the people knew who to vote for and express the will 
of Mugabe for ZANU-PF to win, because “we don’t want to go back to Rhodesia” 
(The Herald, July 23, 2013).  
 
While Mugabe did not make many, campaign stops during the 2013 election, his 
first Star Rally was in Mashonaland Central at Nzvimbo Secondary School in 
Chiweshe, close to Mount Darwin on 11th July 2013. Mugabe’s message was in 
sync with part of Mujuru’s approach highlighted above, and probably informed 
the Vice President’s approach in her solo outings.  His main message comprised 
historical and ideological appeals, an appeal for support and votes to undo the 
2008 “mistake”, and a call for peace.  
 
Mugabe first acknowledged and reminded the people in the area of its 
revolutionary place in the struggle for Zimbabwe through giving a deep historical 
background that transcended his usual starting point of the second war for 
liberation from the 1960s and 1970s. He went back to the 1800s, and skilfully 
played to the “revolutionary” history of Chiweshe, home of the ancestral spirit 
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and fabled leader of the first Chimurenga (first war for liberation), Ambuya 
Nehanda. 
…from the beginning we recognise that here in Chiweshe is where the war 
for liberation got its fire, sound leadership, wisdom and the illumination of 
the spirit.  It is here that I am starting my campaign, so that I can remind 
you of your pedigree, remind you of your liberation war history which you 
fought hard in. Let that word spread from Nehanda’s first chimurenga, to 
the second chimurenga for independence, and  the third chimurenga for the 
land (Herald, 11 July, 2013). 
 
Mugabe reminded the people of Chiweshe that despite the liberation pedigree, it 
was also in Chiweshe that “we were betrayed and misled, put to sleep through 
some kind of muti that I do not know of” (Mugabe, ibid). He accused the people 
of Chiweshe of forgetting the history of the liberation struggle and that people 
had died for the country, something which, as shown earlier, was believed to be 
a betrayal of the legacy of the living and the dead heroes of the liberation struggle 
(ZANU-PF takes , 2008). Beyond the symbolic betrayal, Mugabe also saw the 
fact that Chiweshe, located in Mazowe Central constituency, had voted more for 
the opposition than for him and ZANU-PF in 2008, as an actual betrayal (Muzulu, 
2013). In addition, the voter turnout for the constituency in 2008 had been 
uncharacteristically low for Mashonaland Central, at 42.8%, and Mugabe’s vote 
share, at 4133, was about 22 percentage points lower than Morgan Tsvangirai’s 
haul of 6622. This, for Mugabe, had been an unbelievable and disappointing feat, 
which, in jest, he ascribed to witchcraft, and called a mistake. Mugabe called on 
Mashonaland Central in general, and Chiweshe in particular to correct this 
‘mistake’ and asked that the people not forget that people had fought and died for 
the country and that the living had a responsibility to the dead to take care of the 
country. Mugabe argued that: 
We must see to it that no foreigner will come again saying I have white 
skin, so I am superior. NO. We liberated the country let us not fall into the 
slumber of 2008. Let’s be weary of imperialist lapdogs, British puppies 
that are tempted by leftovers thrown to them by the master (Herald, 11 
July, 2013).  
 
In both the 2008 and 2013 elections, ZANU-PF bigwigs placed historical and 
ideological appeals at the centre of their campaigns to motivate voters to support 
ZANU-PF. I argue that these historical and ideological appeals, as shown by the 
above excepts from rally speeches, were emotional appeals that sought to ignite 
voters’ pride around their role in the liberation struggle and bring back painful 
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memories of the realities they had lived and the atrocities they had survived. I 
agree with LeBas (2006:435), who, while referring to the opposition, argues that 
unreasonable qualities of the opposing party and the language of betrayal and 
“forgetting” of past suffering were potent means of reinforcing party unity. They 
also reinforced commitment to continued confrontation, and saw this as true for 
ZANU-PF’s use of historical and ideological appeals in 2008 and 2013. ZANU-
PF also appealed to voters’ mind and to voters as rational beings through 
portraying and arguing a “just” war against neo-colonialism, anti-imperialism and 
the preservation of self-determination and the country’s sovereignty. This was a 
serious ideological pitch despite being embellished with lies around the 
opposition giving land back to whites and placing Zimbabwe back under British 
and Rhodesian dominion.  
 
The argument I make above about the historical and ideological appeals and their 
purpose is a slight departure from the arguments made by Bratton & 
Masunungure (2008) and other scholars on ZANU-PF’s use of history and 
ideology. For instance, Bratton & Masunungure (2008) argue that ideology and 
history were used to claim power and an almost divine right to govern by ZANU-
PF. This reasoning neglects the reality that history and ideology are part of 
ZANU-PF’s claims to legitimacy and were also tools deployed to win the hearts 
and minds of voters, and not, as Bratton & Masunungure (2008: 43) argue, just a 
shabby cover for the personal interests of a narrow clique, or ZANU-PF’s  crude 
attempt to hold on to power. I argue that there is little wrong with a party using 
ideology and history as a claim to legitimacy in the traditional and charismatic 
tradition of Weber’s characterisations or  what von Soest & Grauvogel (2017) 
register as identity based claims to legitimacy.  
 
Nonetheless, the point is that history and ideology, although manipulated and 
convoluted, were in many respects used to persuade and demonstrate a track 
record that showed ZANU-PF’s “viability” as a governor ahead of other parties. 
The above review of the bigwig rally appeals shows that ZANU-PF’s historical 
appeals can be seen as akin to selling a political and performance record covering 
both the pre-independence and post-liberation era. Viewed this way, historical 
appeals are  not only legitimate, but also legitimacy seeking. This is validated by 
Zamchiya (2013:958), who after being imbedded in Tsvangirai’s campaign in 
2013, remarked that Tsvangirai “…misread Mugabe’s claim to the liberation 
struggle mantle and his ability to invoke memories of the war as a sign of 
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weakness.” Tsvangirai, Zamchiya reports, thought “…Zimbabweans were more 
concerned with day to-day bread-and-butter issues”, yet “… in many people’s 
eyes, invoking memories of the liberation war validated Mugabe’s candidature 
and invalidated Tsvangirai” (Zamchiya, 2013: 958). The opposition had no 
effective counterweight to the liberation narrative, leaving Mugabe as the 
custodian of the revolutionary past and a fit candidate for leadership, while 
depicting Tsvangirai as ‘without history’ and lacking the credibility to embody 
and lead Zimbabwe.  
 
This study’s evidence suggests that beyond comparing histories, as Zamchiya 
(2013) states, or giving ‘lectures’ on history, as Tendi (2013) characterises it, the 
use of historical and ideological appeals had additional persuasive effects that 
contributed to ZANU-PF winning voters hearts  and minds through invoking 
pride, sorrow, fear and foreboding in Mount Darwin, which was heavily involved 
with the liberation struggle. As Tendi (2010) acknowledges, patriotic history was 
not just a fabrication or a polemic with limited resonance. Rather, it incorporated 
real grievances that resonated with people’s interests, and, as the study’s 
engagement in Mount Darwin shows, translated to some positive identification 
with ZANU-PF and some form of popular support for Mugabe at elections, which 
I demonstrate in the next section on ZANU-PF’s ground game in 2008 and 2013 
in ZACs. 
  
6.1.7 The Blame Game: The Opposition as a hinderance to people centred 
government and policies 
In 2013 ZANU-PF continued its attacks on the opposition and on Mugabe’s main 
competitor, Morgan Tsvangirai, at both personal and political levels. Attacking 
Tsvangirai personally, Mugabe derided Tsvangirai as a “philanderer” and “sell-
out” who had impeded government business in the inclusive government 
(Zimbabwe Independent, 12 July, 2013). Politically, outside just the name calling, 
ZANU-PF also offered a disciplined attack on the opposition as corrupt, power 
hungry, and the reason for the ‘failures’ of the GNU. The political attacks were 
also sharpened, specific and targeted. Speaking in Muzarabani North 
constituency on the border with Mount Darwin on 11th July 2013, Mujuru blamed 
the MDCs for the plight of farmers, and singled out the then Minister of Finance, 
Tendai Biti, who was also the MDC-T Secretary General for special blame. 
Mujuru argued that Biti had brought “darkness” by failing to fund new farmers 
and had blocked “ a number of projects that were meant to benefit the masses”  
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including two projects that were meant for the Agricultural and Rural 
Development Authority (ARDA) in  Muzarabani (Herald, 12 July, 2013). The 
nature of the attack on the opposition was decidedly different from those of 2008, 
when ZANU-PF had mostly ridiculed and demonised the opposition as western 
puppets. In 2013, ZANU-PF attacked the opposition not just in regard to their 
perceived intent and associations, but also for their performance record. Whether 
true or not, Mujuru had specific examples for her target audience, and argued that 
the opposition’s actions in government had led to limited support for farmers, a 
crime worthy of voting out the MDC.  
Most of you here are cotton farmers and you lost a lot of household goods 
and cattle as a result of this type of farming [Contract Farming]. The best 
time to vote out puppets is now so that a ZANU-PF Government, that 
started the land reform, supports you to the maximum (Herald, 12 July, 
2013) 
 
Mujuru’s pitch and attacks on the opposition were effective and well targeted 
because they centred on issues and problems that her audience could relate to as 
farmers and beneficiaries of the land reform. The opposition was provided as a 
scapegoat and voting Mugabe as the solution. These attacks were meshed 
together with ZANU-PF’s traditional attacks on the west and sanctions. During a 
whirlwind four rally tour in Mount Darwin during the first week of July 2013,15 
Mujuru reminded the people of Mount Darwin of how they had “ …bought this 
land and farms with blood” for which the opposition “…invited the illegal 
sanctions” (Herald, 8 July, 2013).  
 
Mujuru often followed through on the targeted and locally relevant attacks by 
talking up the right of communities to benefit from the natural resources in their 
communities. She also made pledges around electrification, employment, and 
local mining. For instance, on 26th July 2013, while speaking at Chimhanda 
Primary school in Rushinga where coal had been discovered at Semwa dam, she 
expressed her expectation for “Mount Darwin residents to benefit from the coal 
project”. Mujuru pledged that the 15 megawatts of electricity that the dam’s plant 
would produce would be used to ensure that “all schools in Rushinga without 
electricity would be electrified” as part of the people of Rushinga and Mount 
Darwin benefitting from their resources (Ruwende, 2013). The electricity pledge 
was a fairly credible promise and, as mentioned in section 6.1.2 Mugabe had 
 
15 Mujuru conducted rallies at Nembire Primary school, Chakoma Primary School, Mudzengerere Secondary School, and 
Dotito Township. 
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made similar pledges to Mashonaland Central in 2008, and by 2013, ZANU-PF 
appeared to have delivered this promise. According to a Rural Electrification 
Agency (REA) report to Parliament in 2013, 49% of key target areas like schools, 
hospitals, small businesses, farms, chiefs homesteads, and small-scale mines in 
Mashonaland Central province had been electrified, making it the most electrified 
rural province in Zimbabwe (REA, 2013:3). This achievement made Mujuru’s 
2013 commitments to electrification fairly credible. 
 
Despite the Mount Darwin constituencies being rural, Mujuru’s campaign 
messages also focused on job creation for young people. In Dotito Township on 
6th July 2013, Mujuru argued that ZANU-PF was embracing young people in all 
of its structures, including as parliamentarians. Mujuru emphasised job creation 
for young people and ZANU-PF’s commitment through its manifesto to 
addressing youths’ concerns regarding employment and rural livelihood 
transformation (Mugabe, 2013). Mujuru’s special focus on young people and 
promises of job creation, as I will show in Chapter 5, were a critical component 
of ZANU-PF’s 2013 strategy, and signalled a shift from its general neglect of the 
youth vote in the past.  
 
6.1.8 “Respected” and “Respectable” Traditional Leaders in the 2013 Presidential 
Election campaign  
The four Mount Darwin constituencies fall under five chiefdoms: Matope, Dotito, 
Kandeya, Nembire, and Chiswiti, presided over by chiefs of the same names. 
These Chiefs share similar powers to the village headmen but over more 
expansive territory. They have the veto over the headmen who preside over wards 
and villages  in the chiefdoms. The Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 (section 46.1) 
states that traditional leaders are supposed to be neutral and apolitical and must 
rule without being “influenced by any considerations of race, tribe, place of 
origin, creed, gender or political affiliation”. This message is reinforced in the 
2013 Zimbabwean Constitution, which recognises Traditional leaders in Chapter 
15. Section 281 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is clear that traditional 
leaders must not: 
1. be members of any political party,  
2. must not participate in partisan politics, or act in a partisan manner, or 
further the interests of any political party or cause, and  
3. must not violate the fundamental rights and freedoms of any person. 
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The above legal requirements stopped neither ZANU-PF from using chiefs in 
political affairs nor some traditional leaders from willingly engaging in electoral 
affairs, with most headman automatically treated as branch chairpersons and cell 
leaders in their villages, although they were excluded from higher level ZANU-
PF party structures from the district stage upwards. Speaking at Chimhanda three 
days before the 2013 election, Mujuru lauded these chiefs and traditional leaders 
as “the custodians of the country’s heritage” whom “…political leaders should 
consult on national issues” and respect “No matter how learned” one was (Herald, 
27 July, 2013). This call to respect the traditional leaders was taken seriously by 
their subjects, and ZANU-PF leaders at a local level instrumentalised chiefs and 
traditional leaders as partisan instruments in a similar way to 2008. I argue that 
constituents in Mount Darwin and the surrounding areas interpreted this and 
similar calls as meaning that respecting traditional leaders meant following their 
instructions, especially regarding voting for ZANU-PF.  
 
Mujuru’s call on the campaign trail in Dotito was an example of how ZANU-PF 
used social norms and customs to enforce partisan agendas and interests.  ZANU-
PF agents saw the chiefs as an instrument to access and manage prospective 
voters. In this respect, a respectable traditional leader was one who followed 
“gwara remusangano” (the ways of the party). Mujuru’s lauding of the 
traditional leaders, and her call for their respect was loaded with political 
meanings and intentions, calling chiefs to respectable action and their subjects to 
obedience. Despite it being illegal, Mujuru had, in the past, defended the right of 
traditional leaders to engage in ZANU-PF politics because they were “pioneers 
of the struggle for freedom” (Herald, 1 October, 2010) 
 
Mujuru’s exaltation of the traditional leaders is at odds with the historical record, 
which makes it clear that while some traditional leaders assisted guerrillas during 
the liberation struggle, most collaborated with the settler regime as its local state 
agents to counter the influence of either elected councils or liberation fighters 
(Bratton, 1978; Kriger, 1985; Lan 1985 Weinrich,1971). As Kriger (1985: 64) 
notes, to survive, some chiefdoms, village heads and tribal leaders had to be 
responsive to the colonial authorities rather than their subjects because the 
“…chiefship and other positions depended not only on the application of 
inheritance laws but also on government approval”, with those who rebelled 
being removed and loyalists rewarded. Lan (1985:136) shows how chiefs’ 
collaboration with the colonial state discredited them with the guerrillas, leading 
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the guerrillas to establish an alliance with the Mhondoros (spirits of past chiefs) 
as the legitimate traditional rulers, with that legitimacy passing on to the 
guerrillas. Because of this dynamic, the liberation fighters usurped the authority 
of the chiefs, and either assumed it themselves or handed it over to local ZANU-
PF village committees (Alexander, 2014). Nonetheless, as shown in Chapter 4, 
this revisionist attitude towards the historical role of traditional leaders was in 
step with the general revision of history as part of the patriotic history trope and 
was increasingly at play in the run-up to the 2013 election.  
 
While Mujuru stroked the traditional chiefs’ egos on the 2013 campaign trail, the 
army had a more direct message and added threats. On several occasions from 
2010 onwards, the army is reported to have summoned traditional leaders to 
military barracks to discuss ZANU-PF’s campaign strategies ahead of the 2013 
election. At one of the meetings, Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Douglas 
Nyikayaramba, who is also a former Zimbabwe Election Commission Chief 
Elections Officer, continued to falsify the historical record, asserting that gone 
were the Rhodesian days when chiefs were apolitical. Instead he told the chiefs: 
From today no one will come into your communities to hold political 
meetings or rallies without your blessings. Those who defy such an order 
will be dealt with. Only war veterans and chiefs have the right and powers 
to hold rallies and meetings because they fought for this country. I want to 
make it clear to all chiefs gathered here today that if President Mugabe 
loses in next year’s elections, they will have a case to answer 
(Nyikayaramba cited in Muckraker, 2010). 
 
Most of the traditional leaders in Mount Darwin took Mujuru and 
Nyikayaramba’s exhortations seriously, and non-compliance, as in 2008, had 
grievous consequences for both the traditional leaders and their subjects. 
Although death was not on the menu in 2013, ostracization and victimisation 
were. The call for the traditional leaders to watch their own people through 
various processes was quite similar to the Rhodesian establishment’s use of 
traditional leaders and the regime’s attempts to block access to villages for the 
liberation movement. At that time, the protected villages as well as a network of 
informers were used to inform on any strange visits to the villages, leading to 
quick mobilisation of the armed settler forces to disrupt any engagement between 
villagers and guerrilla forces or their commissars. This history of the role of 
traditional leaders, and ZANU-PF’s use and abuse of them during elections is 
197 
 
instructive, as they played a critical role in relation to ZANU-PF’s local politics 
in ZACs during elections. 
 
6.2 The Ground Game In Mount Darwin Constituencies 
 
This section unpacks how ZANU-PF managed its electoral politics and 
campaigned at the sub-national level in Mount Darwin constituencies. It will 
show that ZANU-PF structures, with the aid of the local state (traditional leaders 
and rural councils) and coercive arms of the state (the intelligence, police and 
military services), engaged in a dual process of persuasive and coercive politics. 
These structures constituted an intractable, complex and localised ZANU-PF 
political machinery aimed at capturing and retaining ZANU-PF support at 
elections by fair means or foul. The section will show how, generally, ZANU-PF 
initially went about hyperbolising Mugabe’s and ZANU-PF's virtues, and 
enticing people to support the party through inducements, preferential treatment 
and access to a wide variety of public goods that came with membership. Given 
that Mount Darwin was generally perceived to be strong ZANU-PF territory, this 
message was well received by many, but there were also islands of opposition, 
which ZANU-PF sought to remove in the spirit of Mashonaland Central, which 
they considered a “one party province”. These islands of opposition were engaged 
with the hope of converting them into ZANU-PF supporters, but where this failed, 
ZANU-PF associates subjected them to unrelenting coercive politics that left 
many of them with a Hobson's choice of voting for the party or suffering 
punishment.  
 
This section looks briefly at how the persuasive and coercive appeals sat 
uncomfortably side by side in ZANU-PF’s local campaign efforts for the 2008 
and 2013 elections, and how the bigwig rally appeals were received in Mount 
Darwin. It highlights the salience of history and ideology, as persuasive tools that 
ZANU-PF used to campaign by day, while by night it unleashed violence and 
intimidation on real and suspected opponents with the intent of punishing dissent, 
compelling support, and dissuading opposition organisation and support ahead of 
the 2008 polls.  
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6.2.1 The local appeal of history and power of ideology 
In section 3 above I showed that at the national level, during the bigwig visits to 
ZACs in 2008 and 2013, ZANU-PF deployed historical, ideological and populist 
appeals augmented by programmatic appeals and a clientelist distribution of both 
targeted and general goods. These ideological and historical appeals found 
traction on the African continent, for whom they had been initially deployed as a 
counter narrative to a pervasive liberal discourse around a human rights crisis in 
Zimbabwe. However, these messages also resonated with some members of the 
local electorate in places like Mount Darwin, where the wounds of the liberation 
war festered, and memories were still reasonably fresh. In Chiweshe, Mugabe’s 
historical and ideological appeals yielded dividends and the corrections he called 
for were made as his political stoke rose in the Mazowe constituency, in which 
the opposition had outpolled him in 2008. Voter turnout increased from 42.8% to 
62% and in turn his votes increased to 10,534, about 39 percentage points higher 
than Tsvangirai’s reduced vote haul of 4,385.   
 
Outside the numbers, which I will highlight later for the Mount Darwin 
constituencies, conversations with a cross section of society in Mount Darwin 
showed that historical and ideological appeals were resonant amongst people with 
lived experiences of colonisation and the war, as would be expected under the 
movement legacy (Hyden, 2006). ZM2301, a resident of Bveke village in Mount 
Darwin East, who participated in the 2008 and 2013 elections as a local observer, 
told me that the historical and ideological appeals resonated for three reasons. 
First, the people of Mount Darwin, he argued, were uneducated. Secondly, these 
narratives were the only ones in the Mount Darwin public sphere given the limited 
opposition campaigning. Thirdly, because  
people remember the brutality of the white men and the hardships of war. 
Telling them that someone wants to take them back to war and white rule, 
whether correct or not will make them both afraid and angry (ZM2301-
Interview, 2018). 
 
Surprisingly, the messages were also well received by younger people born after 
Independence, who were fairly educated and literate, but, by their own admission, 
had grown up on a healthy diet of oral tradition in regard to the war and the ‘evils’ 
of the ‘white man’. These younger people, some of whom were members of 
ZANU-PF, corroborated ZM2301's observations, but stressed that supporting 
ZANU-PF and taking to heart its messages were not functions of ignorance or 
illiteracy. To them these were the products of the rationalisation and 
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reconciliation of their history and lived experiences, and to them it was those who 
did not find this message attractive who were ignorant. MC2201, from Chitsato 
village in Mount Darwin’s Ward 12, was persuaded by ZANU-PF's ideological 
and historical appeals. He sincerely believed that the “whites never accepted that 
we defeated them in 1980, and when we took back the land they kept coming 
back and supporting the MDC so that they could come back” (MC2201-
Interview, 2018).   
 
MaiZ2201, a 32 year old Bveke district and ZANU-PF member, stated that in the 
15 years she had been involved with ZANU-PF, she had grown to understand the 
hazards of losing power to sell-out parties like Tsvangirai’s MDC because of their 
motives to bring back the whites and be at the beck and call of the west 
(MaiZ2201-Interview, 2018). TP2501, a 26-year-old from Mavhuradonha 
Village, shared MaiZ2201’s perspective and stated that the issues that Mugabe 
raised around whites and imperialists were not new. He stated that his parents had 
always told him about these issues, to such an extent that “It was clear to me that 
not supporting ZANU-PF would bring back the whites, and was war, or would 
take us back to war” (TP2501, 2018). He argued that “while I did not live through 
the war, I have seen war on television and know that it is a bad thing that no one 
would wish for. (TP2501, 2018).  
 
At the very least, ZANU-PF’s message had permeated to lower structures of the 
party and ordinary card-carrying members, and the historical and ideological 
appeals had been drilled down from the top candidate, Mugabe, and transmitted 
to the rest of the party structures through the party’s organs and commissariat. 
These local party structures also took this case to members of their communities, 
including members and non-members. For instance, an aspiring Member of 
Parliament, Wonder Mashange, declared that victory at parliamentary level was 
a given in Rushinga and Mount Darwin, and that what mattered was increasing 
the tally in aid of the Presidential battle. He promised Mujuru that he would 
contribute no less than 20,000 votes and argued that the main challenge in the 
elections was not the opposition, but apathy. Mashange, addressing a local rally, 
told his captive audience that voting was part of the process, not just to secure a 
Mugabe victory, but also to defend the sovereignty of the country (Ruwende, 
2013). Mashange’s pitch on sovereignty mimicked Mugabe’s continued message 
on the liberation war and the need to safeguard the country from falling back into 
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the hands of colonialists and their proxies, which was central in both the 2008 
and 2013 elections.  
 
Mashange delivered on his promise to Mujuru, with the constituency casting 
24,032 votes for Mugabe, compared to 1175 for Tsvangirai, with a voter turnout 
of 71.31%. These figures were improvements on the 2008 performance of 13988 
votes for Mugabe, 4240 votes for Tsvangirai and a turnout of 60%. Anecdotal 
evidence from Mount Darwin suggests that this result is also plausible due to 
Mujuru’s encouragement for those who were illiterate to be assisted being taken 
to heart. The “beneficiaries” of the assistance were not just illiterate people, but 
also suspected opposition supporters who were forced to fain illiteracy.  
 
A former rural district councillor from Ward 14 stated that, “suspected opposition 
supporters are warned in advance during meetings ‘that we shall see you when 
elections come’ so to be safe they and a lot of old people would say they are 
disabled and seek help voting”(LCM2701-Interview, 2018). The electoral 
statistics for ZANU-PF in 2013 showed improvement across the board in Mount 
Darwin Constituencies. For instance, as shown in Table 6-5, voter turnout in 
Mount Darwin constituencies, which consistently surpassed the national average 
as well as the average for ZACs, increased to an average of 74.7% against a 
national average of 59.24% and 61.2% for ZANU-PF aligned constituencies in 
2013. 
 
Table 6-5: Voter Turnout rates- Mount Darwin Constituencies compared 
to ZACs and National Average 
Election Average Voter Turnout 
 Mount Darwin ZANU-PF Aligned 
Constituencies (ZACs) 
National 
Average 
    
2013 75% 61% 59% 
2008 55% 47% 42% 
2002 69% 58% 55% 
Source: Author’s data & ZEC 2002, 2008 & 2013 Presidential Election Reports 
 
The 2013 Mount Darwin electoral outcomes based on official data showed 
marked improvements in all four constituencies. For instance, during the 2008 
presidential election, the winning margins across the four constituencies averaged 
49%, but in 2013, ZANU-PF’s winning margin in Mount Darwin almost doubled 
to an average of 85%. 
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Figure 6-3: ZANU-PF's winning margins in Mount Darwin constituencies 
 
Source: Author’s data adapted from official presidential election results 
 
The data showing improved turnout figures, increased winning margins, and 
increased votes for Mugabe across Mount Darwin suggests that Mashange was 
correct about the low turnout “mistake” and apathy being ZANU-PF’s main 
challenges in Mashonaland Central. Based on the election results, he was also 
correct that the opposition posed little contest. The data suggests that the 
“mistake” Mugabe lamented was duly corrected in 2013, but not just by fair 
means of politics and campaigning but also through foul and violent means.  
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Figure 6-4: ZANU-PF Opposition Votes in Mount Darwin Constituencies 
(2002-2013) 
 
Source: Author’s data from Official Election results. 
 
6.2.2 Clientelist appeals, selective distribution of petty patronage, and selective 
access to programmes and projects 
While Mugabe and other members of his praesidium made grand announcements 
of programmes at Star and Bigwig rallies, the implementation of the stated 
programmes was always at a subnational level. Such initiatives made ZANU-
PF’s promises believable and assisted in strengthening the resolve and loyalty of 
party supporters, while demoralising non-members through restricting their 
access to campaign goods. A group of women associated with the opposition in 
Nyamazizi, Mount Darwin East reported that in 2008 
ZANU-PF politicised farming implements, farm products, and welfare 
products. They excluded us from accessing them because we were 
opposition. It was hard for us because 2008 was a time of hunger and 
poverty (GI-OWAN2101, 2018). 
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Their “saving grace was that at some point in 2008 the MDC distributed seed and 
groceries to its members here, which really assisted because at the time we were 
in dire poverty and desperate for survival” (GI-OWAN210, 2008). Although this 
was a one-off thing, the women continued their defiance of ZANU-PF  but bore 
continued costs to their welfare. Traditional leaders also played a key role in 
limiting the distribution of various resources to community members based on 
political affiliation. A village headman, 74-year-old CS2501, stated that he was:                                                                                                                                                             
restricted in terms of the people from my community that I can deal with. 
My community is diverse with ZANU-PF but also non-ZANU-PF people 
and Aliens [Zimbabweans of foreign decent]. I am usually told by ZANU-
PF district leaders that I should not mix with or cater to aliens and non-
ZANU-PF people, and that they should not get anything (CS2501-
Interview, 2018). 
 
Headman CS2501 also stated that he had tried to resist the selective distribution 
of resources like seed, fertiliser and food based on political affiliation, but he was 
labelled a Mupanduki (sell-out) and threatened with beatings and death. He stated 
that the ZANU-PF district structures had reported him to Chris Kuruneri, an MP 
in Mount Darwin, seeking a “kill order”, but the MP had said, “why should we 
kill him, leave him alone, we’ve won already” (CS2501-Interview, 2018). 
 
As shown earlier, during both the 2008 and 2013 electoral campaigns, ZANU-
PF’s programmatic appeals, especially Mujuru’s, were skilfully tailored to the 
people of Mount Darwin and the surrounding areas. These appeals, around 
electrification, and the locals benefiting from natural resources, jobs and other 
social amenities were well received and utilised in local jurisdiction campaign 
efforts. As a persuasive tool, they were made potent by ZANU-PF’s demonstrated 
ability to deliver on its commitments, as it had done at the national level with the 
land issue, farming implement schemes, and other initiatives highlighted above. 
At a local level in Mount Darwin, NTAD2001 attested that it was difficult for the 
opposition to campaign in Mount Darwin meaningfully in part because of 
violence, but also because they could not compete with ZANU-PF 
programmatically in terms of providing socio-economic opportunities to the 
constituents (NTAD2001, 2018). He also added that ZANU-PF had used its 
access and control of the local state to selectively distribute bicycles, ox-drawn 
carts, land (farming plots) and jobs meant for the entire community to its card 
carrying and known members. In a country where unemployment was high, 
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ZANU-PF’s pledges around indigenisation and empowerment as well as 
employment resonated with youths in Mount Darwin, who knew that it could 
deliver because of its past fulfilment of its pledges.16 In the run-up to the 2013 
elections, ZANU-PF made efforts to place young people in Mount Darwin district 
in local companies, especially cotton companies, and this became part of their 
persuasive appeal and legitimacy through performance. As MM2201, a former 
ZANU-PF secretary for indigenisation and local district executive member, 
stated,  
People in Mount Darwin know that ZANU-PF’s campaign promises are 
not empty promises. Maybe in town they are empty but here in [Mount] 
Darwin the rhetoric is often followed by action, even when the action is 
unfair to opposition. People here take ZANU-PF’s commitments and 
threats seriously…. In 2008 and 2013, they gave us bicycles for 
transportation, we had land, we got T-shirts, seed, and food. But it also 
went beyond these handouts and  made sure that our youths had jobs. 
ZANU-PF recruited youth officers for each district, who were paid by the 
government, and placed other youths at Graffax, COTTCO Zimbabwe, 
INSING and SINO-Zim (MM2201-Interview, 2018). 
 
The companies that MM2201 referred to were cotton companies and ginneries 
that operated in the Mount Darwin area. Despite being private companies, 
ZANU-PF appeared to control them and could determine recruitment. Like other 
interventions in 2008, this kind of delivery by ZANU-PF, which endeared it to 
some people, exemplified the way in which ZANU-PF conflated pragmatic and 
programmatic interventions with patronage-based access to economic 
opportunities. This was neither new nor restricted to Mount Darwin, as Alexander 
& Chitofiri (2010) noted for Norton. Interestingly, the fact that where possible 
both the opposition and ruling parties engaged in the selective distribution of 
goods to their supporters in 2008 shows the extent to which the distribution of 
goods to supporters had been established as a custom in Zimbabwe’s electoral 
processes. Although normatively, clientelist politics are largely considered illicit 
or socially undesirable (Zovighian, 2018), empirically, as shown above, they may 
be grudgingly acceptable to constituents as part of the rules of the game, and 
socially desirable and acceptable as a “fair” exchange for their support.  For most 
candidates and parties in Zimbabwe, clientelist bargains were reluctantly 
accepted not as fair but as part of the game in the electioneering process, 
 
16 The Zimbabwe Labour Force Survey for 2014 showed that 94,5% of those employment in Zimbabwe is informal, 
up from around 85% for 2012. Over 86% of those in informal employment are unskilled young people, mostly female 
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especially in relation to vote buying. Recall MDC-Alliance president Nelson 
Chamisa’s sentiments on the material dimensions of campaigning that I reported 
on in chapter 2. Chamisa had also remarked that: 
We have reduced the standards of our politics in campaigning to the extent 
that even giving a cup of rice or a small tin of beans or a cup of maize seed 
from a 25kg bag, solar power torches, will make a difference and meaning 
(Chamisa-Interview, 2017). 
 
It is because of this acceptance that clientelism (including patronage and vote 
buying) occupies a shaky middle ground on the persuasive-non-persuasive 
continuum. However, as argued above, the fact that the focus of the distribution 
of access to economic opportunities as well as the distribution of goods was on 
party loyalists rather than “swing” or independent voters shows that ZANU-PF 
was mobilising its base, and the goods were rewards rather than enticements. 
ZANU-PF was already dominant in ZACs, so the inducements served to ensure 
the turnout of its members rather than the vote itself, especially in 2008, but also 
in 2013. For ZANU-PF, the elections were censuses of its membership, and its 
membership structures constituted an important part of ZANU-PF’s strategy 
because it is through them that they could coordinate, gather and spring their 
members into electoral action, as I will show in the next section.  
 
6.2.3 Party organisational structure as strategy 
While historical and ideological appeals, as well as programmatic and practical 
clientelist interventions were integral to ZANU-PF’s campaigns, for the 
mobilising strategy to work, ZANU-PF leaned heavily on effective organisation 
and party structures. The mobilising strategy entailed combining ZANU-PF’s 
hierarchical presence at the local level with the use of persuasion, coercion, and 
intimidation. At the local level, ZANU-PF party organisational structures 
comprised Cells, Branches, and District Structures, which operated in sync with 
traditional leadership roles. Multiple respondents stated that everyone in ZANU-
PF belonged to a Cell, and that Cells were typically made up of 50 people and 
were the lowest organising structures of the party. At least five Cells formed a 
Branch (250 people) and Branches were often led by a village headman 
(Sabhuku). At least five Branches formed a District (1250 people) and Districts 
were led by war veterans and youths who collaborated with the headmen 
(Sadunhu).  
The number of district party structures depended on the size of the constituency 
and were coordinated at the top of the local party hierarchy, by the District 
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Coordinating Committee (DCC), or District coordinators, who liaised with the 
Chiefs (Madzimambo). These connections gave ZANU-PF’s structures the ability 
to manipulate the influence of traditional leaders and coordinate party activities 
through the traditional leaders, who led community processes like village 
meetings. It also meant that ZANU-PF’s definition of a District differed from the 
Administrative District, which was bigger than a constituency, often 
encompassing more than one and as many as four constituencies, as well as the 
opposition’s definition of a district, which was often the same as a constituency.  
 
According to MM2201, ZANU-PF’s organisational structures were a strategy in 
themselves, and the most potent of all of the strategies that ZANU-PF used at the 
local level to triumph in elections. MM2201 stated that:  
ZANU-PF formed structures in such a way that in every district and cell 
structure they expected a certain number of people. Based on those figures 
they would know how many members they had, votes to expect, and people 
to intimidate, and on polling day the village head would lead people to the 
polling stations based on the party registers (MM2201-Interview, 2018) 
 
NM0202, who had served as ZANU-PF district chair for eight years and held 
several other positions in the party in Mount Darwin, explained that all of the 
other strategies were predicated on the ZANU-PF Cell and Branch structures 
being intact (NM0202-Interview, 2018). According to MT2301, these party 
organisational structures facilitated a three-pronged approach, which included 
staging regular village level and district meetings, campaigning for ZANU-PF 
through selling the party agenda and presiding over inducements and the selective 
distribution of farming inputs and food and turning out the vote on election day 
(MT2301-Interview, 2018). These three processes were part of a mobilising 
strategy in Mount Darwin, which several respondents referred to as the 
Dambawasara. The Dambawasara was both a mandatory village meeting and 
process where everyone in the village was marshalled to engage with the political 
process, usually under the pretext of politically innocuous village engagements 
led by traditional leaders but sanctioned by war veterans in the ZANU-PF district 
structure (MM2201, 2018).  
 
In Mount Darwin, a lot of the public political work at the local level was 
coordinated through these regular meetings and processes where roll calls were 
made. The Dambawasara subnational politics in aid of the national presidential 
campaign races in both 2008 and 2013 straddled the line between what may be 
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normatively considered legitimacy-seeking and non-legitimacy seeking methods. 
It combined the use of persuasive appeals, manipulation, and coercive methods, 
some of which had a discursive, yet compulsory, character. The roll call element  
of the Dambawasara also served an additional purpose of surveillance, because 
through presence or absence at the Dambawasara and allied voting process, 
ZANU-PF could also  identify “errant” people in each village and punish them 
accordingly during the campaign and post-election period, in particular by 
excluding them from the benefits of membership. During the 2008 election run-
off and ahead of the 2013 elections, ZANU-PF made serious attempts to make 
sure that those in the villages were not only under surveillance but would also not 
be subjected to undue external influences from the opposition. As such, besides 
regular meetings and roll calls, the village was also turned into a fortress, with 
village headman and ZANU-PF district organisational structures as the key 
watchmen, in a way that refashioned some colonial methods for post-colonial 
authoritarianism.  
 
6.2.4 The “Ten by Ten” Strategy: Return of the cordon sanitaire 
The strategy of the cordon sanitaires, no-go areas, and the surveillance that came 
with “Protected Villages” during the liberation struggle, were methods that were 
also alive and well in Mount Darwin ahead of, during and post the 2008 election. 
ZANU-PF’s organisational structures and agents instituted cordon sanitaires 
ostensibly to “protect” voters from “outside influences” in a similar way to the 
Rhodesian use of the strategy to stop ZANU-PF and other liberation movements 
from entering and influencing rural folk in the 1970s. ZANU-PF adopted this 
strategy and used it in Mount Darwin to shut out the opposition and other external 
influences. To a large extent, especially ahead of the 2013 elections, this could 
be seen as the application of Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba’s call not 
to allow anyone, apart from traditional leaders and war veterans, to conduct 
meetings and hold rallies in villages. ZANU-PF implemented this with strategic 
precision in the Mount Darwin villages. NM0202 revealed that ZANU-PF, 
including its formal party structures and the local traditional leadership, instituted 
a surveillance programme that would detect and deter external people from 
entering their villages and politicising villagers.  
 
We had the ten-by-ten strategy where blocks of ten households in any 
direction were constituted into a physical matrix to thwart the opposition 
penetration into Mount Darwin. This was before we even reached formal 
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ZANU-PF party structures like the cell or the branch. If a visitor reached 
any one of these houses, the name of the visitor was supposed to be 
reported to the village head, who most of the time was also a ZANU-PF 
Branch Chairman, to report to the district (NM0202, 2018). 
 
The ten-by-ten structure was primarily an intelligence network with physical 
barring instituted by the ZANU-PF district party organisational structures when 
they received reports from village heads. The village heads oversaw an area just 
a bit smaller than a typical administrative ward. For instance, the village headman 
VHKS2401’s village had about 86 households in 2008 before being cut in half 
ahead of the 2013 elections, partly due to suspicion that part of his area had 
opposition members (VHKS2401-Interview, 2018). Based on this estimation, 
there was a network of 4x4 to 8x8 ten-by-ten columns in each village. The village 
heads were under instruction to report to the ZANU-PF District structure 
“whenever there is a new opposition party or person visiting from outside the 
village” (VHKS2401-Interview, 2018). If a traditional leader was informed of the 
presence of “intruders” and failed to act on or transmit the information for action, 
the consequences were theirs to bear for “spoiling their children”. If the visit was 
“not innocent”, measures would be taken at night through the zvipoko strategy to 
hound out the visitors. Sometimes this was not necessary, as ZANU-PF could 
quickly mobilise and attend to the affected household, or intercept and disrupt an 
intrusive political process or place where the “intruders” were located. An MDC 
youth ward chairperson from Mount Darwin East marvelled at how “ZANU-PF 
is ever so watchful” and recounted that whenever they travelled as MDC 
supporters, they would hear through rumours that ZANU PF was aware of their 
activities. He shared one experience where MDC activists were assaulted at the 
Chipfunyanguwo shops where they found ZANU-PF waiting for them and were 
surprised by “how ZANU-PF had caught wind of the fact that we would be 
passing through the area.” (CWY2601-Interview, 2018). 
 
The ten-by-ten strategy was effective, and the fact that it was based on households 
not individuals meant that it had an inbuilt fail-safe mechanism where members 
of the same household also had each other under surveillance, and if one failed to 
report an incident, another could. BZ2202, a suspended former district 
chairperson for ZANU-PF, stated that the system was so effective, “to the point 
that even your wife can be like the biblical Peter or Judas, who can deny you or 
betray you. If I don’t tell them there is no guarantee that my wife won’t tell them 
to protect the family” (BZ2202-Interview, 2018). Outside the reporting functions, 
209 
 
members of the ten-by-ten structure could also be called upon to implement the 
disruption of activities that were not aligned to ZANU-PF. As BZ2202 recalled, 
“the behaviour in this area is that before elections, we hang around and get along, 
but towards elections it becomes a dog eat dog relationship, and ZANU-PF and 
the opposition become like oil and water, despite other relationships” (BZ2202-
Interview, 2018) 
 
6.2.5 “Ghosts” and “Goblins”: Violence and intimidation under the cover of 
darkness  
It is largely accepted in the literature that the March 2008 presidential and 
parliamentary elections were held under conditions that were free, if not entirely 
fair, and produced a plausible result (Alexander & Tendi, 2008; Masunungure, 
2009; Matysak, 2017). These elections did not produce a decisive winner in the 
presidential poll, necessitating a presidential election run-off in June 2008. As 
Alexander & Tendi (2008) argue, 2008 was a tale of two elections in which there 
was a relative lack of state-led violence in March, while in June there was extreme 
violence orchestrated by the ruling party, leading to unacceptability of the results. 
There are a few places in Zimbabwe where the violence and intimidation in 2008 
were worse than in Mount Darwin. Here, the violence had multiple purposes, 
including to punish opposition supporters, as well as the traditional chiefs who 
sought to protect them and uphold their freedom of choice and association. The 
violence was also aimed at “convincing” reluctant converts, who otherwise would 
have proved resistant to ZANU-PF’s persuasion.  
 
VHKS2401 stated that while in most of the country, violence became a feature 
of the run-up to the run-off election, in Mount Darwin, it was also a feature of the 
“free and fair” March 2008 elections. He stated that: 
In the March 2008 election, and after that election in which the opposition 
party won, ZANU-PF sent representatives to the Village Headmen to 
identify and weed out opposition supporters. Their main strategy was to 
target opposition party supporters and intimidate them through the use of 
violence.  For example, they would send what they termed ‘zvidhoma’ 
[goblins] or ‘zvipoko’ [ghosts] to beat up opposition party members and 
supporters at night. Some people even lost their lives. Most people known 
to be opposition party supporters would seek refuge in the mountains at 
night, as staying in their own homes became unsafe (VHKS2401-
Interview, 2018). 
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In the above instance, the violence acted not only as a punishment for belonging 
to the opposition, but also as a destabilising strategy that forced the opposition to 
scatter, and go into hiding, which resulted in them failing to organise themselves 
openly and meaningfully in the area. MM2201, added that in the first instance 
ZANU-PF made sure that people could see that it could deliver, but “…those who 
do not believe from seeing action are visited by what we call Zvipoko (ghosts) at 
night and convinced through other means” (MM2201-Interview, 2018). These 
“non-believers” were the ones that the traditional leaders were supposed to 
identify, and non-compliance bore consequences. For instance, in Mount Darwin, 
village headman, Sabhuku Chaparira, was reportedly assassinated in 2008 for 
“supporting the opposition” (VHKS2401-Interview, 2018). VHKS2401 
recounted how he had also feared for his life after being labelled a Mupanduki 
(sell-out) because he had allowed the MDC to have organisational structures in 
his village.  
I had been asked that whenever there was a new opposition party, I must 
advise ZANU-PF through district party chairpersons. But how could I 
report my own children to be beaten, raped and killed? Not reporting 
opposition members in 2008 got me into trouble. It got to a point where I 
had to leave my homestead and seek shelter in the mountains for my own 
security (VHKS2401, 2018). 
 
Besides the traditional leaders and opposition supporters in general, the violence 
was targeted in particular at opposition officials and candidates for election who 
acted as the key connecting cogs between the national presidential election and 
the constituencies. NTAD2001, a 2008 MDC-T parliamentary candidate and 
chief presidential campaigner in one of the Mount Darwin constituencies, was 
assaulted in 2008, his home was burnt, and his wife raped (NTAD2001-Interview, 
2018). NTAD2001 explained that his ordeal and the opposition’s inability to 
assist impacted his and other constituents’ ability to champion the opposition’s 
cause in Mount Darwin post-2008.  
Given what I went through, I would not attempt to run or lead opposition 
campaigns here in Mount Darwin again. During that time in 2008, I could. 
Even after the elections, after my house had been burnt. But from the 
party’s side no-one even bothered to call or visit to check on me. So you 
know people would ask me if the party would rebuild my house and buy 
property that I lost in the unfortunate incidents, and as a member, the polite 
thing to say would be that they are looking into the matter, but nothing 
came up.  So, when you then try to approach people to say let’s campaign 
or bring people into the party, they say my house will be burnt and I will 
211 
 
lose my property, what help would I get?  You did not receive any help 
after your ordeal, so why do you want me to get involved. (NTAD2001-
Interview, 2018) 
 
NTAD2001’s story had a huge impact on the communities in Mount Darwin 
because of his status in the community. NTAD2001 was a former police Senior 
Assistant Commissioner, who had commanded several provinces during his 29 
years of service before resigning in 1985. In addition, he had two sons, one a 
soldier, and the other an ex-combatant, NTDA, who was a senior director in 
Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and responsible for 
President Mugabe’s security.  This circumstance unnerved a lot of people amidst 
speculation that if NTDA could “do” or allow to be done what was done to his 
father and stepmother, Vimbai, by “Zvipoko” to protect Mugabe, what more could 
happen to those he did not share blood ties with? NTAD2001’s son was reported 
by members of the MDC-T District structures for Mount Darwin, for having 
discharged his gun on several occasions and dispersed MDC rallies or meetings 
during his weekend visits to Mount Darwin. The reports suggested that NTDA 
was usually aided by a member of the Presidential Guard from the area identified 
as Martin Kwainona, and a Youth leader, Mavhura Nyamaruka (GI-
MDCdistrict2601-Interview, 2018). The overnight acts of violence and 
intimidation in 2008 were mainly conducted by members of ZANU-PF, (mostly 
Youths and War Veterans), but were aided by members of the national security 
services who were from the area and who, because of their profiles, could not 
hide under the cover of darkness. 
 
The above evidence shows that the violence and intimidation did not just target 
and affect known MDC candidates and members, but also suspected ones, 
including traditional leaders suspected of accommodating opposition members in 
their villages. Based on this evidence, I argue that the violence had various uses, 
and was not happenstance. Rather, it was signalled by senior party officials at 
both the local and national level. At the local level, the task of surveillance given 
to the traditional leaders, with the ZANU-PF district structures receiving and 
processing information and directing action, show that the violence at the local 
level was sanctioned. At the national level, the instructions to purge the 
opposition were implicit in the framing of the electoral contest as a war to 
safeguard Zimbabwe’s sovereignty from enemies of the revolution. I concur with 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) that these labels signalled how those identified deserved 
to be treated. During the liberation struggle, ZANU-PF often created “hit lists” 
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of people who had “sold out” and needed to be liquidated. The labels were more 
than just derogatory, they pointed to those who needed to be dealt with and 
“…deserved to die if the Zimbabwean nation was to live” (Ndlovhu-Gathseni, 
2012:10).  
 
However, the rampant use of violence and coercion in 2008 had consequences 
for ZANUPF’s legitimacy at home and abroad. In 2013, ZANU-PF dumped overt 
violence with Mugabe calling for unity and peace during the elections. He clearly 
had the 2008 elections in mind and encouraged ZANU-PF members to exercise 
restraint: 
Right now, the MDC is poking you so that you poke back. Resist the 
temptation to poke back, refuse to be incited, and you also must not poke 
them. They want there to be violence so that they can say the elections were 
fraudulent because people were intimidated and beaten like they were in 
the 2008 elections (Herald, 11 July, 2013) 
 
This was a telling message in part because of the departure from violent politics 
by a ZANU-PF candidate who, in 1998, had claimed to have “degrees” in 
violence (Blair, 2002). The message was also a veiled acknowledgement of the 
2008 violence, which ZANU-PF had frequently denied and or blamed on the 
opposition.  
 
The relative peacefulness of the 2013 Presidential election suggests that 
Mugabe’s message was headed across the country, at least as it related to overt 
physical violence. MT2301, a ZANU-PF youth league member in Mount Darwin, 
stated that in 2013 they resorted less to physical violence and relied more on 
intimidation and invoking memories of past episodes of electoral and political 
violence: “In 2013 the emphasis was more on intimidation, when we intimidated 
people, we would just say ‘Chegore riya vabereki !’[remember that year 
people/parents!] and they would know what we meant” (MT2301-Interview, 
2018). This invocation of memories of the June 2008 violent run off period 
reminded people of the past and the consequences of not supporting ZANU-PF. 
It played on people’s fears and was effective because “…in the past, for sure, 
people were killed and maimed, the ‘long sleeved’ and ‘short sleeve’ stories were 
real, so if we just said, "Che gore riya vabereki !" people know” (MT2301-
Interview, 2018). The “long sleeved” and “short sleeved” refer to practices 
reported in 2008 where suspected opposition supporters had their arms cut off at 
the elbow (short sleeve) or closer to the wrist (long sleeve).  
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Violence and intimidation were ZANU-PF’s tools of disenfranchisement in 2008, 
and  compulsion in 2013. In both elections, where the campaign targets refused 
to accept hagiographic accounts of ZANU-PF and Mugabe, ZANU-PF subjected 
them to unrelenting coercive politics that showed them that they had a Hobson's 
choice of voting for the party or suffering punishment.  In these instances, 
choosing whether or not to support ZANU-PF became the difference between 
hunger and starvation; access, or no access, to seed, grain and land; or being 
celebrated and welcomed in the village versus being treated like a pariah, if not 
rendered homeless. It was a choice between rape and pillage versus "peaceful" 
and harmonious settlement, and in the worst cases, it was, quite literally, the 
difference between life and death. ZANU-PF district secretary for lands, JJ2601, 
who was an opposition supporter until 2009, explained why and how he had 
changed political sides: 
The main reason that I left MDC was because I feared for my life. My 
father was murdered for political reasons, and the party did not assist us in 
any way, and the police reports that we made did not bear any results.  
ZANU-PF asked me to convert, and I did because ZANU-PF seemed a 
safer option (JJ2601-Interview, 2018).  
 
After 2008, ZANU-PF was not content with letting opposition members be. As 
LeBas (2006:420) pointed out, in rural areas societies were very polarised along 
political lines, and opposition sympathisers experienced violence and 
intimidation in ways that ensured that party affiliation was seldom chosen but 
imposed.  
 
The fact that in the run-up to the 2008 presidential run-off election ZANU-PF 
was content to intimidate opposition members into fleeing their homesteads 
suggests that the violence was not meant to convert them. Instead, it was meant 
to take them out of the electoral equation and ensure that they did not turn out, 
making the 2008 run-off race a one-horse race. In 2013 overt violence was 
limited, but intimidation and coercion were rife. This time intimidation was used 
not to block the participation of suspected opposition members in the electoral 
process, but to compel them to vote for ZANU-PF.   During this period, patronage 
distribution was meant to cover both vote buying (convincing people to vote 
through inducements) as well as turnout buying (ensuring that beneficiaries of 
ZANU-PF’s patronage turned out to vote).  ZANU-PF also monitored 
constituents vote choices through traditional leaders and forced suspected 
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opposition members to feign illiteracy or disability so that they could be assisted 
to vote.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
The politics of campaigning and elections in Mount Darwin bring out the multiple 
layers and shades of operation for ZANU-PF including the good, the bad and the 
very ugly. The empirical facts presented in the chapter show that ZANU-PF 
pursued a coercive mobilising campaign strategy in 2008 in ZACs where it 
catered for most to its members and core-constituencies. In 2013, ZANU-PF 
maintained a muted version of the mobilising campaign in ZACs, vigorously 
pursuing OACs at the national level and suspected opposition supporters at the 
subnational level in ZACs. In both elections, rather than just attaining victory, the 
campaign objective was to mobilise (2008) and increase (2013) turnout to boost 
its presidential candidate’s votes. Also, ZANU-PF’s campaign strategy between 
the elections changed regarding the tenor of the bigwig campaign speeches, as 
well as the nature of the inducements and sanctions offered for supporting (or not 
supporting) ZANU-PF. In the run-up to the March 2008 election, ZANU-PF 
distributed patronage goods with no discernible follow-up, suggesting that these 
clientelist distributions were to thank and reward its membership. When ZANU-
PF did not win the March 2008 presidential election nationally, it resorted to 
violence.  
 
Nevertheless, the chapter also provided evidence that showed that ZANU-PF’s 
efforts to increase the voter turnout and their winning tallies were also made 
through legitimacy-seeking historical, ideological and programmatic appeals. 
This was ZANU-PF’s daylight strategy to win hearts and minds, which proved 
useful in Mount Darwin. This was based on the strength of ZANU-PF’s ability to 
establish historical connections, evoke memories and emotions, appease and 
reward loyalty through practical and material inducements, inspire members 
through programmatic visions, and establish performance legitimacy through 
delivery on past programmatic promises, as well as running interventions in the 
run-up to and during the elections. These attempts by ZANU-PF to seek 
legitimacy through persuasive politics have not been examined much in the 
existing literature on ZANU-PF politics.  
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The findings partly lend traction to Southall’s (2013: 137) argument that ZANU-
PF secured its 2013 victory in part because it presented a programmatic message 
around empowerment, indigenisation, and jobs at rallies and in the press, as 
opposed to the MDC-T’s lacklustre campaign. Southall (2013) argues that this 
messaging struck a chord with voters and that it is not inconceivable that ZANU-
PF could have won in 2013 without rigging. However, the chapter complicates 
this by showing that these persuasive elements were also part of ZANU-PF’s 
campaign in 2008; yet it lost the first round of the Presidential election and only 
secured a hollow victory in the June 2008 run-off election on the back of 
unmitigated violence and intimidation.  
 
In sum, the chapter shows that in ZACs, ZANU-PF campaigned to increase voter 
turnout and their winning tallies using a multi-level political game aimed at 
achieving legitimacy and delivering large winning margins. By “day”, ZANU-PF 
bigwigs campaigned to win voters’ hearts and minds through legitimacy-seeking 
historical, charismatic, programmatic and ideological appeals. The chapter 
showed that when the inquiry is limited to this aspect of electioneering, ZANU-
PF appears to have campaigned to win the hearts and minds of voters and to 
enhance its legitimacy. The chapter used evidence from interviews and 
conversations with a cross-section of ZANU-PF members, traditional leaders, 
opposition members, liberation war veterans, and ordinary villagers to highlight 
how and why ideological, historical and programmatic appeals had some 
resonance in the Mount Darwin constituencies. At the local levels, ZANU-PF and 
its appendages initially went about hyperbolising Mugabe’s and ZANU-PF’s 
virtues. These actions represented the levelling down of persuasive appeals from 
the bigwigs. However, while emphasising the persuasive elements of ZANU-
PF’s campaigns because of their neglect in the literature and analysis, the chapter 
still found that by “night” ZANU-PF organisational structures, with the aid of the 
local state and coercive arms of the state, engaged in a process of compelling 
support. The chapter thus also validates, in part, existing arguments on ZANU-
PF’s use of coercion and patriotic history discourses. 
 
Nonetheless, the type of subnational politics in aid of the national presidential 
campaigns that were present in ZACs straddled the line between what may be 
normatively considered legitimacy-seeking and non-legitimacy seeking methods. 
It combined the use of persuasive appeals, manipulation, and coercive methods, 
some of which had a discursive, yet compulsory, character.  The chapter 
216 
 
concludes that ZANU-PF campaigned in ZACs to reinforce its liberation war 
legacy as a credential for governing, to promote the party’s programme, and to 
mobilise and compel members and ordinary voters to turn out on election day 
through a range of positive and negative local sanctions. ZANU-PF flattered to 
deceive as it publicly sought legitimacy, but privately compelled support in 
wicked ways that are inimical to legitimacy-seeking modes of electioneering. In 
ZACs, therefore, ZANU-PF did not campaign to just win; it did so to win big. 
How it went about this in 2008- mainly coercive mobilising in its core 
constituents and hounding the opposition out of the electoral process - differed 
from 2013- when it sought to mobilise its base, and convert suspected opposition 
supporters into at best ZANU-PF members, and at worst, just votes for ZANU-
PF. 
 
 In the final analysis ZANU-PF, by invoking its liberation war credentials and 
anti-imperialist rhetoric, it signalled that although it was participating in a process 
which could land it with procedural legitimacy, it emphasised more its identity-
based claims to legitimacy. Also, rather than touting its own performance during 
the GNU, ZANU-PF chose instead to shoot down the opposition, and using them 
as a reason for the bucolic to keep supporting their needs. The next chapter 
investigates ZANU-PF’s campaigns in opposition-aligned constitutions whose 
political DNA was fundamentally different from the ZACs covered in this 
chapter.
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7 BEHIND ENEMY LINES: ZANU-PF CAMPAIGNS IN 
OPPOSITION ALIGNED CONSTITUENCIES (OACS) 
 
This chapter discusses ZANU-PF’s campaigning in the 2008 and 2013 
presidential elections in opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs). The OACs 
category includes opposition strongholds (where the opposition’s winning 
margins against ZANU-PF were over 52.75%), consolidating-opposition 
constituencies (where the winning margins for the opposition against ZANU-PF 
were between 31.3% and 52.75%), and constituencies where the opposition 
scored narrow victories (between 15.1% and 31.3%). While the primary 
presidential competition in 2008 and 2013 was between Robert Mugabe of 
ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC, the opposition’s winning 
margins, which inform the OAC category in this chapter, are calculated based on 
combined opposition votes (MDC-T and other parties) against the incumbent, 
ZANU-PF. The calculation follows a simple formula of subtracting the second 
placed candidate’s votes from the winning candidate’s votes and dividing this by 
the total number of votes cast. The chapter analyses the presidential election 
campaigns in OACs at the national and sub-national levels in 2008 and 2013, 
when ZANU-PF appeared resurgent.  
 
This chapter uses overview data from the study’s dataset as the basis on which to 
conduct a national level analysis. It augments this with an analysis of the bigwig 
visits for the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections by members of the ZANU-PF 
praesidium, acting in their national leadership capacities to OACs. In addition to 
this, the chapter also leverages other descriptive outputs from the study’s dataset 
(overviewed in chapter 5) , the public record (newspapers and other secondary 
evidence), and interviews conducted in Bulawayo ‘s Makokoba and Pumula 
constituencies, as well as Lupane West constituency to analyse ZANU-PF’s 
campaign strategy in OACs. As shown in chapter 3, circa 2008, Bulawayo 
province in particular, and the Matebeleland provinces in general, were perceived 
to be opposition stronghold provinces. Ahead of the 2008 elections, Makokoba 
and Pumula constituencies were opposition strongholds because the opposition 
had registered winning margins of around 62% in the previous elections in 2002. 
This was over the stronghold threshold of a winning margin, which was 52.75%. 
Lupane West constituency was a marginal-opposition constituency after the 
opposition carried the constituency in 2002 with a winning margin 28.27%, 
placing it in the marginal (i.e. narrowly won) constituency category. After the 
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2013 election, Makokoba and Pumula turned into consolidating-opposition 
constituencies (with winning margins of 47.2% and 46.7% falling into the 
consolidating-constituency category, with winning margins between 31.33% and 
52.75%) while Lupane West became a battleground constituency with the 
opposition only mastering a winning margin of 10%. This selection of 
constituencies is representative of OACs, especially from the Southern region of 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The chapter picks up the change and continuity discussion started in chapter 5 
and will show how that a change in strategy occurred and that it had its genesis 
in the March 2008 presidential election. It attributes the shift in campaign strategy 
to several factors, including the March election results and the negative 
consequences of ZANU-PF’s resort to violence in the run-up to the June 2008 
presidential election run-off on its legitimacy. These circumstances caused 
dissonance in ZANU-PF, requiring practical political action at a strategic level to 
stem ZANU-PF’s embarrassment. In contrast to some of the popular scholarship 
on ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe’s electoral processes, the chapters argues that 
ZANU-PF was forced to learn “new” ways of capturing power, and unlearn old 
habits of power retention in 2013 to meet its ambition of risk mitigation against 
loss power as nearly happened in March 2008, and loss of legitimacy as had 
happened after the June 2008 presidential election run-off.  
 
In advancing these arguments, the chapter departs from some of the more popular 
analysis on Zimbabwean elections, which focuses on ZANU-PF manipulation 
and violence. It argues that ZANU-PF’s campaigning in licit and persuasive ways 
also had an impact on the electoral outcomes in 2013. The chasing strategy that 
ZANU-PF adopted in 2013 comes across as compelling evidence that ZANU-PF 
went out and mobilised more voters through strategic shifts in how their 
campaigns targeted people and places.  My main conclusion is that ZANU-PF 
shifted its campaign strategy in OACs in 2013, desisting from overt violence, and 
relying on the utilisation of persuasion and patronage. There was a shift in 
strategy from just mobilising its partisan core (ZACs) to attempting a persuasive 
clientelist chasing strategy targeting non-members (found mainly in OACs). The 
data supports the study’s the notion that in 2013, ZANU-PF, a clear example of 
a competitive authoritarian regime, campaigned to win the hearts and minds of 
more independent voters to enhance its legitimacy. 
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 presents an overview 
of OACs as a category, outlining the main features of constituencies and how 
they fit into it over time. It also covers how ZANU-PF executed its election 
campaigns in OACs in 2008 using bigwig rallies and particular appeals. It will 
show how, at bigwig rallies, ZANU-PF utilised programmatic and clientelist 
appeals, and also attempted to leverage history and Joshua Nkomo’s legacy in 
Matebeleland. As in ZACs,  ZANU-PF savaged the opposition. Section 7.2 looks 
at the local politics of the 2008 ZANU-PF campaign in OACs, showing how 
ZANU-PF used its party structures at the cell, branch and district levels to 
mobilise support. I argue that in the absence of positive and negative sanctions to 
entice or force people to be part of ZANU-PF, the party structures, as a mobilising 
and organising strategy in elections, became of limited utility. Section 7.3 
outlines the outcomes of the 2008 elections and the implications that they had for 
ZANU-PF’s campaign strategy going forward. Section 7.4 covers ZANU-PF’s 
“forays into enemy territory” in the 2013 election. It engages the literature on the 
2013 Presidential election and outlines how this study argues ZANU-PF’s 
switched its campaign strategy. Section 7.5 analyses 2013 bigwig rallies and the 
kinds of appeals that ZANU-PF made. It then looks at how ZANU-PF’s  local 
party structures and members conducted ZANU-PF’s ground game in OACs in 
2013. It will outline several approaches that ZANU-PF adopted with decent 
electoral returns. The conclusion summarises the chapter, its main findings, 
arguments, and analysis. 
 
7.1 Overview Of OACs 2002 To 2013 
Between 2002 and 2018, a total of 108 electoral districts of the 210 that are 
contested were at one point or another opposition-leaning constituency, as either 
opposition strongholds, or consolidating, or marginal constituencies. Although 
the general impression is that the opposition is dominant in urban areas and 
ZANU-PF is dominant in rural areas, the data compiled for this study based on 
official election returns from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) shows 
that across time (2002 to 2018) this was not completely the case. The OAC 
category was constituted of an almost equal number of rural (48 constituencies) 
and urban areas (49 constituencies), with peri-urban areas taking up the remaining 
11 slots. Also contrary to the view that ZANU-PF controlled all constituencies 
where land reform had occurred, almost 78% of the rural constituencies (34 out 
of 48) in the OAC category had experienced some form of land reform.  
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Absent the legitimate criticism around the integrity of official election returns in 
Zimbabwe as covered in chapter 5, the data suggests that the opposition was 
generally weakening across time. For instance, the average winning margins for 
the opposition across OACs were generally declining. In 2002 the average 
winning margin for OACs was about 40%; it went down to 35% in 2008, further 
declining to an average of 24% in 2013. However, the picture is more volatile 
when one looks at concrete numbers of OACs and voter turnout in OACs across 
time. As Figure 7-1 shows, although there was an increase in the number of OACs 
in 2008 to 105 out of 210 from the 2002 levels of 69 out of 210, the number of 
OACs decreased from this 2008 high watermark of 105 OACs to only 47 out of 
210 in 2013. In 2008 OACs constituted about a third, 33% of the 210 
constituencies, that ZEC’s delimitation exercise had introduced for the 2008 
election. Out of the 69 OACs, 29 were opposition strongholds, 21 were 
consolidating, and 19 were marginal opposition constituencies.17 
 
Table 7-1: Opposition Aligned Constituencies (2002 to 2018) 
OPPOSITION LEANING CONSTITUENCIES 
 
Opposition 
Strongholds 
Marginal 
opposition 
Consolidating 
Opposition TOTAL  
T1-
2002 
13.80% 9% 10% 32.80% 
29/210 19/210 20/210 68/210 
T2-
2008 
22% 14.30% 13.80% 50.10% 
46/210 30/210 29/210 105/210 
T3-
2013 
5.20% 7.61% 9.52% 22.33% 
11/210 16/210 20/210 47/210 
T4-
2018 
9.00% 8.57% 16.66% 34.23% 
19/210 18/210 35/210 72/210 
 
 
17 In this chapter and the rest of the thesis, marginal constituencies refer to constituencies narrowly won by either the opposition 
or the incumbent. This classification is a departure from the general usage where marginal is used interchangeably with 
constituencies considered battlegrounds, swings or close contests. I further clarify the difference between these three 
(marginals, swings and battlegrounds) as used in this thesis in chapter 6, which is on battleground constituencies. 
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Figure 7-1: Opposition-leaning constituencies as proportions -2002 to 2018 
Source: Author’s data 
 
Although the data shows that, over time, rural and urban constituencies 
constituted roughly equal shares of OACs, in 2008, the vast majority (46 out 69) 
were urban areas, while 17 were rural, with only six constituencies being peri 
urban. Official election returns, if taken as correct, also show that voter turnout 
in OACs averaged around 50.7 % in 2002, going down to 42% in 2008, before 
increasing again to 55% in 2013. This official data suggests that ZANU-PF, rather 
than the opposition, benefited from the increased voter turnout. Generally, when 
the turnout was low in 2008, the opposition benefited from the apathy, while 
when it was higher in 2013, ZANU-PF benefitted from the increased turnout 
figures. This could have been the result of voter education and mobilisation 
saturation in rural areas in 2013, given the commonly held understanding that this 
is where civic education was needed the most. 
 
As Figure 7-1 shows, the presidential election for 2008 led to increases across all 
three types of OACs, with strongholds increasing to 46, up from 29, 
consolidating-opposition constituencies increasing to 29, up from 21, and 
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marginal-opposition constituencies increasing to 30 from 19. In aggregate terms, 
the opposition mastered pluralities in 105 constituencies, exactly half of the 210 
single member districts, although they also had some very narrow winning 
margins in some of the 57 battleground constituencies.   
  
7.1.1 2008 Political Calculus: Neglecting OACs, Shoring Up The ZANU-PF 
Heartland.  
Figure 7-2, below, shows the number of bigwig visits that ZANU-PF made to the 
different types of constituencies. It shows that in 2008, ZANU-PF deployed the 
most bigwig visits to marginal ZANU-PF constituencies (12 visits), followed by 
ZANU-PF Strongholds (7 visits). Marginal-opposition constituencies and 
battleground constituencies enjoyed the same level of attention (6 visits). Figure 
7-2 also shows that ZANU-PF paid the least attention in 2008 to consolidating-
ZANU-PF constituencies, opposition stronghold and consolidating 
constituencies. In other words, in 2008, ZANU-PF concentrated its attention on 
its own partisan strongholds.  
 
Figure 7-2: 2008 ZANU-PF Bigwig visits By Constituency Type. 
 
Source: Author’s data 
 
Table 7-2 shows how many bigwig visits ZANU-PF deployed to the different 
constituency types in 2008. The table presents this data on two levels and in two 
forms. It shows the absolute number of recorded visits and the 
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proportion/percentage they constituted of all visits in 2008, as well as the 
aggregate proportions of visits to OACs, ZACs, and battleground constituencies. 
The percentages in Table 2 are rounded to the nearest whole number.  
 
Table 7-2 shows that ZANU-PF concentrated its bigwig efforts in ZACs (53%), 
with battlegrounds receiving 14% of visits, while OACs received 34%. About 
54% of visits to ZACs were to marginal constituencies, i.e. where its margins of 
victory were narrow, although a sizable proportion, 32%, were to its strongholds. 
Regarding OACs, ZANU-PF devoted 43% of its visits to marginal-opposition 
constituencies with the remaining visits being equally split between opposition-
consolidating and opposition-stronghold constituencies. 
 
Table 7-2: ZANU-PF Bigwig visits 2008 Across Constituency Types 
Constituency Type 2008 Bigwig Visits 
 
N = 42 
2008 Aggregate 
proportions per Major 
Constituency type 
 14%  
Opposition Strongholds 4  
 
 
34.% 
10% 
Consolidating Opposition 4 
10% 
Marginal Opposition 6 
14% 
Source: Author's Data based on cataloguing campaign stops of the ZANU-PF 
Praesidium during the2008 (March and June) and 20 13 elections.  
 
The 2008 pattern of bigwig visits shows that ZANU-PF largely neglected OACs 
and sought to shore up support in its core constituencies. This was a strategy to 
mobilise its base, as explained in chapter 6. It was aimed at maximising the 
turnout in its strongholds and allied constituencies (ZACs). The ZANU-PF base 
had also benefitted from the land reform programme and other populist 
intervention programmes that supported both commercial and communal 
agriculture. As Raftopoulos (2013:983) notes, this effort to win rural support 
through populist programmatic interventions, and ZANU-PF’s support to the 
informal and formal mining sectors and informal traders in the cities, were part 
of reconstructing its social base for elections and future developmental visions. 
If Raftopoulos (2013) and scholars like Dube & Makaye (2013), who argue that 
ZANU-PF’s past success was due to the strength of a captive rural electorate, are 
correct, then the mobilising strategy that ZANU-PF employed in 2008 made 
political sense. The data suggest that ZANU-PF intended to shore up shaky 
224 
 
elements of its base (marginal ZANU-PF constituencies) and maximise support 
from its strongholds. That ZANU-PF paid the least attention to areas that they 
were unlikely to win (opposition strongholds) is in line with a mobilising strategy, 
elaborated in chapter 6, in regard to ZANU-PF’s campaigns in ZACs. However, 
ZANU-PF did pay some limited attention to OACs in 2008. The next section 
focuses on how it did so through bigwig rallies and the appeals that Mugabe made 
during rallies in Matebeleland and Bulawayo provinces. 
 
7.1.2 Programmatic and Clientelist appeals & Leveraging the Nkomo Legacy  
On the few occasions that Mugabe and other ZANU-PF bigwigs made forays into 
OACs in 2008, their appeals were similar to those made in ZACs (chapter 4). The 
campaign speeches featured spirited attacks on the opposition, historical and 
ideological appeals, and the partisan distribution of basic essential commodities 
through people’s shops, the BACOSI initiative and price controls. There were 
also programmatic appeals around transport and the resuscitation of industries. 
These were important issues nationally but had particular resonance in Bulawayo 
and Matebeleland (Bulawayo Bureau, 2008). Several news stories from the 
campaign period show that while mentioning issues regarding social service 
delivery, health (including donating 400 cars to senior doctors), transport 
(including the donation of thirty-five minibuses each to the three Matebeleland 
provinces), and sharing his grain import scheme through Zambia, Mugabe’s main 
focus was on addressing the issues of runaway inflation and basic food prices. 
 
Speaking at Hwange Colliery mine just outside Lupane on 24 March 2008, 
Mugabe made populist threats to companies that refused to lower their basic 
commodity prices. He accused them of a deliberate attempt to push a regime-
change agenda by frustrating people so that they turned against the government 
in the 29 March elections. Mugabe threatened a political response: 
We are going to read them the riot act. If they refuse [to lower prices], we 
too will reject them. That is no play. We are going to use the Indigenisation 
and Empowerment Act which stipulates that all companies, be they mines 
or manufacturing companies with foreign ownership, without black 
shareholders, or with black shareholders without a majority, should have 
at least 51% shares reserved for indigenous people (Gagare & Mpofu, 
2008). 
 
Mugabe also attempted to leverage the memory and popularity of late veteran 
nationalist and Vice President of Zimbabwe, ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo. This 
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was in a bid to calm Matabeleland’s historical regional hostility against ZANU-
PF on account of the Gukurahundi massacres. The Fifth Brigade is reported to 
have killed between 8000 (CCJP & LRF, 1997) and 20,000 people (International 
Association of Genocide Scholars, 2005), mostly consisting of people of Ndebele 
descent and ZAPU supporters. Nkomo, dubbed “Father Zimbabwe”, enjoyed his 
greatest support in the Matebeleland provinces. As Alexander, McGregor, & 
Ranger (2000) note, Zimbabwe’s two liberation guerrilla armies, ZANLA for 
ZANU and ZIPRA for ZAPU, followed regional patterns of recruitment and 
operation during the war. While considered allies, there was also a history of 
animosity and distrust between them and their political leaders, in part stemming 
from the ZANU’s split from ZAPU in 1963 (see chapter 4). Alexander, McGregor 
and Ranger (2000:181) also note that the patterns of recruitment and operation 
left ZIPRA forces dominated by Ndebele speakers from Matebeleland, while 
ZANLA was predominantly Shona-speaking. These composition dynamics and 
operational areas impacted political loyalties both pre- and post-independence, 
mostly following ethnic and regional divisions.  
 
Mugabe was aware of this history, including the complication added by the 
Gukurahundi massacres. He sought to salvage some support, claiming that he 
wanted to uphold and fulfil Dr Joshua Nkomo’s legacy of empowering the people 
of Zimbabwe, and excluding the British from taking over the land (Sibanda, 
2008). 
 
In Mugabe’s eyes, the opposition was standing in the way of Nkomo’s legacy 
and, by extension, the ideals of the liberation struggle. Mugabe made scathing 
rhetorical attacks on the opposition, which hitherto had been quite dominant in 
Matebeleland. In the 2002 presidential race, Morgan Tsvangirai had bested 
Mugabe in the three provinces, securing 63% of the vote while Mugabe only 
received 32.5%. Tsvangirai’s dominance was pronounced in Bulawayo, where he 
massively dominated in every constituency with an average winning margin of 
62%. In Matebeleland South and North, Tsvangirai still led but with lower 
winning margins averaging 31% and 24% respectively, with Mugabe leading in 
five of the 26 constituencies with small winning margins, averaging 12%. Since 
the 2002 presidential election the opposition had split, with the bulk of its leaders 
from Matebeleland (like the then Deputy President Gibson Sibanda, Secretary-
General Welshman Ncube, and Spokesperson Paul Themba Nyathi) leading the 
faction opposed to Tsvangirai. With the opposition seemingly weakened by the 
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split, 2008 seemed like an opportunity to cut down Tsvangirai’s support in the 
region (BBC, 2005).  
 
7.1.3 Savaging the opposition: “Puppets”, “Sell-Outs”, “Political Adventurers” 
and “Prostitutes” 
Speaking at Stanley Square in Makokoba a few days before the March 2008 
presidential election, Mugabe was more combative than persuasive, perhaps 
because he knew his chances in Bulawayo were limited. The Herald newspaper 
reported that Mugabe had chided the people of Bulawayo in particular, and 
Matebeleland in general, for voting for “puppets of the west” since 2000. In 
Hwange, Mugabe had dismissed the MDC challenge, stating that losing to 
Tsvangirai would be a curse of biblical proportions. Nonetheless, he was 
confident that although “they may win some seats”, it would be impossible for 
them to win across the country (Gagare & Mpofu, 2008:1). In Bulawayo, at the 
Stanley Square rally, Mugabe did not equivocate, declaring that constituents 
would be wasting their votes if they voted for the opposition because, 
You can vote for them, but that will be a wasted vote. You will be cheating 
yourself as there is no way we can allow them to rule this country. We have 
a job to do, and that is to protect our heritage. The MDC will not rule this 
country. It will never ever happen. Asisoze sivume [we will not accept it] 
(Sibanda & Mavhumashava, 2008:1).  
 
It appears that Mugabe meant what he said, as he later refused to acknowledge 
being defeated in the 2008 election by Tsvangirai. This attitude is true to the 
nature of elections in competitive authoritarian regimes, where, despite having 
politically valid results, the elections seldom offer a “real” opportunity to change 
ruling regimes (Blaydes, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). I also 
argue that given the place, Bulawayo, and the time, a week ahead of the election, 
Mugabe was engaging in intimidation at scale, sowing the seeds of the futility of 
voting in OACs to dissuade opposition supporters from participating in the 
election. This kind of intimidation, as Collier & Vicente (2012) note, is useful in 
attacking the resolve to participate of the opposition’s soft-core supporters, who 
can be easily dissuaded from voting by intimidation and violence.   
 
Part of the logic in Mugabe’s declarations around protecting Zimbabwe’s heritage 
stemmed from the blame he placed on the MDC for the sanctions and economic 
challenges that Zimbabwe had faced ahead of the 2008 election. Mugabe accused 
MDC leaders of being empty vessels with no solutions and being puppets on 
227 
 
Western strings. He derided Morgan Tsvangirai as being uneducated and having 
no locus standi for solutions to Zimbabwe’s economic challenges. He accused 
Tsvangirai of not being able to “think for himself” and relying instead on white 
people and former white farmers to think for him (Sibanda & Mavhumashava, 
2008). Even then, Mugabe claimed that the MDC’s campaign message, while 
catchy, was vacuous and should not entice Zimbabweans:   
Day in day out they say they have five objectives. These five fingers, what 
objectives? They say they have new ideas, that Morgan means “more” 
things. More what? More sanctions? More problems? More white 
participation here? We do not want their “mores” they have hurt us 
(Herald, 21 March, 2008:1). 
 
While Mugabe sought to take advantage of the MDC split, ZANU-PF was also 
in disarray and in danger of disintegrating. ZANU-PF politburo member and 
former finance minister Simba Makoni declared his intention to run as an 
alternative ZANU-PF candidate a month ahead of the 2008 election. Makoni’s 
bid for the presidency followed a failed palace coup at ZANU-PF’s December 
2007 Congress to have a candidate other than Mugabe for the 2008 election (DD, 
2017). Coming into the 2008 race, Mugabe was aware that ZANU-PF too was 
fraught with elite dissensus over his leadership. Party influentials ultimately 
advanced the “Bhora Musango” [kick the ball into the bush] strategy, where 
some senior ZANU-PF insiders urged constituents in 2008 to vote for ZANU-PF 
MPs but not Mugabe in the presidential ballot (Ncube, 2016; Tendi, 2013).  
 
In Matebeleland, these fractions within ZANU-PF were more pronounced.  One 
of the most senior ex-ZAPU members in ZANU-PF after the death of Nkomo, 
former ZIPRA intelligence chief Dumiso Dabengwa, quit ZANU-PF at its 
December congress. Dabengwa became Makoni’s chief campaigner in 
Matebeleland and the surrounding regions, where ZAPU’s name and heritage 
carried much more weight than ZANU-PF. As a result Mugabe also made 
scathing attacks on Dabengwa, whom he accused of “straying into the darkness” 
for following Makoni, whom he called a political prostitute without a party, a 
sell-out, and a political adventurer driven by personal ambition (Bulawayo 
Bureau, 2008; Staff Reporter, 2008). The opposition also accused Makoni and 
Dabengwa rhetorically of being  ZANU-PF plants. Despite these attacks, 
Dabengwa and Makoni’s history as ZANU-PF members, and Makoni’s 
insistence, despite being expelled from ZANU-PF, that he was loyal to ZANU-
PF, are thought to have assisted him to get 8% of the vote share in 2008. Some in 
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ZANU-PF believed that his candidature reduced their support base. In an 
interview with me, one ZANU-PF Member of Parliament and Central Committee 
member from Matebeleland Province, M.P-KM1212, shared his belief that 
ZANU-PF could have performed better in 2008 had it not been divided. As far as 
he was concerned the three-way split of votes between Mugabe, Tsvangirai and 
Makoni was an artificial result that did not adequately show ZANU-PF’s strength. 
He argued that  in Matebeleland, Makoni and Dabengwa were rogue ZANU-PF 
members who took votes away from ZANU-PF (M.P-KM1212, 2017). 
 
The above issues, appeals, and attacks were assimilated, acted on, and 
appreciated differently by different constituencies and voters on the ground in 
Matebeleland. The next section looks at how ZANU-PF went about localising the 
national presidential race in OACs. However, given the limited campaign effort 
in OACs in general, and in urban areas in particular, the section covers 
experiences from rural Lupane more than Makokoba and Pumula, which are 
urban areas in Bulawayo. 
 
7.2 The Local Politics Of The 2008 Presidential Election 
Campaigns  
Mugabe’s attempt to appropriate Nkomo’s legacy did not work, putting a dent in 
his historical and ideological appeals. In this region, ZANU-PF had a chequered 
history, and could not make the monopoly claims to liberating the country that 
Mugabe could make anywhere outside Matebeleland. As explained above, during 
the liberation struggle, ZAPU was the party, and ZIPRA the army, that most 
people in the Matebeleland region supported and interacted with during the war. 
The fact that this movement was targeted for extermination by Mugabe post-1980 
through the Gukurahundi Massacres, and then absorbed as a junior partner into 
ZANU-PF through the 1987 Unity Accord, did not sit well with ZAPU purists in 
the region (Masunungure, 2008). Although this fact is neglected in most broad 
sweeping analyses, Mugabe, if the official results are to be believed, still enjoyed 
a sizable amount of support in the Matebeleland province. In 2002 Mugabe’s vote 
share stood at 32%. However, it is correct that the historical regional disdain for 
ZANU-PF left the region fairly open to opposition. In 2008, opposition forces 
provided two options other than Mugabe: Makoni and Tsvangirai.  
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In 2008 Tsvangirai seemed to prevail in Matebeleland and was considered by 
some the best candidate with national credentials strong enough to defeat 
Mugabe. TS1612, a Matebeleland North provincial opposition leader, explained 
in an interview that some in the province saw Tsvangirai as Nkomo’s successor. 
This was plausible because Nkomo had not anointed a successor in the region, 
and, throughout his life, had styled himself as a Zimbabwean nationalist and 
“father of the nation”, despite being from Matebeleland. This gave Tsvangirai an 
advantage. Other leaders from the region, like Dumiso Dabengwa, Welshman 
Ncube, and others that Ncube had left the MDC with during the 2005 split, were 
seen, and sometimes portrayed themselves as  regional leaders. Importantly, none 
of these other leaders were on the 2008 Presidential election ballot. Tsvangirai 
was, by contrast, perceived, and portrayed himself as a national leader, who, like 
Mugabe, also claimed, during a tour of all of the districts in the region in 2008, 
that he wanted to finish what Nkomo had started (TS1612, 2017). TS noted that 
people actually believed in Morgan [Tsvangirai] so much more than they 
would believe in their Ndebele brothers in the Presidential election. They 
felt that their struggle and challenges had local manifestation but were 
nationally driven, and the only person who could tackle those national 
issues, who could remove Mugabe was Morgan. So, at all costs, Morgan 
was their messiah, their Joshua Nkomo (TS1612, 2017). 
  
Tsvangirai's retail politics of moving from district to district doing rallies, the 
region’s historical disdain for ZANU-PF, and ZANU-PF's poor economic 
stewardship, which had left Bulawayo, formerly Zimbabwe’s industrial hub, 
deindustrialised, damaged Mugabe’s candidature in the Matebeleland provinces. 
These factors made Mugabe’s appeals during the bigwig rallies largely 
ineffectual. The opposition made good on this opportunity through  “a well-
polished campaign strategy, supported by Command Centres at provincial offices 
in Bulawayo, Lupane and Gwanda, which the business community supported and 
funded together with an astute technical team” (TS1612, 2017).  
 
Mugabe’s ideological and historical appeals, as well as his vilification of the 
opposition, especially around their ties with whites and the West, also seemed to 
have a limited impact in OACs if the electoral results are used as a measure of 
success. In part, this limited impact was because the message was too broad. It 
was tailored to appeal to the rural folk who had direct interest in the land, and 
who were more concerned about this than ideological concerns around land 
reclamation and righting past wrongs. It must be remembered that, in 2008, the 
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vast majority of OACs were urban areas (46 out of 69). These constituencies had 
been hardest hit by the country’s serious economic challenges and did not readily 
accept the third chimurenga discourse as an explanation for the economic decline.  
Different types of appeals outside land and land-related inducements would have 
been needed.  ZANU-PF also had limited capacity to transmit its messages from 
the presidency downwards to the local level, given the poor shape that the party 
was in, the present infighting, and the Bhora musango phenomenon.  
 
Away from the urban areas, for some in the predominantly rural constituency of 
Lupane, the connections with white people that ZANU-PF chastised the 
opposition for were precisely why the opposition was worth supporting. In an 
interview, Counc-CM1112, a former Local Authority counsellor in Lupane, 
stated how this demonization worked against Mugabe.  
People thought if they voted for Tsvangirai in 2008, the white settlers could 
come back and spearhead developmental projects that could revive the 
economy. It is and was useless to vote for Mugabe. For example, we have 
an ARDA [Agricultural and Rural Development Authority] Estate in 
Lupane East in Jotsholo which is being run by white men. It has proved to 
be a shining beacon in terms of agricultural production. This proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that the white man is a hard worker and can provide for 
the community (Counc-CM1112, 2017). 
 
In Lupane and Bulawayo, evidence from the interviews suggests that ethnicity as 
an organising principle was salient. It mattered who introduced and who 
campaigned for the presidential candidates outside of the settings of the bigwig 
rallies. While this was the case throughout the country, in Bulawayo and Lupane 
particularly, ethnicity and the local patron's position in what was understood to 
be the Ndebele tribal hierarchy were important. Several Lupane respondents 
stated that the politics of representation and campaigning had to be what they 
called “a well-balanced tribal act”. MXS1612,  a local business owner at Lupane 
Center, contextualised this sentiment during an interview: 
...Lupane is dynamic in the sense that this is where you find the core 
Ndebele, the Mguni and Khumalo people who believe in the ideology of 
Ubuntu ubuNdebele [Ndebele fundamentalism]. These people are a small 
clique, but they swing the vote. I will give you an example in Lupane West. 
It has been contested, but it is a Khumalo constituency if you bring in a 
Sibanda, the Khumalo wins. The Presidential candidate fronted by the pure 
Ndebele, the Mguni and Khumalo also does well. If you go down to 
Dandanda you find and see these cliques there who believe in and support 
231 
 
Khumalo, but maybe some of them don’t even know him but because he is 
a Khumalo, he is the right person to elect and whose call on the Presidency 
is also followed (MXS1612-Interview, 2017). 
 
TS1612, the opposition provincial executive member who was part of the 
province-wide leadership for the campaigns in 2008 and 2013, validated the 
efficacy of the above sentiment for political practice in Lupane. Despite the 
homogeneity that most assume for Matebeleland, the provinces are a dynamic 
constellation of various ethnicities and self-identifying tribes. Pushing a Ndebele 
candidate and point-person forward can be inadequate to deal with the political 
dynamics, which vary from district to district. To illustrate, TS1612 stated that 
while the Ndebele leadership question was salient in Lupane and Tsholotsho, in 
multi-cultural Umguza (another constituency in Matebeleland North), it was not 
an issue. The representation and leadership matrix in Binga district, which is 
Tonga dominated, and in Hwange, where the Nambya are the major group, also 
changed the dynamics of the campaign leadership and representation. TS1612 
credited the opposition’s good performance in Matebeleland North to getting 
these dynamics right.  
 
However, the MP and ZANU-PF Central Committee member whom I 
interviewed in Lupane watered down the above perspective. He saw his and 
Mugabe’s success in Lupane as a function of his record of working with the 
community at different levels. He argued that it was also a sign of being a good 
candidate and campaign lead selection at ward and constituency level beyond the 
position of the person in the ethnic hierarchy (M.P-KM1212-Interview, 2017). 
According to him, his record and relations in the community, rather than his 
perceived position in the ethnic hierarchy, allowed him to mobilise support 
beyond ZANU-PF members to include people who were “development driven” 
(M.P-KM1212-Interview, 2017). The MP’s input and argumentation could have 
been rationalization and revisionist reflection on the politics on the ground. 
Tribalism and ethnic mobilisation are generally frowned upon in Zimbabwe, 
which since independence has been trying to foist a unitary national identity on a 
state with ethnic diversity.  
 
Ethnic considerations and mobilisation appeared to play an important part in 
campaigns at the local level, at least in Lupane. Those in public office could deny 
it for purposes of painting a picture of meritocratic and performance-based 
politics for fear of being labeled tribalists and ethnic political merchants. Despite 
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this, ethnicity seemed to impact voters’ choices. However, the nature of the 
presidential race, the absence of a Ndebele on the presidential ballot, and the 
almost perfect three-way split between Mugabe, Makoni and Tsvangirai in 
Lupane, suggest that while the local level campaigners and representatives had to 
fit a certain ‘ethnic’ mould, they had no co-ethnic to elect as President. This 
muted the nature and possible prevalence of ethnicity in the political field because 
it could not be identified from the top and did not appear to be a major 
mobilisation tool in mainstream national political mobilisation.  
 
7.2.1 The limitations of party structure in the absence of positive and negative 
sanctions 
My data suggests that while ZANU-PF did very little to appeal to general 
constituents in OACs, it did, however, concentrate on mobilising its own party 
members. A ZANU-PF Provincial Executive member for Bulawayo Province, 
DF0212, who was closely involved in the ZANU-PF campaigns in Bulawayo 
Province in 2008 and 2013, said that ZANU-PF's approach in 2008 in the 
province mostly depended on mobilising its party structures and members 
(DF0212, 2017).  This entailed ensuring that, in the first instance, it mobilised 
members of its party cell structures to vote. In this way, ZANU-PF could 
anticipate the minimum number of expected votes based on the number of cells 
it had. DF0212 explained this as follows:  
If in Bulawayo Mugabe had 30000 votes, it is highly probable that that is 
the same membership we have in the party. These are the people who you 
will see at the rally. Those are the people, because you are using a 
guaranteed system, because you are using the party structure. What we got 
outside the membership was good luck. But we relied on our membership 
(DF0212-Interview, 2017).  
 
The approach, as MPKM explained, was similar in Lupane.  
It all starts with the structures. We have very strong party structures which 
start from the Cell, Branch, Districts up to the Province. If all those 
structures are managed properly, we keep our numbers in check. The 
African National Congress, ANC, in South Africa uses the same strategy. 
So, in elections, we just add on new numbers (M.P-KM1212-Interview, 
2017). 
 
The reliance on party cells that DF and MPKM mentioned is evidence that 
ZANU-PF was following a mobilisation-centred campaign strategy, focusing on 
turning out its base and its supporters. As argued in earlier chapters, after 
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achieving a two-thirds majority in parliament in the 2005 general election, 
ZANU-PF had no reason to doubt that it had sufficient numbers to carry the day 
in 2008 if those numbers turned out.  
 
The opposition attempted to use similar stated that in Lupane West, they had tried 
to mobilise their party structures. However, the poor organisation, lack of 
transport, and limited campaign resources curtailed the effectiveness of this 
strategy (Counc-CM1112, 2017). In contrast, ZANU-PF were 
well resourced. They had 4x4 trucks to cover all the areas they needed to 
reach. It used the Border Gezi national youth service to campaign through 
night Pungwes, and they were also incentivised with allowances. In the 
MDC, it was hard to even get transport to go into constituencies as the 
party was under-resourced (Counc-CM1112-Interview, 2017). 
 
The opposition’s resource challenges and ZANU-PF’s use of night vigils and 
youth officers and/or militias were similar to the campaign dynamics in in ZACs. 
CM1112 mentioned ZANU-PF’s use of the “Border Gezi” youth militia in its 
ground campaign in Lupane West. It is notable, however, that even in 2008, 
opposition officials noted that, “If they know that you are opposition like me, 
they do not bother you. They sort you out by not giving you food parcels and 
other benefits associated with being ZANU-PF” (Counc-CM1112, 2017). In this 
respect, even in rural OACs, the March 2008 elections were generally peaceful 
with limited violence and coercion. This changed somewhat towards the 
presidential election run-off, but not at scale. One interviewee, MXS1612, stated 
that there were some incidents in Lupane West where liberation war veterans took 
over the leadership of the ZANU-PF campaign and harassed civil servants. 
During this process, the war veterans took over the policing services, randomly 
asking people to positively identify themselves with photo ID and declaring some 
areas "No-Go zones” for the opposition (MXS1612-Interview, 2017).  During the 
period of the Inclusive Government, this situation was serious enough to warrant 
the attention of the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC). 
The JOMIC staged a musical concert in Gomoza in Lupane West.  This brought 
together all three parties represented in parliament “to try and bring closure to the 
communities that had been affected by the 2008 political violence” (MXS1612-
Interview, 2017)  
 
The limited ZANU-PF violence and intimidation in the OACs did not gain much 
traction or lead to many ZANU-PF converts. A former legislator for Pumula 
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constituency and key opposition organiser, M.P-MA1212, suggested that this was 
because   
…the people of Bulawayo and Matabeleland have been fighting the 
military and politically motivated violence since the days of Joshua Nkomo 
and the ZIPRA. They have been resisting Mugabe and army deployments 
in Matabeleland since Gukurahundi and have developed a thick skin unlike 
our colleagues in Mashonaland who only knew ZANU-PF's violence in 
2008 (M.P-MA1212-Interview, 2017). 
 
MP-MA1212 added that “whatever threats from the war vets, militia or the army, 
ZANU-PF will never win anything. Matabeleland people know that the Shona 
majority has targeted and segregated them as a tribe. They have developed a thick 
skin because of that seclusion” (M.P-MA1212-Interview, 2017). Unlike in ZACs 
where ZANU-PF’s use of cell mobilisation and organisation was married with 
negative sanctions and coercive measures, in OACs, these aids were only there 
to a limited extent in 2008. However, in 2013, as will be discussed later, the 
structure was augmented and assisted by positive measures that could accrue to 
recruits as part of ZANU-PF’s patronage networks.  
7.3 2008 Election Outcome And Aftermath  
 
We are not used to boxing matches where we go from round one to round 
two. We just knock each other out…. It is a constitutional requirement that 
there may be a re-run, but it will not be necessary (Sunday Mail, 30 March, 
2008:1). 
 
These were the words of a buoyant Mugabe to a waiting press on 29 March 2008, 
after casting his ballot at Mhofu Primary School in Harare's high-density suburb 
of Highfield. Yet the outcome of the 2008 March presidential elections showed 
that ZANU-PF had failed to achieve the results Mugabe had hoped for. The 2008 
results across the three Matebeleland provinces bear this out, but also show that 
sweeping declarations around Tsvangirai carrying the provinces and Mugabe 
being very unpopular obscure the reality that these were highly contested areas. 
Tsvangirai prevailed, but failed to get more than half of the vote share. Tsvangirai 
obtained about 42% of the vote share across Matebeleland in the March 2008 
election, down from 63% in 2002. Makoni had the second largest vote share, with 
about 29%, and Mugabe was narrowly behind with about 27%, down from his 
32.5% in 2002. The vote split was tighter outside Bulawayo province. For 
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instance, in Lupane West, Mugabe narrowly led with 34% of the vote, followed 
by Makoni with about 33%, with Tsvangirai polling third with about 32% of the 
vote, down from 61% in 2002. In Makokoba, the inverse was true, with 
Tsvangirai leading with 48% of the vote followed by Makoni with about 39%, 
and Mugabe with about 14%. Phumula  followed a similar pattern to Makokoba, 
with Tsvangirai getting around 50% of the votes,  Makoni 29%, and Mugabe 
maintaining 14%.  
 
The data shows that the opposition was dominant, but mostly so in its combined 
form rather than as separate parties. ZANU-PF was very competitive in Lupane 
West and maintained a steady vote share of only 14% in the city, where it was 
most unpopular. It also suggests that Mugabe was right to go after both Tsvangirai 
and Makoni, as they both enjoyed more support than he did across the provinces 
and the constituencies that are the focus of this chapter. The data suggests that 
MP-KM1212’s assessment that Makoni took away votes from ZANU-PF was 
wrong. It seems that Tsvangirai took the hardest hit from Makoni’s entry into the 
presidential race. As shown above, Tsvangirai’s support fell proportionally by 
half in Lupane West, from 80% to 50% in Pumula, and from about 81% to 48% 
in Makokoba.  
 
Table 7-3: 2008 Vote Share Across Constituency Types + Matebeleland and 
National 
2008 Vote 
Share 
Constituency Type  
 OACs ZACs Matebeleland  Battlegrounds National 
R.G. 
Mugabe 
27% 56% 27% 41% 43% 
M.R. 
Tsvangirai 
60% 39% 42% 47% 48% 
S. Makoni 12% 4% 29% 11% 8% 
 
Beyond Matebeleland and the constituencies on which this chapter focuses, as 
table 7-3 shows, the national picture showed that Matebeleland was much more 
competitive than any other area in the country. Overall, Tsvangirai led the 
national vote share tally with about 47.85%, followed by Mugabe with 42.99%, 
and Makoni trailing at a distant third, with 8.31% of the vote. In opposition-
aligned constituencies only, Tsvangirai led the vote share tally with about 60%, 
followed by Mugabe with about 27%, and Makoni with 12%. Using the 2008 
election results as a measure, it is apparent that ZANU-PF’s mobilising strategy 
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and attempts to benefit from the opposition splits did not work. Figure 7-4 
presents the national picture regarding constituency types before and after the 
March 2008 presidential elections. It shows that ZANU-PF suffered declines in 
the number of constituencies in the ZACs column, which accrued as gains in the 
opposition (OACs), and battleground columns, as shown in Figure 7-4.  
Figure 7-3: Numbers of Constituencies per type before and after the March 
2008 Presidential Election 
 
Source: Author’s Data from Official Election Results. 
 
Some read the 2008 results as ZANU-PF’s Waterloo, following decades of 
dominance and an incipient decline that had started in late 1990s (Sithole & 
Makumbe, 1997). What remained of the party, according to Mandaza (2011), was 
surviving only through its conflation with the securocrat state and according to 
Bratton & Masunungure (2008:45) the conflation of all organisational and public 
administration structures with the party. Given the challenges that Zimbabwe 
faced and ZANU-PF’s role in creating those challenges, it was easy to see ZANU-
PF as being on its political deathbed. Yet contrary to this thinking, I argue that 
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the post-2000 socio-political and economic challenges that contributed to ZANU-
PF’s near defeat at the 2008 elections did not sound the death knell for ZANU-
PF as a political force. Rather, the empirical reality of the fusion of the ruling 
party with public administration structures which saw the party married to the 
state, as well as its militarisation through a civilian-military compact  did not 
weaken but strengthened it. Despite the conflation, the near defeat also prompted 
a reawakening, reorganization and redefinition of ZANU-PF as a political party 
proper. This redefinition included ZANU-PF re-emphasising its radical 
ideological redistribution agenda beyond land, adjusting itself to the increased 
political and electoral competition, and responding to protest in ways that ensured 
that it survived the confounding challenges and assault from the “strong” 
opposition. While the perspective of Mandaza (2011) and others is dominant, its 
analysis is limited to  ZANU-PF’s response to, and continuing fight with, the 
opposition. I argue that the extant analysis does not capture ZANU-PF’s post-
2008 responses to the political market’s verdict on its poor political and economic 
stewardship, outside coercion and violence. These often-neglected ZANU-PF 
responses are what drove ZANU-PF’s transformation ahead of the 2013 election. 
These responses were born out of the 2008 near loss and contributed immensely 
to its 2013 victory. The general implication is that competitive authoritarian 
regimes may learn from and adapt to circumstances  to enhance their electoral 
appeal, as ZANU-PF appears to have done after 2008. 
 
7.4 The Switch: From “Mobilising” Core Constituencies In 
2008 To “Chasing” Non-Members In 2013 
 
Although most manifest in 2013, ZANU-PF's change in strategy was instituted 
before the establishment of the GNU and went beyond the strategic reduction in 
the number of Mugabe's rallies that Tendi (2013) notes. ZANU-PF realised soon 
after the March 2008 presidential election that, whatever support it had, and 
whatever manipulation it could master, it could no longer carry it beyond the 
finish line at the run-off and in subsequent elections. It instituted other immediate 
changes to its strategy, including overt violence (in June 2008) and excluding 
overt violence in 2013. ZANU-PF National Political Commissar, Eliot Manyika, 
affirmed this in early June 2008, when he stressed that ZANU-PF was reaching 
out, and canvassing at the family level, to ordinary people who were not party 
members so as to ensure that it got an emphatic victory (Chronicle, 3 June, 2008). 
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Reaching out to non-members was part of a resort to “grassroots campaigning”, 
which the then ZANU-PF Chairman for Information and Publicity, Patrick 
Chinamasa, admitted to (Chronicle, 3 June, 2008). In an interview, a well-known 
leader of the liberation war veterans, SJ1212, who played an active part in ZANU-
PF’s 2013 presidential election campaign, confirmed that they had 
operationalised this change in strategy. He argued that while the intention was to 
win the presidency,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
…our strategy was to start by working hard from ward to ward so that 
people do not walk to you, you go to them. This takes time. That is why I 
spent all five years in the bush (SJ1212-Interview, 2017). 
 
The strategy of reaching out to and canvassing non-ZANU-PF members was 
instituted alongside its campaign of violence in 2008. There were, clearly, two 
contending centres of power with different strategies in ZANU-PF. One was the 
civilian element of ZANU-PF, led by former nationalists and politicians. This 
centre of power was aware that the politics had to change, and more voters needed 
to be gained through persuasive means. It was this group that led thought around 
ZANU-PF’s switch from a mobilising strategy in 2008, as outlined in section 7.2, 
to a chasing strategy in 2013, whereby it would direct its campaign efforts beyond 
its base to include non-partisans. The other was the military, whose involvement 
in ZANU-PF politics is well-documented on account of the politicised role of 
militants in the liberation struggle who were then later grafted into the national 
army during the demobilisation efforts in 1980 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Noyes, 
2013). The military had maintained an interest in ZANU-PF and civilian politics 
covertly since 1980, but this interest became increasingly overt post-2000, and 
outright plain to see during the 2017 ousting of Mugabe. The former liberation 
war combatants within the Zimbabwe National Army considered themselves 
“stockholders” (Chiwenga, 2017), and were considered the moral owners (Vene 
vechinhu) of ZANU-PF (Manheru, 2017). In 2008, these stockholders saw their 
political wardens in ZANU-PF as having failed, and were intent on securing 
power for their party at any and all costs, including through the violence of 
operation mavhotera papi (Operation Who Did You Vote For) towards the June 
2008 presidential election run-off (Noyes, 2019)   
 
The data gathered for this thesis shows that the chasing strategy took two main 
forms that are not mutually exclusive. First ZANU-PF targeted opposition-
aligned constituencies the most with its bigwig rallies. The ground campaign 
prioritised constituencies led by opposition frontbenchers. It also made increasing 
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use of members of its praesidium other than Mugabe to campaign. Second, 
ZANU-PF chased the youth and urban vote. It used creative campaign strategies 
to entice the youth, promising and providing inducements to both the youth and 
urban dwellers in exchange for support. 
 
The first element of the chasing strategy that ZANU-PF adopted for the 2013 
election relates to the types of constituencies that it targeted with bigwig rallies. 
In aggregate terms, ZANU-PF paid less attention to ZACs, which constituted 
about 53% of visits in 2008 and only about 26% in 2013. A decline in visits is 
also evident in battleground constituencies, from 14% in 2008 to 8% in 2013 (See 
chapter 8). Bigwig visits to OACs dramatically increased from the 2008 levels of 
about 34%. The proportion of visits almost doubled to about 64% in 2013. As 
table 7-4 shows, the top two types of particular constituencies visited in 2013 are 
marginal-opposition (28%) and opposition stronghold (23%) constituencies. 
Marginal-ZANU-PF and consolidating-opposition constituencies both ranked 
third in priority, at 12% of visits each.  
 
Table 7-4: Proportions of ZANU-PF Bigwig visits across constituency types 
for 2013 
Constituency Type 2013 Bigwig Visits 
N = 39 
2013 Aggregate 
Bigwig visit  
ZANU-PF Strongholds 3  
 
 
 
 
26% 
8% 
Consolidating ZANU-PF  3 
8% 
Marginal ZANU-PF 5 
12% 
Battlegrounds 3  
8% 8% 
Opposition Strongholds 9  
 
 
 
 
64% 
23% 
Consolidating Opposition 5 
12% 
Marginal Opposition 11 
28% 
Source: Author’s data based on cataloguing campaign stops of ZANU-PF 
Praesidium in the run-up to the 2013 elections 
 
Figure 7-4 shows the number of visits to different types of constituencies in 2008 
and 2013 from a comparative perspective. It shows that ZANU-PF made deep 
forays into “enemy territory” through its shift from a mobilising to a chasing 
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strategy. As shown in Figure 7-4, these constituencies received the second highest 
number of bigwig visits in 2013. While we cannot affirmatively argue that this 
increase in ZANU-PF’s attention to OACs was the cause of its 2013 election 
victory, the data shows that there was a correlation between the increased ZANU-
PF bigwig rallies in OACs and the increased ZANU-PF support in these areas. 
This contributed to ZANU-PF’s eventual triumph in the 2013 election. As I will 
show below, these targets had been softened during the Government of National 
Unity period. In addition, ZANU-PF also pivoted from the preponderance of Star 
Rallies that Mugabe addressed to bigwig rallies that other members of the ZANU-
PF praesidium addressed, especially in regions that they came from and OACs.  
 
Figure 7-4: Number of ZANU-PF Bigwig visits 2008 and 2013 per 
constituency type 
 
Source: Author’s data  
 
7.4.1 Chasing Opposition Leaders’ Constituencies During The Interregnum 
Several scholars provide a window into the impact of  the shared incumbency of 
the GNU on Zimbabwe’s 2013 electoral processes and politics (Alexander and 
Chitofiri, 2011;  Chan & Gallagher, 2017; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; LeBas, 
2014). This scholarship invariably argues that the Government of National Unity 
led to the weakening of the opposition through (1.) The MDC’s deployment of 
critical human assets and attention to government rather than the party (LeBas, 
2014; Chan & Gallagher, 2017), (2.) the MDC’s failure to meet the patronage 
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demands of their supporters, some of whom expected access to resources in return 
for past suffering (Alexander and Chitofiri, 2011:685), and (3.) the GNU’s  
undermining of the MDC’s claim to be different from ZANU-PF and to offer 
more responsible governors (Chan & Gallagher, 2017: 57). These implications, 
together with the widely covered scandalisation of Morgan Tsvangirai’s sex life 
and allegations of MDC corruption and profligacy in government are of critical 
importance in understanding why the opposition fared poorly in the 2013 
presidential election (BBC News, 29 July, 2013; Bulawayo 24, 1 December, 
2011; Mail and Guardian, 2 December, 2011; Sunday Times, 2 February , 2014). 
  
I argue that ZANU-PF took advantage of these circumstances and used them to 
inform the 2013 chasing campaign strategy. The MDC's deployment of crucial 
officials to government and its failure to distribute patronage created an 
opportunity for ZANU-PF to gain support, and to loosen the MDC's perceived 
stranglehold on the cities and other OACs.  Heightened patronage expectations 
from MDC members stemmed from its presence in government and hurt those 
appointed to positions in government the most. These were senior opposition 
leaders who were naturally vulnerable to both dissatisfaction among their 
members and attacks from ZANU-PF because they were engaged in government 
business. As the Mail and Guardian reported, it appears that ZANU-PF 
specifically, targeted seats held by senior officials of the MDC-T, 
calculating that this would destabilise Tsvangirai's party elsewhere. The 
party targeted and won Harare North, previously held by Theresa Makone, 
a close ally and family friend of Tsvangirai, and Mt Pleasant, previously 
held by Jameson Timba, Tsvangirai's chief of international relations. 
ZANU-PF also won in Mbare, the city's biggest township, and in Epworth 
(Mail and Guardian, 8 August, 2013). 
 
There were also suggestions that ZANU-PF had deliberately targeted Harare 
East, where MDC-T Secretary-General Tendai Biti was the Member of the House 
of Assembly. ZANU-PF failed to prevail, losing Harare East to the MDC by about 
500 votes in 2013, effectively turning this once consolidating-opposition 
constituency into a battleground constituency. In these targeted constituencies, 
ZANU-PF utilised programmatic and ideological appeals, and added to this 
partisan distribution of resources. The latter included setting up housing 
cooperatives, bringing in thousands of home seekers, drilling boreholes, and 
making makeshift toilets. ZANU-PF did all this while ignoring the legal 
restrictions and health hazards posed by these new settlements in Harare's leafy 
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suburbs (Mail and Guardian, 8 August, 2013). According to officials, ZANU-PF 
devised its “new” strategy as early as 2010 when it began registering its 
supporters in targeted opposition constituencies and making plans to ensure that 
those registered would turn out on election day (Mail and Guardian, 8 August, 
2013; Tendi, 2013).  
 
However, on election day in 2013, I witnessed people being bussed to Mount 
Pleasant constituency where the MDC-T Minister for State in The Prime 
Minister’s Office lost. This was also captured in a sensational video where the 
MDC-T Secretary-General alleged that the people being bussed were not 
residents of the constituency (News24, 1 August, 2013). ZANU-PF's chasing of 
opposition bigwigs’ constituencies was limited to neither Harare nor government 
ministers. It also claimed the scalp of the then-MDC-T Chairperson Lovemore 
Moyo who was the Speaker of Parliament during the Government of National 
Unity  (Muponda, 2013) and MDC-T Spokesperson, Douglas Mwonzora, the Co-
Chairperson of the parliamentary select committee on constitutional reform 
(COPAC).  
 
Bulawayo was not spared, as affirmed by two leading opposition members who 
were also Ministers in the Government of National Unity, David Coltart and Min-
MG1412. David Coltart, the then Minister of Education, Sports and Culture who 
represented Bulawayo East, was a leading member of the smaller MDC faction. 
He argued that ZANU-PF had targeted him, Tendai Biti (Harare East) and 
Jameson Timba (Mount Pleasant) for special attention (Coltart, 2013). Min-
MG1420 explained that in 2013 ZANU-PF appeared determined to chase voters 
beyond its traditional electoral hunting grounds,  
ZANU-PF was determined to do well in Bulawayo and other Matebeleland 
provinces. They invested serious resources stolen from parastatals and 
deployed bigwigs like Obert Mpofu. In Makokoba they deployed Colonel 
Tshinga Dube, a diamond magnate, who ran Zimbabwe Defence Industries 
and was Chairperson of the board of Mbada diamonds, to campaign for 
them (Min-MG1412-Interview, 2017).18 
 
 
18 Mbada Diamonds is a mining company believed to be a front for senior military officials, while Highlanders Football Club 
is a major team that is invariably called the second largest in the country and is the most popular team in Bulawayo and 
Matebeleland provinces. Obert Mpofu is a former government Minister for Home Affairs and Mines who is suspected of being 
amongst the richest in the country and is alleged to own a significant amount of the real estate in Zimbabwe's tourist resort 
town of Victoria Falls. 
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While instances where opposition officials lost House of Assembly seats were 
quite dramatic and grabbed media attention, the story of the presidential election 
in these elections is less often told, yet it was the primary concern for ZANU-PF. 
This is because, as highlighted in chapters 5 and 7, in Zimbabwe, the president is 
elected by simple majority (50% plus1 votes) of the vote in a single national 
constituency. Besides this institutional arrangement, for ZANU-PF, it was also 
because of the 2008 Bhora Musango phenomena wherein some MPs had fared 
better than Robert Mugabe in some constituencies. Former Liberation War 
Veteran’s leader SJ1212 confirmed this in an interview, saying that the 2013 
strategy was to focus on ensuring that Mugabe won the presidency with the 
constituencies as secondary, because the presidency is where the executive power 
in Zimbabwe is located, not the parliament (SJ1212-Interview, 2017). The logic 
expressed in SJ1212’s sentiments partially explains how and why ZANU-PF 
pursued voters outside of its traditional political hunting grounds, and chased 
Harare, for instance, which was generally perceived to be an opposition 
stronghold. SJ1212 noted that their data showed that Harare was the biggest 
province in the country in terms of voter population, followed by Masvingo, and 
that the numbers dictated that  ZANU-PF target them, in addition to eliminating 
and destabilising the opposition’s frontbench in Parliament (SJ1212-Interview, 
2017). SJ1212 explained the political maths and logic through the example of 
Masvingo, where he spent a few months canvassing for ZANU-PF ahead of the 
2013 election.  
By 2013 Masvingo had about 500,000 voters, Bulawayo, Mat North and 
or Mat South …all three of them had less than 300,000 voters or a 
maximum of 380,000 voters. So, we went for Masvingo, if we win those 
500,000 voters and lose Bulawayo and the Matebeleland provinces, still 
my candidate goes to the statehouse. …These were the calculations; 
Masvingo would take care of Bulawayo and other cities, which were 
hostile to ZANU-PF (SJ1212-Interview, 2017). 
 
However, while the voter populations were smaller in Matebeleland, other organs 
in ZANU-PF did target them. There were, predictably, mixed results at the 
parliamentary level, but huge successes in terms of the presidential race. As the 
state-owned newspaper, The Herald noted, although 
 
…the revolutionary party [ZANU-PF] did not win a single seat in 
Bulawayo; it made significant strides as it recorded increased figures from 
the 2008 harmonised elections. In most of the twelve constituencies, the 
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revolutionary party recorded a 100 per cent increase from the 2008 figures 
(Herald, 8 August, 2013). 
 
7.4.2 Pivoting: From Mugabe’s Star Rallies to the preponderance of bigwig rallies 
By the time of the 2013 election, Mugabe, at 89 years of age, was in bad physical 
shape. He routinely went to Singapore for medical check-ups. The media reported 
that Mugabe, who had addressed dozens of rallies in 2008, was only scheduled to 
address 10 in 2013. Also, provincial Chairpersons were asked to send their 
briefings in advance,  and reduce their introductions at rallies to 10 minutes, to 
minimise the time that Mugabe was on the trail and at rallies (Mail and Guardian, 
19 July, 2013). Although political analysts and the opposition ventured that the 
changes were health induced (Daily News, 11 July, 2013),  ZANU-PF provided 
political cover, arguing that they wanted to ensure that Mugabe only addressed 
massive crowds at the provincial level (Tendi, 2013: 966). As one ZANU-PF 
campaign manager explained,  
Colossal gatherings strike fear in the competition and showcase our ability 
to mobilise a whole province to a single venue. We will win this [election], 
but we know there are people who will want to question our victory. After 
seeing big crowds like this, no one, not even the [election] observers, can 
dispute that Mugabe is indeed the winner (ZANU-PF Campaign Manager 
quoted in Tendi, 2013: 966). 
 
ZANU-PF's reduction in the number of Mugabe's Star Rallies is an empirical fact, 
which was strategically justified to stem the murmurs around his health. The 
assertion that the party wanted to concentrate on maximising numbers at rallies 
where Mugabe appeared incorrectly suggests that this may not have been the case 
in the past. In 2008, Mugabe’s many appearances had large turnouts, even when 
he carried multiple events in the same Province, including in opposition-aligned 
constituencies. This was the case, for instance, on 22 March 2008, when Mugabe 
staged three massively attended Star Rallies in Chitungiwa at Chibuku Stadium, 
and in Harare – at Mbare’s Shawasha grounds - and in Dzivarasekwa 
constituency (Sunday Mail Reporters, 2008). Nonetheless, the 2013 reduction in 
Mugabe's appearances did not leave a gaping hole. Instead, party Vice President 
Joyce Teurayi Ropa (JTR) Mujuru took up greater responsibility, campaigning 
outside her constituency and Province (as shown in chapter 6 and acknowledged 
by Tendi, 2013: 966). In addition to Mujuru, ZANU-PF also saddled its party 
Chairperson Simon Khaya (SK) Moyo with more campaign responsibilities in 
2013 than his predecessor John Nkomo had had in 2008. These two members of 
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the praesidium campaigned in various provinces, but especially amongst their co-
ethnics, Mujuru in the Mashonaland provinces, and Moyo in the Matebeleland 
provinces, as shown in Table 7-5 below.  
 
SK Moyo’s task, according to ZANU-PF Matebeleland South Secretary for 
Administration, Christopher Masuku, was to canvass for Mugabe and ZANU-PF 
to recover all of the seats it had lost to the MDC in 2008 and address 19 rallies in 
Bulilima district (Dube, 2013). Moyo was assisted by ZANU-PF politburo 
member, Dr Obert Mpofu, who, while SK Moyo zigzagged between 
Matebeleland North and South, assisted in  Matebeleland North (Chronicle, 16 
July, 2013). While we cannot directly attribute cause, it is a fact that ZANU-PF 
was successful in recovering all of the seats and increasing Mugabe’s vote share 
in Matebeleland South, but not in Matebeleland North. It did improve its showing 
by retaining its four seats and recovering three to have a plurality of seven out of 
13 House of Assembly seats in the Province and a larger vote share for Mugabe 
in the presidential election. 
 
Table 7-5: ZANU-PF Bigwig rallies in OACs  
CONSTITUENCY PROVINCE BIGWIG DATE  
 
Makokoba, Davis Hall Bulawayo SK Moyo 9 May  
Magwegwe, White City stadium Bulawayo RG Mugabe + 27 July  
Chitungwiza South, Chibuku Stadium Harare RG Mugabe + 16 July 
Highfield East, Zimbabwe Grounds Harare RG Mugabe + 5 July 
Harare Central, City Sports Center Harare RG Mugabe + 17 April  
Warren Park, National Sports Stadium Harare RG Mugabe + 28 July 
Mutare Urban, Aerodrome Manicaland RG Mugabe + 23 July 
Mbare, Number 5 Grounds Harare JT Mujuru 13 July 
Masvingo Urban, Mucheke Stadium Masvingo  RG Mugabe + 25 July 
Norton  Mash West RG Mugabe + 24 July 
Kadoma Central, Rimuka Stadium Mash West JT Mujuru 25 July 
Chegutu west Mash West JT Mujuru 25 July 
Chinhoyi, Chinhoyi University Mash West RG Mugabe 18 July 
Marondera Central, Rudhaka Stadium Mash East RG Mugabe 15 July 
Mkoba Midlands RG Mugabe 26 July 
Lupane East, Somhlobo Stadium Mat North RG Mugabe 19 July 
Chikomba Central Mash East G. Mugabe 16 July 
Mangwe, (Multiple venues) Mat South SK Moyo 17 July 
Insiza, Avoca Mat South SK Moyo 25 July 
Matobo, Kezi, Maphisa Mat South SK Moyo 26 July 
Bulilima, (Multiple venues) Mat South SK Moyo 14-24 July 
 
Source: Author’s data compiled from multiple newspaper reports  
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The descriptive statistical data for this study suggests that ZANU-PF’s campaign 
efforts in OACs correlate positively with ZANU-PF’s gains in 2013, as shown in 
Figure 7-6. There is a positive correlation between ZANU-PF’s increased bigwig 
activity in OACs and its increased margins and constituencies in the ZACs 
columns. While it may not be the only reason, ZANU-PF’s strategic campaign 
activity must be included in any explanation of ZANU-PF’s good electoral 
fortunes in 2013.  
 
Figure 7-5: Change in Number of Constituencies per type from 2008 to 
2013 based on election outcomes at Presidential level 
 
Source: Author’s Data  
 
The 2013 election saw the opposition’s vote share fall nationally from 56.70% 
(i.e. 1,419,318 out of a total of 2,501,202 votes cast) in 2008 to 37.25% 
(1,294,846 out of a total of 3,475,406 votes cast) in 2013. While ZANU-PF’s vote 
share jumped from about 43% (1,075,189) in 2008 to 60.50% (2,102,422 out of 
a total of 3,475,406 votes cast) in 2013, in OACs, the opposition’s vote share fell 
from about 77%  (577,047 out of a total of 746,247 votes cast) in 2008 to about 
54% (865,356 out of a total of 1,597,039 votes cast) in 2013. ZANU-PF’s 
fortunes in OACs improved from a 22% vote share (163,811 out of 746,247 votes 
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cast) to a vote share of about 44% (697,161 votes out of a total of 1,597,039).  
Voter turnout also increased from the 2008 level of 44.5% nationally, and about 
40% in OACs, to 59% nationally, and 55% in OACs. Of critical importance to 
this study is that the findings provide prima facie evidence that ZANU-PF 
targeted its bigwig visits at constituencies where "more independent" voters were 
likely to be found, which has serious implications for the study's hypotheses. It 
suggests that (1.) ZANU-PF targeted constituencies outside its zones of electoral 
comfort, and (2.) it sought the support of “more independent voters” and invested 
less effort in campaigning targeted at its captive supporters in ZACs. 
 
While the national level data clearly shows that ZANU-PF targeted its campaigns 
at more independent voters, part of determining whether or not it campaigned to 
win voters’ hearts and minds lies in how it campaigned. The next section looks 
at how ZANU-PF campaigned in OACs in 2013. I examine bigwig rallies and 
analyse how appeals made at these significant national events translated into 
electioneering on the ground in Lupane West, Pumula and Makokoba 
constituencies. 
 
7.5 ZANU-PF Bigwig Rallies In OACs In 2013  
As in 2008, Mugabe continued to leverage the legacy of Joshua Nkomo when 
campaigning in Matebeleland, claiming that Nkomo had told him on his deathbed 
to ensure unity through the continuity of the Unity Accord and to take care of the 
land question. For Mugabe, unity meant supporting ZANU-PF, and getting rid of 
the MDC, who he called “drunkards and ignoramuses” while addressing a Star 
rally at Somhlobo Stadium in Lupane West (Herald, 19 July 2013). This approach 
had its challenges, and in Bulawayo, Mugabe tried to mitigate these, including by 
spending over 30 minutes greeting and chatting with late liberation fighters’ 
widows. Part of the challenge was that these widows included some whose 
husbands had died at the hands of Mugabe’s regime post-1980 during 
Gukurahundi. One was Look-out Masuku, Zimbabwe’s first deputy Commander 
of the defence forces, who Mugabe tried for treason. He died in custody in 1986 
(Zimbabwe Independent, 9 August, 2013). 
 
As he did in ZACs, Mugabe and other ZANU-PF bigwigs placed the Government 
of National Unity and the MDC's role in it front and centre of the campaign pitch. 
Speaking in Lupane, Mugabe made his case against the opposition as follows: 
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We have moved together with the MDCs and people are now able to judge 
their performance and personality. You now know ukuthi ngabantu 
abanjani [what kind of people they are]. Things have been going down and 
down, especially in Bulawayo. People have suffered enough, and we want 
to give them a Government that will correct the wrongs done in the last 
five years (Herald, 19 July, 2013). 
 
Mugabe blamed the MDCs for the failure to resuscitate industries in Bulawayo, 
blaming the then Finance Minister Tendai Biti for holding on to resources that 
could have assisted that effort. He accused Finance Minister Tendai Biti of 
abusing US$500 million that Zimbabwe had received from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Mugabe alleged that the GNU had earmarked part of the 
money to resuscitate companies in Bulawayo, “but Biti said he would give only 
US$20 million, which was not enough. The rest of the $500 million, we do not 
know where it went” (Herald, 19 July, 2013). 
 
The above accusation was tailored to anger the people of Bulawayo and the 
Matebeleland provinces. It added to other allegations around the GNU’s failure 
to support farmers and civil servants. While ZANU-PF could not wrestle 
Bulawayo from the opposition, the message did not necessarily fall flat. It appears 
to have resonated with a significant proportion of the voting population in the 
more peripheral Matebeleland North and South provinces. As Figure 7-6 shows, 
Mugabe’s vote share in 2013 increased from the 2008 levels across all three 
Matebeleland provinces, including in all three constituencies of Lupane West, 
Pumula and Makokoba, which are the focus of this chapter. 
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Figure 7-6: ZANU-PF Vote share in Lupane, Makokoba, and Pumula 
constituencies + Bulawayo, Mat North and South Provinces in 2008 and 
2013 
 
Source: Author’s data based on official election results 
 
It is possible that the gains shown in Figure 7-6 could have been the result of 
ZANU-PF’s electoral manipulation, and other political dynamics during the 
GNU. It is also possible that in 2008, the opposition benefited from a protest vote, 
and the dire economic situation militated against a ZANU-PF victory. However, 
evidence of fraud was hard to come by in the stated constituencies, although the 
allegation of fraud was often repeated by several respondents together with the 
lack of opposition unity. ZANU-PF, nonetheless, spun the increase in its vote 
share and support as a condemnation of the Government of National Unity and 
the MDC, and a vote of confidence for Mugabe and his indigenisation and 
empowerment rhetoric (Bulawayo 24, 3 August, 2013). As DBN1412, a House 
of Assembly candidate for one of the MDCs in 2013, explained in an interview, 
on the campaign trail Mugabe proved adept at the politics of claiming credit for 
all that was good during the Government of National Unity years, and blaming 
Tsvangirai and Biti for all that was terrible (DBN1412-Interview, 2017)).  
Mugabe followed up his attacks on his GNU partners by pledging that alone, 
ZANU-PF would assist existing factories and open new ones in Bulawayo 
(Herald, 27 July, 2013). 
 
250 
 
While the kinds of appeals made at bigwig rallies in OACs bore some 
resemblance to those made at bigwig rallies in ZACs, there were differences in 
some of the content, and in how similar content was accentuated, according to 
where the rally took place. The data set developed for this study shows that in 
2013, rural and urban OACs constituted roughly the same number (48 and 49 
respectively) while there were 11 peri-urban areas. Perhaps because of this, it 
made sense for issues related to jobs, industrialisation, and social service delivery 
to enter Mugabe’s and other bigwigs’ speeches at rallies in OACs, more than they 
did in ZACs, which were predominantly rural. In my assessment, these issues 
were fairly substantive and programmatic. The reason I am pointing this out here 
is to show that there was more to ZANU-PF appeals than what the existing  
“headline” analysis often reveals. The headlines often centre on the vitriol against 
the opposition or the West, and demagogic rhetoric based on the liberation war 
history and ZANU-PF's role in that history. While these were part of ZANU-PF’s 
rally pitches, focusing on just them is an oversimplification.   
 
At bigwig rallies, Mugabe and his colleagues also continued to laud their ability 
to perform and deliver for the people based on their past performance on the land 
issue. They used this to persuade people that their commitments to indigenous 
ownership and control of multimillion-dollar industries, companies, and mines 
were legitimate, credible commitments on which they could deliver, as they had 
done in the past. ZANU-PF was changing the empowerment metanarrative from 
what it focused on in 2008, i.e. land, (which it had sold as “ the economy is the 
land and the land is the economy”), to broad-based economic empowerment and 
indigenisation. This further shifted the popular political discourse from past 
policies to huge historical choices between “jobs” and employment, as promised 
by the opposition, or becoming an employer or entrepreneur, as promised by 
ZANU-PF. These huge questions were tied to significant ongoing ideological 
battles in which ZANU-PF fronted a radical, Pan-Africanist anti-colonial, anti-
imperialist critique of 'the West' against the opposition's 'Universalist' embrace of 
certain aspects of neoliberalism and globalisation (Hammar, Raftopoulos, & 
Jensen, 2003). In this sense, ZANU-PF’s 2013 election campaign strategy 
represented a continuation of the radical discourse of the Third Chimurenga, 
which some scholars have labelled nativist  (Muzondidya, 2010; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2009). 
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As such, part of the change from 2008 to 2013 in ZANU-PF’s populist discourse 
around empowerment was a shift from the 'historicised and racialised monopoly 
claims around land restitution' (Hammer et al., 2003) to extending the scope of 
patronage in 2013 through its indigenisation and empowerment policies 
(Southall, 2013). Whereas ZANU-PF had targeted the land issue to appeal to 
predominantly rural Zimbabweans between 2000 and 2008, as a response to the 
“revolt” in the cities and an attempt to shore-up its base, the new thrust in 2013, 
which promised access to and control of companies, mining concessions, and 
other economic activities, appealed to city dwellers and the youth. 
 
7.6 ZANU-PF’s “Hands-on” Approach: Building Support 
through basic messaging and patronage networks 
 
While the anatomy of the bigwig rallies was reasonably consistent across 
constituency types, the bigwigs tailored their messages in an attempt to placate 
the issues and concerns of the constituents they were addressing. This is 
exemplified by Mugabe's attempts in Matebeleland to leverage Nkomo's legacy 
and the issues related to the deindustrialisation of Bulawayo. By contrast, ZANU 
PF’s campaigning at the local level in OACs became grounded in “knowing” the 
problems of the target audience and addressing them. PG1412, a civil society 
leader interviewed for this study, stated that, in 2013, ZANU-PF had benefitted 
from the GNU-based economic recovery, and had successfully sold urbanites and 
the youth in OACs a dream that resonated with messages of this economic success 
(PG1412-Interview, 2017). He believed that Mugabe’s charge that the MDC 
stood in the way of industrial resuscitation was believable in Bulawayo where the 
MDC had been in-charge of the local council since 2000 and there had been no 
substantial improvements.  PG also suggested that the MDC in 2008 had 
benefitted from a general groundswell of discontent, but when this context had 
changed in 2013, ZANU-PF was smart and began to offer people economic 
empowerment as a narrative, as opposed to the opposition’s “esoteric and distant 
message and promises” (PG1412-Interview, 2017). 
 
DF0212, the ZANU-PF Provincial Executive member for Bulawayo, whom I also 
interviewed,  emphasised this approach to messaging by ZANU-PF. DF0212 
argued that “even when we [ZANU-PF] did big stadium events like Mugabe used 
to do, he would say the most basic things – no GDP figures or scientific things”, 
252 
 
like the speeches that MDC-T Secretary general Tendai Biti was famous for 
making (DF0212, 2017). It appeared that ZANU-PF calculated that the majority 
of the masses were in poor urban areas and rural Zimbabwe and surmised that 
what they wanted and what “elite urbanites” wanted were different things. AS 
DF0212 put it, “As ZANU-PF, we know that the strength is with the so-called 
poor and marginalised rather than their so-called enlightened and developed 
urban counterparts” (DF0212, 2017). 
 
In Bulawayo, NE1612, another ZANU-PF provincial official, explained that the 
engagement strategy does not fundamentally differ from how ZANU-PF operates 
elsewhere. “It is all the same thing”, he said, “You go out there, you tell people 
what the party is, and you have a hands-on approach” (NE1612, 2017). Several 
interlocutors involved in ZANU-PF campaigns at constituency and district level 
across the three constituencies covered in this chapter, argued that ZANU-PF 
adopted a hands-on approach through a “delivery” based strategy married to 
simple and basic messaging. First, ZANU-PF desisted from speaking above 
people's heads about issues like the GDP, democracy, human rights and other 
complex sounding concepts, as the opposition did. It instead focused on issues 
proximate to their target constituents. NE1612 intimated that while  
these issues are important [the economy, democracy and human rights], 
but we all know that most people do not know how they link to their table. 
When we went out, we focused on basic issues. Everyone knows that if 
you are hungry, you need food, so fifty Kgs and seed to grow your own 
food and so on. That is what people wanted to see and hear (NE1612-
Interview, 2017). 
  
Second, the so called “hands-on approach” was characterised by ZANU-PF’s 
attempts to build elaborate patronage networks incumbent on clients’ willingness 
to jump onto the ZANU-PF bandwagon and pledge their electoral support. The 
other ZANU-PF provincial member for Bulawayo, DF0212, illustrated this 
process as follows: 
If it is an issue of vendors in the city, you go out there and you ask what 
the problem is. They tell you, and you share with them what the solutions 
can be. But you also ask them to form cells, hey, because we cannot help 
them if they are not in the party. If they do, you then take their issues up, 
because if you solve their immediate problems, then they can understand 
you better. If it is an issue, like in 2013, there was an issue of council bills. 
That was something that came from the grassroots, not from the top. People 
were complaining about bills and their inability to pay them at the 
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grassroots level, and the Minister acted, and it was a problem that everyone 
had (DF0212-Interview, 2017). 
 
DF0212’s  illustration around council bills was, in all likelihood, revisionist and 
an attempt to order historical events post-facto, but the solution did shock its 
opponents. Some scholars mention this particular initiative, cancelling local 
government rates arrears, as something that endeared ZANU-PF to some urban 
voters. This and other actions possibly constituted vote buying. Assistance in 
dealing with proximate issues in OACs, just like in ZACs, was contingent on 
being a member of ZANU-PF, with exceptions. The example that DF0212 
highlighted, the cancellation of council bills for urban dwellers, where everyone, 
whether they were ZANU-PF or not, benefited, is an example of that. It is clear 
that ZANU-PF’s hands-on practical assistance approach was based on it 
leveraging its access to the state and other resource, purveying institutions to 
sponsor patronage and build its support base in OACs in several ways.  
 
In poor areas, ZANU-PF distributed food and other largesse that the MDC 
heavyweights could not distribute. For instance, a former opposition Minister and 
MP shared in an interview that in Makokoba constituency,  
Tshinga Dube responded directly to Makokoba’s urban poverty through 
distributing food to constituents continuously for three months ahead of the 
31 July elections and used his position as Board chairperson of Highlanders 
football club to campaign for himself and Mugabe. He also distributed 
copious amounts of ZANU-PF party regalia (Min-MG1412-Interview, 
2017)). 
 
Dube also staged concerts, contributed to the purchase of a bus for the local 
football team, and engaged in philanthropic acts, especially with the elderly in 
Makokoba, even after losing the elections in 2008 and 2013. Dube’s was a long 
game, which saw ZANU-PF’s vote share increase from 13% of the vote in 2008 
to 26% o the vote in 2013 . He eventually won a by-election in 2015 which the 
MDC had boycotted. Despite Min-MG1412’s observation reported above, Dube 
claimed that his support for Makokoba constituency was non-partisan 
philanthropic giving (Bulawayo 24, 18 June, 2018). Nonetheless, like other 
“respected” ZANU-PF politicians in Matebeleland, for example Dabengwa 
(before his 2008 resignation), both in 2008 and 2013, Dube did not get much 
electoral support for himself and Mugabe. According to a Bulawayo residents’ 
leader, FR3011, this was not because Dube was “bad” as an individual, but 
254 
 
because he was part of ZANU-PF, and therefore guilty by association of past 
historical wrongs or abating perpetrators of tribal cleansing  (FR3011-Interview, 
2017).  
 
In 2013, as in previous elections, vote-buying as part of building its patronage 
network for electoral support was something that ZANU-PF utilised in Pumula, 
Makokoba and Lupane West. First, ZANU-PF made a concerted effort to attract 
the youth vote. It hogged the administration and access to the Ukondla/Kurera 
[taking care or raising (as in raising children)] 10-Million-dollar Youth Fund. 
Insurance giant Old Mutual had set up the fund in 2011 as part of its 
indigenisation agreement with the Government of Zimbabwe  (Old Mutual, 
2012). Despite being part of the GNU, the MDCs neither claimed credit nor 
staked a claim in the administration of the fund. The Ministry of Youth 
Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment took government responsibility. 
In Bulawayo and other places, they allowed selective access to the fund based on 
party membership. In Bulawayo, the MDCs attacked the fund as a gimmick and 
accused ZANU-PF of using it for vote-buying. ZANU-PF MP for Pumula offered 
a tongue in cheek response:  
At least we buy votes using money, unlike other parties who use vulgar 
language in attacking us as their campaign strategy to win votes. Giving 
money to the youths is something that is there. If young people want us to 
give them money for their projects, we give them, and then you say we are 
wrong (News Day, 1 February, 2013). 
 
In addition to this youth fund, which was not ZANU-PF's to begin with, ZANU-
PF also made use of a controversial church organisation led by Reverend Dr. 
Obadiah Msindo, called the Destiny for Africa Network. This organisation 
promised young people housing stands (small plots of land for residential 
purposes) in exchange for supporting ZANU-PF. In Bulawayo, Msindo pledged 
5000 housing stands, and empowerment projects to woo at least 50,000 votes for 
Robert Mugabe in Bulawayo and 2 million votes nationally (News Day, 7 March, 
2013). This may have worked as ZANU-PF’s vote share in Bulawayo increased 
from 14% of the vote in 2008 to 23% of the vote in 2013. 
 
For non-urban constituents, ZANU-PF also deployed and took advantage of 
another GNU initiative, Community Share Ownership Trust Schemes (CSOTS). 
At least 50 such CSOTS had been set up with average funding of 10 million 
American dollars each. Mugabe inaugurated most of them ahead of the 2013 
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elections and made it difficult for the then Prime Minister Tsvangirai to officiate 
at their launches. Leadership on the CSOTS was calculated to show that ZANU-
PF could deliver on local economic empowerment, and that this was a ZANU-PF 
baby in the GNU (Herald, 29 June, 2012). Yet the CSOTS were a government 
initiative to spearhead the development and empowerment of rural communities 
by giving them a 10 per cent stake in all businesses that exploited natural 
resources in their areas (Herald, 29 June, 2012). In rural OACs and ZACs alike, 
this initiative was well-received and seen as beneficial. As Chief Masuku of 
Mathetsheni in Matebeleland South stated, “The majority of people here say they 
are benefiting from the programme and have embarked on several projects such 
as the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, construction of clinics and 
refurbishment of schools” (VOA, 1 March, 2013). 
 
7.6.1 Chasing The Youth Vote: Becoming “cool” and “fashionable”   
ZANU-PF's bigwig visits and campaigning in general in 2008 focused on 
traditional ZANU-PF supporters, rural folk and older generations that had 
witnessed the liberation struggle. In 2013, by contrast, ZANU-PF aggressively 
competed for the urban and youth votes  (Hodzi, 2013; Southall, 2013). As Hodzi 
notes, the results of the assault are difficult to ascertain. However, ZANU-PF did 
attempt to master “cool politics” through the use of cool iconography, celebrity, 
socialites and fashion. As DF0212 explained, 
In 2013 the party became fashionable. From 2011 to 2013 the party had the 
youths coming in the forefront. If you notice, the posters we had in 2008 
and 2013 were different. The branding was different. The songs were 
different, and the party was attractive. We all agreed that the world was 
changing, and we needed to rebrand and attract the youth vote beyond our 
traditional support. Before 2013 the party rebranded, we had the youth fund 
and so many other activities that attracted the youth and attracted even 
youths from the suburbs, who were the trend and pacesetters. Through that, 
all youths wanted to be part of us. We had beautiful campaign material. I 
remember in 2013 everyone wanted to have that regalia in their car, even 
here in Bulawayo. It was now fashionable, and people forgot about the 
economy (DF0212-Interview, 2017). 
 
DF0212’s assertions speak to how, in 2013,  ZANU-PF rebranded by turning the 
soccer allegory Bhora Musango, which was credited in part with ZANU-PF’s 
struggles in 2008, on its head. The party adopted “Bhora Mughedhi” (Ball into 
the net/goal) as an official slogan for 2013. They assertions also referred to the 
dubious emergence of Robert Mugabe as a fashion icon through clothing apparel 
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under the "House of Gushungo" clothing line, which trademarked Mugabe's 
signature.19 The designers of this relatively fashionable apparel saw it as some 
form of rebellion, and a push back against the opposition’s dominance in the city 
where “everyone” was supposed to be against Mugabe, yet “many” urban young 
professionals supported him (Zimbabwe Independent, 15 March, 2013). 
 
ZANU-PF's assault on the youth vote in 2013 went beyond regalia to include 
branding vehicles (fancy SUVs, 4x4 trucks, haulage trucks, mini-buses and 
sedans),  and hip- hop themed jingles. These vehicles were used to conduct 
roadshows in cities like Bulawayo, where a large haulage truck with Mugabe's 
image and other branded vehicles led processions from constituency to 
constituency over a two-week period in July ahead of the elections (Chronicle, 
27 July, 2013). ZANU-PF, amongst many of their jingles, produced a video jingle 
that was a spoof cell phone network jingle, about “getting connected on Mugabe's 
network”, in which Mugabe featured answering a call from a young lady by 
saying, “what’s up?”.  As Reuters reported:  
However desperate it may look - Mugabe is an 89-year-old social 
conservative who prefers choral arias to hip-hop - the video is a sign of the 
importance given to the generation of Zimbabweans born after the 
liberation struggle (Reuters 13 March, 2013). 
 
This attempt to appeal to the youth vote was driven by young Zimbabwean 
professionals and entrepreneurs who had been swayed by Mugabe’s rhetoric, as 
well as young people who had benefited in some way from ZANU-PF’s 
patronage, or had been socialised into ZANU-PF’s ideology. As Justin Matenda, 
the Chief Executive officer for the company that made the Mugabe apparel, 
attested: 
We all came from families that went through the liberation struggle. Our 
upbringing has been mentored by the concept and principles of 
empowerment and upholding the ideals of black Zimbabweans (Zimbabwe 
Independent, 15 March, 2013). 
 
In addition, the appeal for the youth vote was  also led by a large crop of ZANU-
PF officials' children who had been radicalised through victimisation on account 
of the targeted sanctions and measures from the West, where their parents had 
been targeted, and they were caught up, as collateral damage. For instance, 
Australia cancelled study VISAs and deported children of a dozen or so ZANU-
 
19 Gushungo is Robert Mugabe's totem. It is part of the Shumba (lion) cluster of totems.  
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PF ministers and officials as part of the stronger implementation of the targeted 
sanctions and measures against leading members of ZANU-PF. These deported 
ZANU-PF children would not have taken it lightly that they were bundled onto 
the same flights home as Morgan Tsvangirai, whom their parents blamed for 
calling for the sanctions that had led to their deportation (Zimbabwean, 24 
October, 2007; VOA, 3 September, 2007). In addition, the United States of 
America was reported to have compiled a list of 400 children and close relatives 
of ZANU-PF leaders for deportation, with the UK and other European countries 
following suit ready for more embarrassing deportations (Zimbabwean, 24 
October, 2007). By 2013, a significant number of these “ZANU-PF children” had 
settled back home, and became media (radio and television)  personalities, music 
stars, beauty queens, felebrities (online celebrities, especially Facebook), revered 
socialites, entrepreneurs, and social media influencers. In the spirit of ZANU-
PF’s “all hands to the plough” approach, which I touch on below, these highly 
influential young people assisted in making ZANU-PF appear cool, and helped 
the party reach the youth demographic.   
 
7.6.2 ZANU-PF the “Church” and collegial politics in OACs in 2013 
By most accounts, campaigning in OACs was a peaceful and politically collegial 
affair amongst the contesting parties. In OACs,  the name-calling was treated as 
banter, especially amongst the contesting House of Assembly candidates, who 
served as the principal agents of presidential candidates at a local level. MP-
MA1212 referred to his ZANU-PF opposite number, MP-MG1512, as a friend, 
who he still cordially engaged on national and local political issues (M.P-
MA1212-Interview, 2017). MP-MG1512 affirmed this and stated that the 
cordiality of their relationship with MP-MA1212 allowed for competitive but 
friendly electioneering, which was always smooth and non-violent in both 2008 
and 2013, when they contested, and acted as campaign leads for their presidential 
principals in Pumula constituency (MP-MG1512-Interview, 2017). MP-MG1512 
also added that electoral competition was nonviolent because of ethnic 
homogeneity in the province and a largely shared ZAPU background. He argued 
that people socialised in ZAPU ideology were also socialised in human rights 
respect, respect of other people's views and democratic contestation (MP-
MG1512-Interview, 2017).  
 
The competitive politics in Lupane, Pumula and Makokoba constituencies took 
diverse forms. Yet in all of them, NGOs and community radio stations provided 
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platforms for the different political parties to debate each other and engage 
potential voters through fairly impartial platforms. MP-MG1512 stated that he 
would use these kinds of platforms to explain the liberation war heritage and the 
importance of the land question  (MP-MG1512-INterview, 2017), while MP-
MA1212 stated that the opposition had to do very little from a messaging 
perspective because  
tribalism and the Gukurahundi trump card easily garnered us enough votes.  
Reminding the people that the purveyors of Gukurahundi are segregating 
you and stating the need to replace them with Tsvangirai was enough (M.P-
MA1212-Interview, 2017). 
 
Beyond the platforms organised by NGOs, in Bulawayo and Lupane, ZANU-PF 
also created its own platforms around its members, and made effective use of its 
party structures to mobilise. MP-MG1512 shared that in Pumula, during the 2013 
elections, ZANU-PF had 17 campaign coordination points, one for each of the 16 
ZANU-PF districts in the constituency, plus the constituency coordinating 
campaign team. These teams were responsible for pushing Mugabe’s candidature 
and other ZANU-PF candidates concurrently at the constituency, district and 
ward levels through rallies and meetings that candidates addressed, as well as 
door-to-door canvassing (MP-MG1512-Interview, 2017). This campaign 
structure in Pumula did not supplant but supplemented the regular ZANU-PF 
party structures in the constituency such as the party cells. MPMG added that at 
election time the whole party machinery moves, “no one sits on their laurels, 
everyone who is a member of the party is busy” (MP-MG1512-Interview, 2017). 
DF0212 confirmed this “all hands to the plough” approach, explaining that while 
the commissariat takes the lead during elections, “everyone in ZANU-PF is a 
commissar”. He explained the commissariat system as follows: 
It is like a Church system. The pastor is not the only one solely charged 
with converting people or souls to the fold. It is everybody's responsibility, 
but there will be that one person who will preach who is the “Commissar”, 
but everyone can convert souls. It lies on all of us, for the party to win, it 
is our collective effort and responsibility. Then obviously there are 
strategic partners, I’d say, like these days there are churches, you have 
many institutions in addition to formal affiliates like War Vets who are part 
of the commissariat and the National Youth Service who are affiliated to 
the Youth League. (DF0212, 2017) 
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7.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter covered ZANU-PF's campaigns through bigwig visits in opposition-
aligned constituencies. It showed that the campaign strategy changed over time. 
In 2008 ZANU-PF ventured little into these types of constituencies, choosing to 
employ a mobilising strategy that focused on its core-voters and constituencies 
(ZACs). In 2013, it made a significant strategic shift to a chasing strategy where 
it focused its campaigns (through bigwig visits) on OACs. Its intent was to 
recover ground lost in the 2008 election where it had lost the first round of the 
presidential election to Morgan Tsvangirai of the opposition MDC. Support for 
Mugabe had plummeted from 56.2% in 2002 to 43.2% in 2008. This dip in 
popularity was even more apparent at the parliamentary level. ZANU-PF moved 
from a position of having a two-thirds majority in parliament to just under fifty 
percent of the seats.  
 
The chapter argued that, contrary to the argument in the literature that ZANU-PF 
does not change its modus operandi, the findings highlighted in the chapter show 
that ZANU-PF is a learning institution. It adapted its strategy across time and 
space. In doing this, ZANU-PF dealt with the practical challenge of not having 
enough support on the ground, the possible shortcomings of any manipulation, as 
well as the normative challenge around its legitimacy. ZANU-PF’s legitimacy 
had been eroded by its resort to violent and coercive politics after the March 2008 
election, with severe domestic and international ramifications, including having 
to share power with the opposition and sustained international scrutiny over its 
politics. 
 
The chapter attempted to show the causal pathway that led to the change in 
strategy from mobilising to chasing, eventually contributing to the dramatic 
change in political fortunes that was the 2013 election result. It highlighted how 
ZANU-PF started changing its strategy early in 2008, and how it used the 
Government of National Unity period as an opportunity to attack the opposition's 
frontbench and their constituencies in general through sustained smear campaigns 
in the media, while building its membership and voter base.  
 
The chapter highlighted how, at the subnational level, ZANU-PF used what it 
termed a "hands-on approach" to engage and recruit members to its party in return 
for favours and dealing with practical local problems. It also showed how ZANU-
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PF bigwigs and their proxies at the constituency level used inducements like 
housing stands, food, party regalia, and empowerment grants and loans to recruit 
members and potential voters. These strategies were a mixture. On the one hand, 
they were persuasive and centred on growing party loyalty through delivering 
solutions and incentives. On the other hand, they were also illicit. ZANU-PF's 
"performance" in dealing with grievances and incentivizing support was 
condemnable as vote-buying, patronage politics, and petty clientelism. 
Nonetheless, the chapter also showed that the relative deprivation of perceived 
opposition supporters, selective access to services and goods, and the offering of 
support contingent on ZANU-PF membership were used as recruitment and 
mobilisation tactics.  
 
The chapter’s empirical terrain of Bulawayo and Lupane constituencies also 
showed that while ethnicity was not significant as an organizing and mobilizing 
principle in Zimbabwe's politics in general, at the subnational level, this assertion 
was subject to a lot of qualification. The salience of ethnicity is dependent on 
place and history. In areas that have long been seen as opposition bastions of 
largely Ndebele ethnicity, ethnicity was more salient as a talking point, a matter 
for discussion, a political organisation and mobilisation tool, and an influencer of 
political preferences. In Lupane, it was evident that ethnicity matters at the local 
level when it came to who led and who organized. But for the presidential race, 
it was subservient to a more practical political calculus around who could take on 
ZANU-PF successfully.  
 
The chapter shed light on the politics of coercion and violence in both the 2008 
and 2013 elections. While spoken of in broad analysis by Zimbabwean 
interviewees and prominent literature, coercion and violence were not preeminent 
characteristics of the ground campaign at the subnational level in OACs in 
general, or in Lupane and Bulawayo in particular. For Lupane and Bulawayo, 
some of the reasons behind the absence of politically motivated violence during 
the two elections were historical, but as former ZIPRA combatants and Former 
ZAPU members interviewed for this study also highlighted, they were also 
strategic and ideological.  
 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that, in these kinds of 
constituencies, ZANU-PF engages in its presidential election campaigns in a 
well-organised fashion and, like in ZACs, utilises its organisational structures for 
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legitimacy seeking purposes. Violence and electoral manipulation are difficult to 
find in OACs. When there, violence yielded limited results on aggregate election 
outcomes. During election campaigns, members of the opposition and ZANU-PF 
interviewed for this study agreed that the competition was nonviolent and even 
democratic. While the opposition was dominant in these constituencies, this was 
only the case when the opposition’s votes were collated together. Regardless, in 
these types of constituencies, perhaps because it was the weaker party, ZANU-
PF campaigned using persuasive-clientelist means. It appeared content to win and 
lose within the accepted procedural framework. The kinds of claims to legitimacy 
made in these kinds of constituencies revolved around a muted version of 
identity-based claims and an accented clientelist and programmatic frame.  
 
The next chapter looks at ZANU-PF campaigns in battleground constituencies. 
Like opposition constituencies, battleground constituencies are not ZANU-PF 
bulwark constituencies, but they were not as lost a cause regarding victory and 
capture as the ones covered in this chapter. Nonetheless, despite being difficult 
campaign terrain with limited chances of prevailing, ZANU-PF in 2013 still 
campaigned in OACs, but as the next chapter shows, in battleground 
constituencies where their chances were supposed to be better, oddly, they hardly 
campaigned there using bigwig rallies. The next chapter will explain why. 
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8 CAPTURING NO MEN’S LAND: ZANU-PF 
CAMPAIGNS IN BATTLEGROUND 
CONSTITUENCIES 
 
This chapter describes and analyses ZANU-PF’s campaigns in battleground 
constituencies in 2008 and 2013.It will show the forms of political engagement 
that took place in these types of constituencies through an outline of subnational 
election campaign activity for presidential elections in Goromonzi North and 
Tsholotsho North constituencies. “Battleground”, as a characterization of 
constituencies, is seldom used in African politics and Zimbabwean election 
literature. The preference is often for the term swing constituencies, but even this 
is scarce in the literature. One of the few studies that attempt to address swing 
constituencies in Zimbabwe defines a swing “as a constituency where the 
difference in vote tallies between the MDC-T and ZANU PF in the above-
mentioned elections was 10% or less.” (Freedom House, 2011:4) This definition 
is in line with generally accepted definitions of swing constituencies, equated to 
Battleground constituencies in other jurisdictions. For instance, in the United 
Kingdom (UK), “battleground” is used to denote “marginal” constituencies in 
which the gap between the first and second-placed candidates is less than 10%, 
thus matching the Freedom House definition in terms of magnitude (Barnes, 
2017). In the United States of America (USA), “battleground” states are the same 
as “swing” states, in line with the Freedom House (2011) definition. However, in 
the USA, the terminology is used to denote states that have regularly seen close 
contests between parties in previous elections and could reasonably be won by 
any one of the leading contenders. Additionally, these states are considered key 
to the overall outcome of the election.  
 
While there is no formally accepted definition of Battleground constituencies, I 
find the Freedom House (2011) definition inadequate to characterize battleground 
and/or swing constituencies in Zimbabwe. In this chapter I attempt to go beyond 
cutting and pasting the standard battleground and swing definitions onto the 
Zimbabwean political terrain. I do this to incorporate the context and the 
volatility, as well as the magnitudes of election victories that have turned some 
constituencies into swings over time. While all of the 36 constituencies identified 
by Freedom House (2011) qualify as battlegrounds for this study, I believe that 
pegging the threshold at 10% does not reliably capture the full universe of 
constituencies whose outcomes in elections can be “too close to call” in the 
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Zimbabwean context. I, therefore, move away from both the UK understanding, 
as defined by Barnes (2017), and the Freedom House conception. I define 
battleground constituencies as constituencies in which the winner’s margin of 
victory is less than 15.01%, a margin I consider too narrow for any candidate or 
political party to claim the constituency before an election. Battleground 
constituencies generally possess the common characteristic of not being 
discernibly dominated by one party or candidate regarding electoral outcomes. 
Different political parties and interests can battle it out electorally in battleground 
constituencies, knowing that they stand a 50-50 chance of winning, and that a 
significant portion of constituents will give them the time of day and listen to 
their appeals. Table 8-1 illustrates this point using the constituencies in the 
districts of Tsholotsho and Goromonzi, that have been battleground 
constituencies over time. They include the two constituencies in which I 
conducted in-depth fieldwork to explore the subnational politics of presidential 
election campaigns in battlegrounds, Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho North
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Table 8-1: illustrative volatility of selected  Battleground Constituencies 
Constituenc
y 
Winner 
2002 
Constituency 
Type-2002 
Winner 
2008 
Constituency 
Type 2008 
Winner 
2013 
Constituency 
Type 2013 
Winner 
2018 
Constituency 
Type 2018 
 
Tsholotsho 
South 
 Oppositi
on Battleground 
Oppositi
on 
Marginal 
Opposition 
ZANU-
PF Battleground 
ZANU-
PF Battleground 
Tsholotsho 
North 
Oppositi
on Battleground 
Oppositi
on 
Marginal 
Opposition 
Oppositi
on 
Consolidating 
Opposition 
ZANU-
PF Battleground 
Goromonzi 
West 
 ZANU-
PF 
Consolidating 
ZANU-PF 
Oppositi
on Battleground 
ZANU-
PF Battleground 
Oppositi
on 
Consolidating 
Opposition 
Goromonzi 
North 
ZANU-
PF 
Consolidating 
ZANU-PF 
Oppositi
on 
Consolidating 
Opposition 
ZANU-
PF Battleground 
Oppositi
on 
Consolidating 
Opposition 
         
Gwanda 
South 
ZANU-
PF Battleground 
ZANU-
PF Battleground 
ZANU-
PF Battleground 
ZANU-
PF Battleground 
Source: Author’s data, also Extracted from Annexure 1: List of Battleground Constituencies 2002 to 2013.  
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Table 8-1 shows that Tsholotsho South, while being a battleground ahead of the 
2008 election and again in 2013 and 2018, turned into a marginal opposition 
constituency after the 2008 election. In this constituency, both ZANU-PF and the 
opposition have carried it twice each over four elections. Tsholotsho North 
progressed from being a battleground in 2002 to a marginal in 2008 and a 
consolidating opposition constituency in 2013. At this point, it should have been 
more difficult for it to swing from opposition to ZANU-PF, but in 2018 it did, 
reverting to battleground status but with ZANU-PF carrying it. The two 
Goromonzi constituencies in Table 8-1 have swung from being consolidating 
ZANU-PF constituencies in 2002 to being battlegrounds and consolidating 
ZANU-PF in 2008 and 2013, and eventually consolidating opposition in 2018. 
 
Battleground constituencies are very prone to swings from incumbent to 
opposition and vice versa, as well as between constituency types. To keep the 
analytical field simple, in this thesis I do not differentiate between battleground 
and swing constituencies, although, as shown above, while battleground 
constituencies have a high likelihood of swinging over time, they may only be 
close contests with no swings. It is perceptible that one party or candidate may, 
in such a constituency, perennially occupy the place of “nearly man”, always 
coming close and fighting hard, but never winning to turn the constituency into a 
swing, as exemplified by Gwanda South constituency in Table 8-1. ZANU-PF 
has carried it with small winning margins, 14% in 2008, about 12% in 2013, and 
4% in 2018. 
 
Fridy (2012:108) defines swing voters as voters not beholden to a particular 
political party, who sometimes self-identify as independents who are willing to 
listen to multiple appeals, although they can also be party members who, under 
certain circumstances, are willing to vote across party lines. To get to a swing 
constituency, we can aggregate individual constituents and say such a 
constituency is one where voters, despite party affiliations, have a tendency to 
hear out cross party appeals and under certain circumstances vote across party 
lines. These constituencies also carry most of the hallmarks of a battleground, 
with one important distinction, i.e. alternation of wining candidates and or vote 
leaders in previous elections between the opposition parties and incumbent party.  
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This rest chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.1 provides an overview of 
battleground constituencies from 2002 to 2018, i.e. one election before and after 
this study’s elections of interest, 2008 and 2013. Section 8.2 outlines and analyses 
ZANU-PF bigwig visits to battleground constituencies in 2008 and 2013 as well 
as the kinds of appeals that Mugabe and other members of the ZANU-PF 
praesidium made during these visits. In contrast to the preceding two chapters, 
chapter 8 will, in section 8.3, describe ZANU-PF’s efforts to engage with the 
economic and social crisis that was part of the 2008 election context, and explain 
why there was this difference in approach. Section 8.4 will also cover 
developments and extant analysis on the 2008 run-off election and describe and 
analyse ZANU-PF’s ground game in battleground constituencies. It will argue 
that despite the general approach of analysing ZANU-PF as a monolith, some of 
the ways in which it conducted its presidential election campaigns in the 
battlegrounds show an interesting amount of variation in strategies and tactics, 
not just across constituency types and time, but also within constituency types as 
shown in battleground constituencies. It will attempt to bring out these different 
strategies and tactics within battleground constituencies in four respects: party 
organizational structures and the game of numbers; patronage politics; traditional 
leaders and their mediating role; and lastly coercion (physical violence and 
intimidation).  
 
8.1 Battleground Constituencies Over Time (2002 To 2018) 
 
This thesis considers battleground constituencies as a useful analytical category 
that provides the possibility of illuminating variations regarding the campaign 
tactics and strategies of political parties in Zimbabwe. This is even more the case 
because, as Table 8-2 and Table 8-3 show, battleground constituencies have, 
across time, occupied a significant proportion of the types of constituencies at 
each election, and between the 2002 and 2018 elections 109 of the 210 
constituencies were battleground constituencies at one election or another. In the 
rebased constituency types from the 2002 electoral outcome, they constituted no 
less than 17% of the 210 constituencies. This figure increased in the most 
competitive election in Zimbabwe’s history, the March 2008 presidential 
election, where the number of battleground constituencies rose from 35 to 57 
constituencies out of 210, or 27% (nearly a third) of all constituencies. At 27%, 
battleground constituencies were the largest single constituency type when ZACs 
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and OACs are disaggregated into strongholds, consolidating and marginal 
constituencies. In 2013, these figures dropped in absolute number terms from 57 
in 2008 to 43 in 2013 before increasing again to 52  out of 210 in 2018. 
 
Table 8-2: Battleground Constituencies Dashboard (2002-2018) 
 
Number Of Battleground Constituencies Per Election 
Year 
 2002 2008 2013 2018 
Absolute Number out of 210 35/210  57/210 43/210 52/210 
Proportion/Percentage 17% 27% 20% 25% 
Source: Author’s data from official presidential election returns (2002 to 2018) 
 
Table 8-3:Constituency types composition (in absolute numbers out of 
210)2002-2018, with Battleground Constituencies highlighted. 
 
Opposition Aligned 
Constituencies 
Battlegr
ound 
ZANU-PF Leaning 
Constituencies 
 Year 
Strongh
olds 
Margi
nal  
Consolid
ating   
Strongh
olds 
Margi
nal  
Consolid
ating 
2002 29 19 21 35 39 33 34 
2008  46 30 29 57 9 20 19 
2013 11 16 20 43 46 30 44 
2018 19 18 35 52 34 37 15 
 
Figure 8-1 shows the proportions of battleground constituencies across time. It 
shows that the proportions fluctuated, but never by more than 10 percentage 
points, which suggests some stability, especially after 2008, where the category 
contributed an average of 24% across three elections. However, although the 
category seems to have been stable in absolute number terms and proportions, its 
composition regarding actual constituencies was very volatile. For instance, only 
four constituencies, Seke, Buhera West, Chimanimani West, and Gwanda South 
retained battleground status across all presidential elections from 2002 to 2018. 
This means that at one point or another the remaining 105 constituencies swung 
from battleground status to either ZACs or OACs. Of these, the majority, 55 
constituencies, occupied battleground status for only one election, while 38 
constituencies occupied this space twice in the four elections and 12 
constituencies occupied battleground status at all but one of the elections. It is 
also this dynamic change in status for most constituencies marked as 
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battlegrounds ahead of the 2008 election that makes this category a worthy 
subject to study, understand and explain. 
 
Figure 8-1: Share of Battleground Constituencies across time (2002-2018) 
 
Source: Author’s data, calculated from official presidential election results (2002-
2018) 
 
Figure 8-2 shows that when the constituencies are disaggregated, they do not fall 
into two neat groups of incumbent and opposition territories as there is a 
significant 20-27% of constituencies that do not fit that mould. Although not as 
volatile, as can be seen from Figure 8-2, the trend in battleground constituency 
composition has followed that of opposition aligned constituencies, increasing 
and dipping with them across time. 
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Figure 8-2: Constituency Type Composition across time (2002-2018) 
 
Source: Author’s data 
 
The data compiled for this study shows that 72% of all 18 peri-urban 
constituencies in Zimbabwe occupied battleground status at some point between 
2002 and 2018. It also shows that 61% of all 143 rural constituencies were also 
battleground constituencies, while only 21% of urban areas were, at some point 
between 2002 and 2018, battleground constituencies. Close to half, 48.60%, of 
all of the constituencies that were battleground constituencies benefitted from the 
post-2000 fast track land reform process.  This data suggests that rural 
constituencies are much more contested than anecdotal evidence on ZANU-PF’s 
control of the bucolic suggests. It also suggests that the opposition has a firmer 
hold of the urban areas and has been able to stop a significant proportion from 
slipping into battleground status.  
 
8.2 Bigwigs In Battleground Constituencies In 2008 And 2013 
Despite the significant space that battleground constituencies occupy as a 
constituency type, ZANU-PF paid scant attention to them in the 2008 and 2013 
elections. In the run up to the March 2008 election, ZANU-PF bigwigs visited 
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battleground constituencies four times, with an additional two visits ahead of the 
June 2008 presidential election run off. In 2013, ZANU-PF only visited 
battleground constituencies four times. As Table 8-4 shows, these visits 
constituted just 14% and 6% of all visits catalogued for this study in 2008 and 
2013 respectively.  
Table 8-4: Number of ZANU-PF Bigwig visits to battleground 
Constituencies in 2008 and 2013 
 
 
 
Election Year 
Number of Bigwig visits 
to Battleground 
Constituencies 
Proportion of bigwig 
visits to Battleground 
constituencies 
(percentage) 
2008 6 14% 
2013 3 6% 
Source: Author’s data from press archives 
 
Table 8-5 lists the bigwig visits to battleground constituencies in 2008 and 2013. 
It shows that consistent with the finding in the other two constituency types, in 
2008, Mugabe did most of the campaign’s heavy lifting, and was the main 
attraction at five of the six bigwig visits, while in 2013, all of the visits noted 
were presided over by Joyce Mujuru. Half of the constituencies that ZANU-PF 
targeted with bigwig visits in 2008 (Marondera central, Masvingo urban, and 
Insiza) were revisited in 2013, but do not show up on the table for 2013 because 
their constituency type had changed to opposition aligned constituencies. 
Goromonzi, which Mujuru visited in 2013, had, in 2008, benefitted from the 
unusual luxury of two Mugabe visits on 3rd March. Except for Insiza, which as 
stated in Chapter 7 received a tremendous amount of campaign attention from the 
ZANU-PF Chairman, Simon Khaya Moyo in 2013, and Goromonzi, the visits to 
Marondera and Masvingo were probably because these two constituencies are 
also provincial capitals for Masvingo and Mashonaland East provinces 
respectively. 
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Table 8-5: Locations, dates of ZANU-PF Bigwig visits to Battleground 
constituencies in 2008 and 2013 
Constituency Province Bigwig Date of Visit 
March-June 2008 
Insiza South 
Avoca Business Center 
Matebeleland 
North 
V.P. Mujuru 5 March 
(Herald 6 
March)   
Bubi Matebeleland 
North 
R.G. Mugabe 11 March 
(Chronicle 13 
March) 
Marondera Central 
Rudhaka Stadium 
Mashonaland 
East 
R.G. Mugabe 20 March 
(Herald 21 
March) 
Masvingo Urban 
Mucheke Stadium 
Masvingo R.G. Mugabe 25 March 
(Herald 26 
March) 
Chegutu East 
Pfupajena Stadium 
Mashonaland 
West 
R.G. Mugabe 14 June 
(Herald 15 
June)  
Tsholotsho South 
Tsholotsho Business Center 
Matebeleland 
North 
R.G. Mugabe 19 June 
(Chronicle 20 
June) 
2013 
Goromonzi west 
(Mungate GP, Domboshava) 
Mashonaland 
East  
V.P. Mujuru 22 July 2013 
(Herald 24 July) 
Mhondoro-Ngezi 
Mamina Business Center 
Mashonaland 
West 
V.P. Mujuru 23 July 2013 
(Herald 26 July) 
Mhondoro-Mubaira 
Nyamweda Business Center 
Mashonaland 
West 
V.P. Mujuru 23 July 2013 
(Herald 26 July) 
Source: Author’s data from press archives 
 
The overall pattern of bigwig visits to battleground constituencies suggests 
neglect. This neglect was present in both political practice and popular as well as 
academic analysis. This was despite the fact that, post-March 2008, there were 
more battleground constituencies (27% of the 210 constituencies) than ZANU-
PF aligned constituencies (23% of the 210 constituencies), and after the July 2013 
elections, the proportion of battleground constituencies was roughly the same as 
that of opposition aligned constituencies (20% and 22% respectively). The 
pattern of visits is a bit counterintuitive, as one would think that because of their 
prevalence, and the possibility of being swung, battleground constituencies 
should have had more currency in polities where the first past the post electoral 
system exists. One way of understanding the little attention that ZANU-PF paid 
to battleground constituencies for the March 2008 election is on account of the 
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mobilizing strategy that ZANU-PF adopted, whereby it targeted its core 
constituents and members, as argued in Chapters 5 and 6. However, ZANU-PF’s 
continued neglect of battleground constituencies in the 2013 election begs the 
question, why, if, as I have argued in Chapter 5, it was pursuing a chasing 
strategy?  
 
I argue that political agents in the Zimbabwean context adopt a dyadic perspective 
when viewing campaign targets and constituencies. They hardly use the term 
battleground, and do not see it as viable organizing principle for their campaigns, 
preferring the binary mapping of the national constituencies into incumbent and 
opposition territories, or in Zimbabwe’s case, ZANU-PF and Opposition (mostly 
MDC) territories. A viable explanation for this is the deep polarization between 
the major political actors that LeBas (2006) highlighted when she argued that 
electoral competition in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s required elites to build 
parties able to mobilize their constituencies and maintain cohesion through 
polarizing tactics that established sharp boundaries between opponents (LeBas, 
2006:435). This polarization and the resultant dyadic logic extend to campaign 
strategy, with the net result being the absence of  grey zones in the political 
imagination of campaign strategists, who prefer either black (ruling party) or 
white (opposition) categorizations. The dyadic approach in practice also extends 
to analysis and is part of the reason why there is a scarcity of battleground and 
swing constituency analysis in African politics in general, and in the Zimbabwean 
politics scholarship in particular.  
 
The limited interest in battleground constituencies in both practice and theory in 
Zimbabwean politics can also be understood in terms of the winner takes all types 
of politics that result from the perils of Zimbabwe’s presidentialism. While 
parliament exists and winning constituencies matter in Zimbabwe, part of the 
reason why battleground constituency analysis and campaign practice is limited 
is precisely because, ultimately, in the presidential contest, it matters less whether 
candidates win these battleground constituencies where support for incumbents 
and opposition is almost an even split. It matters more for parties and presidential 
candidates to strategize around a vote maximizing logic that forces them to invest 
their efforts more where they are strong and either have a chance of getting more 
votes or reducing those of their opponent. This argument explains both why 
limited attention was paid to battleground constituencies in both the 2008 and 
2013 elections, and also why ZANU-PF elected to mobilize its base in ZACs in 
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2008, and why it resorted to chasing opposition constituencies in 2013. As Linz 
(1990:56) argues, institutional arrangements directly and indirectly shape entire 
political processes. This influence is inclusive of both ways of ruling as well as 
ways of campaigning to attain the right to rule.  Zimbabwe’s institutional setup 
entails a bicameral parliament, but one which does not have executive authority 
and power. This parliament is pitted against an Executive Presidency in whom 
executive power and authority reside. The president, as stated in Chapter 4, is 
directly elected by a national constituency in a zero-sum electoral contest. This is 
part of the “ineluctably problematic” nature of presidentialism and its "winner-
take-all” rule that leads to democratic politics and elections being a zero-sum 
game (Linz, 1990:56).  
 
8.2.1 Mugabe’s Handling Of The 2008 Socio-Economic Crisis And The Politics Of 
Giveaways 
Despite the limited allocation of bigwig visits to battleground constituencies, 
when they took place, there were some features of the rallies that were different 
from ZANU-PF’s approach to other types of constituencies. The broad messages 
and themes remained the same in both 2008 and 2013 across constituency types, 
with Mugabe insisting that people should vote for him and ZANU-PF because 
they were “the custodians of the legacy of the people” (Herald, 21 March, 2008). 
Shaming the West was a consistent theme, and speaking in Bubi constituency, at 
the border with Tsholotsho North and South constituencies,  Mugabe pleaded for 
votes on the strength of his and ZANU-PF’s passion for the interests of the 
people. He urged the people of Bubi and the surrounding areas to unite behind 
the party of liberation and show Britain and America, who wanted Zimbabwe’s 
resources, that Zimbabwe would never be a colony gain. For Mugabe, unity of 
the country meant unity behind his candidature and ZANU-PF. 
This is the time to demonstrate our unity. This is the time to show that we 
were united by the war of independence, that we are united in defence of 
our country. Let us not sell out those who died for this country. Let us not 
sell out our heroes (Chronicle, 12 March 2008). 
 
However, in 2008, Zimbabwe was reeling under a serious socio-economic crisis. 
It had a grain deficit on account of a drought, leaving the country in need of 
emergency grain imports to meet maize meal and wheat requirements (Financial 
Gazette, 6-12 March, 2008). Shortages were also evident in the electricity and 
fuel supply, basic commodities, and clean water. The year on year inflation rate 
set and broke records, reaching 66,212.30% in December 2007 and just over 
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100,000% at the beginning of 2008. The economy had entered firm hyperinflation 
territory, and by the third quarter of 2008 the hyperinflation rate reached the 
ridiculous rate of 79.6 billion percent,  with prices doubling every hour (Hanke 
& Kwok, 2009). The Zimbabwe dollar lost virtually all of its value, 99%, in 2008 
alone, despite the ZANU-PF government’s attempts to stem the tide by cutting 
off zeros and introducing a 10-million-dollar bill in January 2008 (Financial 
Gazette, 21-27 February, 2008; Hanke & Kwok, 2009).  
 
Over the course of ten years (between 1998 and 2008), the Zimbabwean economy 
had shrunk by more than 50%, and 18% in 2008 alone, eroding “billion dollar” 
incomes and pensions, especially for civil servants (Bond & Sharife, 2012). The 
economic crisis was so deep that those who could migrate did, leaving the health 
sector operating with only 20% of the doctors needed, while half of the skilled 
personnel in the mining sector also left for South Africa, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and other destinations (Chikanda, 2006; Keller, Stewart, & Eppel, 
2008). On the campaign trail, Mugabe stated that he saw this brain drain not as a 
result of the socio-economic and political challenges, but as being due to the “the 
massive investments made in the education sector”, which had led to 
Zimbabweans being attracted by Australia, the United Kingdom and South 
Africa, which offered better packages to trained professionals (Herald, 6 
March(A), 2008) Of those who were left, an estimated 80% of the population 
were living below the poverty datum line, and over 80% were working on their 
own account in the informal sector (BBC, 20 February, 2008; Kanyenze, 2009).  
 
The above-mentioned issues spawned serious disquiet in the country, leading to 
several civil service strikes. These included the worst teachers’ strike since 
independence, which started in the school term in January 2008 and continued 
until the 2008 election. The teachers demanded a salary increase to Zim$ 1.7 
billion dollars per month, and access to benefits from the AIDS levy; although 
they contributed to this levy monthly, many of them had no access to 
antiretroviral drugs (Zimbabwe Independent, 7-13 March, 2008:2). Medical 
doctors and nurses had also been on strike from December 2007 to March 2008 
over poor earnings (estimated at less than the equivalent of US$170 per month) 
and their tenuous working conditions, whereby they were without basic 
anaesthetics, sutures, and drugs (Meldrum, 2008). As Meldrum (2008) noted, 
“Mugabe used to be able to campaign on the excellent health care his government 
offered” but in 2008 as Zimbabweans voted, many had “to go to the polls by 
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stepping over pools of raw sewage” and Mugabe, in the main, could “…only 
pledge to distribute more antiretroviral drugs, which weary Zimbabweans 
dismiss[ed] as empty promises” (Meldrum, 2008:1059). 
 
The 2008 crisis was too pervasive for Mugabe to ignore. In  ZANU-PF’s core 
constituencies Mugabe could get away with blaming the “illegal sanctions” 
imposed by the West at the urging of an “unpatriotic” and “sell-out” opposition, 
for the economic downturn. But the newspaper record suggests that in OACs and 
battleground constituencies Mugabe could not end at the rhetorical anti-
imperialist excuse. He went further and spoke of what he and the ZANU-PF 
government were doing about the situation. This approach at a national level was 
similar to a hands-on approach and ZANU-PF’s attempts at stemming the dissent 
and building support through patronage networks, covered in Chapter 7. 
Mugabe’s pre-March 2008 rallies in battleground constituencies indicated a focus 
on the manifestations of the socio-economic crisis. This meant limited reliance 
on the historical and ideological appeals that he often used in ZACs, and the 
programmatic ones that took centre stage in OACs.  
 
For instance, at the beginning of his official campaign Star Rally schedule in 
Chipinge on the 4th of March 2008, Mugabe dwelt on the issue of food shortages 
and assured voters that the government was looking into resolving the problem 
through importing 500,000 tons of  maize from Malawi, Zambia and South Africa 
to alleviate the effects of the crop failure due to drought (Herald, 5 March, 2008). 
The issue did not go away on the strength of Mugabe’s assurances, and would 
continue to be a talking point at his rallies in the battleground constituencies of 
Marondera on March 20, and Masvingo on March 25, 2008. Mugabe had to repeat 
his commitment to dealing with hunger, doubling down on his import solution, 
and arguing that the food had arrived in the country, but relief efforts were being 
hampered by bad roads (Herald, 21 March, 2008 and Herald, 26 March, 2008). 
In Masvingo Mugabe added that his government had released funds to the District 
Development Fund (DDF) to create and maintain feeder roads to improve 
distribution, and ensure equitable distribution of the food aid (Herald, 26 March, 
2008; Chronicle, 12 March , 2008). 
 
The food aid was a temporary stop-gap solution. Mugabe presented the effective 
use of the land as the long term solution to Zimbabwe’s food woes and promised 
to transform people’s lives through this form of empowerment.  He pledged his 
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government’s continued support with equipment and related implements like 
hoes and tractors, and argued that these were the “weapons that we use to 
empower you so that your lives may be transformed” (Herald, 5 March, 2008). 
In Bubi, Mugabe emphasised his party’s understanding of the differentiated 
agricultural needs of different areas and pledged to support matebeleland beyond 
cropping with animal breeding through a donation of 500 cattle to each of the 
Matebeleland provinces, and just over 300 each to other provinces (Chronicle, 12 
March, 2008). In a similar spirit, Mujuru made similar commitments at the rallies 
she addressed, and in Insiza she donated two billion Zimbabwean dollars to the 
establishment of pigsties and the renovation of a dam in ward 12, as well as 
Jatropha seed (the plant extracts could be used to produce biodiesiel and lamp 
oil), enough to cover 50 hectares of land (Herald, 6 March(B), 2008). In addition, 
as was the case in other provinces, Mugabe distributed computers to schools in 
Masvingo province and buses as part of the “National Transport Enhancement 
Program”. He also promised gasoline powered electricity generators to provide 
for the electricity needs of towns in light of the incessant power cuts.  
 
For the civil servants, Mugabe announced at his rally in Bubi that he had signed 
off on a new salary schedule for teachers and other civil servants. Mugabe, a 
former teacher himself, praised the profession, proclaiming it to be the “first of 
all professions” because everyone, regardless of their eventual profession, passes 
through the hands of a teacher (Herald, 6 March(A), 2008). He sympathised with 
the plight of teachers and declared that they must not be allowed to become 
destitute and that his government would act on their griveances. In Murewa, 
Mugabe promised to deal with businesses to stop them raising prices in ways that 
eroded civil srrvants’ incomes. Mugabe urged teachers to engage the government 
with their grievances instead of striking and stated that his government “wants 
teachers to be well remunerated. Their issues are legitimate, but I only heard the 
day before yesterday that teachers have gone on strike, and was surprised since I 
am teacher number 1. No one wanted to whisper in my ear before striking” 
(Herald, 6 March(A), 2008). A week later, the teachers’ strike was still ongoing 
and Mugabe was still pleading. 
Teachers, please please, we do not want strikes. These kids are yours. Why 
go on strike when you have a good case? I have told them [the teachers] 
that I am teacher number one. It is undignified (Chronicle, 12 March , 
2008).  
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In regard to the health sector, Mugabe admitted the dire state of affairs and 
presented what he thought would be a popular solution. 
In our hospitals, there was now a disaster because we didn’t have 
medicines, equipment and other supplies. Our doctors and nurses were 
complaining that their salaries were too low. This Thursday, I am going to 
meet the doctors at Harare Central Hospital to discus these issues. But at 
the same time, we will also be giving Senior and Junior doctors 400 
vehicles. They will also be told about housing and accomodation, and 
where we have built houses for them in various places, although in some 
places the houses are yet to be built. We will also be distributing 
ambulances to several hospitals (Herald, 26 March, 2008).   
  
The scheme for medical doctors that Mugabe announced was on top of a US$1 
million donation that he had made to buy high-tech scanning equipment for 
distribution to all hospitals (Herald, 26 March, 2008). However, like many other 
things during the 2008 election, this scheme for doctors was financed by the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to the tune of US$ 4 million. Although Mugabe 
argued at rallies that this intervention was not election related, the Minister of 
Health and Child Welfare, Dr David Parirenyatwa, admitted that the move was 
also meant to prevent junior doctors from “downing tools ahead of the March 29 
harmonised elections”, which he saw as a a plot to decampaign government 
(Herald, 11 March, 2008). Parirenyatwa argued that the “ purchasing of vehicles 
bears evidence that we have taken their grievances as genuine and we are working 
towards addressing conditions of service for all health personnel” (Herald, 11 
March, 2008). 
 
Mugabe’s approach to some of the issues that constituted the socio-economic 
crisis in 2008 was a showcase at the national level of the hands-on approach 
mentioned in Chapter 7, and shows how Mugabe instrumentalised dissent and 
attempted to fashion solutions as part of ZANU-PF’s attempts to win votes, or at 
least not lose them. Outside blaming the West and sanctions, the evidence 
suggests that at some of the rallies Mugabe took some responsibility for the 
challenges engulfing Zimbabwe at that time, blaming poor monitoring and 
supervision in some ministries. He argued that some ministers were only visible 
during election time, and once appointed to the Cabinet, they left all of the work 
to their permanent secretaries (Herald, 26 March, 2008). He pledged closer 
monitoring in the future and stated that he would “whip” ministers into working, 
and was thus asking the electorate to give him the whip (Herald, 26 March, 2008). 
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8.2.2 Opposition Vilification And Attacks In The 2008 Presidential Election 
Mugabe appeared aware that in battleground constituencies the opposition could 
inflict a lot of harm on his bid for re-election. This was especially so because, on 
the one hand, Makoni was running as a technocrat, scholar (with a Ph.D. in 
Medicinal Chemistry), former Executive Secretary for the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) and former liberal Finance Minister, who 
Mugabe had allegedly side-lined because he refused to engage in populist 
financial management. Tsvangirai, on the other hand, claimed to have answers to 
the economic challenges the country was facing. Although the MDC had split in 
2005, Tsvangirai had experience of running against Mugabe from 2002, and, 
unlike Makoni, he was backed by an experienced and formidable movement that 
after close to ten years of existence was no longer fumbling in the dark as far as 
challenging ZANU-PF was concerned.  
 
Given the above, it was no surprise that in battleground constituencies, Mugabe 
reiterated his disdain for Makoni, and contempt for Tsvangirai. At the beginning 
of his 2008 campaign, at Checheche growth point in the battleground 
constituency of Chipinge central, Mugabe accused Makoni of being “a ploy by 
the British to divide Zimbabweans” (Herald, 5 March, 2008). Mugabe’s 
argument, made at several rallies including in the battleground constituency of 
Marondera nine days ahead of the elections, was that the British, Australians and 
Americans were funding the opposition’s regime change agenda (Herald, 21 
March, 2008). His evidence was a fundraising lunch that the Citi Group had held 
for Simba Makoni in London, which ZANU-PF had discovered through a leaked 
email as well as the arrest of a British pilot who had flown in opposition material 
from South Africa and was supposed to ferry Morgan Tsvangirai to rallies. 
ZANU-PF publicized these developments as proof of foreign funding and 
“promises” by opposition leaders to give back land to the whites. These 
fabrications were made at rallies and distributed on pamphlets, which were also 
published as attack advertisements in various editions of the state-controlled 
media (see Figures 8-3 and 8- 4 for examples). 
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Figure 8-3: ZANU-PF Makoni attack pamphlet 1 
 
 
Figure 8-4: ZANU-PF Makoni Attack Pamphlet 2 
 
 
Mugabe expressed his disappointment that while he was launching his campaign 
in Manicaland province because it had lost the highest number of people during 
the liberation struggle, the province was also home to the most prominent 
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opposition leaders and sell-outs. These included Simba Makoni and Morgan 
Tsvangirai, as well as former ZANU-PF Secretary General turned opposition 
leader in the 1990s, Edgar Tekere (Herald, 5 March, 2008). ZANU-PF rubbished 
both Makoni’s and Tsvangirai’s credentials at bigwig rallies and replayed the 
attack scripts in the daily press that circulated in urban and peri-urban areas where 
some of the battleground constituencies were located (See Figure 8-5).  In Insiza 
South constituency, Mugabe’s Vice President, Joyce Mujuru, followed a similar 
lament, calling Simba Makoni and Dumiso Dabengwa’s defections from ZANU-
PF distractions. Mujuru argued that the defections were a ‘black hole’ that 
ZANU-PF members needed to cover, and encouraged them, instead, to focus on 
the election at hand (Herald, 6 March(B), 2008).  
 
The attacks on the integrity of the two main opposition candidates were 
juxtaposed against Mugabe’s record and sacrifice, which ZANU-PF argued, 
needed to be rewarded. The pamphlets in Figure 8.6 show how ZANU-PF 
captured these messages, emphasizing the benefits of land reform, Mugabe’s 
education, and his 11 years in prison.20  
 
 
 
20 Between 1944 and 1974 Mugabe attained an assortment of seven Undergraduate and master’s Degrees in English and 
History, Education, Administration, Economics, and Law from the University of Fort Hare, the University of South Africa, 
and the University of London. 
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Figure 8-5: ZANU-PF Tsvangirai attack pamphlets and advertisements 
 
282 
 
Figure 8-6: Mugabe Campaign pamphlet on the “self-sacrificing” hero 
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8.2.3 Bigwig rallies and appeals during the 2008 run-off election in BCs 
 
In Chapter 6, I outlined how the results of the March 2008 election were not 
constitutionally conclusive as no presidential candidate met the victory threshold 
of 50% plus 1 vote, but with Tsvangirai leading and Mugabe in second position, 
the result led to a presidential run-off election in June 2008. In constituencies that 
were coded as battleground constituencies for this study, the number of registered 
voters was just over a million (1,007,053) but less than half of these (463,041) 
turned out to vote (just about 46%). It took five weeks for the Zimbabwean 
Electoral Commission to release the presidential election results. According to 
ZECs official numbers, the vote share distribution in battleground constituencies 
between the three main candidates almost mirrored the national presidential 
election results. Tsvangirai mastered about 47% of the vote, Mugabe got about 
41%, while Makoni’s vote share was above his national average at 11%. The 
combined opposition vote share was close to 59%, which shows how, had the 
opposition not been split, it could have comfortably won the presidential election 
without the need for a run-off election.  
 
At this point, the March 2008 election was the least violent of all post-2000 
elections and had succeeded in “redeemed[ing] a popular faith in the electoral 
process that had waned”  between 2000 and 2008 elections, which were 
characterized by opposition defeats (Alexander & Tendi, 2008:5). But this was 
one end of a spectrum, with the June presidential election run-off marking the 
other end, undermining the power of the vote and exposing the deeply 
problematic nature of the militarized means and liberation struggle logic that had 
hitherto sustained ZANU-PF’s power (Alexander & Tendi, 2008).  
 
The period between the March 2008 election and the June presidential election 
run-off revealed ZANU-PF’s militarized authoritarian underbelly. Mugabe’s 
challenger, Morgan Tsvangirai, speaking at a rally in Bulawayo on 3 June 2008 
before being detained on his way from a another rally in Lupane, claimed that 
Mugabe was “…determined to turn the whole country into a war zone” to 
“subvert the will of the people and steal the June 27th election by any means 
possible” (Reuters, 4 June, 2008). Tsvangirai was not wrong and would be 
detained at least four more times during the run-up to the June run-off election. 
As Masunungure (2009) pointed out, the 2008 run-off election demonstrated the 
“brazenly intrusive and expansive role of the military/security complex”, leading 
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to an omnipresent fear enveloping the whole country (Masunungure, 2009:79). 
This military incursion into civilian politics was not a new thing. As many writers 
have established, even before assuming power in 1980, ZANU-PF as a movement 
was militarized, in the sense of having the ‘military’ involved politically in 
civilian institutions as well as processes. If the Gukurahundi massacres of the 
early 1980s provided the clearest  manifestation of this involvement, as the 
military went out to quash opposition against Mugabe in Matebeleland and the 
Midlands regions of the country, 2008 presented the second major manifestation. 
These events served to portray how indirect militarization had long been a factor 
in Zimbabwe’s politics, starting in the mid-1970s when ZANU’s military wing, 
ZANLA, installed Mugabe as the civilian face and leader of the movement after 
his 11-year stint in jail.  
 
Nevertheless, in 2008, after multiple disruptions to his efforts to campaign, more 
than 100 supporters being killed, more than 200 being abducted, hundreds being 
jailed on spurious charges, thousands being beaten, and tens of thousands being 
forced from their homes, the sheer intensity and systematic nature of the violence 
and intimidation forced Tsvangirai to pull out of the run-off election (The 
Guardian, 22 June, 2008; Masunungure, 2009). Having fled to Botswana in April 
2008 after receiving intelligence regarding threats to his life, he had to flee again, 
taking sanctuary at the Dutch Embassy in Harare soon after withdrawing from 
the race, fearing for his life (Government of the Netherlands, 2008).  
 
It is irrefutable that the 2008 presidential election run-off was a farce, which, 
instead of being a democratic contest and conclusion to the inconclusive 
presidential election,  ZANU-PF turned into a battle between the ballot and the 
bullet. Speaking at Tsholotsho Business Center on 19th June 2008, Mugabe made 
this abundantly clear. He repeated the message he had shared earlier in Nkayi, 
Beitbridge and Gwanda South, that the run-off was an opportunity to stop sell-
outs from mortgaging the country to colonizers. For Mugabe, June 27 was an 
opportunity for patriotic Zimbabweans to reject recolonization through rejecting 
Tsvangirai. Specifically, in regard to the validity of the vote, Mugabe stated that 
war veterans had approached him and stated their intention to safeguard the land, 
sovereignty and independence from foreign threats. He told his audience: 
The war veterans came to me and said, President we can never accept that 
our country, which we won through the barrel of the gun, be taken merely 
by an X made by a ball point pen. Zvino ballpoint pen ichirwiswa neAK? 
[now, can a ballpoint pen fight against an AK (47 rifle)?] Is there going to 
285 
 
be a struggle between the two? But if the X is following the path of the 
gun, then that is fine. We can meet and win squarely. (Chronicle, 20 June, 
2008). 
 
It was clear that Mugabe was only interested in a contest on his terms, and as he 
and ZANU-PF had already demonstrated, any result that was not a ZANU-PF 
victory would not be acceptable and would be resisted by members of the former 
liberation movement. Mugabe made this abundantly clear at Pfupajena stadium 
in Chegutu, where he surmised that in March 2008 the electorate had engaged in 
economic voting (both pocketbook and sociotropic), which he thought was 
misplaced when compared to the fundamental legacy issues that he thought the 
votes betrayed. He told his audience:  
You should consider carefully. Did you consider carefully (in the last 
election) or you were moved by prices? This is voting against yourselves. 
We have come a long way with ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF fought for you, for 
our rights, land and for a bright future. This legacy should not simply be 
vanquished by the stroke of a pen at the ballot simply because ‘I am not 
getting any basic goods. This is not the way to do it. (Sunday Mail, 15-21 
June, 2008) 
 
Mugabe insisted that the British and Americans were using Tsvangirai and the 
MDC to reverse the gains of independence. He argued that he was prepared to 
pass on the leadership baton but only to people known to be committed to 
Zimbabwe’s ideals, who would continue to safeguard the legacy if “sell-outs” 
continued to abide in the country. In Mugabe’s mind Zimbabwe’s ideals were 
ZANU-PF ideals. He proclaimed that: 
We are the custodians of Zimbabwe’s legacy. We will only pass this on to 
those we know are fully aware of the party’s ideology; those who value the 
country’s legacy. We will pass on leadership to them, telling them to go 
forward. But as long as the British still want to come back here, I will not 
grow old, until we know we no longer have sell-outs amongst us (Sunday 
Mail, 15-21 June, 2008). 
 
The statement above was a clear indication of the direction that ZANU-PF was 
taking which presidential spokesperson George Charamba had outlined on 3 May 
2008 in his column in the Herald under the pseudonym of Nathaniel Manheru. 
Charamba argued that the British and the Americans had interfered with and 
rigged the March 2008 election through influencing the SADC mediation process 
that was a precursor to the election (Manheru, 2008). The SADC mediation 
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process had begun after several opposition leaders were beaten and tortured on 
11 March 2007 when they attempted to stage a prayer rally in Highfields 
constituency.  
 
The ZANU-PF campaign rallies in the run-up to the run-off were not exercises in 
persuasion like the ones prior to March 2008 had been. They served as platforms 
where Mugabe made statements of intention and declarations that ZANU-PF 
would not go easily, and especially not through or because of an electoral defeat. 
They also served as exercises in mass intimidation. They were verbalization of 
physical violence against, and the intimidation of key opposition organizers, 
leaders and civic activists, which had become endemic in the country at this point. 
The premise was grounded on the two ideological issues that had been central to 
the March 2008 election campaign, anti-imperialism and economic emancipation 
through the land. Mugabe, at the post-March 2008 rallies in the run up to the run-
off presidential election, paid lip service to being prepared to concede defeat, 
through declaring that he would do so to but not to parties that were being used 
by the British and the Americans. This, as the above quotation from Chegutu 
showed, meant a power transfer in ZANU-PF. The second element was related to 
the first, with Mugabe declaring that he needed to safeguard the legacy of the 
country through staying until the land reform process was completed. This was 
not a plea, but a statement, and to him, the root of his dispute with the British and 
the Americans and by extension their proxies in the opposition. Mugabe 
eloquently, albeit aggressively, tied the two issues together in Tsholotsho as 
follows: 
I walk on this land; I farm on this land. I sleep on it. My house is built on 
it. Our children play on it. Our schools are built on it, that is truly our 
number one legacy. Ndiyo nhaka yedu. Haitengeswi [it is our inheritance. 
We cannot sell it] (Chronicle, 20 June, 2008) 
 
In the “election” that would follow Morgan Tsvangirai’s withdrawal, the 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission announced Mugabe as the winner with 90.2% 
of the vote, with the remaining 9.8% going to the non-competing Tsvangirai 
(Herald, 30 June, 2008:5). This ZANU-PF “triumph” was indeed a triumph for 
militarized authoritarianism. I, however, concur with Alexander & Tendi (2008) 
that the way in which the 2008 elections panned out was not “simply the triumph 
of crude authoritarianism rooted in coercion, over a revived democratic idealism” 
(Alexander & Tendi, 2008). As I have shown in previous chapters, the ZANU-
PF election story was indeed too complex, and its house was too divided to fit 
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this simple analysis. The 2008 election, more than any other election in 
Zimbabwe, provided glimpses of the underlying architecture and settlement in 
ZANU-PF, as I will expand on below.  
 
While the bulk of the evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates the unitary 
and command nature of ZANU-PF as an establishment, the party was also a 
political settlement of groups that, during ZANU’s formative years, were 
disparate and geographically separated, and shared varied experiences (Chung, 
2006). Although Chung (2006) demonstrates how, post 1976, Mugabe tried to 
meld this revolutionary mish-mash into a coherent organization, it remained true 
that contrary to claims of having one centre of power, ZANU-PF, on account of 
the diversity it melded, had multiple groupings with contesting claims to 
legitimacy and moral ownership of the party ZANU-PF. Added to this ZANU 
history is the infusion of ZAPU into ZANU-PF through the 1987 Unity Accord, 
as an additional stakeholder in the contemporary ZANU-PF. ZAPU had been part 
collaborator, part foe during the liberation struggle, as well as the organization 
from which ZANU emerged or split from in 1963. Nonetheless it is fair to say 
that in the main ZANU-PF was a settlement between civilians and militants, 
generally. Norma Kriger (2006:1151) identified the primary components and 
contestations in the ZANU-PF political settlement as being liberation war fighters 
and veteran nationalist politicians. Using parliamentary debates in assemblies that 
were almost entirely constituted of ZANU-PF, Kriger shows how these two 
groups were united by the national myth of the liberation struggle but diverged 
on whose contribution was greater between the fighters and the nationalists. With 
the emergence of a strong opposition in 1999, these different interests in ZANU-
PF closed ranks, but the fissures made intermittent appearances, especially 
around ZANU-PF succession politics post 2000, and eventually came to a head 
in the 2017 military coup that forced Robert Mugabe to resign as state president 
and deposed him as ZANU-PF leader.  
 
During the post-March 2008 election processes towards the run-off election, both 
the civilian nationalist/political centre, which emerged from its ZANU structures 
during the liberation struggle, and the militaristic, violent arm of the party, which 
had its roots in the fighting ranks of its military wing ZANLA, were at work. 
Although, as Tendi (2013) argues, senior members of the military had a staunch 
ideological commitment to ZANU-PF, the fact that this group stepped-in to 
secure Mugabe’s power violently was a testament to this commitment, but also a 
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betrayal of this faction’s disappointment and lack of faith in the civilian arm to 
safeguard the party’s reign. What this military faction did is well-captured in the 
literature by Alexander & Tendi (2008), Masunungure (2009) and Tendi (2013), 
amongst others. The efforts of the civilian/nationalist political arm during the run-
off period are less well captured, although Mugabe made at least ten more 
campaign stops in the run-up to the run-off election, two of which were in 
battleground constituencies, as covered above.  
 
The review of the two rallies in battleground constituencies shows that the 
civilian element of ZANU-PF maintained the pretence of campaigning. The 
material that was distributed in and around the run-off election campaign, despite 
Mugabe’s tenor, also changed, becoming more issue focused and appealing 
especially to young people in an attempt to yield more votes. This was in concert 
with coercive actions that subverted voters’ free choice, which were led by the 
military and militant wing of the ZANU-PF political settlement. This persuasive 
approach was secondary because to all intents and purposes, the consensus in 
ZANU-PF was that the fair political campaigning route had failed, and that people 
needed to be forced into submission, albeit through voting for Mugabe. Mugabe’s 
tone on the campaign trail is a testament to this, and the actions of both factions 
in ZANU-PF are what led most people to dismiss the 2008 run-off election as a 
democratic non-event and see it instead as a critical authoritarian showcase on 
clinging on to power.  
 
I argue that ZANU-PF knew that the game was up when Mugabe trailed 
Tsvangirai in March 2008. Given the state of the economy and the fact that the 
opposition had tasted victory in both the presidential lead and the narrow victory 
in the parliamentary race, the momentum was with them. It is not inconceivable 
that it was to slow down this momentum that the ZEC delayed the announcement 
of the presidential election results, whilst assuaging tensions by releasing the 
parliamentary ones. However, in that moment of anxiety, ZANU-PF, instead of 
conceding defeat and negotiating an amicable exit, engineered a stalemate and a 
political crisis to weaken the opposition, and to bring them to the negotiating table 
kicking and screaming rather than in triumphant jubilation. In my view, while the 
focus of most of the scholarship is on the violence that led Tsvangirai to withdraw 
from the June 2008  presidential election run-off, ZANU-PF’s strategy was 
always to have that election, defeat Tsvangirai by fair means or foul and create a 
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stalemate that would force a settlement that would allow them to regroup but with 
at least one foot in the state.  
 
8.2.4 Bigwigs Rallies In Battleground Constituencies In 2013 
 
As highlighted in previous chapters, Mugabe’s deputy Mujuru took on more rally 
work in 2013 than she did in 2008. The few bigwig visits (three visits to 
battleground constituencies but multiple rallies) that ZANU-PF staged in 
battleground constituencies and that are captured as part of this study were all 
presided over by Mujuru. The themes were similar to her campaign pitches in 
other constituency types, and followed on from the major themes from 2008, i.e. 
land reform, sanctions and shaming imperialists, as well as empowerment. The 
2013 specific issues revolved around her blaming of the opposition for the limited 
progress of the GNU, as well as the mobilisation of chiefs through pleading for 
their respect and encouraging their involvement in ZANU-PF’s political 
activities. In addition, she mirrored Mugabe’s calls for peace, which appeared to 
be quite central to ZANU-PF given the costs of violence to its legitimacy, as seen 
in 2008. She asked voters in Goromonzi to be peaceful and urged co-existence 
across party lines. She encouraged ZANU-PF supporters to conduct non-coercive 
campaigns and urged them to “Tell those who support other parties what is good 
about ZANU-PF, its policies and its leadership and convince them to join our party 
without being violent” (Herald, 24 July, 2013) 
 
 In Goromonzi, where Mujuru staged three campaign rallies (Mungate Growth 
Point, Nyaure Clinic and Munyawiri secondary school) in one day on 23 July 
2013, she continued her GNU bashing and blaming of the MDC Secretary general 
Tendai Biti for refusing to release funds for projects (Herald, 24 July, 2013). She 
urged voters to vote ZANU-PF from president to councillor, arguing that some 
of the challenges in Goromonzi had not been dealt with because of poor 
coordination and a communication breakdown between MDC-T councillors and 
their ZANU-PF members of parliament. In Mhondoro, she doubled down on this 
message, arguing that it had been difficult to achieve people’s goal during the 
GNU because,  
of different ideologies of political parties [ZANU-PF and the two MDC 
formations] in the inclusive Government. Instead of raising motions that 
help people in Parliament, it was all about disagreement and sometimes the 
House would adjourn after a few minutes (Herald, 26 July, 2013). 
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The blame game continued with Mujuru blaming the opposition’s “call” for 
sanctions for the collapse of the textile industry, which for many years had been 
the centre of production and productivity in Chegutu and Kadoma, the two towns 
closest to Mhondoro (Herald, 26 July, 2013). She pledged that Mugabe would 
resuscitate manufacturing industries and urged Mhondoro voters to reward 
Mugabe for his sacrifice.  
He [Mugabe] has been called all sorts of names while defending you and 
me from the imperialists. His stance to defend the land and empower 
people through the indigenisation and economic empowerment 
programmes has angered some quarters, with some putting economic 
measures against us. Our leader remained steadfast and today we have 
prevailed over sanctions and doing things on our now (Herald, 26 July, 
2013). 
She buttressed this message by proclaiming the irreversibility of the land reform 
programme, not just because ZANU-PF said so, but also because  
This is enshrined in the new Constitution and pawakagara ndipapo hapana 
anokubvisa mumunda wako [where you are now settled is fixed and yours. 
No one can come and remove you from the land]. The supreme law that 
we now have recognises what our war veterans fought for, and it also 
respects the custodians of that land, who are our traditional leaders. 
(Herald, 26 July, 2013) 
 
The statement above points out key constituencies that Mujuru was mobilising 
and appealing to as part of her campaign efforts across the constituencies she 
visited, i.e. chiefs and war veterans. She argued that Tsvangirai and the opposition 
had no respect for either. “Instead of appreciating and honouring them for the work 
they do in various provinces, we have someone purporting to be a leader threatening 
the chiefs. This is unacceptable and our chiefs should not be moved by these empty 
threats”, Mujuru declared (Herald, 26 July, 2013). 
 
At all of the rallies in question Mujuru also tried to deal with local challenges like 
water shortages. In Mashonaland West, at her rallies in Chegutu and Mhondoro, 
she blamed MDC local councils for failing to provide services and asked the 
voters to reclaim Chegutu West from the opposition. In Goromonzi, she placed 
the blame for the water shortages on the opposition, and suggested that Mugabe 
was committed to clean water provision but that some of the money that had 
initially been earmarked for this had been reallocated to food aid efforts (Herald, 
24 July, 2013). She also pleaded for time on the longer term promises that ZANU-
PF had made like empowerment, and asked voters to understand that 
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empowerment was not a one-off programme but a sustained effort at shifting the 
economic balance of power (Herald, 24 July, 2013).  
 
8.3  Ground Game: Strategies, Tactics And Opposition 
Competition In Goromonzi And Tsholotsho 
The two constituencies covered in this section, Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho 
North, are both battleground constituencies in different parts of the country. 
Goromonzi West is located in the heart of Mashonaland, in Mashonaland East 
province, which has been largely characterised as a ZANU-PF stronghold 
province, while Tsholotsho North, about 400 miles away, is located in 
Matebeleland North province, which is perceived as an opposition stronghold 
province. While both are rural constituencies that enjoy a tremendous amount of 
influence from the major cities of Harare and Bulawayo and, in Tsholotsho’s 
case, even further afield, they are also different in various respects.  
 
Goromonzi is located about 30 miles from Harare and is dominated by inhabitants 
of one form of Shona ethnicity or another. This proximity to Harare made it a 
commercial farming hub prior to the land reform process. Circa 2000, Goromonzi 
had an estimated 257 small- and large-scale commercial farms specialising in 
mainly livestock rearing, horticulture for the export market (Paprika, Soya, and 
flowers) as well as tobacco and maize. Prior to 2000, no land resettlement had 
taken place in Goromonzi, whose commercial value was protected and highly 
valued by the government (Marongwe, 2009) . However, post-2000, 243 of the 
257 farms were gazetted for fast track land reform allocation. Suffice to say, a 
fair amount of land redistribution took place in the district during the Fast Track 
Land Reform Process (FTLRP). Marongwe (2011) points out that the vast 
majority of the beneficiaries in Goromonzi, especially on A2 farms, were people 
connected to ZANU-PF and the state, i.e. war veterans, party officials and civil 
servants – including those from the army, police and intelligence services - while 
peasants from the Goromonzi area, and some urban dwellers benefited from the 
allocation of at least 1,800 A1 farms (Marongwe , 2011).21  The foregoing land 
 
21 As Marongwe (2011:1070) explains, under the Fast Track programme land was redistributed in terms of two main 
planning models: the A1 model involved small plots for household-based production, and the beneficiaries were to be the 
generality of the ‘landless’ population of Zimbabwe, while the A2 model involved the sub-division of large scale 
commercial farms into medium-sized farms, and was intended for would-be black or ‘indigenous’ commercial farmers. 
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redistribution exercise was presided over by the state in its various hues as part 
of the national land reform process, but Goromonzi was still left with large tracts 
of communal land under the province of chiefs and municipal land under the rural 
district council. The traditional leaders and the council, over time, saw the value 
of allocating land for housing purposes to desperate city dwellers looking for 
cheap accommodation and housing close enough to the city. As a former solidier 
and lifelong resident of Goromonzi who uncharacteristically supported the 
opposition shared during an interview, chiefs and councillors were selling land 
for residential purposes in Goromonzi for around USD 5,000 for 1000 square 
meters (T0403-Interview, 2018). 
 
That land redistribution occurred in Goromonzi, and also that the community of 
Harare-Goromonzi commuters was increasing made for an interesting mix of 
residents in Goromonzi district in general, and Goromonzi North and West in 
particular. The proximity to the capital made it easy for some Goromonzi 
residents to work in the city, formally, or through informal  trade, especially, in 
fresh vegetables, since the area is good for horticulture and market gardening 
activities to stem poverty. The poverty prevalence rate is estimated at about 
62.4% for the rural part of the constituency, and about 41% for the urban Ruwa 
local board, which is also part of the Goromonzi North constituency (ZimStat, 
2015).  According to HMG0704, a traditional leader in Goromonzi, its proximity 
to the city means that Harare influences Goromonzi on a daily basis through 
people who work in the city, leading to city dynamics more than rural ones 
affecting the residents of Goromonzi, and partly informing their politics 
(HMG0704-Interview, 2018). However, as can be noted, the Goromonzi 
residents who commuted to Harare and or Marondera (another town close by) 
came in different political shades. They included high numbers of civil servants, 
security sector employees and war veterans who got farms and housing plots 
alongside other Goromonzi residents who plied their trades in the private and 
informal sectors, as well as civil servants who did not benefit from the land reform 
process but got housing plots from either chiefs or the local council. 
 
Tsholotsho, on the other hand, is a bit further (about 72 miles) away from 
Zimbabwe’s second largest city, Bulawayo. It is home to predominantly Ndebele 
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ethnic groups (generally, but Kalanga, San, and Ndebele specifically). Poverty is 
rife and is estimated at about 89.3% (ZimStat, 2015). Most of its water is from 
underground sources/boreholes, with the prevalence of Kalahari sands (over 70% 
of the land area) making farming difficult but enhancing the possibility of animal 
rearing. Given the limited economic opportunities, livelihoods in Tsholotsho are 
sustained by a strong remittance economy from the diaspora, mainly South 
Africa. As one respondent, a shop owner at Efusini Business centre in Tsholotsho,  
explained during the field work for this study,  
There are no young people here. Everyone has gone to Egoli [Johannesburg 
in South Africa]. If you go to South Africa, you pick a stone and throw it 
in a restaurant, you are bound to get a waitress or a waiter from Tsholotsho. 
The bulk of the youth of Tsholotsho they are there in South Africa. The 
moment children reach the age of seven here, they are taken by the 
Malaicha22 to join their parents in Joburg [Johannesburg], and the few who 
stay go to Bulawayo by the time they are 18  (SOE2112-Interview, 2017). 
     
TS1612, a former opposition Matebeleland North province chairperson, added to 
SOE2112’s explanation, stating that because of the migration and the cultural and 
economic exchange between Tsholotsho and Johanessburg, the district in general 
is not influenced by Bulawayo or Harare, but by Johanessburg (TS1612-
Interview, 2017).  He explained further that, 
of all the districts in Matebeleland, the district with the highest levels of 
immigration to South Africa is Tsholotsho. It means Tsholotsho is 
influenced by South Africa, and when those guys come back for holidays, 
which they always do in large numbers to the see their relatives, Tsholotsho 
turns into a South African township, and they talk politics. They sow the 
seeds, and they influence their communities on how they are supposed to 
vote (TS1612-Interview, 2017).  
 
Tsholotsho is also widely reported to have suffered severely during the 
Gukurahundi massacres of the early 1980s. This, according to TS1612, also 
explains why “most of the vote from Tsholotsho is anti-ZANU PF. There are so 
many mass graves of the victims in there” (TS1612-Interview, 2017).  
 
However, despite the general sentiment that Tsholotsho North is opposition 
territory, and Goromonzi North (located as it is in Mashonaland East) is ZANU-
PF territory, their designation in this study, as battleground constituencies, shows 
 
22 Malaicha are informal couriers who travel between Zimbabwe and South Africa. Besides smuggling goods between the two 
countries, they also engage in human trafficking. It is the latter that the statement refers to.  
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how dynamic and competitive both constituencies have been. According to the 
official election results, during the 2002 presidential election ZANU-PF actually 
carried Tsholotsho (Then one constituency) with a narrow margin of victory of 
about 3.36%, with only 749 votes separating Mugabe from Tsvangirai. In 2008, 
Simba Makoni led the vote in Tsholotsho North with 42% of the vote, while 
Tsvangirai trailed with about 29% and Mugabe had about 26% of the vote. In 
2013, Tsvangirai carried Tsholotsho North with about 47% of the vote, while 
Mugabe trailed with about 38% of the vote, leading to a narrow margin of victory 
for Tsvangirai of about 9%. In all of the elections (2002, 2008 and 2013) the voter 
turnout in Tsholotsho North was very low (about 47% in 2002, about 33% in 
2008, and 41% in 2013). In Goromonzi North, a similar tale unfolds. In 2002, 
Mugabe carried the consolidated Goromonzi constituency with a winning margin 
of 33%, but in 2008 Tsvangirai carried the new Goromonzi North constituency 
with a winning margin of 18.9%. Mugabe regained pole position in the 
constituency in 2013, winning it by a margin of about 11%, while the opposition 
regained pole position in 2018. The voter turnout in Goromonzi  contrasted with 
that in Tsholotsho. It was about 54% in 2002, then 49% in 2008 before rising 
dramatically to 82% in 2013. 
 
Clearly, based on the official election results, the two constituencies were much 
more competitive than the general perceptions imply. The next section looks into 
the kind of politics that played out at the local level in the presidential races, 
which could have assisted in making the political competition in the two 
constituencies as intense as it was in both similar and dissimilar ways.   
 
8.3.1 Party Organisational Structures And The “Game Of Numbers” In 
Battleground Constituencies. 
A recurring theme throughout all constituency types was ZANU-PF’s adept use 
of organisational structures as a way of mobilizing support for its candidates 
during elections. The battleground constituencies were no exceptions with minor 
variations to the rule. In Goromonzi North, CdeM0503, a member of ZANU-PF’s 
Chinyika district partystructure in Goromonzi, confirmed that the organizational 
structures were a critical pipeline in the communication and execution of the 
campaign strategy in the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections, as directed by the 
Politburo -ZANU-PF’s Highest Decision-Making body. CdeM0503 stated that 
strategy was the domain of the national leadership but was handed down to 
provincial executives, district structures, branches and eventually cell structures 
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(CdeM0503-Interview, 2018). The communication of strategy followed a strict 
command and obey process through these organizational structures, which, 
CdeM0503 stated, seldom changed in between or during elections, but were 
constantly audited with any gaps being filled ahead of elections (CdeM0503-
Interview, 2018).  
 
According to CdeM0503, the auditing and gap-filling processes usually occurred 
after the official intensive voter registration to ensure that cells were intact and 
determine the number of party supporters. Because Zimbabwe’s electoral 
legislation ( Zimbabwe Electoral Act of 2008 Section 17A, Chapter 2:13 
amended in 2013 to move registration responsibilities from the Registrar General 
to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, ZEC)  allowed for continuous voluntary 
voter registration through the Registrar of Voters or Registrar General in both 
2008 and 2013, CdeM0503 presumably meant that the restructuring occurred 
before the proclamation of the election dates. While the registration process was 
a continuous or rolling process at law, voters who registered after the 
proclamation of the election day could not vote in the impending election but 
would be registered for future ones. In both 2008 and 2013, Mugabe proclaimed 
the election dates, prior to which the dates were a closely guarded ZANU-PF 
secret (Lewanika, 2012; 2013). Anyhow, the point that CdeM0503 was driving 
at was that  
during elections ZANU-PF plays the game of Numbers. Registration of 
prospective voters is a strategy, including assisting with the process for 
party members or supporters to avoid the hustles of queuing at registration 
centres through registering in the village with the cell chairperson. The cell 
chair, who is usually a traditional leader, chief or sabhuku, can take up the 
names to the district for easy registration (CdeM0503-Interview, 2018). 
 
CdeM0503’s assertions regarding the numbers game bring out three critical 
things related to ZANU-PF’s election campaign efforts and the electoral process 
in general. First, they assist us to understand a bit more the arguments around 
urban voter suppression made on the strength of more people being registered in 
rural than urban areas in terms of the proportion of eligible voters. Some of the 
reasons for this discrepancy obviously have to do with deployment of resources 
and registration centres across the country, which is usually skewed towards rural 
areas, as well as possibly voter inflation. But CdeM0503’s statement also shows 
that part of this mismatch in voter proportions between rural and urban areas is 
because in rural areas, voter registration is facilitated with very few hustles as 
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long as the potential voter is a registered cell member of ZANU-PF. Registration 
takes place from the convenience of the home or village, whereas in urban 
centres, where ZANU-PF’s structures are few and generally weaker, and there 
are no traditional leaders,  people have to go to registration centres, and endure 
queues and bureaucracy, in addition to registration requirements like proof of 
residency, which are more stringent on urban dwellers who do not own property 
than rural folk whose proof of residency can be a note or nod from the traditional 
leader.  
 
Second, CdeM0503’s statement shows how, in the 2008 and 2013 elections, the 
district committees and district coordinating committees (DCCs) were the most 
critical organ of the party regarding campaign coordination at the constituency 
level starting from the registration process. In Goromonzi North, ZANU-PF 
ensured that each village had a cell of no less than 50 people;  some villages had 
more than one cell and up to five cells and thus constituted branches. These cells, 
led by a seven-member executive or leadership (Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, 
Secretary, Treasurer, Security plus two Committee members), were responsible 
for collating data on both ZANU-PF members and potential voters and 
transmitting this to the authorities responsible for voter registration.23 They were 
also responsible for transmitting the same information to ZANU-PF as part of 
both informing the party about its potential vote haul, and presumably where the 
numbers were insufficient, informing the party’s strategy on attracting more 
support. In rural Zimbabwe, including Goromonzi North, the latter was seldom 
required because registering as a cell member, besides facilitating registration and 
affirming support for ZANU-PF, had other perks associated with it, as shown in 
Chapter 5, like access to food aid, farming implements, land, and ZANU-PF 
facilitated employment. This access was often moderated by ZANU-PF local 
leadership, including traditional leaders. This is the third thing that CdeM0503’s 
statement points out, and it will be dealt with in more detail below. 
 
CdeS0503, a colleague of CdeM0503 in the ZANU-PF leadership in Goromonzi, 
Chinyika district, stated that regarding campaign strategy implementation and 
communication, the district and its leadership structure were the nerve centre and 
hardest working arm of the party because of their horizontal connecting role 
between the “top leadership”, i.e. provincial and national levels (central 
 
23 This structure was replicated at branch and district level where a District Coordinator, an employee of the party, was 
responsible for inter district coordination after the banning in ZANU-PF of District Coordinating Committees. 
297 
 
Committee and Politburo), and downwards to branches and cells (CdeS0305-
Interview, 2018). The district structures, according to CdeS0503, were the “real 
implementation centre of what the party would have decided on and sometimes 
morphed into inter-district platforms to ensure uniform sharing of information 
and strategy to avoid information asymmetries because the idea is to have one 
broad strategy across the province, and where possible across the country” 
(CdeS0305-Interview, 2018). 
 
CdeS0503’s assertions about uniformity of strategy, and his articulation of the 
communication pipeline, show how ZANU-PF, during the elections in question, 
attempted to have a unitary party that marched to the same beat. Specifically, for 
battleground constituencies, these assertions assist in making this chapter’s 
argument that battleground constituencies were neither seen nor treated as a 
special type of campaign target requiring a bespoke strategy. Rather, the 
battleground constituency campaign strategy was largely dependent on 
impressions of whether they were ZANU-PF or opposition constituencies, and 
also determined by their specific geographic location. In this case, Goromonzi 
North, while being a battleground constituency in terms of this thesis’ 
characterization, was largely subjected to the strategy that applied to 
Mashonaland East as a ZANU-PF stronghold province, a province that ZANU-
PF considered theirs and thus subjected to the kind of organization and strategies 
shown in Chapter 5. The foregoing also makes clear that although a general line 
of march was declared by the ZANU-PF politburo, provincial, and sometimes 
constituency, peculiarities and idiosyncrasies determined the nature and form of 
organization and mobilization for presidential election campaigns on the ground. 
The fact that in Tsholotsho, another battleground constituency, ZANU-PF 
operated differently, lends traction to this argument, as I will now outline. 
 
In Tsholotsho, the talk of ZANU-PF structures and their use as part of the central 
ways in which ZANU-PF ‘campaigned’ or went after votes is much more muted. 
By most accounts from interviews conducted in Tsholotsho with ZANU-PF, 
MDC, and ordinary community members, ZANU-PF’s structures in Tsholotsho 
had always been very weak. A survey of parliamentary election results shows that 
after the advent of the MDC in 1999, Tsholotsho did not have a ZANU-PF 
Member of Parliament until 2013 for Tsholotsho South and 2014 in Tsholotsho 
North. Prior to this, in Tsholotsho North, the MDC had represented the 
constituency in 2000, and had then lost it to Professor Jonathan Moyo, who ran 
298 
 
as an independent candidate. Jonathan Moyo retained the seat again as an 
independent in 2008 but the MDC-T’s Roseline Sipepa Nkomo won it in 2013. 
Nkomo, while not originally from Tsholotsho, had strong connections in the 
constituency as she was married to the MDC-T Minister of Water Resources 
during the GNU, Samuel Sipepa Nkomo,  who in turn was brother to ZANU-PF 
National Chairperson during the 2008 elections, John Landa Nkomo. 
Nonetheless, the pendulum in the electoral outcomes in Tsholotsho’s 
parliamentary contests is mirrored in the presidential election results, as shown 
in above.  
 
The perceptions and reality of the ‘weaknesses of ZANU-PF’s organizational 
structures in Tsholotsho did not stem only from the electoral reality, as outlined 
above, but also from the weakness of ZANU-PF as a brand in Tsholotsho on 
account of Gukurahundi. According to a former proportional representation 
female Member of the House of Assembly for Matebeleland North province, who 
came from Tsholotsho, MP-SL1312:   
People in Tsholotsho North generally do not support ZANU-PF. Jonathan 
Moyo did well when he did because he stood alone. This is because of the 
history of Gukurahundi in Tsholotsho. There are many mass graves and 
histories of displacements from that era which makes the constituency 
tough for ZANU-PF even when they intimidate people. People are not 
afraid as they have gone through the worst of politically motivated 
violence, intimidation and persecution. That is why the MDC has always 
won (MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017). 
 
As already shown above the MDC had not always won in Tsholotsho, but more 
importantly, the perceptions and reality of ZANU-PF’s weak formal party 
organizational structures, as well as its battered image in Tsholotsho, spurred 
ZANU-PF to employ other organizational strategies and tactics as part of its 
campaign effort in the constituency. It employed two primary strategies, i.e. 
creating alternative organizational structures, and using famous “sons” of the 
district to campaign in a lower form of the bigwig visits. The creation of 
alternative organizational structures took two forms, i.e. the creation of parallel 
organizing structures at ward level, and the use of an existing network of highly 
mobile couriers, the Malaicha. Regarding the first, creating alternative ward 
structures, a former ZANU-PF District Coordinating Committee Chairperson, 
who also served as a Senator for Tsholotsho, Sen-GA1312, accepted that the 
structures in Tsholotsho were generally weak, such that ZANU-PF, through the 
299 
 
leadership and coordination of Jonathan Moyo in Tsholotsho North, had to 
develop an alternative structure for campaign purposes. Sen-GA1312 stated that:  
To improve our chances of winning in 2013, Jonathan and 1 had to 
establish what we called the Groups of 40 (G40) which operated at every 
ward campaigning for Councillor, MP, senator and President. The G40s 
would go from door to door distributing campaign materials. These G40s 
were coordinated constituency wide by another team also of 40, which 
coordinated the campaign activity in the constituency (Sen-GA1312-
Interview, 2017).24 
 
Regarding the second element, ZANU-PF also made extensive use of the illegal 
traffickers, Malaicha, who had an extensive network throughout Tsholotsho and 
were quiet mobile spreading information and mobilizing for ZANU-PF even as 
they made deliveries of remittances and groceries from South Africa and 
collected people and goods for transport to South Africa. According to one of the 
MDC-T’s campaign managers in Tsholotsho for 2008 and 2013, CMT2112, the 
Malaicha were coordinated from the Efusini business centre by a local 
businessman identified as Esau. According to CMT2112: 
Esau’s Malaicha network could reach everywhere, while the MDC only 
had two vehicles. Jonathan Moyo, while charismatic in English and on 
matters of national importance, did not have as much impact on the ground 
in Tsholotsho, and was not as charismatic in the vernacular language. But 
him and Mugabe’s efforts in Tsholotsho were well served by a well-
coordinated team on the ground, especially the  Malaicha network 
(CMT2112-Interview, 2017) 
 
Nonetheless, this great organization on the ground in Tsholotsho was not enough 
in 2008 and 2013 to deliver vote leads for ZANU-PF in Tsholotsho, although 
Jonathan Moyo himself had been a two-time Member of the House of Assembly 
for the constituency, in 2005 and 2008. In both of these elections he had run as 
an independent candidate, and in 2008 he had the explicit support of the MDC-
T, which did not field a candidate against him, after being expelled from ZANU-
PF in 2004. Moyo was one of the senior party leaders who had plotted, at a prize 
giving ceremony at Dinyane school in Tsholotsho, to sponsor Emmerson 
Mnangagwa as a vice presidential candidate in ZANU-PF’s 2004 congress and 
 
24 Coincidently, Jonathan Moyo would, in 2017, be expelled from ZANU-PF again and forced into exile for being part of a 
“cabal” called G40 (Generation 40), a faction of ZANU-PF that promoted itself as younger, politically savvy, and well-
educated, which pitted itself against the Lacoste faction led by eventual president Emmerson Mnangagwa.  Jonathan Moyo 
and his colleagues however insisted that the G40 as a faction was a media creation that was non-existent in real life (see Tendi, 
2019 on the motivations and dynamics of the coup that toppled Robert Mugabe in 2017) 
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an eventual successor to Mugabe, against Mugabe’s wishes, in what became 
popularly known as the Tsholotsho declaration.25 After winning in 2008 as an 
independent, Moyo made his lot with ZANU-PF, successfully negotiating 
readmission into the party, and leading its national campaign and writing its 
Manifesto for the 2013 election.  
 
According to some in Tsholotsho, the national responsibilities that Moyo carried 
out astutely, as can be seen from the national election results in 2013 and his 
appointment as a non-constituency Member of Parliament and Minister by 
Mugabe in 2013, contributed to ZANU-PF’s weakness in Tsholotsho, since the 
person who was supposed to lead the charge, Moyo, was “complacent as the 
sitting MP, and spent his time doing ZANU-PF national duties in Harare” 
(CMT2112-Interview, 2017). This view is interesting when it is juxtaposed with 
other assertions from Tsholotsho that credit Jonathan Moyo’s success as an 
independent to the “development” that he had been able to bring to Tsholotsho 
between 2000 and 2004, when Mugabe first appointed him as a non-constituency 
member of parliament and Minister of Information. During this period, Moyo led 
the assault on fundamental civil liberties and is credited with penning draconian 
pieces of legislation in 2001, including the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) 
and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). These 
pieces of legislation were the lament of the opposition and civil society ahead of 
both the 2008 and 2013 elections because of their restrictions on assembly 
through allowing the police to ban meetings including rallies as well as their 
partisan control of the information market through AIPPA. Nonetheless, even 
though Moyo carried out these national duties between 2000 and 2004, in 
Tsholotsho he was hailed as a hero. According to TS1612, the MDC-T provincial 
leader in Matebeleland North cited earlier,  
People of Tsholotsho had faith in Jonathan, that he was the most educated 
man coming from their district, that he was dynamic, independent, and 
because he had managed to put a GMB [Grain Marketing Board] in 
Tsholotsho and to tar some 20km of road. So, they expected that if they put 
him again as MP, they were going to have more development in Tsholotsho 
(TS1612-Interview, 2017).  
If TS1612’s assessment is correct, it could account for why Mugabe did slightly 
better than Tsvangirai in the 2002 presidential election, why ZANU struggled in 
 
25 Both Tsholotsho North constituency and Jonathan Moyo are prominent in contemporary Zimbabwean political history 
because of this so-called Tsholotsho debacle, which was the first brave attempt at dealing with the succession question in 
ZANU-PF.  
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2008 when there were no new developments, and why Tsvangirai did better in 
2013, when, as I will show below, his champions facilitated some “development” 
in the constituency. In TS1612’s assessment, a lot of people in Tsholotsho were 
disappointed because no further development came to Tsholotsho, perhaps in part 
because Moyo no longer had a ministerial position and could not leverage 
resources well as an independent and later as a ZANU-PF strategist with no 
formal foothold in the inclusive government between 2009 and 2013. This 
foothold in government was something that the opposition had, to the benefit of 
Tsholotsho, as I will show in the next section.  
 
The second strategy that ZANU-PF used in Tsholotsho to mitigate the perceived 
and real organizational structural weaknesses of the party was the deployment of 
successful sons of the district, local bigwigs, back to Tsholotsho to aid its 
campaign efforts through visits. MP-SL1312 noted that:  
In Tsholotsho ZANU-PF has tried to drum up support through using  
regional bigwigs or heavyweights to mobilize support. In the past those 
who have conducted rallies have included Cain Mathema [Tsholotsho MP 
between 1990 and 2000 and Governor of Matebeleland North], John Landa 
Nkomo [Tsholotsho’s first post-independence MP and ZANU-PF National 
Chairperson], Jacob Mudenda [Former Matebeleland North resident 
Minister (1984) and governor] and Jonathan Moyo (MP-SL1312-
Interview, 2017). 
 
MP-SL1312 also added that Mugabe’s visit had been for nothing” because 
ZANU-PF did not get a lot of support at either the presidential or parliamentary 
level, was probably on the strength of the persuasion of the heavyweights . This 
approach made sense given the tremendous amount of influence that “sons and 
daughters” of Tsholotsho who were no longer staying there have on the 
constituency when they do come to visit, as noted earlier (TS1612-Interview, 
2017). While this appeared to be a good strategy, part of the challenge of 
deploying these regional bigwigs was that for some in Tsholotsho they were not 
in touch with issues of local relevance, and as such came carrying a national 
message, especially around land and indigenization (SOE2112-Interview, 2017). 
However, even as the former senator for the area, Sen-GA1312 noted, these 
messages were not resonant because  
Tsholotsho is largely a communal area,  formerly part of Umguza district. 
There was no land reform in Tsholotsho, no farms in Tsholotsho, and any 
beneficiaries of the land reform process in Tsholotsho had mainly relocated 
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to Umguza and Nyama Ndlovhu where they had been allocated land (Sen-
GA1312-Interview, 2017). 
 
The above reality also meant that Mugabe’s message, when he visited Tsholotsho 
in 2008 and preached about not leaving until the land question was resolved and 
legacy issues around safeguarding land, sovereignty and independence, would 
have been dissonant in Tsholotsho (Chronicle, 20 June, 2008). This was different 
from Goromonzi North, which had benefitted from the land reform as a 
constituency, and where a significant number of beneficiaries were domiciled in 
the constituency. Yet still in Tsholotsho, while acknowledging the deficiencies 
of the message and avoiding overemphasizing the land issue, campaigns at a local 
level were still informed by and revolved “around the national message notched 
on 100% total empowerment and indigenization”(Sen-GA1312-Interview, 2017).  
 
According to SOE2112, a Tsholotsho based shop owner, “ZANU-PF  didn’t 
know how to talk to people nicely, and instead tried to use intimidation & partisan 
distribution of resources, which backfired” (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018). Sen-
GA1312 informed me that he had advised that food relief should be given to all 
people and then votes should be asked for later, but this was not followed, leading 
to the erosion of ZANU-PF’s support in Tsholotsho North (Sen-GA1312-
Interview, 2017). It is this element around patronage distribution and its 
differential application in Goromonzi and Tsholotsho as part of the presidential 
election campaigns in 2008 and 2013 that this chapter now turns to. 
 
8.3.2 Turn Out Buying And Vote-Buying Across The Partisan Political Divide. 
The subnational politics of the 2008 and 2013 elections in Tsholotsho and 
Goromonzi followed familiar terrain regarding partisan/patronage distribution of 
goodies in exchange for electoral support. In 2008 this phenomenon was fairly 
similar for both constituencies with reports of ZANU-PF using grain, fertilizers, 
farming inputs, livestock and secondhand clothes, torches, and party regalia as 
gifts to the electorate in both constituencies. This was in addition to the 
establishment in both constituencies of Basic Commodity Supply Intervention 
Facility (BACOSI) shops through which residents were supposed to access basic 
commodities at subsidized prices.  
 
In both constituencies the distribution of these various goods took a clear partisan 
turn. A traditional leader, headman HMG0704, shared that ZANU-PF distributed 
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food and inputs in Goromonzi, but this was usually done in a way that was not 
fair because “there are a number of former soldiers who have settled in 
Goromonzi, especially in the resettlement areas where support and command 
bases were set up ahead of elections in 2008, and these tend[ed] to benefit more 
than anyone else” (HMG0704-Interview, 2018). In Tsholotsho in 2008, Mugabe 
opened a BACOSI store, but this was viewed as tokenistic. Other food 
distribution efforts were steeped in scandal as members of ZANU-PF structures 
and campaign team were accused of corruption and theft. The situation caused 
some serious rifts within the party structures, and “eventually  ZANU-PF 
meetings had to be held at Ward Centres to avoid theft, and establish neutrality 
in distributing campaign materials, food stuffs and grain as well as inputs”  (Sen-
GA1312-Interview, 2017). 
 
Outside of the general distribution of the above-mentioned products, which took 
place in a partisan fashion, according to MP-SL1312,  in Tsholotsho “Jonathan 
Moyo upped the stakes. He would have community gigs where he would 
slaughter even 5 cows and bring in a tanker from Ingwebu [this was some type of 
local opaque beer from a Bulawayo based brewery] for inter-ward and ZANU-
PF inter Districts meetings, stating that these were gifts from ZANU-PF’s 
president and himself” (MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017). This was especially the 
case in June and July 2013, when Jonathan Moyo allegedly became “pretty much 
stationed in Tsholotsho and slaughtered over 25 cows - one every two days - 
which were used to feed people at meetings and campaign events”  (CMT2112-
Interview, 2017). All of this largesse, according to Sen-GA1312, was facilitated 
by Jonathan Moyo’s access to state resources and financial contributions from his 
allies in the military and other ZANU-PF officials  (Sen-GA1312-Interview, 
2017). This additional element, which was meant to win over voters in ZANU-
PF’s favour, did not yield the desired results. Part of the reason why possibly lies 
in the fact that ZANU-PF faced a formidable opposition challenge in conducting 
this kind of politics in Tsholotsho, because the opposition was also engaging in 
similar politics. As CMT2112, the MDC-T campaign manager in Tsholotsho, 
explained,  
Our campaign to win over Tsholotsho started quite early in 2011 because 
by this time it was clear that Jonathan Moyo had betrayed us and was 
heading back to ZANU-PF even though we had campaigned for him. We 
identified members at ward level and built teams of women, youths and 
men to identify projects they wanted to do. 20 women wanted to do chicken 
feeding, Youths wanted soccer teams, and most villages had serious clean 
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water challenges because as you know Tsholotsho is semidry. So we went 
around building and repairing boreholes, sponsored the chicken projects, 
provided proper breakfast and lunches for school kids, bought soccer kits 
and balls, and sponsored some goat rearing projects under the Common 
Danga [kraal] project in most villages (CMT2112-Interview, 2017). 
 
According to CMT2112, the opposition continued to sponsor most of these 
projects up until the elections in 2013 and used meetings to discuss the progress 
of  the projects as part of their mobilization and organisation building exercises. 
The difference between what the opposition and ZANU-PF did was, first, that the 
opposition did not discriminate politically. Anyone who wanted and asked for 
support would get it, and some of the efforts were party blind like the bore holes, 
the common kraals and the children’s feeding schemes. Second, these efforts, 
while clearly politically calculated, were more sustainable and people felt that 
they owned the projects. CMT2112 explained that “we would encourage people 
to go and drink Jonathan’s beer and eat his meat but remember their future and 
how a meal for a day would not guarantee meals in the future”. The opposition 
appeared to match and even outdo ZANU-PF in their efforts to instrumentalize 
community needs for political expedience. In addition, the borehole repair 
process was aided, not in the least by the fact that the spouse of the MDC-T 
parliamentary candidate in Tsholotsho was a cabinet minister responsible for 
water resources, and, by CMT2112’s admission, some resources from the 
ministry as well as the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) 
were used to assist some of their efforts (CMT2112-Interview, 2017).26 The use 
and abuse of state resources in Tsholotsho was therefore not the preserve of 
ZANU-PF because the shared incumbency in the state allowed the MDC-T to 
manipulate resources in aid of their political objectives. 
 
In both Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho North vote buying appeared to be an 
accepted part of the electoral process. While the opposition was not implicated in 
this practice in Goromonzi, in Tsholotsho, ZANU-PF and the opposition 
appeared to be in a bidding war for constituents’ votes on the strength of what 
they could offer. From the evidence gathered in the two constituencies, it appears 
that in Goromonzi and Tsholotsho ZANU-PF distributed campaign material 
along the same lines that it did in ZANU-PF aligned constituencies, mainly to its 
 
26 During the GNU a fleet of all-terrain vehicles (4x4s), estimated to number about 200, was bought and given to JOMIC, 
which was constituted of all three parties in Parliament. The vehicles were used by JOMIC coordinators from across the 
political divide. These are amongst some of the resources that the parties took advantage of and used “illegally” to support 
their campaigns. 
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party faithful. The opposition appeared to have a more catholic approach to the 
distribution of its largesse. In this respect, the data suggests that more than buying 
votes, ZANU-PF’s efforts were aimed at rewarding party loyalty on the 
assumption that by virtue of being members of the party their votes were 
guaranteed. The opposition appears not to have had such illusions, and its 
distribution of resources and sponsorship of “projects” was aimed at “buying” 
votes. I argue that this was not out of profound strategic wisdom on the part of 
the opposition, but rather on account of the reality that the opposition did not have 
a stringent and well-established membership framework as ZANU-PF did. 
Ordinarily this could be perceived as a weakness because parties need members, 
but in this unusual case, working beyond and being oblivious to known members 
could have assisted the opposition to gain more support. 
 
8.3.3 Traditional Leaders As (Willing) Accomplices To ZANU-PF’s Campaign 
Efforts In Battleground Constituencies. 
In chapter 6, this thesis highlighted Mujuru’s courting of traditional leaders and 
how this acted as some kind of activation for their heavy involvement in ZANU-
PF campaign activities in ZANU-PF aligned constituencies. This elevation and 
mobilization of traditional leaders was a theme that ran across constituency types 
during Mujuru’s visits, as shown above. However, these calls for respect for and 
activation of traditional leaders to act on behalf of ZANU-PF in electoral 
campaigns at the local level were received differently in different types of 
battleground constituencies.  
 
In Goromonzi North, respondents from ZANU-PF and the MDC, as well as 
traditional leaders themselves, confirmed that chiefs, headman and kraal heads 
had huge roles to play in ZANU-PF’s campaign efforts on the ground. In fact, 
traditional authorities were part of ZANU-PF’s organizational structures and 
kraal heads invariably chaired all of ZANU-PF’s cell party structures in 
Goromonzi North, and “in instances where the village had more than one cell or 
was a branch these were chaired by the Sabhuku/Headman” (CdeS0305-
Interview, 2018). However, although chiefs coordinated with ZANU-PF’s district 
structures, traditional leaders were not permitted to be part of the party structure 
above the cell and the branch level (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018). For anyone 
looking at ZANU-PF’s campaign infrastructure at a national or even provincial 
level, it would have been easy to miss the traditional leaders as part of the ZANU-
PF formal machine because they would not have been there, and ZANU-PF’s  
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provincial leadership made sure through strict communications that this was the 
case (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018).  
 
Most electoral stakeholders in Goromonzi North almost accepted the 
involvement of the traditional leaders in ZANU-PF’s structures as given, 
traditional and normal (GI-Majuru1004, 2018; HMG0704-Interview, 2018). 
Group discussions with opposition committees in Ward 16 and 17 of Goromonzi 
North revealed that while the opposition was not happy about this, they had learnt 
to live with this situation and looked forward to the day when the traditional 
leaders would service their party once it attained power. One of the participants, 
himself a brother of a local chief and high up in the line of succession, stated that: 
I often argue with brother, chief X, because he uses our chieftaincy only to 
support the ruling party. He calls meetings under the guise of dealing with 
community issues, but once there, people are made to do ZANU-PF 
slogans. I often remind him that ushe madzoro [power is temporary and 
flirting] and that when ZANU-PF gets out of power he will have to serve a 
different master, or if he dies and I take over, I will serve a different master 
(GI1-Chinyika0904, 2018). 
 
 Headman HMG0704 affirmed this attitude and stated that while he tried to serve 
everyone across party lines because of the nature of the constituents in his village, 
ultimately, he was expected to serve ZANU-PF more and coordinate ZANU-PF 
activities in his village. He stated that what happened in his village regarding his 
role was the norm across Goromonzi (HMG0704-Interview, 2018). Headman 
HMG0704 also said that since becoming a headman he had not been side tracked 
from what was required of him, in part because his own brother was a former 
member of parliament and diplomat, and also because the consequences were too 
ghastly to contemplate (HMG0704-Interview, 2018). In addition to convening 
local village and ZANU-PF meetings, traditional leaders were also expected to 
deliver the votes of their subjects. In Goromonzi North, this role was codenamed 
“Operation bereka mwana iyeye” [Operation carry that child ( on your back)] 
(CdeM0503-Interview, 2018). This operation was similar to the Dambawasara 
processes in Mount Darwin, covered in chapter 4. Operation bereka mwana iyeye 
conceptualized traditional leaders as local patriarchs or fathers of the village, who 
were responsible for their children (subjects) and had to ensure that they 
participated in ZANU-PF activities and went to the polls to vote for ZANU-PF, 
even if that meant carrying them on their backs. The accountability trail did not 
end with “carrying one’s subjects” to the polling booth; it extended to accounting 
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for voting preferences. For instance, in 2008, the opposition vote at one polling 
station at Goromonzi high school was so high that the village head was 
summoned by the “president’s office” [members of the central intelligence 
organization] and asked to explain. The village headman recounted this incident 
as follows: 
In 2008 Goromonzi high school polling station was problematic because it 
voted opposition. I was asked by the president’s office to explain, and I 
told them that I was sure that my villagers had voted ZANU-PF but could 
not account for the teachers who fell outside my jurisdiction. Luckily my 
explanation was accepted, and in 2013 teachers were not allowed to vote 
at Goromonzi high school; they were taken to other polling stations [as 
election officials] and the district administrator (DA) was fired and a new 
DA was brought to the area (HMG0704-Interview, 2018). 
 
Opposition supporters in Goromonzi testified that during the 2013 elections, 
village headmen had walked around the queues on polling day at various polling 
stations reminding people to vote for ZANU-PF (GI1-Chinyika0904, 2018). Any 
suspicions that one would not follow the suggestion to vote for ZANU-PF were 
met with sanctions from the traditional leaders. The power of the traditional 
leaders in rural Zimbabwe, as previously noted, was complete.  
 
Some of the accounts noted in chapter 4 on ZANU-PF’s campaigns in ZACs 
demonstrated the violent aspects of the power of the traditional leaders who could 
leverage their association with ZANU-PF to mete out physical punishment to 
dissenters. Given the changing times, the traditional leaders themselves were not 
immune to physical violence if they turned out to be dissenters. Besides this 
physical violence, there were other forms of sanctions that the traditional leaders 
could mete out as part of their all-encompassing power, as Mamdani (2001) 
describes. If physical violence constituted traditional leaders’ hard power, in 
Goromonzi, their soft power was characterized by one participant in a focus group 
discussion at Majuru growth point through the following illustration:  
For you to survive in the area you have to be written in the small and big 
book [village registers kept by traditional leaders]. Non-compliance with 
the instructions of traditional leaders could lead to one being removed from 
the bhuku rasabhuku [the village headman’s register]. Being removed from 
the bhuku rasabhuku could lead to one losing their land, which was under 
the purview of the traditional leaders if you stayed in the village, and being 
automatically removed from accessing food, seed and other government 
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provided handouts meant for everyone in the village (GI-Majuru1004, 
2018).  
 
The constitutional roles and powers of the traditional leaders across the country 
are defined in Zimbabwe’s constitution. However, the conduct of the traditional 
leaders in Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho North brings out some interesting 
parallels and differences in how the traditional leaders carried out their formal 
and informal roles, the motivating factors for their conduct, and the way they used 
their formal and informal power during the 2008 and 2013 elections. In 
Tsholotsho, while there were press reports around chiefs being partisan, a number 
of election stakeholders across party lines believed that the local chiefs were, as 
expressed by an opposition member of parliament, “not involved in  politics, not 
captured by ZANU PF or the opposition, not separatist in their approach, and 
fairly independent” (MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017). The chiefs themselves 
declared this relative impartiality “within limits” and one of the three chiefs 
interviewed for this study lambasted accusations from some in the opposition that 
they were partial to ZANU-PF. Chief12012 stated that, 
The opposition press often attacks us first, for things that are outside of our 
control and second, from a preconceived and uninformed position. For 
instance, sometime in 2013 the Daily News and News Day reported that 
the chiefs in Tsholotsho summoned traditional leaders from the district and 
threatened them and bribed them with bicycles to support ZANU-PF’s 
campaign efforts. But this never happened. The truth is that Jonathan Moyo 
asked for a meeting with the traditional leaders to explain his party’s plans 
and share their vision for Tsholotsho. We obliged and brought in headmen 
for one-on-one encounters to share their problems and hear ZANU-PF’s 
plans. (Chief12012-Interview, 2017) 
 
The above clarification was repeated by Chief22012, who added that they 
engaged equally with all parties but were not “in the business of chasing after 
parties”, and that the problem was that sometimes the opposition assumed that 
they were partisan and just did not approach or engage them (Chief22012-
Interview, 2017). Chief22012 explained that ahead of elections falsehoods are 
unavoidable but the truth was that in the run-up to the 2013 election, the 
opposition appeared to have an anti-traditional chief position and made no effort 
to meet and or share their policies (Chief22012-Interview, 2017). The good 
reputation that the traditional leaders have in Tsholotsho appears to support the 
defence given by the two chiefs. In addition, the fact that I was given an audience 
by half of the chiefs in the area (three out of six and all of those presiding over 
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Tsholotsho North) and yet was relegated to interviewing the headman and kraal 
heads in other research sites speaks volumes about their accommodation. The 
MDC campaign manager for Tsholotsho, CMT2112,  testified that at least during 
the 2013 election,  
there were little to no challenges engaging with traditional leaders. Chiefs 
were fairly impartial and allowed parties to do what they wanted to do. 
Maybe this was because Matebeleland chiefs are generally sceptical about 
ZANU-PF and different from chiefs elsewhere. They are not afraid of 
ZANU-PF and as you can see from the actions of Chief Matema, Chief 
Kayisa and Chief Ndiweni, they can stand up to ZANU-PF (CMT2112-
Interview, 2017). 
 
CMT2112 further stated that the MDC-T had a particularly good interlocutor in 
Mrs Nkomo, the parliamentary candidate, when it came to engage traditional 
leaders.  
Mrs Nkomo excelled with traditional leaders and was a good ambassador 
for Tsvangirai and the party. She took advantage of her Malukazana status 
[Daughter in law], and used it to fit in, humbly and with the humility 
befitting of a daughter-in-law. She consulted the local headman and visited 
them with gifts. She went to see Chief Matuphula, who despite being 
young, she treated with deference and respect. She also used the issue of a 
homestead as an advantage, Jonathan Moyo did not have a homestead in 
Tsholotsho (CMT2112-Interview, 2017). 
 
Despite the positive report card for the traditional leaders in Tsholotsho regarding 
non-interference with their subjects’ voting preferences, Chief12012 admitted 
that they were under tremendous pressure to toe the ZANU-PF line, and 
sometimes they had no choice but to do so. This is what he meant when he 
mentioned impartiality within limits. He stated in an interview that: 
You have to understand our position as chiefs and traditional leaders. 
Those who represent us in senate have perks and benefits, other 
jurisdictions like civil and criminal courts, magistrates and so on have 
resources, yet the District Administrators’ office which supports chiefs 
doesn’t even have budgets for chiefs’ administrative purposes, and we are 
not salaried, but get a small allowance that traditional leaders generally do 
not. To achieve results, we end up having to rely on elected officials, and 
central government, who do not help out of benevolence but expect favours 
in return. So, when elections come, you are forced to work with and support 
those who have supported you. (Chief12012-Interview, 2017).  
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Chief12012, Chief22012, and Chief32112 were highly trained in various 
professions, and prior to assuming their chieftaincies on the deaths of their fathers 
had all been working professionally, either abroad or in other parts of Zimbabwe. 
They all explained the challenges of catering for a family at a particular standard, 
which their previous lives had entailed, on a chief’s allowance, and how this often 
forced them to compromise politically to facilitate scholarships for their children 
and other comforts for their families. Despite these social pressures, the 
traditional leaders at the highest level in Tsholotsho maintained the optics of non-
partisanship and not being unjustly involved in the local politics of the 
presidential election races. There is little doubt that the traditional leaders in 
Goromonzi North were under similar social pressures, as well as political 
pressure, given the location of the constituency in a ZANU-PF “stronghold” 
province. Nonetheless, the ways in which the traditional leaders used their 
positions, power and privileges in relation to ZANU-PF’s local politics and 
electoral campaigns were different. In Tsholotsho the chiefs also had the 
additional burden of the history of Gukurahundi and how their subjects and their 
own families were seriously affected during the 1980s. 
 
8.3.4 Coercion, Violence And Intimidation. 
The coercive politics in battleground constituencies, as with other modes of 
“political” engagement highlighted above as part of ZANU-PF’s campaign 
efforts, mirrored what this thesis has already covered in previous chapters. 
Goromonzi North, typical of ZANU-PF operations in ZACs, had a fair amount 
of coercive politics at play, and was reminiscent of Mount Darwin. In Tsholotsho, 
the coercive politics were toned down for similar reasons to Bulawayo province’s 
Makokoba, Luveve and Lupane constituencies.  
 
Various respondents from Goromonzi North provided accounts of a team and 
operation from the 2008 run-off period called “Capricorn”. Despite the pervasive 
references to it, respondents had different understandings of what it was. For 
instance, T0403 described Capricorn as a team of what he referred to as “bad 
people”, who, in 2008, moved around Goromonzi with guns intimidating people. 
T0403 recounted that in his area the Capricorn was led by a retired army major 
who would fire shots in the air to intimidate people (T0403-Interview, 2018). 
ZANU-PF insiders conceded that there had been coercion in Goromonzi during 
the 2008 run-off election period, and that the exercise was called “Operation 
Capricorn”. According to Cdes0305, the Zimbabwe National Army deployed 
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captains in the top districts, who in Chinyika were assisted by a ZANU-PF leader 
referred to as Mai Mudhara and war veterans. The captains and war veterans were 
reported as instructing, commandeering and forcing ordinary ZANU-PF party 
members to perpetrate acts of violence as part of operation capricon. (CdeS0305-
Interview, 2018; CdeM0503-Interview, 2018). 
 
These assertions from members of ZANU-PF could have been perpetrators 
covering their own backs on the strength of “following instructions”. In regard to 
opposition members in Goromonzi North, ZANU-PF members were responsible 
for carrying out egregious acts of violence in 2008, and intimidation in 2013 (GI-
Majuru1004, 2018). While opposition members suspected some involvement of 
formal security sector members in violence, they squarely pointed the finger of 
blame at ZANU-PF members. This was despite that ZANU-PF members, in the 
main, tried to carry out some of the local acts of violence discretely and in 
neighbouring rather than their own villages. Opposition supporters identified 
ZANU-PF supporters and war veterans like “Malaba, Marunguzhike and Mrs 
Mudhara” as giving the directives for violence (GI-Majuru1004, 2018 and GI1-
Chinyika0904, 2018). The patterns of violence and intimidation, and their 
consequences in 2008 and 2013, mirrored those shown to have taken place in 
Mount Darwin. As T0403 recounted, 
remember that people were still affected by the 2008 violence, long-
sleeved and short-sleeved, and where some houses were burnt, and 
businesses were closed. I remember many people like Joshua Marihwa 
who had to desert their homes and literally run to Ruwa [a small satellite 
town about mid-way, 20km between Harare and Goromonzi] on foot in the 
middle of the night because ZANU-PF was unleashing violence in 
Goromonzi. In 2013 people were told that if you don’t vote ZANU-PF the 
days of Capricorn will return. (T0403-Interview, 2018) 
 
The implementation of violent politics in 2008 and intimidation in 2013 severely 
affected the ability of the opposition to campaign openly and of its members to 
be open in Goromonzi, due to fear. As headman HMG0704 stated, the net impact 
was that a few brave opposition members were left to campaign at growth points 
but not in the villages, and invariably ZANU-PF had more meetings and rallies 
than the opposition in different localities in the constituency (HMG0704-
Interview, 2018). Although there was virtually no physical violence in 2013, and 
the intimidation was “not as bad as 2008. Most opposition activists did not want 
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to come out in the open for fear of reprisals and victimization, limiting their 
ability to campaign for their party.” (HMG0704-Interview, 2018) 
 
In Tsholotsho North, some respondents reported that ZANU-PF did deploy some 
war veterans to the constituency in 2008, but the violence was “limited to a few 
incidents and virtually non-existent in 2013 (TS1612-Interview, 2017; MP-
SL1312-Interview, 2017). Despite this limited violence, the impression was that 
ZANU-PF did not fare well in Tsholotsho because “People in Tsholotsho North 
generally do not support ZANU-PF, because of the history of Gukurahundi” with 
many mass graves and stories of displacements as a constant reminder of this 
period. On account of this history, like in other parts of Matebeleland, the people 
of Tsholotsho did not easily succumb to intimidation because they had already 
“gone through the worst of politically motivated violence, intimidation and 
persecution” (MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017).  
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined how ZANU-PF campaigned in battleground constituencies 
in 2008 and 2013. It showed that battleground constituencies were relatively 
deprived of bigwig campaign attention in both elections and explained that this 
was on account of battlegrounds not being a concept that was factored into 
ZANU-PF’s election campaign calculus. It argued that the ZANU-PF appeared 
to look at constituencies using a binary lens and, as a result, saw them as either 
ZANU-PF or opposition. As a result, although constituencies that meet the 
criteria for battleground constituencies exist, the concept is seldom applied in 
analysis and election campaign strategy formulation on the ground. While 
political agents across the political divide accepted that the politics in Goromonzi 
North and Tsholotsho North were extremely competitive, they seldom saw the 
constituencies as battleground constituencies. The overwhelming impression was 
that although the opposition had support, Goromonzi North was a ZANU-PF 
constituency, and that despite the close contests in Tsholotsho, it was an 
opposition constituency. For Tsholotsho, while it is true that the constituency was 
largely opposition leaning, the results of the electoral contests in 2008 and 2013 
show that the allegiances to the opposition did not automatically flow to the 
MDC-T, with other opposition candidates also getting sizable proportions of 
support. 
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However, on the few occasions that bigwig visits took place in battleground 
constituencies, the campaign messages seemed to drift away from the hard hitting 
historical and ideological appeals, like those made in ZACs, as well as the sound 
programmatic appeals made in OACs, to a more sober attempt to address the 
immediate problems. This suggests that at a subliminal level, the ZANU-PF knew 
that in battleground constituencies rhetoric alone would not carry the day and it 
attempted to buttress it with the introduction of practical issues and solutions to 
people’s everyday problems.  
 
The chapter also showed that while the kinds of politics at the subnational level 
in ZACs and OACs were fairly distinct, this distinction was less clear in 
battleground constituencies, which tended to mimic the modes of political 
activity of either their neighbours or the partisan constituency type that actors 
believed the constituency to be. In this respect, Goromonzi constituency tended 
to mimic the politics of Mashonaland East and central because of its geographic 
location as well as perceptions of it being a ZANU-PF constituency. Tsholotsho’s 
subnational politics mirrored the politics of the rest of Matebeleland, and 
campaigning was also informed by perceptions of it being an opposition 
constituency.  
 
The two constituencies thus diverged on critical subnational campaign patterns, 
buttressing the first point that it appears that ZANU-PF did not have a specific 
election campaign strategy for battleground constituencies. ZANU-PF’s 
campaigning in Goromonzi North was certainly more oriented towards 
mobilizing its base, and opposition support was fairly suppressed and given 
limited room to manifest. Its campaigns in Tsholotsho North appeared to be more 
legitimacy seeking and entailed the adoption of fairly novel forms of organizing 
and chasing the vote on account of perceptions of a weaker ZANU-PF presence 
on the ground. In both constituencies patronage-based distribution of resources 
and campaign “gifts” was present, and accepted as critical element of the 
electioneering process, leading to some form of outbidding contest between 
ZANU-PF and the opposition. In Goromonzi North, ZANU-PF almost had a 
monopoly on this type of politics and used goodies as rewards for its members 
and enticements for further support. In Tsholotsho both ZANU-PF and the 
opposition deployed a patronage distribution of resources and attempted to buy 
people’s votes with consumables such as food and drink, as well as long term 
projects such as animal rearing. Another critical point of divergence relates to the 
314 
 
role of traditional leaders. In Goromonzi, the traditional elders were by and large 
captured and in the service of ZANU-PF both formally (through leadership at cell 
and branch level) and informally, while in Tsholotsho they appeared to keep a 
healthy distance from partisan politics. The use of violence also diverged, with it 
being used quite a lot and effectively in Goromonzi North, but not much and 
ineffectively in Tsholotsho South. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation presented a unique descriptive analysis of competitive 
authoritarian regimes by focusing on Zimbabwe’s ruling party, ZANU-PF as a 
case.  It assessed ZANU-PF’s national and subnational campaign strategy during 
the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections and provided a detailed descriptive 
analysis of the campaign strategies. The dissertation used the detailed descriptive 
analysis to draw inferences on why ZANU-PF campaigned during the 2008 and 
2013 presidential elections. Inferences, that can hopefully be used to study and 
compare with other competitive authoritarian regimes. The analysis presented in 
this thesis was based on the classification of constituencies into three broad types: 
ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies (ZACs), opposition-aligned constituencies 
(OACs), and battleground constituencies (BCs).  
 
The study revealed a spatially and temporally variegated strategic logic to 
ZANU-PF’s campaigns centred around its need to preserve power and enhance 
its legitimacy. The thesis found that ZANU-PF pursued these goals by deploying 
a vote and turnout maximisation logic for itself. It also employed a vote and 
turnout minimisation strategy for its opponents. The thesis showed how ZANU-
PF deployed combinations of seemingly competing strategies that included 
persuasion, intimidation, and clientelist inducements in varied proportions across 
space (constituency types) and time. It argued that ZANU-PF proved adept at 
learning and adjusting its campaign strategy-based election results from previous 
elections and geographic and political location and categorisation of 
constituencies. In this respect, contrary to popular analysis which suggests the 
unchanging nature of ZANU-PF and its reliance, as a competitive authoritarian 
regime, on force and fraud, this thesis built on analysis showing that ZANU-PF 
changes its strategies across time and space. It specifically argued that ZANU-PF 
switched its campaign strategy from a predominantly persuasive mobilising 
strategy in March 2008 which focused on its core-constituents to a coercive 
strategy in June 2008. In 2013 it adopted predominantly persuasive and clientelist 
chasing strategy that focused more on unaligned and soft-core opposition voters, 
but without neglecting its base in ZACs. The thesis argued that the predominantly 
persuasive mobilisation strategy of March 2008 and the persuasive chasing 
strategy for the 2013 presidential election campaign showed that ZANU-PF cared 
about its legitimacy. In both elections it made identity-based legitimation appeals 
which were ideological, historical and programmatic. This showed that ZANU-
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PF cared less about procedural legitimacy and more about traditional and 
identity-based legitimacy. Generally, the literature suggests that competitive 
authoritarian regimes rely on performance legitimacy to establish authoritarian 
bargains that sustain them in power. ZANU-PF in 2008, as in 2013 bucked this 
trend and insisted on identity-based claims to legitimacy more than any other. 
This finding has implications for theorising on legitimacy and legitimation along 
the lines of work by, for instance, von Soest & Grauvogel (2017). During the 
2008 June presidential run-off “election” ZANU-PF’s interests on legitimacy 
were severely watered down as it used coercion to prolong its stay in power 
through force  However, during the 2013 elections, it added issues related to 
performance during the GNU and accented Mugabe’s history and achievements 
into its appeals while reiterating the identity-based appeals. This showed that 
ZANU-PF while still claiming legitimacy based on tradition was moving more 
towards performance-based claims to legitimacy as well as procedural 
legitimacy.   
 
It undergirded this temporal change of national campaign strategy with spatially 
variegated subnational campaigns strategies based on constituency types. This 
predominantly involved coercive-clientelist mobilisation in ZANU-PF aligned 
constituencies across time, persuasive-clientelist chasing in opposition-aligned 
constituencies in 2013 after neglecting them in 2008 where it focused on 
clientelist mobilisation of its core-supporters there. The study found that ZANU-
PF largely ignored battleground constituencies in terms of the national level 
campaign strategy, as well as allocation of bigwig visits. However, at subnational 
campaign level, ZANU-PF allowed battleground constituencies to follow 
territorial logics where strategy was determined by geographic location and the 
politics and strategies employed in the province or district in general. It also 
allowed battleground constituencies involved to deploy strategies incumbent on 
whether the constituency was perceived to be opposition or ruling party, making 
for a dynamic, sophisticated and often creative campaign strategy. However, 
ZANU-PF broadly employed persuasive-clientelist mobilisation strategies 
battleground constituencies. 
9.1 Recap: Main Findings And Arguments 
The thesis found that in 2008, the ruling party concentrated its campaign 
resources in ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies, where it held the highest 
proportion of bigwig rallies. At these rallies, members of the Praesidium touted 
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their performance legitimacy based on their land redistribution efforts. They 
made ideological and historical appeals designed to mobilise existing ZANU-PF 
supporters and to persuade them to turn out to vote in defence of the gains of the 
land redistribution efforts. To ensure support and obedience, ZANU-PF 
distributed clientelist emoluments to its supporters. It conducted violence and 
intimidation campaigns, often at night, designed to ensure that its supporters and 
any “converted” suspected opposition people kept their commitment to vote for 
ZANU-PF. In this regard, the thesis found that most violence and intimidation 
during the 2008 and 2013 elections was in ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies. The 
thesis argued that this betrayed a territorial logic of control. It reflected the party's 
wish to minimise the risk of low supporter turnout through a mobilising campaign 
strategy that focused, geographically, on ZANU-PF’s core-constituents. This 
strategy also reflected the party’s concern with identity-based claims to 
legitimacy based upon the party’s ‘foundational myths’ and perceived 
‘traditional’ legitimacy as Zimbabwe’s liberation party. However, as is typical of 
legitimacy as defined by Weber’s (1978) traditional ideal type, minimal to no 
dissent was allowed. In ZACs, obedience and support were 'owed' to ZANU-PF. 
 
In contrast with the intensive campaigning in ZACs in 2008, ZANU-PF limited 
its attention to opposition-aligned constituencies and battlegrounds. Historical 
and ideological appeals, as well as clientelist and coercive strategies by the ruling 
party, were initially conspicuous by their absence in opposition constituencies 
ahead of the March 2008 presidential election. ZANU-PF appeared to focus on 
maximising turnout among its members, who were a minority in these 
constituencies. They sought to  create the impression for opposition supporters 
that the election was a fait accompli because ZANU-PF's triumph was obvious. 
It rewarded its supporters in these constituencies for their loyalty and made  
limited attempts to persuade new and swing voters or to convert opposition 
supporters into ZANU-PF supporters. In the main, this was consistent with the 
logic that ZANU-PF could clinch electoral success through targeting its core-
constituents in ZACs, and through mobilising its supporters in other types of 
constituencies while discouraging opposition supporters from turning out on 
election day. 
 
The thesis found that bigwig did not focus on battleground constituencies (BCs) 
in the March 2008 election. However, during the few visits made, Mugabe largely 
adopted the posture of a responsive performer, speaking to contemporary 
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economic and social challenges and how his government was addressing them. 
This approach spoke to a different type of legitimacy, one based on performance 
and an almost subliminal acceptance of the electoral procedure.  This suggested 
a subordination to legal-rational process in pursuit of the express consent of the 
people, procedural, as well as political legitimacy.  
 
However, the ruling party’s strategy spectacularly failed in March 2008, since 
Mugabe trailed Tsvangirai in the first-round presidential election and compelled 
a presidential run-off election in June 2008. Towards the June 2008 election, 
ZANU-PF minimised the risk of defeat by conducting a campaign of intense 
violence across all constituency types. Faced with the prospect of losing power 
in 2008, ZANU-PF decided to focus more on securing its foothold in the state 
and not on seeking legitimacy in the presidential run-off election.  
 
Ahead of the presidential run-off election, at the few rallies it conducted, ZANU-
PF resorted to historical and ideological appeals and the identity-based claims to 
legitimacy that had won it support in ZACs. However, this time, this strategy was 
spread across all constituency types and with a twist. Whereas in the run-up to 
the March 2008 presidential elections, these identity-based claims were made as 
appeals and meant to credential Mugabe and his party as the best candidates to 
lead, in June 2008, ZANU-PF did not make these as appeals. Instead, it recast 
them as claims to legitimacy in their own right and as the basis on which ZANU-
PF would not accept anyone with a different history and alternative ideology to 
take over the state. History and ideology became the fuel behind ZANU-PF’s 
refusal to vacate power, even in the face of defeat.  The party claimed legitimacy 
from "the barrel of the gun" foundational myth, and from legitimacy steeped not 
in procedure or performance but history, identity, and ideology.  
 
Analysis of ZANU-PF campaign strategy over time revealed that despite the 
success of its coercion-based campaign in June 2008, ZANU-PF changed its 
campaign strategy in 2013.  It relied on a persuasion-based campaign in 2013. It 
learned from its mistakes in 2008, and this time it concentrated its bigwig rallies 
in opposition-aligned constituencies where it made programmatic appeals and 
relied more heavily on clientelist inducements.  The observed aspects of the 2013 
strategy are consistent with a chasing campaign strategy. ZANU-PF sought to 
increase turnout for itself in opposition constituencies by winning the hearts and 
minds of unaligned and swing voters, as well as through an increase in turnout in 
319 
 
its core-constituencies. Overt physical violence was minimal, although 
intimidation was still rife in ZACs. I argued that this reflects the party’s continued 
concern with its legitimacy, but now also in opposition areas. Moreover, the party 
seemed to move beyond traditional legitimacy-seeking to embrace a more 
rational-legal and procedural legitimacy, in line with the modern-day 
prerequisites of political legitimacy.  
 
Just like in 2008, in 2013 there was no evidence of a specific, tailored strategy 
pursued by ZANU-PF pursued in battleground constituencies. I argued that this 
reflects the polarised nature of Zimbabwe's political landscape:  the party 
employs a binary classification of constituencies into either pro-ZANU-PF or 
pro-opposition types. As such, the campaign strategy in battleground 
constituencies followed from the geographic location. For instance, Goromonzi 
mimicked broader strategies employed in Mashonaland East province, which is 
perceived to be a ZANU-PF aligned province, while Tsholotsho followed trends 
in Matebeleland generally perceived to be anti-ZANU-PF and pro-opposition. 
Campaign strategy as such also followed the party's perceptions and 
categorisation of that location as either ZANU-PF or opposition. ZANU-PF 
applied the logic of territorial control to battleground constituencies which it 
perceived as ZANU-PF territory, like Goromonzi, complete with attendant 
clientelist inducements and intimidation. The political space was reasonably 
open, and the politics more persuasive, in battleground constituencies considered 
more opposition-aligned, like Tsholotsho.  Here we saw signs of outbidding 
between the opposition and the ruling party, even in terms of the distribution of 
clientelist inducements. I argued that while this nuance is neglected in the 
literature on African politics and in election campaign discourse of ZANU-PF 
political agents, battleground constituencies represent a rich political canvas that 
can expose considerable variation in how presidential campaigns play out at 
subnational level. 
  
Based upon the analysis presented in the chapters of this thesis, I challenged and 
qualified explanations of ZANU-PF's longevity that emphasise a part of the 
party’s history (i.e., the war of liberation), its authoritarian character, and its 
reliance on force and fraud to win elections. I argued for an approach to history 
that acknowledges ZANU-PF’s roots as a mass-based, popular party, existing in 
the emergent nationalist movement of the mid-1950s, complete with its 
democratic aspirations as well as its emergent, violent sub-culture. Such an 
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approach does not take away or negate extant historical explanations of ZANU-
PF's coercive politics and its demonisation-of-all-opponents discourses. It does 
however make such analysis more complete and more accurate, nuanced and 
situated within in a proper periodisation of ZANU-PF's becoming the hardened 
ruling party that it was by the 2000s. 
 
For a historical explanation to offer insights into ZANU-PF's post-independence 
existence as a competitive authoritarian party, the analysis must embrace the 
party's diversity, complexity, and change over time.  That is, the analysis must 
take into account the diversity of characters, experiences, ideologies, and 
generations that made up the nationalist party and its metamorphosis into a 
liberation movement with a guerrilla army. It must also address ZANU-PF’s 
status as a merger between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU, with their own armed 
wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA. This is in addition to their vast "armies" of citizen 
diplomats and support systems that looked out for their own material well-being, 
as well as lobbied internationally on their own and the party's (and the country's) 
behalf. This approach allows for a better understanding of ZANU-PF's apparent 
inherent contradiction between violence-dispensing and legitimacy-seeking, and 
the tensions within the party that lent it its hybrid character. The empirical 
strategy I employed in the thesis chapters offered a genetic explanation of why 
ZANU-PF campaigns varied over time and across space.   
 
The analysis also suggested that understanding ZANU-PF requires that we see it 
as more than its violent past and its militant and authoritarian components even 
in the present. It was also a marriage of Sino-Russian ideological influences with 
liberal notions of freedom, an aspirational social-democratic front, a radical 
nationalist movement in constant conflict with a modernising ethos that had been 
part of the leadership's grooming and development process.    
 
Regarding ZANU-PF's reliance on force and fraud, the thesis acknowledges the 
existence of force and provided evidence of this, and also acknowledged the 
possibilities of fraud in elections. I took electoral manipulation as given but 
argued that focusing on these elements is a  narrow lens through which to 
understand ZANU-PF’s campaign strategies. I argued that ZANU-PF not only 
genuinely campaigned, but that it did so sometimes using persuasive, legitimacy-
seeking methods.  This means that regardless of the emphasis on force and fraud, 
election campaigns do matter in Zimbabwe. I demonstrate the latter point by 
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providing evidence showing that suggested ZANU-PF's campaign efforts and 
electoral outcomes in 2008 and 2013 are correlated. I argued that such a 
correlation was not fallacious - that is, there is a good reason to believe that 
campaigning to win the votes of citizens may have succeeded in some places.   
 
9.2 Contributions: Theoretical And Empirical  
This thesis contributes to several empirical and theoretical conversations in the 
African and comparative politics literature around election campaigns, political 
parties, and competitive authoritarian regime legitimation. It moves the 
conversation on authoritarian legitimation strategies forward.  I do so through an 
analysis of campaign appeals, and the ruling party's claims to legitimacy. This 
gives the concept of "authoritarian legitimation" an empirical foundation, helping 
to move analysis beyond its philosophical and normative applications. 
That ZANU-PF insisted on identity-based claims to legitimacy; i.e. history, 
foundational myths, ideology, and personalism, has implications for extant 
theorisation and systematic analysis of how authoritarian and competitive 
authoritarian regimes substantiate their claims to rule and or govern. Extant 
expectations are that out and out authoritarian regimes are the ones that bank on 
identity based and performance claims to legitimacy, while competitive 
authoritarian regimes bank on procedural, and performance claims to legitimacy 
(von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017; Schedler 2013).  
 
This thesis, however, finds that obviously, not all competitive authoritarian 
regimes are the same, and refinement is required on the expectations of the 
legitimacy claims that regimes make. This entails being cognisant of the origins 
of political parties making the claims. This is because even democratic regimes 
which value procedure if they have strong foundational myths part of their claims 
should move from just procedure and performance to include identity-based 
claims. An example is the ANC in South Africa, which by most accounts is 
democratic although hegemonic, and has a rich liberation movement history. The 
ANC can campaign on performance and procedure but can and often does make 
claims steeped in its identity as the liberation movement that ended apartheid in 
South Africa. The same applies to several other regimes and parties highlighted 
in this study’s scope conditions.  
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Therefore, the hypotheses and descriptive inferences that the thesis puts forward 
have possible applications in other competitive authoritarian settings in sub-
Saharan Africa. They are also open to further testing at a subnational level within 
Zimbabwe itself. The subnational comparison that is the centrepiece of this 
analysis of variation of campaign strategy showed different extents of aperture 
and closure across space. This part of the analysis contributes to conversations 
around subnational authoritarianism, which have not yet found much traction in 
Zimbabwe. Such conversations have also been muted in broader political science 
analysis of elections in Africa, given the enduring primacy of the country as the 
primary unit of analysis and the search for unit uniformity and country-level, 
cross-national comparisons. 
 
The thesis also contributes to a growing literature that has begun to take electoral 
campaigns seriously in Africa. Existing literature acknowledges that for most of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, traditional rally intensive campaigns are still the order of the 
day (like Brierley & Kramon, 2018; Cheeseman & Lamar, 2015; Harowitz, 2016; 
Paget, 2019). This literature, while focusing on diverse campaign elements (e.g. 
ethnic mobilisation, campaign targeting, ground politics, clientelism, canvassing, 
messaging, rallies and opposition campaigns), is paving the way for much-needed 
analyses of electoral campaigning in sub-Saharan Africa. This study’s findings 
put it in direct conversation with general elections literature on campaign 
targeting (e.g. Potter & Olivella, 2015; Harowitz, 2016) and literature on 
incumbent parties’ electoral targeting based on spatial logics (e.g. Boone & 
Wahman, 2018, Koter, 2013b). It contributes a study of ZANU-PF's spatial and 
temporal campaign logics into this theoretical discussion, focusing on the 
importance of rallies, itinerant leadership (bigwig visits to localities), campaign 
messaging, and appeals for legitimacy. These are topics that figure prominently 
in the global literature on parties and elections, but most remain underdeveloped 
in respect of their application to sub-Saharan Africa. These contributions and 
inputs into extant theoretical and empirical conversations are elaborated briefly 
below.  
 
9.2.1 Electoral campaigns, rallies, & the increasing importance of bigwig rally 
analysis 
Part of the challenge with studying electoral campaign strategy in Africa is the 
scarcity of literature. In part, this reflects the assumption in much of the scholarly 
literature that campaigns do not matter in Africa. The preference, in the main, is 
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to focus on how elections are shams, on parties' silence around programmatic and 
policy issues, and on incumbents' use of coercion and fraud.  I agree with Paget 
(2019), who argues that most of the existing campaign literature is too focused 
on electoral campaigns in the West, and as such, speaks with a distinct Western 
accent. I endorse and operationalise Paget's classification of the "rally intensive 
campaign" as a distinctive type of campaign more suited to new democracies. 
While Paget measures campaign intensity in terms of numbers of rallies and rally 
attendees, in this thesis I focused on a different type of indicator of rally intensity.  
I coin the concept of "the bigwig rally," define it and, sketched out its dynamics, 
and use this as a proxy measure/indicator for campaign intensity. Developing and 
using bigwig rallies as a critical variable has, until now, not been used in studies 
of Zimbabwean politics and sub-Saharan Africa. As such its categorisation, 
characterisation, and profiling as a proxy for campaign intensity is an academic 
end in itself. 
 
Where most analysis of Zimbabwean elections focuses either on national level 
processes and outcomes or on local level politics, bigwig rallies offer a layer of 
analysis that brings the two together. It explores this middle layer between the 
star and ordinary rallies, national and local campaigning, and the presidential 
candidate and the grassroots.  As Paget (2019) argues, the rally in particular and 
in sub-Saharan African election campaigns (which are "rally intensive"), have 
been trivialised in the literature and made peripheral in the Western-centred 
approach to and categorisation of campaigns mentioned above. This thesis 
demonstrated that bigwig visits were an excellent indicator of the constituencies 
that ZANU-PF prioritised for vote maximisation and were (possibly) integral to 
ZANU-PF electoral fortunes and signalled which kinds of voters ZANU-PF 
targeted in its legitimacy-seeking appeals.  
 
The study inferred intensity from bigwig rallies because bigwig visits to 
constituencies and districts naturally lead to heightened political and 
organisational activity in the locale visited. This stems from the effort that goes 
into the making of such rallies, which is complex and demands extraordinary 
effort to ensure that bigwig rallies are well attended by favourable audiences. 
Bigwig rally production is both a test of the popularity of the party and of the 
ability of the local leadership to mobilise participants and create a good 
impression of themselves to national leaders. Besides the increased investment in 
organising on the ground, bigwig visits also signal an increased investment in 
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clientelist handouts from both local notables and the visiting bigwigs. Bigwigs 
ordinarily do not travel empty-handed, and they are better placed to leverage the 
incumbency advantage to distribute campaign largesse.  
 
The use of bigwig visits as a critical variable in this thesis also allowed the study 
to escape the dangers of over-generalisation and the "mean spirited-ness" usually 
associated with national unit analyses. It also allowed me to escape the 
parochialism of purely local (subnational) unit analysis. Local unit analysis is 
often disconnected and separated from broader developments at regional and 
national levels. My analytic strategy also allowed me to escape the usual, 
(although at times warranted) conflations of the party leader with the party, and 
the party with the state. By going beyond 'the' party leader to the party leadership, 
the study treated ZANU-PF as an organisation. It avoided treating the party 
leader as the personification of and a replacement for the party. It also treated 
ZANU-PF as more than its occupation of and conflation with the state or the 
regime and analysed it as a political party (without forgetting that it was a party 
which controlled the state and enjoyed attendant incumbency advantages). 
  
Bigwig visits analysis can be replicated in other similar settings, and the casual 
mechanisms attributed to it are traceable. This approach may be able to shed light 
on other campaigns under competitive authoritarian regimes in other parts of sub-
Saharan Africa. Comparable cases may include countries presided over by former 
liberation movements like Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, as well as 
Uganda and Rwanda, although their liberation movements were different in 
character and political moment to those of the aforementioned countries. Bigwig 
visit analysis can also be applied to other competitive authoritarian regimes which 
operate with the presidential system. In Southern Africa, this could include 
Malawi and Zambia. Further East, they could include Kenya, who’s ethnic and 
coalition politics would lend themselves to the study of visits beyond those of the 
presidential candidate, given that different coalition leaders would constitute 
discernible sets of bigwigs. 
 
Bigwig visits should become a critical node for meaningful analysis of future 
presidential elections in Zimbabwe. Already, political developments in 2017 led 
to the establishment of a government where the president, Emmerson 
Mnangagwa, to all intents and purposes was appointed by his deputy, General 
Constantino Chiwenga, who as commander of the defence forces, led a coup to 
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depose Mugabe. During the 2018 elections both Mnangagwa and Chiwenga hit 
the campaign trail, and even in governing, it is more a partnership of equals 
making the deputy’s actions, pronouncements and claims to legitimacy critical to 
understand. However, outside this speculative importance of bigwigs, in the year 
2023, Zimbabwe is constitutionally set to transition to a presidential election 
system which requires presidential candidates to pick a running mate. This 
American-style setup will mean that meaningful analysis of campaigning will 
need to follow the presidential candidates and their running mates, as well as 
small but critical sets of their surrogates. The slow rates of internet penetration, 
and the fact that despite the “hype”, social media continues to be an urban 
phenomenon, means that rallies will continue to be a critical feature of ground 
campaigning in Zimbabwe and other parts of Africa, at least for the next few 
electoral cycles. 
  
9.2.2 Election campaign targeting 
The study contributes to thinking around the power of itinerant (i.e. travelling 
around the country) leadership in competitive authoritarian settings and merges 
this with analyses of the targeting of campaign efforts. Zimbabwe is a multi-
ethnic country, and the study of campaigning in Zimbabwe adds to the body of 
knowledge that seeks to go beyond ethnicity in understanding campaign targeting 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethnic targeting is the primary mode of campaign 
targeting that is explored in the literature on African countries. One often 
encounters exaggerated assumptions about the ethnic logic of campaigning in 
Africa (e.g. Harowitz, 2016 and Cheeseman & Lamar, 2015). While this may be 
close to the truth in some countries, in nations such as Zimbabwe where ethnicity 
is not a salient political organising principle, a different logic applies. 
 
This thesis has described a logic to campaign targeting that is spatial.  It is based 
on politically salient features of constituencies.  These are defined here as 
incumbent strongholds, consolidating and marginal constituencies, i.e. 
incumbent-aligned constituencies; and opposition-strongholds, consolidating and 
marginal constituencies, i.e. opposition-aligned constituencies; as well 
battleground constituencies. Analysing campaign targeting logics in terms of 
constituency types moves the conversation beyond ethnicity and ties the analysis 
of election campaigning in Zimbabwe to analyses of campaigns elsewhere on the 
continent and beyond. For instance, Brierley & Kramon (2018) use a similar 
categorisation to study campaigning in Ghana's 2014 election. While their 
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findings differ from this studies (for instance they argue that incumbents do not 
campaign in their bulwarks because they would have invested in them enough 
during their tenure to warrant safety and allowing the incumbent party to focus 
on swing constituencies), the two studies of election campaigning become a bit 
more easier to compare. This kind of comparison through a targeting logic of 
campaigns based on politically salient features beyond ethnicity has the 
possibilities of pushing forward theorisation on campaigning in Africa or at least 
sharpen thinking around what accounts for the differences beyond location. This 
kind of analysis also recognises that ethnic targeting is not universal, while 
variation across constituency types based on electoral outcomes is arguably more 
universal. This approach allows for more significant comparative analysis in the 
future because these basic constituency types can be ascertained for any country. 
In future work, there is room for debates and refinement of the definitions and 
standardisation of what constitutes a stronghold, incumbent or opposition-aligned 
constituency, as well as swing or battleground constituency. This remains an open 
empirical and conceptual question. There is certainly scope in the future to 
incorporate socio-demographic variables in the definition of constituency types. 
 
9.2.3 Some cause for pause on political parties in Africa 
This thesis presents evidence on how ZANU-PF is structured, operates, and 
campaigns.  As such, it pushes back on and calls for a recalibration of a significant 
tendency in African politics and third wave of democracy literature on political 
parties. Carothers (2006:4) christened this tendency “the standard lament of the 
parties in new and emerging democracies.” Carothers lamented that parties in 
emerging democracies were invariably corrupt, only active around elections, do 
not stand for anything, and party leaders were selfish and preoccupied with 
squabbling instead of governing the country (Carothers, 2006: 4).  Van de Walle 
and Butler’s (1999:15) early work explicitly voiced this lament in the African 
context. They worried that African political parties were plagued by "weak 
organisations, low levels of institutionalisation, and weak links to the societies 
they are supposed to represent." The net effect of such analyses was to portray 
incumbent regimes in Africa as mainly patronage and clientelist electoral 
machines that were almost without agency outside the state, and that had little 
regard for distinguishable policy platforms. When they did have some semblance 
of policy platforms, these were judged to have little relevance to what politicians 
did once in office (Randall and Svasand, 2002: 10; Van de Walle and Butler 
1999).   
327 
 
 
This thesis showed that this canonical lament is an ill-fitting description of 
ZANU-PF for three primary reasons.  These are associated with time context, 
political party institutionalisation, and opposition bias in the analysis. First, as 
shown in Chapter 2,  ZANU-PF's existence as a political party predated 
Huntington's (1991) third wave of democratisation, which acted as the fulcrum 
of analysis for most of the political parties’ analysis referenced above. Huntington 
(1991) placed the start of the third wave of democratisation around 1974 with the 
Portuguese revolution and its demonstration effects on Spain and South America 
and traced the consequences for its colonies like Mozambique and Angola in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The third wave of democratisation was supposed to have peaked 
shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 when a significant number 
of Eastern European countries were born as breakaway states from the Soviet 
Union and ‘democratised.'  ZANU-PF's formation in 1963 predates this "wave."  
ZANU-PF is not among the political parties that emerged after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. 
 
Second, ZANU-PF was not a “weak” organisation with poor ties to the 
communities it serviced. Neither was it poorly institutionalised, as Van de Walle 
and his colleague lamented. ZANU-PF's long history and its control of the state 
allowed it to establish itself as a strong political party (Kuenzi & Lambright, 
2001:461). By 2000, Zimbabwe's party system was relatively well 
institutionalised. It scored quite high on Kuenzi and Lambright's 
institutionalisation index, falling just short of full institutionalisation because of 
ZANU-PF's dominance in electoral contests (as the thesis showed in Chapter 3). 
Kuenzi & Lambright explained their surprising scoring as follows:  
Although some might be surprised at this outcome, given the hegemonic 
nature of its party system, it is, in fact, the hegemonic nature of the leading 
party (ZANU-PF) which caused it to score so highly on our criteria. Not 
only has the ZANU-PF been in existence for a long time, but its role in the 
independence movement elicited the long-term loyalty of many (Kuenzi 
and Lambright, 2001:462).  
 
Outside ZANU-PF itself, Zimbabwe has enjoyed a long history of parties that 
have proved reasonably sustainable. The UANC existed at least from 1972 to 
circa 1985, ZAPU from 1961 to 1987 when it merged with ZANU-PF, ZANU 
(Ndonga) from about 1973 to the 2000s, ZUM, lasted long enough to contest in 
all the elections in the 1990s, while the MDC, in various formations, has stuck 
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around from 1999 to date. This state in which parties are stable, have roots in 
society, and possess strong organisations with the status and value of their own, 
is what (Mainwaring, 1999: 26) defined as party institutionalisation. It is a study 
in contrast to the "musical chairs" of political parties in many other African 
countries, including Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, and Ethiopia amongst others. 
However, in the African context, party institutionalisation is not unique to 
Zimbabwe. Tanzania's party system is reasonably institutionalised, as are party 
systems in South Africa,  Mozambique, Botswana.   
 
According to Mainwaring (1999), party institutionalisation is associated with low 
electoral volatility, and limited personalistic and neo-populist leadership. It is also 
associated with policy stability and better representation of popular sectoral 
interests. The case of ZANU-PF suggests that while Mainwaring's (1999) 
argument may apply to his empirical cases in South America, in Africa, the 
inverse may be true. In ZANU-PF's case, institutionalisation did not stem 
electoral volatility, and it still produced a personalistic neo-populist leader. 
ZANU-PF's governance was often characterised by policy inconsistency, and it 
suffered (post-2000) severe legitimacy deficits on account of its failure to acquire 
unquestioned popular consent. This raises again the question of whether all 
concepts developed for the study of political parties elsewhere can travel well to 
Africa.  
 
Third, ZANU-PF was corrupt, and for some time in the 1990s, it appeared 
disconnected from the people (despite its political dominance), as could be seen 
in sliding voter turnout rates during this period. When placed in this temporal 
context, Carothers' lament makes sense. However, post-2000, ZANU-PF 
demonstrated that it was a master of the permanent campaign and attempted to 
stay in programmatic action and connected to rural peoples social, economic and 
political existence in between elections. This thesis also demonstrated that 
ZANU-PF stood for something. It was comfortable in its ideological straitjacket 
and revelled in its anti-imperialist and chimurenga ideologies. It used them as the 
basis on which it claimed patriotic citizenship and rights, including the right to 
govern the country.   
 
Most accounts of African political parties consider them as ideologically vacuous 
and intent on collecting support on any grounds (catch-all parties) or through the 
manipulation of ethnic cleavages.  ZANU-PF calls for a rethink of this stereotype 
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of African parties as ethnic parties. ZANU-PF is not the only party to break this 
mould, and exciting literature on politics in Ghana, Senegal, Namibia and other 
places is beginning to dispel the exaggerated view of ethnicity as an organising 
principle for all parties on the continent (Brierley & Kramon, 2018; Elischer, 
2013; Koter, 2013a; 2013b). Even so, ethnicity remains a geographically 
circumscribed yet salient feature of politics in some parts of East Africa (e.g. 
Kenya and Ethiopia), and other places (e.g. Zambia). Also, although factional 
fights in ZANU-PF were present from inception (and came to ahead in 2017 as 
discussed in the prelude and chapters 2, and 5), and while ZANU-PF party leaders 
were indeed selfish, they cannot be accused of having been preoccupied with 
squabbling instead of governing. They governed, although poorly in the 1990s 
and 2000s. 
 
Fourth, the thesis demonstrated that while ZANU-PF has been a governing party 
since 1980, its organisation and the imbrication of its organs and officials in 
almost all aspects of social, political and economic life demonstrates that it was 
more than just its conflation with the state. ZANU-PF was also a strong political 
party with the ability to organise outside the state.  It demonstrated in 2013 that 
it could resort to organising outside the remit of the state. The conflation of party 
and state often leads political scientists to restrict their analysis to what ruling 
parties achieve on account of a genuine incumbency advantage, but often leaves 
out the agency that they demonstrate as political parties. This thesis deliberately 
deemphasised this "state" element to get into the "black box" of ZANU-PF as a 
party. It sought to understand its organisation, formal and informal structures, and 
how these were used in service to ZANU-PF's interests of retaining power and 
enhancing its legitimacy through the vote and turnout maximisation.    
 
For a long time the Africanists neglected political parties and when it covered 
them, it slanted towards opposition parties. This was a outcome of the time as 
civil society and opposition politics were fairly new phenomenon post the fall of 
the Berlin wall and the rise of the third wave of democracy. Van de Walle 
(2015:232) admits as much, when he states that the weaknesses of political parties 
that he and Buttler outlined in 1999 related mainly to opposition parties 
contesting authoritarian regimes. Van De Walle’s privileging of opposition 
political parties in the study of African political was not an exception and left a 
gap around the study of ruling parties, understood as political parties outside of 
their conflation with the state. The literature correctly suggested that incumbent 
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regimes survive in part on the strength of the incumbency advantage and the 
weakness of the opposition. However, the almost exclusive focus on these two 
elements inadvertently underplayed incumbent victories that are based on 
incumbent party strengths distinct from the powers they gain from how they carry 
and manipulate the state. This thesis follows a new track of scholarship on 
African political parties in filling the attendant gaps in our understanding of these 
political parties and their theorisation. This literature exemplified by Bogaards 
(2004;2009); Bogaards & Elisher (2016); Elischer (2013), LeBas (2019); Riedl 
(2013), and Morse (2012), amongst others have began to take dominant parties 
seriously and expanded our understanding of politics and political parties in 
Africa. This thesis speaks to and contributes to this new found understanding 
through showing that besides just chicanery, strong ruling parties can be flexible 
in terms of the instruments they use to shape, manipulate and affect election 
results through legitimacy-seeking in addition to nonlegitimacy seeking methods. 
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